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**THE DANCE OF JOY: NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS OF BECOMING &  
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**AUTHOR'S DECLARATION:**

I hereby declare that project represents my own work and has not been submitted, in whole or in part, by me or another person, for the purpose of obtaining any other credit/grade. I agree that this dissertation may be made available by the College to future students.

Signature of author \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Karen McCutcheon.

## Abbreviations:

BT:	<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>
PTAG:	<i>Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks</i>
DCW:	<i>David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer</i>
UD:	<i>On the Uses &amp; Disadvantages of History for Life</i>
SE:	<i>Schopenhauer as Educator</i>
HH I:	<i>Human, All too Human Volume I</i>
HH II:	<i>Human, All too Human Volume II</i>
D:	<i>Daybreak</i>
Z:	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>
BGE:	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
GS:	<i>The Gay Science</i>
GM:	<i>On the Genealogy of Morals</i>
CW:	<i>The Case of Wagner</i>
TI:	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i>
AC:	<i>The Antichrist</i>
EH:	<i>Ecce Homo</i>
WP:	<i>The Will to Power</i>
UM:	<i>Untimely Meditations</i>

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## **Abstract**

This thesis seeks to establish Nietzsche as a Metaphysician of Becoming, as a foreseer of the immanence of eternity and in turn to establish a deep correlation between his writing style and his account of an “eternity” that is within Becoming and the unconscious self. It shows that there is a connection between the content of Nietzsche’s works and his writing style as a manifestation of pathos, “the unsaid” and of dancing-musical rhythms. This content includes the idea that tragic pathos and the dance better express reality than the conceptual or propositional uses of language. In outlining that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of Becoming, this thesis explores Nietzsche’s notion of truth and the possibility of accessing reality through tragic insight into reality. It firstly ascertains what reality is for Nietzsche as Becoming and that it is through the unconscious or more specifically the “great reason of the body” that reality reveals itself. There follows an analysis of Nietzsche’s spiritual hierarchy, that is the hierarchical nature of relating to Becoming. It then explores Nietzsche’s “art of philology” as a way of relating to Becoming through pathos, blood and unconscious. Finally, the thesis further illustrates that it is through pathos, the unconscious that one experiences the “untimely” or the non-spatiotemporal, an “eternity” within Becoming, which is best exemplified by the dance.

## Introduction

The goal of this thesis is to establish Nietzsche as a metaphysician of Becoming, as a foreseer of a new Dionysian age and a higher dancing culture and in turn to establish a deep correlation between his writing style, his unconscious his higher self and his account of reality.. In doing so, it will be shown that there is a connection between the content of Nietzsche's works and his writing style as a manifestation of pathos, "the unsaid" and of dancing-musical rhythms. This content includes the idea that *tragic pathos* and the dance are expressive of the nature of reality in a manner that is denied to propositional or conceptual uses language. For Nietzsche, propositions can in no way express the higher than human, the realm of Becoming. He recognizes the inadequacy of the conceptual and propositional uses of language characteristic of rational thinking in expressing his own experience of tragic insight into reality. Therefore, he chooses a style that can communicate this insight, the language of the Dionysian dithyramb, of the most intensified pathos, and of unconscious musical rhythms. Nietzsche rejects the rational, empirical or scientific justification of life, as he recognizes the limits of human reason, of propositional or conceptual thinking to capture reality. He rather advocates a metaphysical-aesthetic justification of life, and chooses the language of pathos to best express this justification. It is a life-affirming style; it is the language of "Yes-saying" of the unsaid: "*For I love you, O eternity*" (Z, III: 'The Yes and Amen Song'). He writes from his *ipsissimosity*, his unconscious self; it is the realm of the unsaid, of spiritual pathos. In this way, his writing style is closest to things themselves, or to the realm of Becoming.

The first chapter of this thesis primarily focuses on the reality from which Nietzsche's writings flow, and contends that Becoming, "things themselves" speak through Nietzsche, the writer. This type of experience, Nietzsche refers to as "inspiration,"



“rapture,” or “revelation” where he views himself as “a medium of overpowering forces”, as “a mouthpiece.” (EH, ‘Z’: §3) He also describes this experience as “the feeling of divinity.” (EH, ‘Z’: §3) In outlining that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of Becoming, this thesis will explore Nietzsche’s notion of truth: that there is “true knowledge” that is existentialist, an insight into a new totality, that of a Dionysian primordial reality. It will also become apparent that this insight takes the form of a spiritual experience. This thesis will explore not only what reality is for Nietzsche but what the most fundamental human relation is to that reality. The goal of the first chapter is to outline what this reality is, as Becoming or more specifically the “inner *logos*” of Becoming, and that the higher self, as the organizing principle of the unconscious or the “Great Reason of the Body” (Z, I: §4) is the site of reality revealing itself. In outlining this, it becomes apparent that the conscious or rational; self, the intellect, is not the most fundamental self.

The first chapter examines the problem of self-referentiality in Nietzsche to show that Nietzsche is not guilty of this paradox that his writings are an expression of truth. They are an expression of truth in being an expression of tragic insight which in ‘accessing’ reality is a true interpretation of the world. In doing so, this thesis is offering an unorthodox interpretation of Nietzsche. The chapter also mentions that type of truth that Nietzsche rejects, and that in spite of this rejection that he has an affinity with new truth that coincides with a life-affirmative ideal. The chapter also outlines that Nietzsche views conscious thinking as a falsification of reality (GS: §354) such that it emerges that he prioritizes unique pathos (unconscious) over conscious, linguistic or rational thinking. For Nietzsche, it is through the unconscious that one comes closer to reality and it is therefore ranked higher than conscious

thought. It then becomes evident that there is a distinction in Nietzsche between tragic insight and empirical knowledge that is knowledge in the scientific or rational sense, and in turn between the unconscious and conscious self. The main aim of this thesis is to contend that there is a reality for Nietzsche that is irreducible to the human and that it is through “reading and writing in blood” (Z, I: §7) that there is insight into this reality. There are other conditions that make possible insight into reality, which will be explored in chapter two. Nietzsche engages in a tragic pathos, and musical and poetical rhythms whereby his style is an expression of his unconscious, and is in turn an expression of reality. In arguing that there is true knowledge in the form of tragic insight this thesis reveals that Nietzsche does not fall victim to the problem of self-referentiality. The chapter also looks at Kant’s influence upon Nietzsche which is as follows that Kant’s phenomenalism informs Nietzsche’s perspectivism; therefore, tragic insight must be mediated through the world. Alternatively there is the argument that tragic insight is to be distinguished from Kantian phenomenalism (scientific knowledge) and perspectivism in the conscious sense, and as a unconscious experience can ‘access’ reality. Nietzsche’s artist’s metaphysics upholds the idea that through “rapture” or “intoxication” one can glimpse reality *as it is*. (WP: §799); (BT: §1, §2) He upholds a genuine ascetic ideal (non-moral) that provides the conditions for encountering the truth, and is followed up in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, whereby it is opposed to the Kantian ascetic ideal. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche proclaims: “All honour to the ascetic ideal *in so far as it is honest!*” (GM, III: §26)

The final chapter of this thesis continues to regard Nietzsche as a metaphysician of Becoming and illustrates that in *amor fati* the philosophical type can encounter the

non-spatiotemporal or an “eternity” within Becoming (EH, ‘Why I am So Clever’: §10) In this thesis, it becomes apparent that tragic insight (unconscious) into reality is the necessary transcendental precondition for all other knowledge that is in the conscious, rational or linguistic sense. Therefore, this knowledge as tragic wisdom precedes the knowledge that arises from human language or conscious I thought. The chapter outlines the way in which reality can be ‘accessed’ in which knowledge of reality as the “inner *logos*” of Becoming, which Nietzsche describes as tragic or Dionysian wisdom. It is a revelatory experience in the form of entering into a dancing oneness with reality whereby the individual type is a direct expression of this reality, and becomes its most beautiful appearance.

The first chapter also explores this type of wisdom in the early period of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In examining further what reality is for Nietzsche, and what the most primordial relation is to it, the chapter discusses Nietzsche’s reading of Heraclitus in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. In this, it becomes evident that Nietzsche re-introduces Being as the *logos* or the law behind the flux, as “the One” that is behind “the Many,” that is constant or is referred to as the “inner necessity” of Becoming. In spite of his introduction of a new being (non-substance), he is however overall a metaphysician of Becoming. It also looks at Nietzsche’s emphasis on the inadequacy of logical, scientific or conceptual thinking to capture reality. It demonstrates that tragic wisdom involves entering into the silent *logos* of Becoming and draws parallels between Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Plato on the relationship between true knowledge and silence. It is through silence (non-linguistic) that one experiences the “revelation” or the “showing” of truth. The silent intuition of the *logos* coincides with self-knowledge, which renders it the “most truthful” type of

knowledge. It also highlights that Nietzsche's rejection of the old correspondence theory of truth does not imply a rejection of truth *per se* but only language – in particular the 'herd-use' or the propositional use of language as a means of expressing reality. Nietzsche rather advocates a correspondence between a certain type of tragic pathos and reality such that the philosopher of truth in his experience of tragic pathos is the most adequate expression of that reality. Nietzsche himself will be argued to be an exponent of this type of truth, that his writings flow from intuition of the "inner *logos*" of Becoming, and that this occurs through his unconscious self that belongs to the whole (SE: §6).

This thesis does not offer an explicit analysis of the problem of self-referentiality in Nietzsche. However, in arguing that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of the real and that his writing style emerges from insight into this reality, it can be inferred that his works have an affinity with truth and are not self-refuting. His works flow from an "inspirational" experience where he stands as a prophet in the face of an absolute. (EH, 'Z': §3)

The chapter ends with a discussion of Nietzsche's musical style as an expression of the *logos* as opposed to the conceptual, doctrinal or propositional uses of language. It emerges that the truth of Nietzsche's writings is in his Dionysian life-experiences; he speaks from "the innermost heart things." (BT: §16) His writing style is not only in attunement with a musical whole but also is an expression of his true self, his "inmost being" (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec 14<sup>th</sup>, 1887) or the "Great Reason of the Body"; in being an expression of his most fundamental self, they are in turn an expression of what is real.. The chapter includes an analysis of Nietzsche's rejection of the ordinary

use of language or what he refers to as the herd use of language in *On Truth & Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*. In doing so, it looks at the close resemblance between Nietzsche and Wittgenstein on the inability of language to capture reality; it draws upon Wittgenstein's mysticism in *The Tractatus* in order to highlight the mystical nature of Nietzsche's works. The realm of the mystical is the realm of the higher than human, of Becoming and lies outside of what is expressible in language or its referential capacities. Wittgenstein, like Nietzsche, argues that the transcendent cannot be referred to "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (*The Tractatus*: 7), and that, while there is a metaphysical self, it cannot be referred to by language. Wittgenstein refers to it as a metaphysical self, Nietzsche rather refers to it in terms of the unconscious; it is an impersonal self that belongs to the whole. It is this "I," like Nietzsche's idea of the unconscious or what Hutter (2006) stresses in Nietzsche as his "ipsissimosity" (HH, II, Preface: §2) that is the site of reality revealing itself, and it is from this "I" that Nietzsche's works arise. It is in this way that his works are an expression of a spiritual pathos and of "the unsaid," and in turn of the unsayable God that of Dionysus. Nietzsche "writes in blood" in the same way that Hölderlin writes with "words, like flowers." (*Bread and Wine*) Nietzsche writes with blood, a tragic pathos; it is the language of Becoming, the language of stillness, of silence. Reality reveals itself through his writing, which expresses the revelatory nature of his poetic use of language.

The second chapter of this thesis explores Nietzsche's notion of a spiritual hierarchy, which offers further insight into what reality or truth is for Nietzsche, and argues that it is through tragic pathos and the dance that the highest type can encounter reality *as it is*. His notion of a rank-order among varying psychological types or forms of

existence is determined by the degree to which the varying types encounter reality. He advocates hierarchy strictly in terms of spiritual status; those who encounter reality *as it is*, higher reality, the “untimely,” or atopian, they are the few that are ranked highest. The chapter elucidates Nietzsche’s use of the term “pathos of distance” (BGE: §257), which refers to the distinction between the highest and lowest types of human being. It is a pathos that not only reiterates a distinction amongst psychological types but is “an experience itself” that the higher type undergoes. This spiritual pathos involves the higher type’s ascent to reality as Becoming or more specifically an “eternity” that is within Becoming, and implicates him in the experience of “loving contempt” (Z, Prologue: §4) as “love of man for God’s sake.” (BGE: §60) As McIntyre (1997) stresses that for Nietzsche, the higher type has a profound contempt for the “human, all too human” and condemns it as unworthy of true seriousness but grants to man a measure of value when brought under the rule of something higher than man. The new measure of value is love of reality, of the highest things; the noble type can love man only for the sake of something higher than man or for God’s sake. In exploring the relationship between the higher type and reality, the chapter establishes the new measure of value for Nietzsche, as love of reality or truth (universal), and only by way of implication it becomes apparent that Nietzsche does not adhere to a relativism of perspectives where truth has no meaning *for us*. It is the relationship to this reality that determines rank.

The chapter also discusses Nietzsche’s rank-order in terms of “grand politics” and in turn draws parallels between Nietzsche and Plato. In this thesis, in looking at Nietzsche as a foreseer of a new Dionysian age, of a “Kingdom of Heaven on Earth,” Nietzsche’s notion of a spiritual hierarchy is examined as conducive to the coming of

an age. The best order is possible or the highest epoch in history as the “seventh day” (BGE: §225) can only take place only through reconciliation of the realm of polity of an “eternity” within Becoming and the empirical realm, as the human or political realm. In the new age to come, the realm of politics is subordinated to polity. It is through the philosopher’s experience of life-affirmation in glimpsing eternity that he thereby renders Becoming as the highest measure of value for the human world. It is in this way that the philosophical self has a spiritual authority over baser types. As McIntyre (1997) suggests that for Nietzsche, the higher type or the philosophical type acts as a cultivating influence (BGE: §61), and gives meaning to society and in turn he initiates the enshrinement of a new law book of values.

The chapter continues to uphold the argument that it is through Dionysian rapture or revelation that truth is grasped. Nietzsche’s advocacy of a spiritual hierarchy is also looked at as reinforcing the argument that the truth of Nietzsche’s works is based upon philosophical “insight” (EH, ‘BT’: §2) or divine “inspiration” whereby they are an expression of the Oneness of Becoming. It also explores Nietzsche’s notion of the higher self in detail, and his experience of spiritual insight not only to re-iterate his relation to reality but also to establish the type of person that can enter into the silent *logos* of an author. This type of experience which belongs to “reading and writing in blood” is to be examined in the third chapter of this thesis. Nietzsche associates the “art of reading well”, slow reading, reading as “ruminantion” (GM, Preface: §8) with the higher type in contrast with the lowest type as the “newspaper-reading *demi-monde* of the spirit.” (BGE: §263) The second chapter offers detailed analysis not only of the varying spiritual types, rank-order amongst psychological types but also a rank-order amongst values. The measure of value is the universal; therefore, that

which is valued the most is that which brings the highest type into attunement with reality. The conditions that enable one to enter into the most primordial relation with reality, are what Nietzsche refers to as values, such as self-overcoming, solitude, discipline, and suffering. These ascetic values also form a necessary part of the experience of “reading and writing in blood,” of entering into the silent *logos* of Becoming. They act as cultivating influences upon the philosophical type whereby he develops his higher self. The will to power is looked at as a spiritual *eros* that leads the soul upwards towards Becoming. This chapter also illuminates Nietzsche’s notion of “higher justice” as a virtue of the noble type in his experience of truth. It is a virtue that involves images of wholeness and beauty whereby the higher self as a unified subjectivity is cultivated towards reality *as it is*. This includes the realization that “all things are One.” (PTAG: §3) The redemptive nature of entering into the whole is best exemplified by laughter and the dance, both of which are values, for Nietzsche, as he associates them with entering into the whole. It is only the “highest caste,” the fewest, who “represent happiness, beauty, and graciousness on earth. Only to the most spiritual human beings is beauty permitted: among them alone is graciousness not weakness” (AC: §57). This chapter is also a continuation of the first one in developing the idea that Nietzsche seeks a new metaphysics following Kant; that his rejection of the old ascetic ideal is to be replaced by a new one, a genuine one of true insight into reality *as it is*. It is this genuine asceticism that provides the ideal conditions for the higher type to encounter truth.

The third chapter of this thesis further compounds the argument that there is a unity between Nietzsche’s writing style, his unconscious self or higher self, (SE: §6) and reality as Becoming. His writing style flows from his higher self, which is in turn an



expression of the whole. It explores the relation between Nietzsche's metaphysics of Becoming and the art of reading and writing. In this way it is evident that there is a connection in Nietzsche between his style, "writing in blood", a tragic pathos that flows from the silent *logos* of Becoming and his message that that pathos captures reality more accurately than the propositional or conceptual uses of language.

This chapter firstly explores "the art of philology" (AC: §52), and in doing so it examines what the most fundamental relation or the most truthful standpoint is to an author. In *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche mentions what he means by the "art of philology" that it is to read a text without falsifying it by interpretation, which raises the question as to what it is to not falsify the text or to enable the text to reveal itself. It also implies that Nietzsche is an advocate of the metaphysical independence of the text from interpretation. Nietzsche returns to the "art of reading well" in his later works is safeguard us against the relativistic tendencies of perspectival knowledge. In *The Will to Power* he expresses the same idea that the art of philology is "to read off a text without interposing an interpretation" (WP: §479). In light of chapter one where it is outlined that consciousness and language is a falsification of reality, it becomes apparent that to read Nietzsche at the surface level of the word is inadequate in coming to a true understanding of the meaning of his works. The third chapter then further reiterates this point in outlining the important role of tragic pathos, 'blood' and the unconscious, in coming to a true understanding of his works. Nietzsche's works must be recognized to be an expression of the personal, blood and the unconscious, and in turn reality. The ideal readers, as the "select few" must suspend all pragmatic, utility or herd "interests" in order to enter into the most fundamental relation with him as an author. It is through bringing a similar pathos (non-linguistic) to the text that the

reader enters into a primordial relation with an author, which is one of silence. It requires that that one takes a presuppositionless disposition to the text; it requires an epochē or *ephexis* (AC: §52) or that the intellect or “linguistic or social interestedness” be suspended. It is being argued that the most fundamental self that can enter into a primordial relation with Nietzsche is what he refers to as the *ego ipsissimum* (HH, Preface: §1) the unconscious self that is impersonal in belonging to the whole or the untimely. This self is referred to by Nietzsche by many names the “basic material of your being” (SE: §6) the “spiritual granite” (BGE: §231) or the “essential self” (BT: §5). It is the higher self that is “untimely”.

This chapter also highlights Nietzsche’s affinity with existentialist truth, and its connection with his writings. It does so in discussing in-depth Nietzsche’s notion of bodily writing as the impact writing has on the unconscious. In bringing life-experience to the text, and in writing from his body, Nietzsche participates in the whole or reality *as it is*. It is through the personal that one comes into attunement with truth. In this way there is an intimate connection between existentialist truth and Nietzsche’s writing style. The chapter also explores how inseparable his “inmost being” (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec 14<sup>th</sup>, 1887) or his unconscious is from Becoming itself. It also asserts therefore that the true meaning of Nietzsche’s works lies in his higher self or impersonal self that belongs to the whole. It examines in detail Nietzsche’s notion of writing the self, the impact of writing on the unconscious. Writing the self involves a certain type of awareness or consciousness that reflects upon itself as the self-reflective ego or the transcendental mind whereby it reflects upon the impact the discipline of writing has on the unconscious. The chapter also looks at the cultivating influences upon Nietzsche, the role reading and writing played

in the restoration of Nietzsche to a unified subjectivity, and in realizing his “life-task” (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §9) as a foreseer of raising humanity to the highest level. In realizing his “life-task” that it is in this way that his writing style emerges from a feeling of “rapture” or “revelation”, from Nietzsche’s insight into reality *as it is*. (EH, ‘Z’: §3)

The chapter ends with a comprehensive discussion of the “art of reading” for Nietzsche. It continues to assert that the most fundamental reading is reading from one’s “heart”, one’s unconscious horizon as ‘blood’, one’s *ipsissimosity* or from what Wittgenstein refers to as the metaphysical “I”, the “I” that is the transcendental limit of the world that cannot be referred to by language. It is opposed to the empirical self, the self as object that can be referred to by language. In *The Tractatus* Wittgenstein argues that the metaphysical subject “it is like the eye in relation to the field of sight; the eye that cannot see itself” (5.633-6.331) It involves the reader entering into the realm of the “unsaid,” of silence through bringing a similar pathos (non-linguistic) to the text, and in turn participating in the “immortality” of his works or in the “total union of all being.” (HH, I: §208) It also explores Nietzsche’s idea of the art of reading as “rumination” or digestion (GM, Preface: §8) and the role it plays in the cultivation of the reader’s higher self towards reality. It therefore looks at the connection between self-knowledge and reading, as is expressed by Nietzsche in the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals* (§1). It also looks at the notion of “reading and writing in blood” as a form of education (*paideia*) or cultivation towards the highest things, reality such that the reader participates in the dance: “Only in the dance do I know how to tell the parable of the highest things: and my highest parable remained unspoken in my limbs.” (Z, II: ‘The Tomb Song’) The philosophical *eros* of

love for the highest things is presupposed by education. Reading “in blood” provides the ideal conditions for encountering reality, which coincides with the conditions outlined in the previous chapter; it involves self-overcoming through reading. It in turn examines the wounding nature of reading Nietzsche and asserts that the most ideal readers are “warriors” (Z, I: ‘On Reading & Writing’; GM, III). It is in this way that reading “in blood” is a true asceticism that enables the reader to encounter reality *as it is*. His writings instil creative acts of self-shaping through the discipline, self-overcoming, and exhaustion involved in reading his works. It also strengthens the transcendental mind of the reader in consciously examining the impact reading has on one’s unconscious in order to get in touch indirectly with one’s life task or unconscious *telos*, goal or meaning. In this thesis, it is being maintained that Nietzsche’s role as a writer is to initiate struggles of self-overcoming in his free-spirited readers. He wishes to assist in the development of his reader’s souls and in turn to prepare those select readers for the “Zarathustra Kingdom of a Thousand Years” (Z, IV: ‘The Honey Sacrifice’) or what is referred to in the Bible as “Millennial Kingdom”. The chapter maintains that the meaning of philosophical reading for Nietzsche is that those “select few” through “reading in blood” can go on to encounter reality *as it is*. This meaning also includes that the reader enters into the silent *logos* of an author. The art of reading not only involves mental focus upon the written word and digestion where reading has an impact on the unconscious, but also making the transition to reading with ears, and then entering into the silent *logos* of the author. In doing so, the author reveals himself whereby the text cannot be digested. Reading Nietzsche primordially is twofold; it involves both enabling his ideal readers to encounter reality *as it is* or Becoming in *amor fati*, and in turn, in bringing a similar pathos to the text, it involves entering into the silent *logos* of an

author and of Becoming. In this way Nietzsche will be looked at as an “untimely” educator of the ears and of the heart.

The final chapter examines Nietzsche’s new metaphysics, where his refutation of the Christian moral god or what he refers to as the death of God lays open the way for a new Divine God such as the dancing God “Dionysus”. In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche expresses the latter when he proclaims that he still withholds a metaphysical faith in a section entitled “In what way we, too, are still pious”:

...you will have gathered what I am getting at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year-old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine... (GS: §344)

The loss of belief in the Christian God is to be overcome through belief in the God of dance, the new “Yes-Saying” totality. Nietzsche overturns the old “No-saying” or life-denying Christian totality by introducing the idea of a new totality that is life-affirmative, and in turn overcomes the nihilistic affects of the death of God. This new totality is a reality irreducible to the human and is that of innocence of Becoming. This reality can be felt through Dionysian insight, tragic pathos or “transfiguration.” (GS, Preface: §3) In transfiguration, the philosopher artist can be argued to be “the lightest shade of appearance” (BGE: §34) or “reality once more” (TI, ‘Reason’: §6). The highest type’s spirit shines—an aura or raiment by which the body and one’s whole being is glorified. The final chapter will discuss this as an artist’s metaphysics: Nietzsche as a “writer in blood” takes the most truthful standpoint to reality, that of rising above the human, or the mere “ways of the world” (Z, I: ‘On the Flies of the Marketplace’). In this way, Nietzsche initiates a new measure of value as the universal

or the “more-than-human,” and that which in turn enables the individual type to attune himself to the whole such as solitude, suffering, self-overcoming, and “reading and writing in blood.” (Z, I: §7) The final chapter also explores the spiritual significance of this transfiguration experience; it is a divinity that is life-affirmative. It is also comparable to Christ’s ecclesiastical teachings that relate to life-affirmative Christian praxis, and speak of experiences that include “a state of the heart” (AC: §34) which relates to the “Kingdom of Heaven that is within you” (AC: §34). The chapter outlines not only that there is a new totality for Nietzsche but also shows its redemptive nature. For Nietzsche, it is through the “Great Reason of the Body” (Z, I: §4) that one enters into the most primordial relation to reality. For Nietzsche, as for Jesus, one does not encounter truth in propositions but rather one is the truth, as one is an expression of “eternity” that is within Becoming. In the experience of transfiguration the highest type *is* the truth or is an expression of the truth, which is reminiscent of Jesus’ claim “I am the truth”. This type of truth is distinct from truth that has an abstract character, where truth is always distinct from the person who sets it forth. Nietzsche wishes to overturn conceptual truth, where truth and the person who lays claim to it are seen as two distinct spheres. Jesus, in a vein analogous to Nietzsche’s life affirmative type, does not have the truth but *is* himself the truth: in Christ, the truth and the person are fused in an unity. This experience of truth is to realize that “all is One;” that there is a necessity to all of life’s events and that even the most demonic ones play a role in the creation of the most divine. Nietzsche emphasizes the inability to communicate the truth; one can only communicate it indirectly. The final chapter makes clear that the expression of truth is in the experience of “intoxication,” “transfiguration,” like Nietzsche’s own experience of “rapture,” “revelation,” and “inspiration,” or what Hölderlin refers to as “the holy pathos”. Christ, like Nietzsche, emphasizes “the

innermost”: ““life” or “truth” or “light” is his word for the innermost”; it is the site of reality revealing itself. This chapter not only stresses Nietzsche’s affinity with truth or reality but it also looks at the relationship between this truth and the earth; the relationship between eternity and the earth. The chapter will illuminate Nietzsche as a foreseer of the earth becoming divine, of eternity becoming immanent in the world. In this way the earth becomes the sole source of value. The world and eternity become one; however, eternity is irreducible to the earth. This chapter highlights Nietzsche as a prophet of the earth reaching its highest state or becoming ‘Godlike’, of a “Kingdom of Heaven on Earth” or what is referred to as the “Millennial Kingdom” or the “Zarathustra Kingdom of a Thousand Years” (Z, IV: ‘The Honey Sacrifice’).

This chapter also goes on to explore in more detail what reality is for Nietzsche, and what the most primordial relation is to that reality, as the necessary self (unconscious) and its relation to the eternal. It will be argued that the reality which the highest type affirms will be argued to be an “eternity” within Becoming. c This chapter explains in further detail Nietzsche’s idea of God as the ultimate, which is comparable to Anselm’s “that which nothing greater can be thought.” In exploring Becoming as reality for Nietzsche, the chapter examines Nietzsche’s own experience of the eternal return of the same, and how it marks the beginning of entering into a new era entitled the “Noon period” where eternity becomes manifest in the world. The final chapter will also look into Nietzsche’s pantheism the idea of the eternal return of the same as god or the ultimate, and the relation in turn between God and the temporal. In doing so, it is possible to argue that, for Nietzsche, “God is in every moment.” It also addresses the question ‘to which reality do we belong?’. The reality to which we belong will be argued to be eternity or objective reality that is independent of space; it

is the non-spatial or the heavenly. It is through the unconscious that one experiences the “feeling of eternity” (AC: §34). It can be experienced through the divine act of the dance (Z, III: §4).

In order to further establish that Nietzsche has an affinity with truth and “true knowledge” in the form of tragic insight as a glimpse into eternity for Nietzsche, this chapter looks at Nietzsche’s return to tragic wisdom in the later period in the work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It enquires into Nietzsche’s notion of “The Return Home” or what is also referred to as the homecoming. (Z, III: ‘The Return Home’). This experience is the site of reality revealing itself to the higher self as the “Great Reason of the Body”. It involves “true knowledge” in the sense of the higher self, as the most necessary self, the divine self glimpsing eternity in “deep wells” (Z, III: ‘Before Sunrise’), which is Nietzsche’s metaphor for the heavens or what he refers to as the “highest spheres” (Z, II: ‘On the Rabble’). The chapter goes on further to argue that for Nietzsche there is a universal, as reality that is non-spatial, and that in *amor fati*, the necessary self belongs to it. The final chapter coincides with the second chapter on the view of Nietzsche as a metaphysician of the real, examining his notion that there is a spiritual hierarchy associative of the New Age where the highest type, the redeemer is representative of the epoch to come. In looking at Nietzsche’s idea of “The Homecoming,” it reveals Nietzsche as a thinker who wishes to overcome the loss of an old totality, of a sense of homelessness that comes with the death of God or the loss of belief in God. In arguing that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of Becoming, the chapter also examines parallels between Nietzsche and Plato (as opposed to Platonism). It is the higher self that is outside space that is the self that experiences “the untimely,” the heavenly or eternity. The climax of Zarathustra’s wisdom of “The



Yes and Amen Song” will also be explored; it is referred to as “bird-wisdom” or a “dancing wisdom”. It will be argued that true enlightenment, for Nietzsche, is best exemplified by the dance and is expressed through the writing style of the Dionysian Dithyramb. This experience of true enlightenment is inextricably linked with “reading and writing in blood.” In this way, the final chapter is a continuation of themes introduced in the third chapter. The chapter further explores the relationship between eternity and the earth whereby it becomes apparent that Nietzsche is a prophet of the earth becoming eternal or divine, and in turn of the highest dancing culture. In *Ecce Homo*, he speaks of the “tremendous hope” of his essay entitled *The Birth of Tragedy*, where he promises “a tragic age” to come, the “highest art in saying Yes to life” whereby tragedy will be reborn (EH, ‘BT’: §4). He speaks as a prophet of a “new party of life”, a Dionysian future of music:

Let us look ahead a century; let us suppose that my attempt to assassinate two millennia of anti-nature and desecration of man were to succeed. That new party of life which would tackle the greatest of all tasks, the attempt to raise humanity higher, including the relentless destruction of everything that degenerating and parasitical, would again make possible that excess of life on earth from which the Dionysian state, too, would have to awaken again (EH, ‘BT’: §4).

He speaks as a prophet of the “great noon at which the most elect consecrate themselves for the greatest of all tasks...” and upholds “the vision of a feast” (EH, ‘BT’: §4) He reveals that it is in the dance that one encounters the earth becoming ‘godly’. In ‘*To the Mistral: A Dance Song*’ Nietzsche writes in poetic song, and makes a call for dancing between the heavens and the earth:

...On a thousand backs we’re dancing,  
billow—backs and backs of chancing—  
hail to dances *new*, I say!  
Let us dance in every manner,  
Free—so shall be *our* art’s banner,

And *our* science—shall be gay!

From each flower let us garner  
Just one blossom for our honour,  
For our wreath just two leaves worth!  
Then like troubadours in riches  
We shall dance ‘tween God and Earth!

...—And to mark this joy forever,  
leave a will that time can’t sever,  
Take this wreath up where you are!  
Hurl it higher, further, madder,  
storm the sky on heaven’s ladder,  
Hang it there—upon a star!

Finally, the chapter further analyses Nietzsche’s idea of an artist’s metaphysics: that the higher type, in his experience of returning home, is the most accurate representation of reality. The artist’s metaphysics will be argued to be present in *The Birth of Tragedy* and that it is continuous with his later works. Nietzsche himself is viewed as an artist metaphysician in his experience of what he calls “inspiration.” (EH, ‘Z’: §3) In “writing in blood,” Nietzsche himself becomes the “most accurate representation” of reality. In exploring his artist’s metaphysics, it further reiterates the argument that reality reveals itself to the most primordial self, and that this is the realm of the unsaid, of silence. In this way, his writing style as a silent expression of the *logos* is one and the same as his message that tragic pathos and the dance better capture reality than that of the propositional or conceptual uses of language.

## Chapter One

Nietzsche's Metaphysics of Becoming & Tragic Wisdom as Insight into  
the Whole.

## I

### *Relative Truth and the Problem of Self-reference*

This thesis wishes to establish that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of the real, of Becoming, such that for Nietzsche there is a reality that is irreducible to the human and that the most truthful standpoint towards it is in the form of Dionysian wisdom. In this way, for Nietzsche there is the idea of glimpsing reality but only in the form of tragic insight into this reality. This tragic insight takes the form of “a this-worldly” artist’s metaphysics; the Dionysian artists are those who enable us to be raised up “we have to be lifted up—and who are those who lift us? They are those true *men, those who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints.*” (UM, III: §5) Nietzsche embraces the idea of insight into reality or truth but only in the tragic sense but clearly rejects it in the dogmatic, conceptual and absolute sense. He considers perspectivism important in highlighting that absolute, dogmatic knowledge is itself perspectival in nature. It is necessary in calling into question dogmatic viewpoints such as the “God’s eye view”, that is Cartesian absolute knowledge in the abstract and conceptual sense; he views it as a necessary scepticism that is a transitional phase towards a more fundamental way of relating to reality, that is perspectival. Nietzsche actually rejects Cartesian metaphysics that embodies a theory of reality which is non-perspectival. However, this does not imply that Nietzsche is not a metaphysician, as Nietzsche seeks a more fundamental truth than a theoretical approach, a truth distinct from knowledge of things and their properties. The type of truth that he seeks as an

“artist-metaphysician” is the non-theoretical truth of Becoming rather than the theoretical truth of “Being”.<sup>1</sup>

However, there is also according to commentators, the idea that there is scepticism about the truth of any perspective, and in turn about a reality, one that is irreducible to the perspective. This relates to the problem of self-reference, the contention that Nietzsche’s philosophy is itself a mere perspective, and is therefore self-undermining.<sup>2</sup> There are certain commentators like Vattimo who seem to suggest that

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<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche rejects conceptual knowledge as the most truthful knowledge, as it falsifies the truth of Becoming into doctrines about stable entities or things. For Nietzsche, this type of knowledge meets with man’s biological needs, and is a product of human logic such that humans require thing-hood for their own needs. He contends that the world of thing-hood is a world that is conditioned by language and needs, and is therefore false. The metaphysical realm of ‘Being’ is also false because it is created by man rendering absolute what is actually a human exigency, that is thing-hood.

<sup>2</sup> Groothius in his article entitled ‘*Postmodernism and Truth*’ identifies the problems of postmodernism, one of which is the problem of self-reference, consistency, and perspectivism. He asks of the reader to consider the statement:

All “truth” is a social construction of language, and nothing more. It cannot orient us to any objective reality outside a system of discourse. (Philosophia Christi, Series 2, vol., 2, no.2, 2000, p.279)

He then goes on to consider the problem that arises with such a consideration of truth. He refers to the above statement in order to do so: “This statement refers to *all truth* and says that truth is *nothing but* a contingent construction that cannot connect us to objective reality *at all*. This statement includes the statement itself in its description or range of reference.” (*ibid.*) He contends that postmodernists claim that truth is merely a social construction, and that such a statement itself cannot “accurately depict the reality it purportedly describes. Therefore, it is false.” (*ibid.*) He then puts it another way, that “the statement sets up truth conditions or reality requirements that it cannot fulfil.” (*ibid.*) In considering the statement to be “self-referentially inconsistent,” he refers to Alvin Platinga’s work ‘*Reason and Belief in God*’ who also uses this term (A. Platinga & N. Wolterstorff, eds., *Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God*, Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983, p.60) A statement is self-referentially inconsistent when it refers to or implicates itself and ends up refuting itself because it cannot account for itself. The paradoxes associated with self-reflexive reference have long been noted in the history of philosophy, and have a special importance in set theory and the philosophy of mathematics. These include the paradox of the Liar, Russell’s paradox, Cantor’s paradox, the Burali-Forti paradox and the Grelling-Nelson paradox (cf. Champlin, TS, *Reflexive Paradoxes*, Routledge, 1988).

The problem of self-reference is also associated with Nietzsche’s philosophy of perspectivism. Groothius looks at Nietzsche’s perspectivism as having shaped many postmodern approaches to truth. The particular statement of Nietzsche’s that is referred to in order to illustrate this point is as follows: “There is “no true world”, only “a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in us.” (WP: §15, cited in this form in Groothius, *ibid*, p.279) He also refers to Nietzsche’s claim “that there are no facts, but only interpretations (or constructions)...” in order to illustrate postmodernists’ relative approach to truth. Groothius mentions the outcome of such an approach to truth: “Everything is a matter of relative and

for Nietzsche, the anthropocentric and therefore perspectival character of all interpretation reduces reality to a perspective or denies its ‘accessibility’. Vattimo in his work ‘*The End of Modernity*’ draws upon Nietzsche’s *The Twilight of the Idols* in claiming that Nietzsche’s philosophy is one of erring:

As *The Twilight of the Idols* was later to argue, the real world has become a fiction and even the ‘apparent’ world has dissolved along with it. Given there is no longer a truth or a *Grund* that could contradict or falsify the tissue of erring, all these errors are to be understood as kinds of roaming. (Vattimo 1988: 169-170)

For Nietzsche, all knowledge maybe perspectival but this does not imply reality is itself perspectival, but rather that there is a reality that is irreducible to the human and that through tragic pathos one enters into the most truthful relation to it. Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not rule out getting at truth itself, as there is the possibility of reality revealing itself through tragic insight such that one adheres to the most truthful interpretation of the world. Lampert in his ‘*Nietzsche’s Task*’ (2001) argues similarly that perspectivity does not condemn the perspectival knower to insurmountable scepticism about the truth of any perspective. According to Lampert, there is for Nietzsche a perspective from the broadest base (BGE: §207) that is “truer” than narrower perspectives, whereby the esoteric few acquire tragic insight into reality.<sup>3</sup> It

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pragmatic perspective, with no method by which to adjudicate rationally between perspectives in order to discern an objective truth for everyone.” (Groothius, D., *Op. cit.*, p.279)

<sup>3</sup> There are also to the contrary, commentators who like Sadler in his ‘*Nietzsche Truth and Redemption: Critique of the Postmodernist Nietzsche*’ argue that the problem of self-reference in Nietzsche can be solved through arguing that there is truth in Nietzsche that is non-perspectival. (London, The Athlone Press, 1995) In spite of his acknowledgement of the significant role perspectivism plays, for Nietzsche in overturning absolute truths (GM, II: §12), and in criticizing positivism (WP: §481), the old correspondence theory of truth that suggests that propositions can capture reality or are statements of fact; however, he also suggests that for Nietzsche, there is the possibility of a more fundamental way of relating to reality than through a perspective. He argues that for Nietzsche, this more truthful way of relating to reality is not a return to Descartes’ approach to truth as absolute knowledge, the “view from nowhere” or “God’s eye view”, as Nietzsche’s perspectivism calls this into question. It is a form of tragic insight that cannot be conflated with his perspectivism, which he argues is a form of conscious activity (GS: §354).

is an experience of the highest nature, of *amor fati* and of saying “yes to life” in terms of belonging to the whole or participating in “the untimely”. There are for Nietzsche various modes of expressing reality, such as through conscious and linguistic activity whereby there are various degrees and shades of appearance; however, for Nietzsche the “aesthetic” relation to reality is the most beautiful. This idea of aesthetic truth is expressed as “instinctual”, “mystical” or “rapturous”. This truth is in the form of tragic insight and is not ‘absolutist’ or ‘dogmatic’; it is a genuine ideal of affirming becoming as becoming in *amor fati*, and therefore can be argued to be the most accurate interpretation of the world.

Although Nietzsche is critical of truth that is in the absolutist sense, this thesis contends that Nietzsche does embrace truth or an objective reality that of Becoming. Nietzsche criticizes the type of truth that serves authoritarian structures of power, absolutes that are actually theoretical in nature, truth that subsists in the rational inquiry into the essence of things, or moral absolutes that are dogmatic in nature. He also critiques the “disinterested” truth of scholars, scientists, and of modernists, that do not take into account their own subjective interests. In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche criticizes the prejudices of philosophers (§6), for not taking their own subjective state into account. The genuine philosopher’s perspectival relation to the whole is one of revealing and concealing, truth and untruth. However, in spite of Nietzsche’s rejection of truth there is also a type of truth that he accepts, one whereby reality reveals itself. He associates this new truth with the new philosophers to come, a new ideal of experiencing *amor fati*; it is the opposite ideal to the ascetic ideal that is the Christian

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Sadler argues that tragic insight in Nietzsche is a new ideal, the genuine insight into reality that is not conscious perspectival or mediate knowledge. In spite of Kant’s aim to overturn the “God’s eye view” in Descartes (immediate direct knowledge), and argue that all knowledge is “perspectival” or mediate showing the limits of reason, he introduces a new ideal. According to Nietzsche, the latter does not consist of genuine insight into reality but is rather an unattainable moral ideal that of a reward in the afterlife. Nietzsche declares that this is actually a “perspective”, and its denial of this, is what renders it dogmatic. According to Sadler, Nietzsche reclaims the genuine ideal, he rather advocates the idea of the genuine philosopher, the higher type who acquires genuine insight into reality, a new ideal that of *amor fati*.

or Platonic ideal of self-denial. Lampert similarly states that the “genuine philosopher” is the rarest of beings whose will to truth drives him to discover the “intelligible character” of the world and to glimpse the ideal appropriate to it...” (2001: 114-119, 196, 207) This new ideal involves a certain attunement to a new totality, to what is referred to as a Dionysian primordial reality in the early work *The Birth of Tragedy* (BT: §4) and as Becoming in the later works.<sup>4</sup> For Nietzsche, only certain kinds of individual can enter into the most truthful relation to reality or to a metaphysically independent author or text.

In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* this idea of Dionysian life-affirmation is not expressed in discourse; Nietzsche refers to it as a “mystic intuition” (PTAG: §3) where “scientific reflection” serves only as “a sad means” (PTAG: §3) where the mystical receives expression through words and concepts. Although Nietzsche abandons the term “intuition” in the later works<sup>5</sup>, this thesis explores his affinity with tragic wisdom of the early period. It will also explore tragic insight of the later period, in the work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which can be argued to be an interpretation of

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<sup>4</sup> It must also be noted that the early work *The Birth of Tragedy* must be read with specific cautions considering Nietzsche’s ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’ or the new preface to the work. This self-criticism suggests that Nietzsche became critical of his earlier use of Kantian and Schopenhauerian formulations expressed in the work. In this way, this has led commentators to contend that Nietzsche’s abandonment of the term ‘Primal Unity’ implies that it has Schopenhauerian or Kantian associations of which he became critical of. There are commentators that argue both in favour and against this idea, which will be discussed in third section of this chapter. It is rather the term “Becoming” that Nietzsche adheres to from *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* through to the later works, which also coincides with his admiration for Heraclitus.

<sup>5</sup> Although this thesis makes reference to the term “intuition” as a form of tragic insight for Nietzsche, it must be acknowledged that Nietzsche’s affinity with the term resides only in the early works, such as *The Birth of Tragedy*, *Philosophy in the tragic Age of the Greeks* and *On Truth & Lies*. It emerges in BT as “instinctive certainty” (§1) in PTAG (§3) as “mystic intuition”, and in the redemptive sense in *On Truth & Lies* (§2). There are commentators who argue that this term shows how Nietzsche came under Schopenhauer’s influence, and contend that Nietzsche abandons the term in the later works. Tragic insight is for Schopenhauer a form of immediate knowledge that is not knowledge of the world. In light of Lampert’s argument in *Nietzsche’s Task*, tragic insight of the later works is for Nietzsche an interpretation of the world. This insight takes the form of “revelation” and “rapture” (EH, ‘Z’: §3) or of the revelatory experience of Zarathustra in “Before Sunrise”, all of which will be discussed throughout the thesis. Nietzsche also associates the term intuition with Heraclitus in PTAG, a philosopher he continues to admire in the later works (EH, ‘BT’: §3), (TI, ‘Reason’: §2). There are commentators like Sadler who argue that that term as a form of tragic insight persists throughout his philosophy.



the world. It is through tragic wisdom that certain types of individual come closest to reality. This mystical experience occurs at a pre-conscious level and therefore precludes conscious activities such as discourse or theoretical thinking and the propositional or conceptual uses of language. These activities are conscious and are therefore a “falsification” of reality (GS: §354). It is consequently possible to infer that it is through instinctive experience that one comes closest to reality rather than through conscious linguistic activity, which, for Nietzsche, is only a mere means for its expression. This relation to reality is the most fundamental one; and it involves taking a presuppositionless position where one suspends all theories of what truth is. For Nietzsche, in coming to the truthfulness of existence one must bracket all “objectivistic assumptions” about the nature of philosophy. The most truthful standpoint towards reality does not consist of what Nietzsche subjectively thinks reality should be, but rather consists of philosophical insight into reality in its most bare form.

## II

### *Nietzsche on Language and Consciousness as the Falsification of Reality & Tragic Pathos as the Most Truthful expression of Reality*

In this section, the passage from *The Gay Science* (§354) will be discussed in order to elucidate Nietzsche's contention that both ordinary language and consciousness is a falsification of reality. It intends to assert that he prioritizes pathos and unique experience over linguistic and conscious activity when it comes to matters of relating to reality in the most fundamental way. It also determines that there is a distinction in Nietzsche between a mere conscious ego and a higher self that is the unconscious self that belongs to reality as a whole.

The idea that consciousness and the herd use of language is a falsification of reality is apparent in a passage that comes from aphorism (§354) of Book V of *The Gay Science*, "On the Genius of the Species". It offers us insight into the connection between the origin of consciousness, the need for communication, the "surface—and sign—world", the difference between the herd nature of man and the individual type and finally into conscious knowledge and truth as tragic insight:

This is what *I* consider to be true phenomenalism and perspectivism: that due to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface—and sign—world, a world turned into generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common denominator, — that everything which enters consciousness thereby *becomes* shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization. In the end, the growing consciousness is a danger, and he who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows it is a sickness. As one might guess, it is not the opposition between subject and object which concerns me here; I leave that distinction to those epistemologists who got tangled up in the snares of grammar (of folk metaphysics.) Even less am I concerned with the opposition between 'thing-in-itself' and appearance: for we 'know' far too little to even be entitled to *make* that distinction. We simply have no organ for *knowing*, for 'truth': we 'know' (or believe or imagine) exactly as much as is *useful* to the human herd, to the species: and even what is here called

‘usefulness’ is finally also just a belief, a fiction, and perhaps just that supremely fatal stupidity of which we shall someday perish.

It is necessary to make clear what Nietzsche actually means by “consciousness” and “becoming conscious”. In the same aphorism, Nietzsche offers us an insight into conscious activity:

For once again: man, like every living creature, is constantly thinking but does not know it; the thinking which becomes *conscious* is only the smallest part of it, let’s say the shallowest, worst part—for only that conscious thinking *takes place in words, that is, in communication symbols*; and this fact discloses the origin of consciousness. (GS: §354)

For Nietzsche, “consciousness” and “thinking” are not the same; rather, he holds that conscious thinking is only the “shallowest, worst part” of thinking. In associating conscious activity with the use of words, he views it as a tool for social communication characteristic of the herd rather than of the individual type of existence.<sup>6</sup> Nietzsche draws a distinction between pre-conscious and conscious

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<sup>6</sup> Kathleen Higgins examines the passage (§354) of *The Gay Science* in her article entitled ‘*Nietzsche on Music*’ where Nietzsche argues that not only does language falsify reality, but it also developed along with consciousness to facilitate the survival of the proto-human herd animals (Higgins, K., *Nietzsche on Music*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 47, no.4, 1986, p.663). She claims that Nietzsche draws three conclusions on language; the first is that language developed in order to serve a species need out of the “intimate association of each animal with every other...” (*ibid.* p.664) Higgins notes that from the first conclusion arises the second, that language itself is inherently social: “So much is language a social phenomenon, in fact, that the individual who attempts to express his experience through language must subordinate the aspects of his experience that are unique and personal to the generalized, conventional categories that specific words label and connote.” (*ibid.*) She maintains that Nietzsche concludes thirdly “that words do violence to the immediacy and individuality of human experience. Words can only refer to those aspects of experience that have been made conscious, “all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities and generalization. Ultimately the growth of consciousness becomes a danger...” (GS: 354, cited in this form in Higgins, *ibid.*, p.664) She also notes that Nietzsche makes this argument in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where “Zarathustra warns that to name and describe one’s personal virtues with common words does violence to the virtue.” (Higgins, K., *Op. cit.*, p.664) She then cites the passage from *Zarathustra* as follows:

You would do better to say, “Inexpressible and nameless is that which gives my soul agony and sweetness and is even the hunger of my entrails.” May your virtue be too exalted for the familiarity of names: and if you must speak of her, then do not be ashamed to stammer of her. (Z, I: ‘Of Enjoying and Suffering the Passions’, cited in this form in Higgins, *ibid.*, p.664)

activity, which is in turn emblematic of the distinction between the individual and the herd. Thus, again in aphorism (§354):

My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man's existence as an individual but rather to the community—and herd—aspects of his nature; that accordingly, it is finely developed only in relation to its usefulness to community or herd; and that consequently each of us, even with the best will in the world to *understand* ourselves as individually as possible, 'to know ourselves', will always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is 'non-individual', that which is 'average'; that due to the nature of consciousness—to the 'genius of the species' governing it—our thoughts themselves are continually as it were *outvoted* and translated back into the herd perspective. At bottom, all our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, there is no doubt; but as we translate them into consciousness, *they no longer seem to be...*

Nietzsche argues that preconscious thoughts are “translated back into the herd perspective” where consciousness reduces thinking to the level of social utility. For Nietzsche, both ordinary language and consciousness which he calls “a surface— and sign—world” is “shallow”, “thin”, “corrupt”, and “false”. Nietzsche associates consciousness and perspectivism with the practical needs of the species and pre-

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Higgins explores Nietzsche's view of language as a mode of consciousness that falsifies reality in order to draw a distinction between music and language in his philosophy; music is argued to “directly express the ground of being that underlies all existence” whereas language only represents things. (Higgins, K., *Op. cit.*, p.670-1) She also contends that for Nietzsche the human capacity to experience music is the transcendental precondition for the possibility of human language. (*ibid.*, p.663, 671)

Higgins in another of her articles entitled '*Nietzsche's View of Philosophical Style*' examines again passage (§354) of *The Gay Science*. She notes that Nietzsche's discussion of language in this passage “clearly reiterates the view that words, developed as a social phenomenon, are not devised in a way that is well suited to the expression of uniquely personal experience” (Higgins, K., *Nietzsche's view of Philosophical Style*, International Studies in Philosophy, vol. xviii/2, B. Magnus & J.T. Wilcox (eds), Baltimore, Scholars Press, 1986, p.69). She also draws upon passages from *On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense* and from *Twilight of the Idols* in order to express Nietzsche's contention that language falsifies and vulgarizes individual experience, and is incapable of expressing the particularity of unique individual experience. She contends that for Nietzsche it is through style that individual experience can be communicated. It is style as the communication of pathos that enables the overcoming of the limitations of ordinary language. It is also removed from the herd and is conducive to the self-development of the philosophical type. It is in this way that the ideal reader of Nietzsche must read him at a level prior to consciousness, at the level of pathos. She reiterates the relationship between the unconscious and style in Nietzsche, and that his relationship with style developed from his rejection of language as an adequate mode of communicating unique philosophical experience. The final section of this chapter will examine the way Nietzsche's style in being musical and an expression of pathos is in turn a more fundamental mode of communication, as it relates to reality more fundamentally than language. It emerges therefore that the style of his works is in an attunement to a musical whole, and in turn to reality as Becoming.

conscious activity with the “metaphysical needs” of the individual. Sadler (1995: 23) indicates that that which is translated back or becomes conscious is “not unconscious mental processes,” as Nietzsche “is talking about the value of conscious versus unconscious thought: his references to corruption and falsification indicate that he is alluding to thoughts which are prior to consciousness not at the level of mental events but at the level of worth.”<sup>7</sup> The distinction between conscious and pre-conscious activity links in with what Nietzsche means by rank order. The individual type is ranked ‘higher’ than the herd type as his pre-conscious activity brings him closer to the truth or reality. This activity has more worth as the individual in transcending this surface—and sign—world catches sight of “the really *great* problems and question marks” (GS: §373) the “essential questions” that arise at an existential level.

The difficulty that could arise with discerning what Nietzsche means by pre-conscious thought is the problem of identifying whether it is “correct” or not. This type of knowledge is non-epistemological and precludes standards of “correctness” that operate within the epistemic sphere of empirical reality, the human “surface—and sign—world”. As Sadler (1995: 24) states, the “greatest obstacle to understanding what Nietzsche means by pre-conscious or pre-verbal thought, as well as the kind of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ which is defined at this level, is the implicit imposition of an epistemological standard of reference: the question will constantly insinuate itself as to how such thought could be ‘correct’ in a sense which is philosophically relevant.” Sadler accordingly (1995: 24) argues that this correctness is transposed onto an

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<sup>7</sup> Sadler examines the distinction between conscious and unconscious thought. He does so in the context of arguing that for Nietzsche consciousness is perspectival and is a falsification of reality and that through unconscious activity enters into a more truthful relation to reality. He argues that for Nietzsche, perspectivism is a falsification of reality, and critiques the postmodern depiction of Nietzsche that claims that perspectival truth is the only truth within his philosophy. He in turn argues that there is a distinction between tragic pathos and a perspective, for Nietzsche.

existential level where it means something prior to the “adequacy” of discursive thought. Nietzsche rejects epistemological knowledge of empirical objects as the source of truth. There are two types of truth for Nietzsche, first order and second order. Nietzsche acknowledges that truth has a second-order meaning, which is “truth” that pertains to propositions, assertions, and conventions. Truth in the first-order sense is more fundamental, it is not philosophical discourse propounding the “truth” but rather the philosopher “existing in the truth” where one is open to “life” or reality. For Nietzsche, “knowledge” and “truth” must be redefined at the level of unconscious activity, where “to know” means “to enter” into and not to conceptualize, and “truth” means coming into attunement with reality. This can either take the form of “entering” into an author in terms of a philosophical reading of what is written “in blood” (Z, I: §7 ‘On Reading & Writing’)<sup>8</sup> or “entering” into reality in the experience of *amor fati*.

Genuine philosophical reading, for Nietzsche, is not bound to conscious words that reside on “the surface”, and his ideal readers are those who share in a similar pathos

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<sup>8</sup> It is for this reason that Nietzsche advocates that only a reader who shares in the same tragic pathos will be capable of sharing in his blood. As Sadler (1993: 234) states in his article ‘*The Postmodernist Politicization of Nietzsche*’, Nietzsche’s select readers will be attentive to the pre-conscious activity from which his writings flow. Sadler’s argument is also in the context of critiquing the postmodernist portrayal of Nietzsche such that he contends that for Nietzsche, it is the non-perspectival reader that will be capable of sharing in Nietzsche’s “blood”:

He is also quite emphatic that the significance of his own utterances is not given along with the publicly available words or signs in which he expresses himself. This is the reason that Nietzsche knows he will not be understood by those (the vast majority) who do not share his basic experiences. The average human being, and therefore Nietzsche’s average reader, is inattentive and unalert to what is prior to consciousness, is fundamentally dominated by his herd nature and the perspectives which go along with it, by words, concepts and conventions. And as long as one tries to understand Nietzsche merely through his words or his ‘perspective’ one is doomed to failure.

as Nietzsche himself. It is this type of reader who also “enters” into the most fundamental relation to reality through pre-conscious activity; these are the individuals that are referred to as “philosophers”. Nietzsche does not state that these philosophers remove themselves entirely from conscious activity, as speech and the use of herd perspectives are indispensable for life. However, the important point he is making is that these individuals can transcend their herd natures and experience the most fundamental relation with reality. It is now clear that Nietzsche prioritizes pathos and unique experience over linguistic or mere conscious activity, and that it is through pathos that one can enter into the most primordial relation to reality.

The passage entitled on the “Genius of the Species” of *The Gay Science* (§354) highlights not only that consciousness is a falsification but that it suits the interests, needs and wants of the herd or the human species, and that by contrast he associates the unconscious with meeting ‘the metaphysical needs’ of the individual. In this way there are not only different dimensions to the self but also different types of human beings. The highest type engages in preconscious activity more than the lower types who participate predominantly in conscious activity. For this reason a distinction can be inferred between a lower self and a higher self. The former engages primarily in conscious activity in knowing things; however, the higher type who engages primarily in unconscious activity experiences the deepest existentialist states. The higher self can also be referred to as a “philosophical self” distinct from the lower or herd self only in so far as this type has what is referred to as “the Great reason of the Body” (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’)<sup>9</sup> or the intelligent instincts, an “organizing”

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<sup>9</sup> See V., Gerhardt’s essay in *A Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche* entitled ‘The Body, the Self, and the Ego’ who examines this chapter from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* where Nietzsche discusses “the Great reason of the Body” (I: §4). He notes Nietzsche’s distinction between the “great reason” of the body and the “small reason” of consciousness (In: K.A., Pearson (ed.), *A Cambridge Companion to*

principle that restores the self to an “ordered” state, and in turn disciplines the self to the whole. (EH, ‘Clever’: §9) This passage from *Ecce Homo* not only shows that for Nietzsche, like the above passage from (GS: §354) consciousness is a surface, but also that there is a “rank-order” among capacities. It is the higher self, which has the ability to be disciplined to a metaphysically independent whole that of Becoming, a self which he compares to Goethe, a poet he admires in his ability to be disciplined to the whole (TI: ‘Skirmishes’: §49). In spite of Nietzsche’s rejection of the self as self-identical substantial ego, which is declared a fictional entity<sup>10</sup>, he embraces the idea of a higher self as the “Great Reason of the Body”, the self as a pre-conscious entity. Although, the self for Nietzsche is not a fixed entity and exists as a state of becoming or overcoming; he does advocate the task of ordering the body or as Thiele suggests of “ordering the soul”<sup>11</sup> (1990: 213), of unifying a multiplicity of instincts. For the philosophical type, what determines “*who he is*” is “what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.” (BGE: §6) The genuine philosopher takes into account the personal that the philosopher’s works reflect *who he is*, their creations are not the product of some transcendent reason, but, rather they mirror their own drives. The philosophical type becomes himself; he realizes that his

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*Nietzsche*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, p.273) He states that Zarathustra speaks not only of the “body” and the “ego” but also of the “self” in the same chapter. He also contends that Nietzsche could have treated self just as he did “substance” or “God” that is view them as grammatical errors (Gerhardt p.274 citing HH, I: §8; TI, “Reason”: §5) but that he rather retains the idea of “self”: “In the case of the body’s “self,” however, things seem to stand differently. “Self” is treated as if it had the same ontological dignity as “body.” In fact, the “self” proves to be the thoroughly real mediator between body and ego...in the end it is nothing other than the *self* that holds the body and soul, or body and ego, together.” (*ibid.*, p.274)

<sup>10</sup> See such passages as WP: §484 and GM, I: §13 where Nietzsche rejects the self as substance or as a linguistic illusion, and the self as Cartesian ego. He also rejects the self as substance or atom that is the Christian conception of the soul. The idea of the higher self expressed above is not a fragmented self, although a becoming self, there is an aspect to the “self” that enables it to be restored to the whole, such as in *amor fati*. This self is distinguished from the herd self, which relates to the idea of rank-order in Nietzsche.

<sup>11</sup> In spite of Thiele’s reference to soul, it must be acknowledged that Nietzsche proclaims in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that the “soul is only a word for something about the body” (Z, I: §4).



passion is to “become what he is” (HH, 1: §263). The highest order of rank involves the “innermost drives” being restored to a unity; in this way there is the idea of a new unified subjectivity.<sup>12</sup> According to Moles, “The source of bodily unity is not a unifying agent, but the self-regulating totality of drives, which constantly maintains itself in a balance.” (1990: 103) The drives’ ability to restore balance, for Nietzsche is an ability that belongs to the higher type. Moles explains that for Nietzsche there are various levels of intelligence,

At one end of the scale, there is a relatively simplified and superficial conscious intelligence...At a deeper level, however, conscious intelligence is revealed as merely a reflection of the intelligence of the drives themselves, whose subtlety is directed toward maximizing their degrees of power. Now Nietzsche proposes a level which is deeper yet. What he sees underlying all the drives is an even greater ruling intelligence which dominates and regulates the whole system of drives as it advances through the world. (1990:11)

Nietzsche calls this ruling intelligence the “shepherd” to the flock of drives, the resolution of their mutual strife or their unifying principle (Moles 1990: 11 citing Z, I: §4). This ruling power as Moles suggests is not one that is beyond the body, or of a different nature, such as the soul in the traditional sense. The unifying principle is what Nietzsche calls the body itself; he also calls it the “self”. (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’) The body searches for the optimum of favourable conditions under

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<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of the idea of a unified subjectivity in Nietzsche see J.F., Whitmire’s article entitled ‘*The Many and the One: the Ontological Multiplicity and Functional Unity of the Person in the Later Nietzsche.*’ (Vol.4, Number 1, Spring 2009, pp.1-17) Whitmire in citing Thiele, Parkes and Gemes argues against the idea of the self as chaotic ontological multiplicity, but rather argues that Nietzsche is in favour of the unity of the body. Whitmire notes that the idea of a unified subjectivity is described by Nietzsche only in aesthetic terms and that the passage that is most quoted to express this occurs in *The Gay Science* “*One thing is needful.—To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even delights the eye.*” (Whitmire *ibid.* p.7 citing GS: §290) Thiele also stresses in his work ‘*Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: Studies of Heroic Individualism*’ the idea that Nietzsche advocates a unified subjectivity, that to “order the soul” for Nietzsche is to “stylize one’s life”. In speaking of Nietzsche’s higher man, Thiele states that “His overwhelming project is to unify a multiple soul. This effort to “impose upon becoming the character of being” is the mark of “the supreme will to power” (WP 330). The higher man’s self-appointed destiny is to make a cosmos of his chaotic inheritance.” (Thiele, L., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, p.212)

which it can achieve its overall maximum level of power. It achieves this through overcoming resistances, the most painful experiences such that its power is increased (Moles 1990: 107 citing AC: §2). The increase in power gives rise to an increased level of pleasure. Therefore in many places we see Nietzsche affirming the wisdom of suffering, as a means to creativity and spiritual power (GS: §318); (D: §114). In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche also refers to the idea of a ruling intelligence, an “organizing “idea””, an unconscious ‘teleology’ that enables one to discover one’s life purpose, one’s “life-task” that is to “become what one is”. (EH, ‘Clever’: §9)

To become what one is, one must have the faintest notion of what one is. From this point of view even the blunders of life have their own meaning and value—the occasional side roads and wrong roads...that are remote from *the task*. The whole surface of consciousness—consciousness *is* a surface—must be kept clear of all great imperatives...Meanwhile *the organizing “idea”* that is destined to rule keeps growing deep down—it begins to command...that will one day prove to be an indispensable means toward a whole—it trains all subservient capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, “goal,” “aim,” or “meaning.” (EH, ‘Clever’: §9)

This “idea” is the ruling force that leads us back from side roads and wrong roads, all of which prove to be an indispensable means toward a whole. “To become what one is” is to be disciplined to the whole, to experience the absolute innocence and joy of all becoming, and in turn of going beyond good and evil. The philosophical type is not determined by a pre-given essence; the higher type must be master of his own destiny<sup>13</sup>, and get in touch with his “life-task”. The “secret force” and “necessity” of

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<sup>13</sup> Leiter, B. in his essay ‘*The Paradox of fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche*’ also refers to the passage ‘To Become what one is’ from *Ecce Homo* (‘Clever’: §9) in order to stress the idea of a fatalism in Nietzsche (In: J. Richardson & B. Leiter (eds.), *Nietzsche*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.286). He also attempts to solve the paradox in Nietzsche between the idea of ‘self-creation’ and his fatalism. He wishes to argue that self-creation presupposes the discovery of what is ‘lawful and necessary’ in one’s life, for Nietzsche. (Leiter, p.315 citing GS: §335) He suggests that in spite of Nietzsche’s critique of the concept of the ‘*Causa Sui*’ or the notion of ‘free will’ that Nietzsche embraces the idea that we are causally determined by natural facts or the environment. (*ibid.*, p.299) There is also no conscious ‘self’ in self-mastery; self-mastery rather arises from a struggle of drives being played out. (*ibid.*, p318) Then, Leiter suggests that “how they play out determines what he

this task is expressed in the preface to *Human, all too Human* (I: §6), it rules “among and in the individual facets of his destiny like an unconscious pregnancy—long before he has caught sight of this task itself or knows its name.” In speaking of his “eccentricities” in a Letter to Carl Fuchs, he expresses the idea of a “task”, which closely parallels the idea of being disciplined to the whole in *Ecce Homo* (‘Clever’: §9). He expresses how his “eccentricities” play a role in the realization of his “task”

In Germany there are strong complaints about my “eccentricities.” But since people do not know where my centre is...Likewise today it seems an eccentricity that I should have been a Wagnerite. It was an inordinately dangerous experiment...To be sure, one’s inmost being gradually disciplines one back to unity; that *passion*, to which no name can be put for a long time, rescues us from all digressions and dispersions, that *task* of which one is the involuntary mission. (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec14th, 1887)

It is this idea of “one’s inmost being” that is analogous to the “organizing” ““idea”” that is expressed in *Ecce Homo*.<sup>14</sup> Nietzsche refers to this idea of the self as an organization of intentionally directed drives in *Beyond Good and Evil* as “our spiritual fatum” and our “unteachable very “deep down””, which is part of a larger Totality. (TI, ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely Man’: §49) It is the “untimely I” that belongs to the whole as Becoming; it is what Nietzsche refers to as his “innermost history” or becoming self. (EH, ‘UM’: §3) For Nietzsche, consciousness is argued to be superfluous, as there are deeper drives that keep the body attuned to reality. As Parkes (2011: 97) notes in his article ‘*Nietzsche, Panpsychism and Pure Experience: An*

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believes, what he values, what he becomes. But, *qua* conscious self or ‘agent’, the person takes no active part in the process.” (*ibid.*, p.318-19) This implies that Nietzsche uses a familiar term ‘self-mastery’ in an unfamiliar way, “one that actually presupposes the truth of fatalism.” (*ibid.*, p. 319)

<sup>14</sup> For Nietzsche, the “Great Reason of the Body” (Z, I: §4), the “organizing “idea”” that is at work in one’s depths, the unconscious (EH, ‘Clever’: §9) and “one’s inmost being” (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec14th, 1887) can be argued to closely relate to one another. It is the higher type or Nietzsche’s idea of the genuine philosopher that has this aspect to the “self” or the body. It is a higher self in that not everyone has this aspect to the self. The idea of the higher self coincides with rank-order in Nietzsche, and also the idea that he writes for the select few, which will be discussed in the third chapter.

*East-Asian Contemplative Perspective*' in speaking of the superfluous nature of consciousness, he states that for Nietzsche

A less sick way to live, then, would be to let the drives that give rise to our everyday consciousness and its thinking in words become quiescent, no longer interpreting the situation from their own perspectives, and to thereby allow what is going on beneath thinking to flow through the body in silence, without commentary. What is going on is basically drives—not exfoliating into consciousness or commenting on the text of experience, not the egocentric drives that sustain the illusion of the I—but now only the more ancient, deeper drives through the millennia of adaptation have kept the human being attuned to its physical environment. Paradoxically, it is by putting ourselves in a situation where we do not need to be concerned with preserving ourselves that we can get to a condition in which it is only those natural, environment-related and life-preserving drives that are operative. Under such conditions, one's responses to the world are naturally spontaneous, and one's actions stem not from the narrow confines of the small self, but from the forces of heaven and earth as they operate through the well trained body.

The idea of a higher self is also intimately connected with the realization of a “life-task” such a task is to encounter the tragic or something higher than oneself that “outweighs all of life's struggles”. Nietzsche expresses this in his discussion of “the meaning of tragedy”

The individual must be consecrated to something higher than himself—that is the meaning of tragedy; he must be free of the terrible anxiety which death and time evoke in the individual: for at any moment, in the briefest atom of his life's course, he may encounter something holy that endlessly outweighs all his struggle and all his distress—that what it means to have a sense for the tragic; all the ennoblement of mankind is enclosed in this supreme task; the definite rejection of this task would be the saddest picture imaginable to a friend of man. That is my view of things! There is only hope and one guarantee for the future of humanity: it consists in his *retention of the sense for the tragic*. (UM, ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’, §IV)

### III

#### *Nietzsche on Tragic Insight into Truth as Primordial Reality or Becoming*

The following section looks at how Nietzsche's perspectivism is traceable back to a Kantian phenomenalism, and examines the contention that his notion of tragic insight is a new metaphysics. It can be argued that in light of Nietzsche's perspectivism, as in the case of Lampert (2001) that tragic insight is itself an interpretation of the world. Alternatively, there are commentators like Sadler (1995) who argues against those who follow a strict perspectival reading of Nietzsche and view truth in perspectival terms, claiming that reality cannot be accessed. They view Nietzsche's perspectivism in light of Kant's "Copernican Revolution" that the limits of human reason show that the world as noumenon can never be known, that there is only mere phenomenal or perspectival knowledge and that accordingly reality can have no meaning for us.

Sadler (1995) also suggests that there is a clear connection between Nietzsche's perspectivism and Kantian empirical knowledge (or what is commonly referred to as Kant's phenomenalism), in order to show that his perspectivism is a form of scepticism.<sup>15</sup> This view entails that the idea that objective knowledge of the thing-in-

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<sup>15</sup> Doyle, in her work '*Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics*,' argues that Nietzsche's perspectivism doesn't involve scepticism. She argues that knowledge for Nietzsche is anthropocentric but that it is of a mind-independent empirical reality. She is an example of a perspectivist commentator of Nietzsche who falls on the analytical side. She claims that Nietzsche is an empirical realist; that there is perspectival knowledge of empirical reality and that this reality is knowable. She therefore claims to solve the scepticism charge (problem of self-reference) against Nietzsche. She traces Nietzsche's perspectivism back to Kantian phenomenalism, but argues that Nietzsche rejects the idea that empirical reality exists as a mental representation, and that the self is disconnected from the thing-in-itself. (Doyle, T., *Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p.53) She claims that Becoming as empirical reality can be known, and that it is irreducible to human minds because of its intrinsic nature. Her emphasis is on epistemic knowledge of things; however, she does not explore the relationship between Nietzsche's perspectivism and his artist's metaphysics. She argues that Nietzsche never abandoned the language of falsification in his later works, and in doing so she refers to the passage cited above from *The Gay Science* (§354) to compound her argument. She references an excerpt from the passage as follows: "all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and

itself (reality) is an unattainable ideal or “God’s eye view”, which has led in turn to the idea that scientific knowledge or phenomenal knowledge is not only the sole form of knowledge but is also devalued, in that it cannot capture the thing-in-itself or objective reality. This in turn has led to the dominance of multiple perspectival truths, which as “devalued” knowledge is a form of nihilism and as representational knowledge has led to the nihilistic notion that reality can have no meaning for us. Scientific knowledge became, for Kant, representational knowledge and as a form of mental representationalism, reality became the ‘object of knowledge’ rather than being viewed as metaphysically independent of human thought. As Sadler (1995: 27) notes, Kant “discredits metaphysics” in rendering metaphysical knowledge an impossibility, and claiming that the only knowledge is phenomenal. He argues that Nietzsche reclaims the true metaphysics whereby tragic insight as the genuine metaphysics is non-perspectival. Kant introduces a scepticism that reality cannot be known and it can be argued that for Nietzsche through tragic insight this scepticism can be overturned. It can be surmounted either by arguing that this tragic insight is not conscious phenomenal or perspectival knowledge, as in the case of Sadler or that it is to the contrary an interpretation of the world, either way tragic insight is ranked highest and can be argued to be a new standard of truth, for Nietzsche.

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generalization.” (GS: §354, cited in this form in Doyle, *ibid.* p.73) Doyle’s aim is to show that Nietzsche overturns a Kantian scepticism, that reality cannot be known. Therefore, there is a mind-independent reality that is perspectively known and there is no epistemic gap between self and world. Doyle argues that, for Nietzsche, the idea that there is perspectival knowledge of empirical reality implies that this reality is knowable, and hence the scepticism charge against Nietzsche (that reality is unknowable) can be removed. However, Doyle’s argument that the charge of scepticism can be removed conflicts with her assertion that Nietzsche retains the language of falsification throughout his work.

The aim of this thesis is to argue that Nietzsche retains the idea of the thing-in-itself not as substance or as representation, but as a reality, that of Becoming, and that “metaphysical knowledge” of this reality is possible only in the tragic sense. The type of metaphysical knowledge that Nietzsche rejects is intellectual knowledge in the sense of the “conscious intellect” capturing the thing-in-itself. He also rejects scientific or phenomenal as representational knowledge where reality becomes the “object of knowledge”. In order to argue that Nietzsche retains the idea of the “thing-in-itself” only as a reality of Becoming and the possibility of corresponding to it, it is necessary to examine his relationship with those philosophers such as Kant and Schopenhauer who also uphold the idea of the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer recognized in Kant the metaphysical need to gain access to the thing-in-itself through the conscious intellect, but, like Nietzsche, rejects this approach to metaphysics. Nietzsche is also anti-Kantian in terms of his criticism of Kant’s adherence to abstract or conceptual thought as a way of accessing the thing-in-itself, which turns out to be an impossible ideal. Nietzsche rejects this ideal, the ascetic ideal as a moral law that renders reality a ‘beyond’, an inaccessible reality or ‘x’. In recognizing Kant’s acknowledgement that conceptual thought cannot capture reality, Nietzsche does not take scientific or phenomenal knowledge as a substitute for metaphysical knowledge or tragic insight. Nietzsche is a Kantian only in the sense of relating to Kant’s desire to satisfy the metaphysical need of accessing “the thing-in-itself” or for Nietzsche, a reality that is irreducible to the human that is not an unknowable ‘x’, but not when it comes to the way in which this need is to be satisfied. Nietzsche recognizes that he retains this same desire but takes a different route to its fulfilment; rather than through conceptual or abstract thought, he argues that there is alternative, non-representational knowledge that can gain access to reality. This non-representational knowledge is, for

Nietzsche of the early period, intuition, a term borrowed from Schopenhauer<sup>16</sup> Schopenhauer rejects, in the same way as Nietzsche, Kant's notion that the positive sciences or representational knowledge can act as a substitute for tragic insight.

Schopenhauer maintains that if representational knowledge cannot gain access to the thing-in-itself then there must be a form of non-representational knowledge which can. This latter type of knowledge is what he calls intuition, which is a form of 'inner experience' distinct from the outer experience of empirical perception. Kant makes the false assumption that if abstract conceptual thought cannot make possible objective knowledge of the thing-in-itself, then it could not be known at all. However, as Sadler (1995: 29) notes, even "Schopenhauer's subjective way to the thing-in-itself cannot reveal the latter in all its pristine nakedness." It becomes apparent that no kind of metaphysical thinking in the intellectual or conceptual sense can access reality, "but inner experience will lead us as closely as humanly possible." (*ibid.*) Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche retain the idea of the Thing-in-itself as they only reject it

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<sup>16</sup> As has been aforementioned Nietzsche drops the use of the term "intuition" in the later works. It must also be mentioned at this point that this thesis is not a complex study of the relationship between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer; however, it must be acknowledged that in spite of the early Nietzsche's affinity with him that this relationship is one of opposition in the later period. Regardless of their complex relationship, it can be argued that Schopenhauer influenced Nietzsche on intuition and the unconscious. In *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer refers to intuitive "aesthetic experience" as "intuitive cognition", "Knowledge of perception" or "feeling"; it is non-conceptual or non-propositional knowledge (abstract knowledge). In aesthetic terms it implies that the genius artist (tragedian) momentarily escapes pain in his identification with the Will. It is a bodily experience. For Schopenhauer's elevation of the body to philosophical importance, see (WWR, I: §18, 100, 102, E.F.J. Payne (ed.), 2 vols., New York, Dover, 1969). It is expressed by certain commentators that Schopenhauer played a role in the discovery of the unconscious. On Schopenhauer's anticipation of the late Freud on the unconscious see, Magee, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.284) Parkes in his work '*Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology*' notes Schopenhauer's influence upon Nietzsche's psychology, that the idea of will ('will to life') as the "innermost being of the whole of nature" that is the force that drives in nature is an anticipation of Nietzsche's notion of the will to power (Parkes, G., *Composing the Soul*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.50 citing *The World as Will and Representation*, I: 21-23) However, it must also be noted that Nietzsche is critical of Schopenhauer's idea of will; he views it as moralistic (GS: §344) and he also criticises Schopenhauer for assigning to the will properties that are only appropriate at the level of phenomena. For a detailed discussion of Schopenhauer's influence upon Nietzsche, see '*Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*', C. Janaway (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998 wherein Higgins discusses the differences between the philosophers. (*ibid.* p.158)



as an ‘object of human knowledge’ or in the form of a mental representation. Nietzsche refers to this “totality” or “whole” as the ‘Primal Unity’ in his early work *The Birth of Tragedy* (§6) and it is also referred to as “Life” or “Becoming” in his later works. It must be stressed that Nietzsche emphasizes strictly “Becoming”, as opposed to the “Primal Unity” in the later period. Nietzsche upholds the idea of a metaphysically independent reality and advocates that knowledge of it is possible, and he describes this type of knowledge as tragic wisdom or as Dionysian wisdom; it is a form of insight into reality.<sup>17</sup> This insight can be referred to as an unconscious, pre-cognitive aesthetic experience, where one “enters into” correspondence with the whole. It is the individual type who can make his life a work of art that is most truthful in corresponding to reality in what is called a “beautiful appearance”. For Nietzsche, in the same way that there are varying degrees of expressing reality, there are varying degrees of being truthful or untruthful or there are varying shades of appearance where the lightest are those that are most truthful. There are both direct and indirect expressions of reality which in turn coincide with the distinction between verbal and pre-verbal thought which has been discussed in the previous section. Nietzsche refers to pre-verbal thought or unconscious activity in the form of a dancing oneness with reality as a direct expression it.. Although Nietzsche’s use of the term “intuition” or “instinctive certainty” (BT: §1) is dropped in the later philosophy, Nietzsche returns to the notion of tragic wisdom in the form of a “dancing revelatory experience” (Z, III: §15-16). Verbal thought, for Nietzsche is an indirect expression of

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<sup>17</sup> This tragic wisdom is also referred to as the ‘Great Reason’ of the Body (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’) or ‘Lioness wisdom’ or ‘wild wisdom’ (Z, II: ‘The Child with the Mirror’), as “bird-wisdom’ (EH, III, ‘The Yes & Amen Song: §7). It is also referred to as “recovered reason” in *Twilight of the Idols*, ‘The Four Great Errors’: §2). In *Ecce Homo* it is referred to as the ‘strangest “objectivity”’ (EH, ‘BT’: §4), “tragic wisdom” (EH, ‘BT’: §3), “inspiration”, “rapture”, and “revelation.” (EH, Z: §1) Nietzsche refers to wisdom as intuition in his early works; however, it is looked at in terms of the intelligent drives or the “Great Reason of the Body” in the later works. (Z, I: ‘On Reading & Writing’) Nietzsche’s early works emphasizes intuitive wisdom in the early works whereas he looks at it in relation to the “Great Reason” of the body (the most intelligent drives) in the later work ‘*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*’ (I: §7).

reality, it is constituted within inter-subjective relations and is an expression of a group or community. Nietzsche often refers to this type of verbal thought as “abstract” or “conceptual” where there is no difficulty of comprehension. Intuitive thought, in contrast requires artistry, or what Schopenhauer refers to as the quality of genius. This is why Fink (2003: 27) asserts that “Nietzsche’s concept of the genius must ultimately be understood and interpreted via the human dedication to truth. Truth here does not refer to scientific cognition but to the tragic intuition of the cosmic ground... he becomes the medium of universal truth.” Fink refers to the idea of genius as the instrument of a divine power “which the cosmic ground creates in order to encounter itself”, and that for Nietzsche “The genius is the caretaker of the truth of the primordial cosmic ground, the location of its revelation.” (2003: 30)

In terms of looking at both Kant and Schopenhauer’s influence upon Nietzsche, it is important also at this point to consider whether the ‘Primal Unity’ of *The Birth of Tragedy* is the Schopenhauerian ‘Primal Will’ or ask the question to what extent does *The Birth* withhold a Schopenhauerian metaphysic? The “Attempt at Self-criticism” (1886) tends to raise this problem; Nietzsche is viewed as being critical of his earlier relationship with Kant and Schopenhauer and that at the later period he abandons these tendencies.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> It must be noted that both Nietzsche’s ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’, a new preface to *The Birth of Tragedy* and the fact that he dropped the term ‘Primal Unity’ after this early work has led to the idea that Nietzsche’s early work may have embodied a Schopenhauerian pessimism or a Kantian scepticism. There is the contention held that Nietzsche’s ‘Primal One’ is ‘metaphysical’ in a Schopenhauerian sense, as like Schopenhauer’s ‘primal will’, it seems to imply a distinction between reality ‘in itself’ and ‘appearance’. There are commentators who argue in favour and those who argue against this estimation. It is suggested by certain commentators that Nietzsche should not have inherited it considering *The Birth* was written “in the post-Kantian Epoch”, at a time when Nietzsche was aware of Kant’s Copernican Revolution that reality cannot be known through conscious thoughts or the mind. See Sadler, T. who argues against such commentators in arguing that *The Birth* does not inherit a Schopenhauerian or Kantian metaphysic (*Nietzsche: Truth and Redemption*, London, The Athlone Press, 1995, p.132). For a detailed outline of who these commentators are, that suggests that he does adhere to a Schopenhauerian pessimism see Han, B., in her article ‘*Nietzsche’s Metaphysics in the*

One may question whether Nietzsche's subsequent critical comments in the "Attempt at Self-Criticism" may affect my using it to support the claim that he is a metaphysician. Although Nietzsche regrets his "romantic" tendencies, his use of Kantian and Schopenhauerian terms, his belief in Wagnerian music as a panacea to the ills of modernity, he nevertheless maintains that the book hints at thoughts that his later works had more "courage" to express (BT, 'Attempt': §6) He wanted to express "strange and new valuations" not necessarily Schopenhauerian but by "means" of Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas "which were basically at odds with Kant's and Schopenhauer's spirit and taste! What, after all, did Schopenhauer think of tragedy?" (BT, 'Attempt': §6)<sup>19</sup> It could be argued that he regrets using certain

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*Birth of Tragedy*, European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3): 2006, p.20, n.2. She herself in this article claims that Nietzsche didn't adhere to a Schopenhauerian pessimism in *The Birth*. What is actually meant by this pessimism will be discussed later in the section. If *The Birth* does withhold a Kantian scepticism, the question that then arises is what is meant by this dualism? This dualism consists of a mind versus reality opposition that the mind cannot access reality, and therefore is set in opposition to it. The former distinction is the one that *The Birth* is accused of inheriting. Kant does not deny reality but only its accessibility through the mind's activity, such as conceptual and theoretical thinking. However, the 'Primal One' of *The Birth* is not an object of theoretical knowledge. If *The Birth* inherited the Kantian prohibition about the 'know-ability' of reality, the Dionysian wisdom of this early work would have to be theoretical in nature. See also Sadler, T. who argues that *The Birth* does not adhere to a Kantian scepticism, *Op. cit.*, p.133. It is theoretical knowledge that cannot 'access' reality and creates an opposition between the 'mind' and reality. Nietzsche rejects the opposition but not the reality itself; the term 'in-itself' is rejected only in the sense that it implies a barrier to reality, but what the term refers to, that is a reality is not rejected. It is possible to argue that the relationship between reality/'Primal Unity' and appearance in *The Birth* does not coincide with the reality/appearance distinction in Kant. Appearance, for Nietzsche, in *The Birth* is the experience of the Dionysian artist who looks "truly into the essence" and possesses "true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth." (BT: §7) The Dionysian artist *identifies* with the 'Primal Unity' in the intoxicating experience of entering into a dancing oneness with reality itself. Appearance, for Kant is rather theoretical, abstract and conceptual such that it sets up a distinction or *opposition* between phenomenon and noumenon (reality/in-itself).

<sup>19</sup> See the Appendix to '*Willingness and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*' for all of Nietzsche's references to Schopenhauer. Janaway outlines that the 'Attempt at Self-Criticism' of BT (§6) shows that Nietzsche in BT uses Schopenhauerian formulae, but is against Schopenhauer's view of tragedy. (Janaway, C., (ed.) *Willingness and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*, *Op. cit.*, p266. Nietzsche's account of tragedy is distinct from Schopenhauer's which is pessimistic in nature, as it implies the conclusion that 'All life is suffering' (WWR, I: 56, 310), and that the will is insatiable. (WWR, I: 56, 308) such that suffering cannot be overcome.

Schopenhauerian terminology, as he didn't understand tragedy to the same degree as Nietzsche himself.

In spite of Nietzsche's use of Schopenhauerian formulae, *The Birth* is actually trying to break away from a Schopenhauerian pessimism, which he views as life-denying. This criticism towards Schopenhauerian pessimism intensifies in the later works in particular in a section entitled 'What is romanticism?' of *The Gay Science* (§370). In his early work, he withholds a life-affirmative philosophy that the most intense suffering can be overcome, which also makes his philosophy redemptive in nature.<sup>20</sup>

It also must be noted that the 'Primal One' is not a Schopenhauerian term<sup>21</sup>; it seems that the main Schopenhauerian term used by Nietzsche is that of the "*principium*

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<sup>20</sup> Nietzsche's early work '*The Birth*' is in no way life-denying; it is life-affirmative, it upholds the philosophy that man can justify his life in the face of a "terrifying" and "absurd" abyss of life. In this early work, Nietzsche rejects a higher Christian or theological purpose to life, in the form of after-worldly hopes. It expresses the 'tragic' insight which must be once again re-embraced after the "optimistic intellectualism" beginning with Socrates that is a rational justification of life that Nietzsche criticizes. Although Nietzsche came under Schopenhauer's influence, he is to be distinguished from the latter's conclusion that life must be 'denied'. *The Birth* expresses a life-affirmative philosophy that of 'life-intoxication'. Although Nietzsche breaks away from Schopenhauer in the later works, he is at the same time indebted to him on the distinction between life-denying and life-affirmative values. His critique of Schopenhauer's pessimism enables him to develop a dichotomy between life-denial and life-affirmation in the later works, such as "Dionysus versus the Crucified" in *Ecce Homo*. The 'Yes-saying' pathos of *The Birth* is clearly expressed in the following passage as "Life is at bottom of things, despite all changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable" (BT: §7) Nietzsche's metaphysics shows us that although life may seem like a vale of suffering, its overall meaning is positive, as suffering can be overcome. This is probably the most radical way that *The Birth* departs from Schopenhauer, which anticipates later themes in his thought, in particular artistic sublimation in *Twilight of the Idols* ('What I owe to the ancients': §4), and of *amor fati* (love of one's fate) in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

<sup>21</sup> This claim that the 'Primal One' is not a Schopenhauerian term also implies that it is not what Schopenhauer means by the 'Primal Will'. In an essay entitled '*On Schopenhauer*' written in 1868, he strongly criticises the latter for having forgotten the Kantian prohibition about the unknowability of things-in-themselves and as a result relapsed into a dogmatic metaphysics by attributing to will qualities which can only pertain to phenomena. In this way it is unlikely that Nietzsche in *The Birth*, which was published in 1872, subsequently to his essay on Schopenhauer that he did what he criticizes the latter for doing, i.e., to deck out "a totally obscure, inconceivable X ... as if in brightly coloured clothes, with predicates drawn from a world alien to it, the world of appearance." (Nietzsche, F., 'On Schopenhauer' (1868), In: C. Janaway (trans.), *Willingness and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*, *Op. cit.*, p.262) Janaway offers the full translation of this essay in 'Willingness and Nothingness', pp.258-265).

*individuationis*".<sup>22</sup> Although the term 'Primal Unity' disappears in the later works, it re-emerges under different terms such as the "will to power" and "Becoming". Looking back on his early work in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche remarks that "the cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer sticks to only a few formulas" (EH, 'BT': §1), which suggests that not all the terms of *The Birth* were Schopenhauerian in nature. However, it must also be acknowledged that Nietzsche did come under some sort of Schopenhauerian influence, and that he becomes more critical of Schopenhauer in the later works, in particular towards his "romantic pessimism." (GS: §370) Although the alleged "romantic tendencies" of his early period are abandoned in the middle work *Human, All too Human*, his "sceptical" or "intellectual" period, Nietzsche returns to the idea of the Dionysian in his later works *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Gay Science*. Nietzsche's self-criticism could also be argued to be equally self-promoting in the sense that his criticism of an earlier self is compatible with the promotion of his present self. In his "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" Nietzsche has come to a place where he has overcome fully Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulae, and he feels that his notion of tragic wisdom that is expressed in the later work '*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*' (BT, 'Attempt': §7) actually supersedes either of these thinkers influences. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he speaks of the "concept of the

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<sup>22</sup> In BT Nietzsche uses the above term to refer to the individuating experience of the tragedian who is removed from the oneness of all things. This individuating process involves suffering and isolation, existentialist states that Nietzsche advocates throughout his philosophy. He does so, as he sees them as a stimulus to life and that can be overcome. The type of suffering that Nietzsche advocates is not one that is purposely self-induced but rather consists of what life just happens to bring to the tragedian's experiences. Schopenhauer's use of the term is rather in the moralistic sense that it involves fasting, and absolute chastity, which Nietzsche would reject. The above term also refers, for Schopenhauer to the way in which we cognitively apprehend the world that is through the human categories of space, time and causality (the world as representation). Nietzsche notes this in '*On Schopenhauer*' (1968) (*Op. cit.*, p.262) In BT: §18 Nietzsche admires both Kant and Schopenhauer for recognizing that space, time and causality are human categories. Nietzsche's tragedian 'transcends' these categories in entering into a dancing oneness with the primal unity ("untimely"). In the later philosophy such as in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra experiences the "untimely" under a different guise in entering into an oneness with "eternity", that is "eternity" that is within Becoming or the "untimely". In this way, Nietzsche overturns a problem in Schopenhauer, the problem of transcending time.

“Dionysian” that it becomes “a *supreme deed*” in relation to Zarathustra’s climb or ascent that it forms part of this most Yes-saying or life-affirmative of spirits:

The ladder on which he ascends and descends is tremendous; he has seen further, willed further, been *capable* further than any other human being. In every word he contradicts, this most Yes-saying of all spirits; in him all opposites are blended into a new unity. (EH, ‘Z’: §6)

In his work “*Nietzsche’s Task*” Lampert explores Nietzsche’s idea of the return of Dionysus of section (§295) of *Beyond Good and Evil*. Lampert asks the question “What does the return of Dionysos mean?” and answers with the claim that “Within the economy of Nietzsche’s writings it means the return of the god whose banishment Nietzsche judged, in his first book, the most significant event of Western history (*BT* 12-17)” (Lampert 2001: 288) He also identifies the affinity this early work has with *Beyond Good and Evil*: “*Beyond Good and Evil* shows that Nietzsche remained true to his early judgement about this event while expanding and deepening his conception of just what happened there.” (Lampert 2001: 288) He also observes Nietzsche’s affinity with the Dionysian in *Twilight of the Idols* in the section ‘What I owe to the ancients,’

...what he finally owes them is “the fundamental fact of the Hellenic instinct,” the Dionysian condition. There too Nietzsche ends by noting the trajectory of his career, beginning with the *Birth of Tragedy* and culminating in the deeper understanding and greater explicitness of the later works: “I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysos, —I, the teacher of the eternal return...” (Lampert 2001: 288)

Lampert also notes a passage from *The Gay Science* (§370) where Nietzsche speaks of the return of Dionysus as the next greatest recent event after the death of God. It is the return of the “genius of the heart”, the “tempter god”, (BGE: §295) “whose mastery of knowing how to seem gives him access to every soul.” (Lampert 2001: 290) In examining the aphorism (§370) of *The Gay Science*, it is apparent that Nietzsche still

has an affinity with the Dionysian; he refers to it as “Dionysian pessimism” as opposed to a Schopenhauerian pessimism. He also exhorts that it is his ‘ownmost’ intuition and vision that the Dionysian returns, a prophetic vision:

(That there *could* be a completely different pessimism, a classical one—this intuition and vision belongs to me as inseparable from me, as my *proprium* and *ipsissimum*; only the word ‘classical’ offends my ears; it has become far too trite, round, and indistinct. I call this pessimism of the future—for it is coming! I see it coming!—*Dionysian* pessimism.)

The section next looks at Nietzsche’s early work entitled ‘*On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*’, it is evident that Nietzsche has an affinity with intuition in this work, that is tragic wisdom of the early period and that there is a certain truth that he embraces. In spite of his very critical attitude to truth at that time, such as truth in the dogmatic sense, this work suggests that there is a certain type of truth that Nietzsche advocates. This is truth in the redemptive sense; that is through intuition the higher type gains insight into reality. For Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer, the intellect knows only the world as representation; it is only a “surface power”, “subjective” or “superficial.” (*The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge*: §54) The main point, for both thinkers, is not only that the conscious intellect cannot access to reality; but also that it does not need such access, because it only serves the practical needs of the herd. Nietzsche confirms this when he states that “the intellect unfolds its principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves—.” (*On the Truth & Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*: §1) Nietzsche identifies the intellect with herd-utility values, and he rejects these as a source of truth. This is a work where Nietzsche is an advocate

of multiple perspectival truths in his rejection of dogmatic truths.<sup>23</sup> It is also a work where Nietzsche rejects language as an adequate expression of reality whereby he makes the claim that it cannot capture reality. (*On the Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*: §1) It can be argued that Nietzsche contends that reality can be ‘accessed’ but through non-linguistic tragic wisdom. Nietzsche’s rejection of abstract, conceptual or linguistic truth does not imply a rejection of truth entirely, as his early works address the notion of philosophical truth and its connection with tragic insight.

This thesis also examines the connection between Nietzsche’s style and truth where it will be shown that his writings are in attunement to Becoming. It will be shown that Nietzsche engages in the art of writing in blood or writing that flows from life experience or tragic insight as opposed to theoretical knowledge, which in turn makes his writings closer to truth. This coincides with Nietzsche’s criticism of Parmenides’ use of “bloodless abstractions” as an inadequate expression of reality which contrasts with the truth expressed by Heraclitus, the type of truth “grasped in intuitions.” (PTAG: §9) In this way, his style will be argued to be an expression of the whole that it is an expression of tragic wisdom and of his life experience.

It is in ‘*On Truth & Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*’ that Nietzsche associates intuition with redemption and truth:

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<sup>23</sup> The work ‘*On the Truth & Lies*’ is one in which postmodernists refer to in order to argue the idea that Nietzsche advocates multiple perspectival truths either in the sense that perspectives cannot access reality or that there are only perspectives whereby reality or truth is overlooked. See Higgins, K., in her essay ‘Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: Temperament and Temporality’ who also notes that this work is adhered to by postmodernists in arguing for multiple perspectival truths. (In: C. Janaway, *Op. cit.*, p.151-178) There are also commentators like Sadler who argue that postmodernists overlook intuition in this work, as they adhere to the idea that Nietzsche’s perspectivism which in being traceable back to a Kantian phenomenalism cannot capture reality. There is also the contention that Nietzsche’s affinity with intuitive wisdom is a Schopenhauerian influence that he later abandons and that his perspectivism coincides with tragic wisdom such that the later Nietzsche views tragic insight as perspectival as opposed to being intuitive.



The man who is guided by concepts and abstractions only succeeds by such means in warding off misfortune, without ever gaining happiness for himself from these abstractions. And while he aims for the greatest possible freedom from pain, the intuitive man, standing in the midst of a culture, already reaps from intuition a harvest of continually inflowing illumination, cheer, and redemption—. (*On the Truth & Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*: §2)

The connection between truth and intuition arises where Nietzsche discusses the distinction between the abstract thinker and the intuitive thinker or the philosopher of wisdom. For Nietzsche, both the abstract man and the intuitive man “both desire to rule over life”; the former through meeting “his principle needs by means of foresight, prudence and regularity” whereas the latter “by disregarding these needs and, as an “overjoyed hero,” counting as real only that life which has been disguised as illusion and beauty.” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche also describes the notion of a liberated intellect as one that “will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts”, one which will be removed from “the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions.” (*ibid.*)

Nietzsche also associates this redemption with spiritual transfiguration as a form of mysticism; he describes the experience of corresponding to the “oneness of all things” as a mystical experience, one in which he himself participates in. Nietzsche also describes this experience as a form of seeking one’s own ‘blessedness’ where one encounters the redemptive act of becoming oneself. Nietzsche draws a distinction between the philosopher and the scientist, where the former is associated with ultimate knowledge and the latter with knowledge of things or “augmented knowledge”: “The individual who wishes to rely *upon himself* requires *ultimate knowledge*, philosophy. Other men require a science which is slowly augmented” (*The Struggle between Science and Wisdom*: 129). The philosopher encounters “ultimate knowledge” in the experience of the “oneness of all things”

Reality, for Nietzsche, is a totality irreducible to the human mind and independent of theoretical constructs. Nietzsche's writings are attuned to this totality that can be referred to as '*one will, one health, one soil, one sun*' (GM, Pref.: §2), a reality that is a necessary whole made up of many interrelated parts, which ties in with the Heraclitean 'One-Many' relation. This reality in no way 'grounds' Nietzsche's works but is rather the underlying totality that his works belong to. Nietzsche rejects the type of system which is a human construct, a mental representation; he rather is an advocate of a reality that is mind-independent. In this way, it will be argued that his works are an expression of truth or that they form part of the whole or the 'One'.

#### IV

##### *Nietzsche on a New Truth: Reality as the 'inner logos' of Becoming*

This section intends to propose not only that reality for Nietzsche is the “inner lawfulness” of Becoming, but also that it is closely related to what he considers ‘eternity’ to be, as is expressed in ‘The Seven Seals (Or: the Yes and Amen Song)’ (Z, III: §16) The very same desire for ‘eternity’ that is associated with traditional metaphysics exists also for Nietzsche except that it is not to be viewed in terms of Parmenidean or Platonic Being but rather in terms of the metaphysics of the “inner necessity” of Becoming. Nietzsche only repudiates the thing-in-itself as a causal ground that is characteristic of substance-based metaphysics, but retains the idea of ‘thing-in-itself’ that is in the sense of a reality as Becoming. The following section consists of a brief examination of what Nietzsche considers reality to be, that is Becoming or more specifically the ‘inner lawfulness’ of Becoming, “the *law in becoming*” (PTAG: §8)<sup>24</sup> . It is this “inner lawfulness” of Becoming or *logos* that relates to what eternity is for Nietzsche and it is the philosopher of truth who intuits the *logos* that experiences *amor fati*.

This thesis contends that the self-overcoming that occurs at the level of the drives is a necessary stage in overcoming dogmatic truth towards the stage of Dionysian wisdom or insight into reality. The self-overcoming that occurs at the level of the drives is a physiological perspectivism, which includes the instinctual activity of “reversing

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<sup>24</sup> This section refers to *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* in order to argue that Nietzsche is a philosopher of intuition or tragic wisdom. It must be acknowledged that it is not only an early work of Nietzsche’s, but is also an unpublished work. However, in the latter stages of this section, I mention the way Nietzsche’s affinity with tragic insight into Becoming re-surfaces in the later work *Ecce Homo* (a published work), in particular in its association with Heraclitus. (EH, ‘BT’: §3) His admiration also for Heraclitus and his emphasis on Becoming persists throughout his works (See TI, ‘Reason’: §2), (WP: §437).

perspectives”. (EH, I: §1) It is what Nietzsche refers to it as “*another kind of phenomenal world*”. (WP: §569) However, it is through the “Great Reason” of the body that one’s “intrinsic nature”<sup>25</sup> is manifested or is disciplined towards the whole in a state of “becoming who you are.” (EH, ‘Why I am So Clever’: §2) Nietzsche identifies the self that participates in the “eternity” within Becoming as one’s ‘higher self’<sup>26</sup>, that of the genuine philosopher or higher type or the self that belongs to

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<sup>25</sup> This notion of an intrinsic nature is explored by Doyle when she argues that Nietzsche appeals to the ‘inner or intrinsic nature of force’ that renders force existentially independent of other forces, or that the activity of an individual power is informed by an ‘inner will’ as its intrinsic nature is existentially independent of perspectives taken on it from an external vantage–point.’ (Doyle, T., *Op. cit.*, p.179) Doyle examines Nietzsche’s notion of intrinsicity in terms of a new model of causality based on causal powers that is opposed to an event model of causality. She mentions that this new model is opposed to Hume’s event model of causality where ‘cause and effect relate to one another in terms of temporal succession’ (*ibid.*) or where relations can obtain only between actually existent relata. (Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992 [1888], Book I, part III, section xiv.) She argues that Nietzsche rather suggests ‘that the power is intrinsically connected to its effect understood as the manifestation of its ‘inherent’ nature and that when manifested this relata is simultaneous rather than successive.’ (Doyle, T., *Op. cit.*, p.180). Nietzsche proposes ‘a power model where cause and effect are simultaneous rather than reducible to one another and where the effect is the manifestation of the power’s nature rather than its interpretation by another power.’ (*ibid.*) Doyle mentions that it is ‘the degree of causal efficacy that dictates a power’s capacity to express its nature by overcoming resistances or by preserving itself against the encroaching attempts of other powers.’ (*ibid.*, p. 179) Ultimately, she is stating that for Nietzsche, powers can exist independent of their manifestation and that the manifestations are simultaneous rather than successive. In this thesis I extend Doyle’s argument by contending that self-overcoming and discipline, for Nietzsche, provide the ideal conditions for the manifestation of the ‘intrinsic’ nature or ‘inner necessity,’ and come into attunement with reality. This manifestation is called ‘Becoming who you are’. Doyle maintains that for Nietzsche, all powers both weak and strong have intrinsic natures; however, there are only a few who manifest their ‘inner necessity’. This relates to the ‘problem of rank order’ in Nietzsche which will be addressed in the following chapter. Doyle does not explore the order of rank among values but does mention that the ‘question of value’ cannot be viewed independently of epistemological or metaphysical commitments. (Doyle, T., *Op. cit.*, p.12). This thesis will argue that the state of ‘Becoming who you are’ is a pre-cognitive state, which is the most truthful standpoint towards a metaphysically independent reality. The ultimate principle of rank-order for Nietzsche is truth or that which comes into correspondence with reality as it is.

<sup>26</sup> This idea of the ‘higher self’ is also known as the ‘Great Reason’ of the Body and is deeper than consciousness and even the drives’ ability to perspectively know. It could be argued that this is an aspect of the self that is irreducible to a perspective or that ensures the metaphysical independence of the self from perspective. This higher self involves the experience of what Nietzsche calls ‘tragic wisdom’, of ‘Becoming who you are’ or of being disciplined to the whole. Nietzsche makes many references to this type of self that belongs to the Universal (reality). In *Ecce Homo* (‘The Untimely Ones’: §3) he refers to it as his ‘innermost history’ or his ‘becoming’, also as the ‘nethermost self’ that no longer listens to other selves as the ‘return to myself’ or ‘a supreme kind of recovery’ (EH, ‘H’: §4), as an intuitive experience it is referred to as his ‘own inmost experience’ (EH, ‘BT’: §2) where the Dionysian is referred to as the ‘only parable’ for this experience. In the preface to *Human, All Too Human* vol. II: §1, he refers to it as ‘my innermost self’ and indicates that his writings are an expression of this self. In a letter to Carl Fuchs (Dec 14<sup>th</sup>, 1887) he refers to it as ‘one’s inmost being’ that ‘gradually disciplines one back to unity’ or as his ‘task’ or his ‘centre’. This type of self will be referred to as the essential, necessary or philosophical self.

“Life”, as the whole or Becoming, which is the most truthful standpoint towards reality. This section is an examination of Nietzsche’s early work *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* not only to explore Nietzsche’s affinity with Becoming but also to look at the early Nietzsche and his relationship with tragic insight as intuition. Nietzsche goes on to drop the term “intuition” but in taking into account his perspectivism, it can be argued that tragic wisdom of the later period is an interpretation of the world.

This idea of reality or Being as Becoming can be traced back to Nietzsche’s early lectures on the Pre-Socratic philosophers. In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche, like Heraclitus, opposed the living flux of Becoming to the frozen false reality of Parmenides’ being. Nietzsche only rejects being (PTAG: §5) in the Parmenidean sense; however, he embraces the idea of Being as the Heraclitean *logos* or ‘the inner lawfulness of Becoming.’ (PTAG: §8) Nietzsche denies being in the same way as Heraclitus, he denies the equation of reality with ‘things’ — that is, a substance-based metaphysics — which he views as a falsification that takes place by the human mind. Nietzsche re-introduces Being as the *logos* or the law behind the flux, as ‘the One’ that is constant or is referred as the ‘inner necessity’ of Becoming whereby he replaces the traditional idea of being with becoming. For Both Nietzsche and Heraclitus, ‘the One’ can exist concurrently with the many. In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, he notes Heraclitus’ teaching of the “*law of becoming and of play in necessity.*” (PTAG: §8) Nietzsche adopts the term ‘play’ from Heraclitus in order to illustrate what is meant by ‘eternity’ or ‘necessity’: that it is not the causal necessity of the laws of nature characteristic of mechanism but rather *amor fati*. Nietzsche notes that the intuition guides the “childhood innocence” that is associated

with the play of becoming in *amor fati*, which is in opposition to the “seriousness” that Nietzsche equates with rational reflection. Nietzsche criticizes Parmenides for assigning primary importance to abstract thought and conceptualization: “The content of our thinking, according to Parmenides, is not present in sense perception but is an additive from somewhere else, from an extra-sensory world to which we have direct access by means of our thinking.” (PTAG: §11) Nietzsche refers to the Kantian critique of knowledge to make the point that thought is only capable of grasping reality according to pre-determined forms: “Through words and concepts we shall never reach beyond the wall of relations, to some sort of fabulous primal ground of things. Even in the pure forms of sense and understanding, in space, time and causality, we gain nothing that resembles an eternal verity.” (PTAG: §11) As is also made clear by Houlgate, (1986: 114) “Kant argues that the categories of the understanding are inadequate to the knowledge of reality ‘in itself’ because they are generated by the mind and therefore subjective .... Kant thus rejects the conviction held, but not fulfilled, by metaphysics ... that thought can articulate the structure of reality itself”. In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche, like Kant, stresses that one cannot access Being through thought and words, and states that “Words are but symbols for the relations of things to one another and to us; nowhere do they touch upon absolute truth.” (PTAG: §11) Nietzsche became aware that the belief in abstract thought as a means to accessing being as upheld by both Plato and Parmenides was overthrown by Kant and Schopenhauer. It is in this way that he refers to the pre-conceptual thought or ‘intuitive’ thought of Heraclitus and his ability to grasp reality as Becoming. Fink (2003: 127) notes that

Concepts are in general something questionable for Nietzsche with only limited application to reality.... Nietzsche thus believes that ontological concepts are ‘abstractions’ and ‘abstract concepts’. He does not clarify his opinion. He does not analyse the abstraction itself. He merely asserts it.

Philosophical concepts appear to him to be ‘the final vapour of a condensing reality’, that is a trace and a postscript. Concepts such as ‘being’ are for him utmost abstractions and manifold copies of reality. Contrary to the metaphysical method one should commence with the senses, the concrete presence, the changing reality and with intuition not with the concept.

Nietzsche views Parmenides as the first philosopher to assign primacy to the concept in grasping truth. Parmenides’ relation to Heraclitus is for Nietzsche what ice is to fire and what logical concepts are to intuition. In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche calls both Heraclitus and Parmenides “truth-tellers” but at the same time emphasizes that both have different approaches to truth. Heraclitus’ truth is acquired through intuition whereas Parmenides’ truth is acquired through reason and logic: “While each word of Heraclitus expresses the pride and the majesty of truth, but of truth grasped in intuitions rather than attained by the rope ladder of logic, while in Sibylline rapture Heraclitus gazes but does not peer, knows but does not calculate, his contemporary Parmenides stands beside him as counter-image, likewise expressing a type of truth-teller but one formed of ice rather than fire, pouring cold piercing light all around.” (PTAG: §9) Nietzsche does not reject the possibility of acquiring insight into an eternal verity or metaphysically independent reality, but what he does reject is words and life-less concepts as a means to grasping this reality. Nietzsche considers the intellect or consciousness as inadequate for comprehension of it (PTAG: §11) whereas intuition, blood, and tragic pathos is considered adequate for grasping the *logos*. Nietzsche thinks that Parmenides’ being is only an abstract term for a fiction of the human imagination, an anthropomorphic representation of reality. Being, for Parmenides is a substance-based realm that is fixed, immovable, rigid, lifeless, and is in turn bloodlessly opposed to Becoming. He views Parmenides as a thinker who is frozen in his lifeless abstractions. Nietzsche uses various metaphors in order to illustrate the distinction between concepts and life:

But no one lays hands with impunity on such fearsome abstractions as “the existent” and “the nonexistent.” Slowly, upon touching them, the blood congeals.... One’s sympathy toward phenomena atrophies; one even develops a hatred for phenomena including oneself, a hatred for being unable to get rid of the everlasting deceitfulness of sensation. Henceforward truth shall live only in the palest, most abstracted generalities, in the empty husks of the most indefinite terms, as though in a house of cobwebs. And beside such truth now sits our philosopher, likewise as bloodless as his abstractions, in the spun out fabric of his formulas. (PTAG: §10-11)

For Nietzsche, reality is not being in the Parmenidean sense, it is rather Becoming and to gain insight into reality is to participate in the Heraclitean *logos*. Nietzsche refers to such participation in the form of intuitive knowledge or philosophical wisdom; it is not a conceptual or an intellectual relation to independent reality ‘out there’ but rather is a divine experience of becoming one with the *logos*. This notion of truth for Heraclitus involves participation in what is common to all existing things, that which is the *logos* or the ‘inner lawfulness’ of Becoming. As Fink (2003: 169) asserts,

Nietzsche does not believe that this human truth of the cosmos realizes itself in an abstract or conceptual thinking. This thinking takes the form of an insight or an intuition. This implies however no immediate sense perception of the given for Nietzsche, but the divinatory intuition of the essence of the cosmos which cannot be expressed in common everyday language. It eludes the concept and remains perhaps inexpressible .... even for Plato the heart of philosophy is guided by silence. It is *Arrheton*—unsayable. Thus even in his rejection of the discursive concept and with the conception of the highest truth as a ‘showing’ Nietzsche still remains on the ground of the tradition which he intends to overcome.

Nietzsche rejects discursive opinions as a way of participating in the *logos*, it is strictly through intuition or tragic pathos does the philosophical ‘warrior type’ participate in reality or the silent *logos* of an author or of Becoming. Nietzsche proclaims “the highest truth” as a “showing”, which is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s distinction between “saying” and “showing” in *The Tractatus*. For Nietzsche, this is



referred to as a lightning flash, a metaphor borrowed from Heraclitus; it is the leading metaphor for the event of truth or of insight. Philosophical wisdom for Heraclitus, as for Nietzsche, doesn't come from engaging in discourse or listening to many opinions but rather through intuitive participation in the *logos*. These many opinions presuppose the *logos* itself. Nietzsche mentions that Heraclitus' statement "I sought and consulted myself" (PTAG: §8) is associative of "the Delphic dictum 'Know thyself,'" that is, to participate in the *logos* comes through self-observation as opposed to the "fact-gathering" of "'historical' men" (PTAG: §8) or the quest for 'absolute' knowledge. Lampert (2001: 189) notes that for Nietzsche, the "great failure of objectivity" or of Socratic knowledge is "its loss of aptitude for subjectivity" such that "'Know thyself' is lost in the subject's turn to the objective" and "such a loss is fatal if psychology is the path to the fundamental problems." Nietzsche expresses that it is the intuitive reader who through an examination of his or her life experiences (or the indirect analysis of his unconscious) and who identifies a similar pathos to Nietzsche is the reader who comes to participate in the silent *logos* of his thought. In the Preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals* (§1), Nietzsche distinguishes between the abstracted knowing self who is concerned with abstract knowledge of things, the "men of knowledge" and the existing human being who seeks to know himself:

We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it happen that we should ever *find* ourselves? ... So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we *have* to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law "Each is furthest from himself" applies to all eternity—we are not men of knowledge with respect to ourselves.

In the Preface to *On Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche also discusses the connection between "the art of exegesis" (GM, Preface: §8) and self-knowledge, that one is "bringing something home" (GM, Preface: §1), which refers to the return home of the

self to itself as expressed in “The Return Home” passage (Z, III: §9). This idea of the homecoming to the self implies for Nietzsche the “return to that element of the complex self which partakes of eternity.” (Sadler 1995: 169) The type of self that “partakes of eternity” or experiences redemption in the life-affirmative sense is the “inmost centre” that has been disciplined by the “Great reason” of the body towards the whole; the self that comes home not just to itself but to ‘Life’. It is no longer a self viewed as “my body”; it is rather viewed as a living body or as ‘Life’ as part of the whole. This art of exegesis, which is referred to as “the art of reading well” in *The Antichrist* (§52, §59) is a certain type of reading that does not falsify the text but allows the author to reveal himself. Nietzsche also expresses that through this type of reading that one can discover oneself, as the art of reading involves being disciplined towards the whole or towards a state of ‘becoming who you are’, and in this state one enters into the silent *logos* of an author. Nietzsche maintains that in taking the most fundamental standpoint or attitude towards ‘Life’ that one at the same time becomes who one is. It is through the subjective or personal that one comes to the objective or enters into the most truthful standpoint to reality. It is coming into attunement with Becoming that one is redeemed at a subjective level; it is an experience of Dionysian rapture or *der Rausch*.

Nietzsche expresses that the way to reality is through the personal or through one’s most fundamental self, and that a certain type of reading can play a pivotal role in becoming attuned to it.

In the introduction to *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Marianne Cowan (1962: 11) states that Nietzsche reveals two of his perennial concerns with philosophy. They can be summed up as follows: “What are the functions and uses of

philosophy?” and “What are the prominent features of the men who engage in philosophy?” Cowan (1962: 11) identifies section three of *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* as the section where Nietzsche discusses what he takes to be the functions of philosophy: “It seems clear that he identifies philosophical thinking with intuition, scientific thinking with reasoned thought, and takes these two functions to be complementary to each other, though, as well, often temporarily opposed.” The distinction between philosophical and scientific thinking represents the distinction between Heraclitus and Parmenides. These differences include philosophy’s “refined taste” in opposition to science’s lack of taste, philosophy’s speedy realization of the oneness of all things due to its intuitive insight rather than through the use of artifice which accounts for the slowness of the scientific approach. The first distinction between the philosopher and the scientist, as outlined by Nietzsche, lies in the philosopher’s superior sense of “taste”. In discussing as to why the ancient Greeks referred to their earliest thinkers as “sages,” Nietzsche states that the “sage”

... is etymologically related to *sapio*, I taste, *sapiens*, he who tastes, *sisyphos*, the man of keenest taste. A sharp savouring and selecting, a meaningful discriminating, in other words, makes out the peculiar art of the philosopher, in the eyes of the people. The philosopher is not a man of intellect. (PTAG: §3)

For Nietzsche, the philosopher’s strength lies not in his “intellect” but in his intuitive capacity. Also one of the ultimate concerns of the philosopher is his desire to reach the “healing and the purification of the whole” (PTAG: §2) whereas the scientist is primarily concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. This idea of the “healing and the purification of the whole” (*ibid.*) relates to what Nietzsche refers to as the experience of the “Great Health.” (GS: §382) It is through a certain purification process that the highest type comes to feel “eternity”, the “heavenly”, as the “inner

logos” of Becoming. It is the intuitive philosopher who has the ability to act as a kind of cultural physician.<sup>27</sup> Nietzsche maintains that this idea of taste as a refined sense directs the philosopher to discriminate between things extraordinary and things unexceptional. According to Nietzsche, the philosophical type encounters the “unusual, the astonishing, the difficult and the divine”<sup>28</sup> whereas the scientist is rather concerned with “intellectual cleverness by its emphasis on the useless.” (PTAG: §3)

In order to highlight the difference between philosophical and scientific thinking, Nietzsche engages the metaphor of mountain climbing, where the philosopher and the scientist are described as two different mountain climbers. Nietzsche draws an analogy between mountain climbing and thinking which persists in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. (Z, I: §7 & EH, ‘Why I Am So Wise’: §1) In both cases the art of reading and writing is compared to mountain climbing; it involves “leaps of intuition”

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<sup>27</sup> This idea of Nietzsche as a cultural physician relates to Nietzsche as an author who is also a physician, and in turn a healer. The connection between the unconscious, physiology, and self-healing as a new science will be explored in the third chapter of the thesis in the context of reading and writing in blood. (Z, I: §7)

<sup>28</sup> He also associates this type of taste with his ideal readers. He writes in the preface to *The Antichrist* that his “predestined readers” must possess “new ears for new music”, “new eyes,” and “the will to the economy of the great style”. This ability to discriminate is evident with regard Nietzsche’s own ability to make a distinction in his audience:

Every nobler spirit and taste selects his audience when he wants to communicate; in selecting it, he simultaneously erects barriers against ‘the others’. All subtler laws of a style originated therein: they simultaneously keep away, create a distance, forbid ‘entrance’, understanding, as said above—while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours.” (GS: §381)

It is the intuitive writer with a certain taste for communication who adheres to all “the subtler laws of a style”. Nietzsche’s taste determines the audience he selects, an audience of readers with ears related to his own, or those that there are capable and worthy of the same pathos. (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §4) Nietzsche also makes references to his ‘taste’ in relation to his nasal capacity:

It is my fate that I have to be the first *decent* human being; that I know myself to stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia.—I was the first to *discover* the truth by being the first to experience lies as lies—smelling them out.—My genius is in my nostrils. (EH, IV: §1)

or acts of self-overcoming. Nietzsche, as a writer is comparable to the artist being impregnated by his work, which shows how the artist has an intuitive or ‘untimely’ relation to the whole. (GM, III: §4) In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of Greeks*, he explains that the peak that both climbers wish to reach represents the realization that “all things are one.” (PTAG: §3) The intuitive process ‘quickly’ leads the philosopher to the resolution of the oneness of all things, and Nietzsche’s mature account of this resolution is *amor fati*. Nietzsche notes that the clearest distinction between the two climbers lies in the philosopher’s more rapid ascent. He goes on to explain this metaphorically: “Philosophy leaps ahead on tiny toe-holds; hope and intuition lend wings to its feet.”<sup>29</sup>(*ibid.*) The scientist, on the other hand, “lumbers heavily behind, looking for better footholds for reason too wants to reach that alluring goal [that all things are one] which its divine comrade [the philosopher] has long since reached.” (*ibid.*) This passage continues to emphasize that philosophy derives its power and strength from its capacity to think intuitively.

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<sup>29</sup> That “hope and intuition lend wings to its feet” is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s many other references to philosophical thinking as “running,” “leaping,” “dancing,” or “flying.” (Z, III: ‘On the Spirit of Gravity’), (TI, ‘What the Germans lack’: §7) Nietzsche ascribes these verbs to his very own way of thinking or his own philosophical method. He draws a distinction between his “task” as a philosopher and that of the scholar, and in doing so, he compares the diet of a dancer to that of the philosopher:

Maybe we philosophers are all in a bad position regarding knowledge these days: science is growing, and the most scholarly of us are close to discovering that they know too little. But it would be even worse if things were different—if we knew *too much*; our task is and remains above all not to mistake ourselves for someone else. We *are* different from scholars, although we are inevitably also, among other things, scholarly. We have different needs, grow differently; have a different digestion: we need more; we also need less. There is no formula for how much a spirit needs for its nourishment;... It is not fat but the greatest possible suppleness and strength that a good dancer wants from his nourishment—and I wouldn’t know what the spirit of a philosopher might more want to be than a good dancer. For the dance is his ideal, also his art, and finally also his own piety, his ‘service of God’. (GS: §381)

The idea of philosophical thinking as dancing re-emerges in his mature works. In *Twilight of the Idols*, under a section entitled ‘What the Germans Lack’ Nietzsche criticizes the scholars of philosophy and the Germans for their inability to “think”.

There is another difference between the philosopher and the scientist, which lies in the way each approaches obstructions in their path. Continuing to engage the metaphor of the mountain climbers, Nietzsche states that the philosopher, when obstructed by “a wild mountain stream that is tossing boulders along its course”, “light-footedly leaps over it, using the rocks to cross, even though behind and beneath him they hurtle into the depths” (PTAG: §3), whereas the scientist “stands helpless; he must first build himself a fundament which will carry his heavy cautious steps.” (*ibid.*) The philosophers’ ability to “light-footedly leap” over obstacles is also indicative of his ability to self-overcome.

Nietzsche stresses the distinction between two types of realities: Parmenidean Being, on the one hand, and Heraclitean Becoming, on the other. Parmenides equates truth with absolute knowledge in terms of conceptualization and abstraction, which also corresponds to the “historical” men’s “fact-gathering” (PTAG: §8) approach to accumulating knowledge. This conceptual type of knowledge is governed by rational certainty, where the concept is supposed to fix the object of knowledge. This makes reality not only fixed but also anthropomorphically conceived through concepts, and this type of certainty can also be contrasted with the type of certainty that Nietzsche advocates, which is called an “intuitive certainty”. In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, Nietzsche associates the philosopher’s intuitive capacity to directly apprehend the “essence and core of all things.” (PTAG: §3)

This “certainty” depends neither on logical or scientific proofs. Intuitive certainty arises from immediate self-evidence, which in *The Birth of Tragedy* he speaks of as “immediate certainty”. (§I) It is tragic insight into reality that consists of a dancing

revelatory experience. In his early work Nietzsche speaks of the languages of the Dionysian Dithyramb such as dance and song that are better able to capture reality than those of concepts or abstract thought:

In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic faculties; something never before experienced struggles for utterance—the annihilation of the veil of *māyā*, oneness as the soul of the race and of nature itself. The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face and speech but the whole pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into rhythmic movement. Then the other symbolic powers suddenly press forward, particularly those of music, in rhythmic, dynamics, and harmony. To grasp this collective release of all the symbolic powers, man must have already attained that height of self-abnegation which seeks to express itself symbolically through all these powers—and so the dithyrambic votary of Dionysus is understood only by his peers.” (BT: §2)

This type of certainty takes the form of philosophical wisdom, and is contrasted with the “blind desire to know all at any cost” (PTAG: §3), which is characteristic of conceptual thinking. It involves intuition of the “ultimate resolution of all things” and “overcomes, by means of such intuition, the vulgar restrictions of the lower levels of knowledge.” (PTAG: §3) Nietzsche speaks of such intuitive knowledge in relation to Thales’ vision of the “unity of all that is” and highlights the inadequacy of scientific reflection for the communication of what he has seen, a “totally different sphere and speech.” (PTAG: §3) This also stresses the inadequacy of verbal language to express the *logos*. It relates to the problem of the incommunicability of the *logos* through language: that intuition of the *logos* is inexpressible.<sup>30</sup> There is a connection between “individual original experience” (*‘On the Truth & Lies in a Non-Moral Sense’*: §1) of

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<sup>30</sup> This thesis will explore Nietzsche’s style as the communication of a pathos, which arises from his experience of insight into the *logos*, and the way in which his style transcends the inadequacies of language. In doing so, his style will be argued to be closer to truth or reality than the style characteristic of the old metaphysicians who engaged in the propositional or doctrinal uses of language.

a primordial nature and tragic intuition or insight into the *logos*. This is of course contrasted with conceptual knowledge of the intellect which serves the species or the herd. It is conscious linguistic conceptual knowledge that falsifies reality, for Nietzsche and primordial tragic pathos that corresponds to the “inner lawfulness” of Becoming. Intellectual knowledge requires the assimilation of different cases under a single word, which is to be differentiated from the flux of Becoming. Nietzsche states in ‘*On the Truth & Lies in a non-Moral Sense*’ §1, 83 that

Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases—.

For Nietzsche, what counts as true is intuitive insight into reality made possible through the “Great Reason” of the Body. (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’) Nietzsche actually identifies the traditional metaphysical use of reason in *Ecce Homo* (II: §2) as “unreason”; it is irrational to view reality as a projection of human consciousness or to view ‘being’ as a substance-based reality or as a causal ground. Nietzsche considers that both Parmenides and Plato should view “reason in *reality*—not in “reason”” (TI, X: §2) or not reality in reason. This idea of viewing “reality in reason” relates to anthropomorphic projections of reality characteristic of the idealist tradition, reality as a product of the human mind or reason. Nietzsche considers this type of “reason” to be actually irrational. He identifies reason of the idealist tradition with “unreason” (EH, II: §2) in *Ecce Homo*, whereas he identifies tragic insight as a product of the “Great Reason” of the body. (EH, I: §6) It is for this reason that Nietzsche criticizes conceptual thinking as it only theorizes reality and is in this way incapable of philosophical insight into reality. This idea of conceptual knowledge for



Parmenides presupposes a correspondence relation between subject and object. Nietzsche considers this “adequate expression of an object in the subject” as a “contradictory impossibility”, for “between two absolutely different spheres, as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness and no expression; there is at most, an *aesthetic* relation.” (‘On the Truth & Lies in a Non-moral sense’, §1, 86) This “aesthetic relation” is referred to in ‘*On the Truth & Lies in a Non-moral Sense*’ as an “attitude” or disposition. The type of truth correspondence that Nietzsche advocates is one between a certain tragic pathos and the ‘inner lawfulness’ or *logos* of Becoming, where the philosopher of truth (artist metaphysician) in the experience of ‘amor fati’ takes a certain standpoint or disposition towards reality. This consists of a Dionysian existential attitude towards reality that takes the form of philosophical wisdom, and is rather opposed to theorizing or conceptualizing reality. The truth correspondence that Nietzsche advocates replaces the old correspondence theory of truth between subject and object or linguistic form and object. Nietzsche maintains that language cannot capture reality, and that language is ultimately inadequate for expressing the *logos*. The philosopher of truth does not conceptualize reality, but rather participates existentially within the *logos*. Therefore, rather than intellectualizing truth, the philosopher of truth, is lead by intuitions: “There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts.” (‘On the Truth & Lies in a Non-moral Sense’: §2, 90)

The literal or conceptual use of language presupposes an intuitive or unconscious standpoint towards reality, as for Nietzsche intuitive insight into reality takes precedence over linguistic determinations of reality. The philosopher of truth realizes

the overall inadequacy of language to express reality; even his own “unheard of language” is inadequate for expressing the *logos*. Nietzsche considers both the literal and metaphorical uses of language to be a falsification of reality. The metaphors Nietzsche consequently uses are only those that are based upon his pre-linguistic and intuitive insights. Houlgate (1986: 236) states that “Nietzsche’s views on language expressed in ‘*On Truth & Lies in a Non-moral Sense*’ though refined and developed, do not change fundamentally throughout his philosophical career”, and also refers to such early passages as BT: §6 and PTAG: §3 where Nietzsche speaks of “the divorce between language and philosophical or ‘musical’ intuition, a divorce which parallels the distinction between language and life. In *The Birth of Tragedy* (§6), Nietzsche maintains that

Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain in the heart of the primal unity, and therefore symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena. Rather, all phenomena, compared with it, are merely symbols: hence *language*, as the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never by any means disclose the inner most heart of music; language, in its attempt to imitate it, can only be in superficial contact with music...

It is for this reason that Nietzsche’s style as the communication of tragic pathos or of musical intuition, intuition of the *logos* is a style that corresponds more adequately to reality than the literal, conceptual, propositional or even the metaphorical uses of language. The dancing and rhythmical style of Nietzsche’s writings as an attunement to a musical whole also highlights his realization of the inadequacy of words. Nietzsche’s style engages in ‘musical intuition’ or what is referred to as unconscious musical rhythms. Although Nietzsche is even more critical of Schopenhauer in his later period, of his “romantic pessimism”, it does not imply that he no longer engages

in the language of unconscious musical rhythms or tragic pathos, both of which he brings to his writing style.

The following shows that the ‘Primal Unity’ is not to be viewed as a causal ground; however, the section goes on to emphasize that Becoming is reality, for Nietzsche. Nietzsche rejects being only as a conceptual posit, and in its place embraces reality in the early work *The Birth of Tragedy* as the ‘Primal Unity’ (BT: §4) or as a reality independent of human minds. Nietzsche’s affirmation of reality as the ‘Primal Unity’ is not to be equated with the thing-in-itself as a causal ground of reality, which is characteristic of traditional metaphysics. It is therefore an error to associate *The Birth of Tragedy* with traditional metaphysics. The ‘Primal Unity’ is actually viewed as Thing-in-itself in the form of primal ‘reality’ not as a conceptual theory. This also shows that tragic insight for Nietzsche in BT is not conceptual, As Sadler (1995: 44) states, Nietzsche equates the primal One with the Thing-in-itself only in a loose sense, i.e., only in the sense that it is the primal ‘reality’. In his view, the Thing-in-itself is, strictly speaking, a conceptual posit of the abstract thinker. “If *The Birth of Tragedy* had assumed the Thing-in-itself in this strict sense, its language would have been theoretically discursive, which it is not...”<sup>31</sup> For Nietzsche, it is the Dionysian

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<sup>31</sup> Doyle holds the same view as Sadler that there are no things-in-themselves in *The Birth of Tragedy*. She argues like Sadler that for Nietzsche that *The Birth* does not adhere to a Kantian scepticism. In this way she claims that there is no metaphysical dualism in this early work. She argues that for Nietzsche, empirical reality is mind-independent as it is informed by a primordial intellect. The Primordial reality as the innermost Kernel of things or appearances is re-worked in the later works in terms of what Doyle refers to as the ‘intrinsicity’ of forces. See chapter three of Doyle’s work ‘*Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics*,’ where she looks at the way his early metaphysics is to a large extent continuous with his later metaphysics. (Doyle, T., *Op. cit.*, pp. 81-110) It is in this chapter that she claims that Nietzsche’s intention is not to draw a distinction in dualistic terms between empirical and primordial reality, as the former, Doyle argues, is rather “informed” by the latter:

One might ask, however, what Nietzsche means by reality. Is he referring to the primordial intellect or to empirical reality? For Nietzsche, at least on the most charitable reading of his early writings, the answer must come in the form of a disjunction. He does not consider the primordial intellect and empirical reality to be two different things. Rather, his appeal to the

experience that brings one into correspondence with “the truly existent primal unity” (BT: §4) and it is this experience that brings with it “Not reflection, no—true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth” or “the horror or absurdity of existence” that arises when the “everyday reality re-enters consciousness;” when the tragic artist is no longer under the “rapture of the Dionysian state.” (BT: §7) Nietzsche’s account of ‘Being’ not only contrasts with Parmenides’ metaphysics of being but also in terms of the relationship that the philosopher of truth upholds in relation to that reality. For Parmenides, knowledge of being is intellectual or conceptual in nature, which is distinct from what Nietzsche considers to be a more fundamental relationship to reality where one is an expression of primordial reality rather than merely theorizing it. In looking back at the “wonderful phenomenon of the Dionysian” in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche states that “I had discovered the only parable and parallel of my intimate

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primordial intellect is intended to capture the inner nature of appearances. This is suggested by both his description of the primordial intellect as the ‘innermost kernel’ of things and his claim that appearances and the primordial intellect share a unity. Consequently, Nietzsche’s appeal to the primordial intellect and empirical reality is not intended to be one between appearance and reality. Rather, to use one of later descriptions, they stand for lighter and darker shades of appearance. (Doyle, T., *Op. cit.*, p.101)

In this thesis it will be argued that this primordial reality is ultimate reality for Nietzsche, and that the most truthful standpoint towards it is an extra-perspectival or intuitive one. However, Doyle is strictly examining Nietzsche’s epistemology, that there is no epistemic gulf between self and world, and that it is cognitive knowledge of the empirical realm or the mind-independent realm of Becoming. There is a mind-independent empirical reality of Becoming that can be perspectively known; however, there is the ‘inner logos of Becoming’, which can only be intuitively known (Heraclitus on the intuition of ‘all things are One.’) (PTAG §3) This thesis holds that truth for Nietzsche is not a cognitive relation to empirical reality but rather a pre-cognitive intuitive and existential relation with primordial reality or the ‘inner *logos* of becoming.’ In this thesis, I shall argue that the lightest shades are those of the individual type coming into a tragic relation to reality, which reveals that Nietzsche upholds an artist’s metaphysics. This will be explored in the final chapter of this thesis, where it will be maintained that this artist’s metaphysics is in both the early and later works.

The relationship between empirical and primordial reality that is expressed in *The Birth of Tragedy* is of concern for Doyle, as it compounds her argument that the later Nietzsche maintains that “empirical reality, although knowable by us, is, by virtue of the intrinsic natures informing its relational constituents, irreducible to human minds.” (Doyle, T., *Op.cit.*, p.12) She explores Nietzsche’s view on the relationship between empirical and primordial reality as she wishes to argue that, for Nietzsche, reality is irreducible to human perspectives, and also to show that the ‘empirical world is intrinsically constituted from within.’ (*ibid.*, p.193) This argument resulted from her ambition to solve the problem that the relationality of force rules out its ontological independence or its intrinsicity, a problem set out by Welshon & Hales, and Peter Poellner. (*ibid.*, p.171, 173)

intuition in history.”<sup>32</sup> This intimate intuition or “inmost experience”<sup>33</sup> is the most fundamental experience for Nietzsche; it is wisdom as the highest insight into reality.

Nietzsche is only critical of being which has been allocated to it determinations that are only appropriate at the level of phenomena, which is then viewed as a thing or substance rather than as the unity of Becoming. It is for this reason that Nietzsche objects to Kant’s distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself:

Kant no longer has a right to his distinction “appearance” and “thing-in-itself”—he had deprived himself of the right to go on distinguishing in this old familiar way, insofar as he rejected as impermissible making inferences from phenomena to a cause of phenomena— in accordance with his own conception of causality and its pure intra-phenomenal validity—which conception, on the other hand, already anticipates this distinction, as if the “thing-in-itself” were not only inferred but *given*. (WP: §553)

It is in this way that Nietzsche’s ‘Primal Unity’ of *The Birth of Tragedy* is in no way to be viewed as a causal ground in the Kantian or Schopenhauerian sense. Nietzsche is critical of Schopenhauer’s association of the will or thing-in-itself with determinations which are only valid at the level of phenomena. Nietzsche emphatically rejects viewing the ‘Primal One’ as a thing-in-itself (conceptual posit): “One would like to know what things-in-themselves are; but behold, there are no things-in-themselves!” (WP: §555)

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<sup>32</sup> Fink in his work ‘*Nietzsche’s Philosophy*’ chapter one makes this reference p. 11. The translator of the book, Georg Richter, states that Fink cites from an edition of Nietzsche’s works prepared by Elizabeth Forster Nietzsche in 1905. p.175. (Fink, E., *Nietzsche’s Philosophy*, G. Richter (trans.), New York, Continuum, 2003)

<sup>33</sup> Walter Kaufmann translates this ‘intimate intuition’ as an inmost experience: “I had discovered the only parable and parallel in history for my own inmost experience.” (Nietzsche, F., *Basic Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche*, W. Kaufmann (trans.), New York, Random House, Inc., 1967 p.727) or cited as (EH, ‘BT’: §2) in this thesis.

The 'Primal Unity' for Nietzsche cannot be viewed at the level of phenomena; it is in this way a mistake to ask what it is or to set out to acquire conceptual knowledge of it.

It is for this reason that Nietzsche says:

The question "what is that?" is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. "Essence," the "essential nature," is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies a "what is that for *me*." (WP: §556)

The truth of Becoming is, for Nietzsche, more fundamental than theoretical or conceptual truth, a truth that is presuppositionless and distinct from knowledge of the properties of things. Nietzsche's metaphysics consists of insight into Becoming rather than of conceptual truth of the being of beings or phenomena. Nietzsche does not deny the phenomena of individuated being but only their objective validity when considered to be reality. Knowledge of the individuated reality of things is, for Nietzsche, not only a falsification of the true reality of Becoming into doctrines or theories about stable fixed entities, but this type of knowledge is also viewed as necessary in accordance with man's basic needs. Fink (2003: 147) discusses the way in which cognition is, for Nietzsche, not a means to understanding the will to power: cognition does not grasp the will to power but is rather that which the will to power forms. In the same way that cognition cannot grasp the will to power, it is also unable to grasp the flux of Becoming or reality, and is in this way viewed as a falsification of reality. Fink (2003: 147) claims that Nietzsche's criticism of cognition or conceptual knowledge does not imply that Nietzsche undermines the validity of his own claims to knowledge as his rejection of conceptual knowledge is based upon another type of knowledge, intuitive insight into reality:

The will to power is at work in that which we ordinarily call cognition. This does not only mean that the desire to understand is an instinct of power or a drive to possess and conquer but even more that understanding is subject to the determinations of the will to power. To put it differently:

what we ordinarily call cognition is not a suitable device to understand the will to power. Such understanding is already itself formed by the will to power. As the forming element the will to power is not grasped itself by that which it forms, namely by 'cognition'. However, how does Nietzsche know this? He only relies on his philosophical intuition which is different from all ontological intuition of any kind. This intuition flows from a receptivity for the flow of becoming, for the forming and destroying 'life' and for the force of the will to power. Only the knowledge of tragic wisdom breaks through the structure of power and gains an insight into the power of life. Tragic wisdom becomes critical for all ordinary cognition.

For Nietzsche, tragic wisdom is that which makes ordinary knowledge possible, where intuition of the *logos* is the presupposition upon which ordinary knowledge rests. Intuitive knowledge is that which affirms becoming as becoming and does not attempt to determine or fix reality. It is in turn not a falsification of reality but a type of insight into reality that allows reality to reveal itself. Nietzsche views cognition as that which falsely fixes the flow of Becoming into the being of enduring things; he considers the 'thing' or substance to be a fiction or a violation of the flux of Becoming. Nietzsche claims that man, in forgetting that the thing has been created and in taking reality to be the anthropomorphically created being of beings, carries out an act of violence against Becoming.

This cognition of the being of beings is also viewed by Nietzsche as a necessary fiction:

This distortion is a biological necessity for us. Necessity breeds invention. The need to live in a world in which everything constantly changes, recedes, passes and spins has created the concepts and the categories which makes this incomprehensible change comprehensible and fixes it, underpinning the events with a basis. (Fink 2003: 149)

These categories are for Nietzsche, a "humanization of the world", "an anthropomorphic interpretation which 'fixes us up' in positing a fixity" where they actually possess no objective validity. (Fink 2003: 149) It is for this reason that

Nietzsche does not conceive of reality as the being of beings or things, but as the ‘*inner logos*’ of becoming.

Nietzsche rejects language as an adequate expression of reality or of Becoming and that this does not therefore imply that “Becoming is altogether inaccessible and inexpressible.” (*ibid.*) He rejects the old correspondence theory of truth that took language “as the adequate expression of all realities”, and replaces it with a more fundamental way of corresponding to reality where the philosopher of truth is an “adequate” expression of reality. Nietzsche advocates a correspondence between a certain type of tragic pathos and reality that is to replace an exact correspondence between reality and linguistic form. Nietzsche maintains that Becoming is not linguistically expressible or theoretically knowable. The inability to express his philosophy through theoretical concepts ties in with the problem of self-referentiality: from what standpoint does Nietzsche justify his own claims? If Nietzsche rejects equating truth with perspectivism, then this implies that his own claims must not be ‘mere perspectives’; they must stem from something more fundamental: “The way of this perspectivism itself, i.e., by reference to that non-perspectival intuition which Nietzsche presupposes from the very beginning.”<sup>34</sup> (Sadler 1995: 47)

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<sup>34</sup> Krebbs in his work *Nietzsche’s hymn to Life: A Buddhist Reading* (Austin: University of Texas) and in his article ‘*Criticism and Perspectivism: The Transition between Nietzsche’s Truths*’ (The European Legacy. 2: 388-393) Krebbs (1998: 15) examines Nietzsche’s account of intuition and argues that to “limit Nietzsche’s epistemology to perspectivism leaves him open to the charge of relativism”, and discusses the way in which his account of intuition relieves him of this charge. In his thesis he argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism acts as a kind of transition or bridge to a more comprehensive experience of reality.



For Sadler (1995) the starting point for Nietzsche is primordial intuition of reality or tragic insight into Becoming and all perspectival claims only presuppose intuition of the *logos*. This removes Nietzsche from the charge of relativism that his claims are perspectival and are therefore relative; they rather flow from intuition of reality as the inner *logos* of Becoming. Alternatively, there is Lampert (2001) who argues that tragic insight as an interpretation of the world or as an expression of truth solves the problem of self-referentiality in Nietzsche, that Nietzsche's philosophical claims as "perspectives" are not self-undermining but rather an expression of truth. It seems that tragic insight whether a perspective or not, can be argued to be a standard of truth, for Nietzsche. It also removes Nietzsche from the charge of self-refutation, a charge that claims that Nietzsche is undermining himself; that by rejecting cognitive forms of knowledge he calls into question the validity of his own knowledge claims. If cognition is false how can he claim to know that it is? However, Nietzsche's own criticism of cognition is itself based upon intuitive wisdom. Nietzsche's philosophical claims actually flow from what he considers to be prior to epistemic cognition; they flow from primordial intuition of Becoming, and are therefore not subject to the concepts of cognition. As Fink (2003: 150) suggests,

One misunderstands the extent of the polemic against the categories if one sees it merely as a fictional epistemology. Nietzsche does not progress from a critical analysis of the faculty of cognition arriving at a rejection of the categories in which the thingness of the thing is conceived according to the ideal of the ego. He rather starts with a primordial intuition of his fictional Heraclitean philosophy that relies on Becoming as the only truth. Since the categorical concepts cannot grasp becoming, since they arrest it, forge it, and base it on something persisting, they are deceptions. He denies finite and individual being with his fundamental conception of being as becoming... More precisely, Nietzsche does not deny the phenomena of individuated being but only its objective significance... Nietzsche's fictional epistemology which understands the will to power as the deceiving and violating power of the intellect is in its important aspects a negative ontology of things: there are no things. His critique does not target all cognition but only the cognition of being, empirical cognition and particularly *apriori* cognition, that is the ontological interpretation in accordance with the categories. His intuition or his philosophical vision of

becoming is not affected by his critique of cognition. It is rather the presupposition that enables this critique in the first place. In other words, if and only if this intuition is true does this critique of ontic and categorical cognition make sense and have validity. Nietzsche himself does not distinguish clearly enough between the truth of becoming and the truth of being. The former is intuitive and the latter is conceptual.

The truth of becoming is a revelation of the existing cosmos as opposed to the truth of being which implies belief in fictions of substance and ego. This distinction for Nietzsche is one between knowledge of the properties of things and insight into primordial reality as becoming. It is an error to associate his philosophical claims with the type of cognition that he rejects, and to infer from this that he undermines the validity of his own claims, or that they cannot be knowledge claims that are true. It is rather that Nietzsche's philosophical claims that flow from the primordial intuition of becoming actually make possible his criticism of cognition, as this criticism presupposes intuition of the *logos*. It is in this way that knowledge of becoming is not subject to the criticized concepts of cognition. The criticism against Nietzsche that his knowledge claims are inadequate as he himself rejects cognitive knowledge assumes that there is only one type of knowledge and that it is conceptual in nature. This criticism fails to take into account that Nietzsche's philosophical claims constitute another kind of knowledge that is tragic insight into reality, and this intuition into the *logos* is presupposed by conceptual knowledge. Fink (2003: 150) explains the way Nietzsche's claims can be mistakenly viewed as contradictory:

One often criticizes Nietzsche for using a circular argument. He connects cognition on the one hand with an instinct for deception but proclaims on the other hand a new philosophy which is obviously a new form of cognition. He believes that cognition is an expression of the will to power and yet claims cognition of this very will to power itself. This critique misses the point because the cognition of becoming which leads to a critical rejection of all categorical cognition destroying the authenticity of becoming is not itself subject to the criticized concept of cognition. The truth of becoming has a completely different nature than ordinary understanding of truth which is only achieved on the basis of the deceptive, fixed concepts.

Nietzsche considers both thinking and the intellect to be deceptive in the sense that they are only subjective sources of reality and actually withhold no objective validity. According to Nietzsche, man actually projects his own subjectivity onto the world, and in doing so denies reality its own metaphysical independence. It is in this way that man has actually removed himself from reality in so far as he engages in the categories for cognition.

Nietzsche has an association with tragic wisdom that is intuitive in the early works; however in the later works Nietzsche speaks of tragic wisdom in terms of “rapture,” “revelation,” and “inspiration”. Although this thesis refers predominantly to the early work *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* in emphasizing Nietzsche’s affinity with intuition or his association of intuition with wisdom, Nietzsche’s admiration for Heraclitus persists throughout his works, and is evident as we see below particularly in *Ecce Homo*. Also Nietzsche not only has respect for Heraclitus and the Stoics for their ability to think intuitively, but he himself has an affinity with this wisdom. He wishes to distinguish his kind of thinking from those who came before him, and in this way refers to it as a form of “inspiration”. In speaking about the “inspirational” experience from which his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* arose in *Ecce Homo*, he states

If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one’s system, one could hardly reject altogether the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely a medium of overpowering forces. The concept of revelation—in the sense that suddenly, with indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes *visible*, audible, something that shakes one to the last depths and throws one down—that merely describes the facts. One hears, one does not seek; one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like lightning, a thought flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form—I never had any choice. (EH, Z: §3)

Nietzsche speaks of the “involuntary” nature of the entire inspirational experience, which is also referred to as a divine experience of *amor fati*. It is an experience which

results from his superior sense of “taste”, which he equates with the sages or the genuine philosopher’s intuitive ability to apprehend the “difficult” and the “divine.” (PTAG: §3) The inspirational experience is a divine experience that occurs necessarily in the face of an absolute,

Everything happens involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity.—The involuntariness of image and metaphor is strangest of all; one no longer has any notion of what is an image or a metaphor: everything offers itself as the nearest, most obvious, simplest expression. It actually seems, to allude to something Zarathustra says, as if the things themselves approached and offered themselves as metaphors (“Here all things come caressingly to your discourse and flatter you; for they want to ride on your back. On every metaphor you ride to every truth...Here the words and word-shrines of all being open up before you; here all being wishes to become word, all becoming wishes to learn from you how to speak”)

This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back thousands of years in order to find anyone who could say to me, “it is mine as well” (EH, ‘Z’: §3)

In referring to his involuntary experience, he claims that one would have to go back thousands of years to find someone else who experienced the same wisdom. This person could perhaps be Heraclitus. There is a passage from *Ecce Homo* which seems to suggest that both philosophers possess the same sense of “tragic wisdom”. In speaking of his search for philosophers with the same wisdom, he proclaims:

In this sense I have the right to understand myself as the first *tragic philosopher*—that is, the most extreme opposite and antipode of a pessimistic philosopher. Before me this transposition of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos did not exist: *tragic wisdom* was lacking; I have looked in vain for signs of it even among the *great* Greeks in philosophy, those of the two centuries *before* Socrates. I retained some doubt in the case of *Heraclitus*, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away *and* *destroying*, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; *becoming*, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of *being*—all this is clearly more related to me than anything else to date. The doctrine of the “eternal recurrence,” that is, of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things—this doctrine of Zarathustra *might* in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. (EH, ‘BT’: §4)

I think that this passage is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, in Nietzsche identifying tragic wisdom with Heraclitus, a philosopher of intuition, it shows that Nietzsche in the later works still has an affinity with Heraclitean wisdom that is insight into reality. Also, the passage shows that Nietzsche's relationship to the Dionysian persists in his discussion of *The Birth of Tragedy* in *Ecce Homo*. He still associates himself with the Dionysian of *The Birth* suggesting that he didn't turn his back on this early work. Also, the passage suggests that Nietzsche's philosophy of the Dionysian and Heraclitus' philosophy of the Innocence of Becoming closely parallel.

In spite of Nietzsche's emphasis upon Becoming in the early work *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* and in the later works, there are some passages which suggest that Nietzsche didn't entirely resist Being, such a passage is as follows:

He who regards his life as no more than a point in the evolution of a race or of a state or of a science, and thus regards himself as wholly belonging to the history of becoming, has not understood the lesson set him by existence and will have to learn it over again. This eternal becoming is a lying puppet-play in beholding which man forgets himself, the actual distraction which disperses the individual to the four winds, the endless stupid game which the great child, time, plays before us and with us. That heroism of truthfulness consists in one day ceasing to be the toy it plays with. In becoming, everything is hollow, deceptive, shallow and worthy of our contempt; the enigma which man is to resolve he can resolve only in being, in being thus and not otherwise, in the imperishable. Now he starts to test how deeply he is entwined with becoming, how deeply with being—a tremendous task rises before his soul: to destroy all that is becoming, to being to light all that is false in things. (UM, Schopenhauer as Educator: §4)

This suggests that there is an ambiguity in Nietzsche on the ontological terms, and in spite of this, the terms seem to imply the same thing, a metaphysically independent reality, which is 'eternal'. However, it must also be stressed that Nietzsche in no way

embraces 'Being' in the transcendent static sense such as that expounded by Plato or Parmenides, and that he predominantly refers to Becoming throughout his works. This ambiguity that resides between the terms 'Being' and 'Becoming' is also apparent in the recapitulation passage of *The Will to Power*. Although Nietzsche is critical of being that is characteristic of the metaphysical tradition, it can be argued that he advocates a conception of 'being' which is no longer to be viewed in opposition to, but rather inclusive of, becoming. Nietzsche seems to suggest that there is some sort of a relationship between Being and Becoming, or that Becoming comes as closest to 'Being' in eternal return of the same. It is possible to infer that for Nietzsche that the 'eternity' that he embraces in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is comparable to the 'necessity' expressed in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (§8). However, it must be stressed that it is an 'Eternity' that is within 'Becoming' that Nietzsche advocates. For Nietzsche, there is a distinction between the will to power within cognition that forms knowledge of things and the will to power as cognition as tragic insight into reality or what Fink (2003: 152) refers to as the will to power of the greatest cosmic truth. "To impose upon becoming the character of being—that is the supreme will to power." (WP: §617) Fink considers what Nietzsche means by this statement, that the greatest will to power as cognition is knowledge or intuitive insight into being as becoming. (2003: 152) This type of knowledge is to be contrasted with deceptive knowledge of things. For Nietzsche, the thought of the eternal return as the "high point of the meditation;" (WP: §617) is knowledge as intuitive insight into reality: "That *everything recurs* is the closest *approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being*:—high point of the meditation." (WP: §617) The truth of the eternal return is for Nietzsche exempt from the statements about the truth of things. The tragic knowledge of the eternal return does not fix or determine becoming but rather affirms

becoming as becoming. It is for this reason that intuition does not determine reality or an author but rather affirms reality as it reveals itself as a silent *logos*. It is in this way that intuition in the form of tragic pathos or insight does not falsify reality or an author and is to be considered the source of philosophical truthfulness. This also implies that Nietzsche's epistemology is not a form of scepticism where his denial of the truth of cognitive knowledge is taken to mean that there is no truth or that it undermines the justifiability of his own philosophical claims: "The insight into the fictional character of the categorical ontology is grounded in an indubitable philosophical insight of the will to power, of becoming as ultimate truth and of the eternal return." (Fink 2003: 153) Nietzsche also associates intuitive insight into reality with the redemption of "tragic warrior-like human, the hero", and he also ascertains that the redemption of tragic insight into reality constitutes "the advent of a redeemer", and a new theology of the master of the tragic. (Fink 2003: 154)

In this thesis, it will be argued that what Nietzsche means by Being is the 'inner lawfulness' or 'inner necessity' of Becoming, and that he views philosophical truthfulness as that which is oriented to the 'inner *logos*' of Becoming, and it is this 'inner necessity' that is considered to be 'eternal.' It is this 'inner necessity' of the world, what Heraclitus refers to as the 'inner lawfulness' of Becoming, is what is eternal for Nietzsche. The next section will explore the nature of philosophical truthfulness in terms of the connection between reality, Nietzsche's writing style, and his "*ego ipsissimum*" or necessary self.

*Nietzsche's Writing Style as an expression of the Silent Logos*

This section looks at the way Nietzsche's musical-dancing style is an expression of the silent logos of Becoming. It looks at Nietzsche's criticism of conceptual language as a way of expressing reality, and that his style aims to transcend the fixed rigidity of concepts. The truth of Nietzsche's writings does not lie in the words but in their rhythmical effect, their pathos and in turn in their relation to reality. In engaging in tragic pathos or what Hölderlin refers to as "holy pathos" Nietzsche's works are an expression of "the unsaid". This section also looks at the close resemblance between Wittgenstein and Nietzsche on the inability of language to capture reality. Nietzsche's idea of his 'innermost self' (HH, Preface: §1) is compared to Wittgenstein's idea of the transcendental ego that cannot be referred to by language. For Wittgenstein, it is the realm of the unsaid, and in turn the realm of the Transcendent. Nietzsche however writes from his "ipsissimosity"<sup>35</sup>; it is the realm of Becoming, a totality to which we belong.

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<sup>35</sup> This is a reference to Nietzsche's self that he refers to in the Preface to *Human, All too Human II* (§1), it is his overcoming or becoming self that belongs to the Totality that is Becoming. It is not the self as fixed enclosed essence or atomistic substance; it is the self that is open-ended to the future. It is transcendental in the sense that it forms one's horizon that is open-ended to the future. Nietzsche writes from this 'I' or his ipsissimosity and in this way his writings are open-ended to the future such that they aim to create the future selves of his "select readers". Hutter in his work '*Shaping the future: Nietzsche's New Regime of the Soul and its ascetic practices*' also contends that even though Nietzsche's writings are "intensely personal, Nietzsche's writings are still open-ended to the future that they aim to create" (Oxford, Lexington Books, 2006, p.127) He does so in making reference to the same passage from the preface to *Human, All too Human II*: "Nietzsche's aphoristic writings thus reflect his movement away from his innermost self (*ego ipsissimus*) toward his innermost self (*ego ipsissimum*)" that his writings reflect a movement from the personal to the impersonal. It is in this way that Nietzsche writes in an untimely fashion, as he writes to shape his posthumous or future readers; this will be discussed more indepthly in the third chapter. The transcendental structure of Nietzsche's idea of 'ipsissimosity' closely parallels the apriori *structure* of Kant's idea of the transcendental ego, that is in its *structure* or Wittgenstein's idea of the metaphysical 'I' but only in the strict sense that it is not the self as an 'object' in the world. However, it is radically distinguished from the Kantian idea of this transcendental ego in its pursuit of the moral law or of any Christian or Platonic idea of soul as substance or as atom. It must also be stressed that it is closely relates to the unconscious for Nietzsche whereas for Kant, the emphasis is on reason, the conscious mind and intuition for Schopenhauer..



Nietzsche criticizes the metaphysical ideas of fixed entity or 'being' which is created by the categories of human logic and language. He maintains that it is our senses which create the original impression that things are in some sense identical through time in order to meet the need for a sense of stability in life. He criticizes language for building upon and reinforcing a fiction which the senses have created. For Nietzsche, the judgements that we form in language falsify life either by simplification of the complexity or particularity of things or by distorting the unique character of our experiences. Language distorts the concrete individuality of experience, and describes it in terms of universal qualities and properties. Nietzsche expresses that reality as becoming is fundamentally in flux and that, insofar as language creates the illusion of stability, it fails to capture what the world is really like. (WP: §715) The main criticism Nietzsche holds against language is that it is unable to express the flux of Becoming because, through the use of concepts, we turn things into substances which have immutable form.<sup>36</sup> It is for this reason that Nietzsche draws a distinction between language and philosophical or 'musical' intuition, as he recognizes alongside Schopenhauer the inadequacy of language to capture 'Life' or the 'Will'. According to Nietzsche, metaphysical thinking is thinking which believes in the reality of the ideal forms that language creates. He wishes that we overcome our naive "faith in

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<sup>36</sup> Alex McIntyre in his work *The Sovereignty of Joy* notes how the human subject is elucidated by Nietzsche, "as an 'indistinguishable drunkenness' (GS, 57), an inexorable mythology that is 'concealed in language' (WS, 11)" (McIntyre, A., *The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche's Vision of Grand Politics*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1997, p.28) He outlines that for Nietzsche language structures the human subject such that "it conceals the 'continuous...indivisible flowing' (WS, 11) of becoming and breaks it up into isolated and self-identical beings, into substantialized atoms." (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p.28) According to McIntyre, Nietzsche maintains that language "creates this complex and illusory dichotomy between appearance and the thing-in-itself, even before conceptual thought, by throwing a veil of metaphors over the undivided and indivisible flowing." (*ibid.*) He then references a quote from *Human, All Too Human* I: "The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it." (H I: 11 cited in this form by McIntyre, *ibid.*) Language actually veils reality such that for Nietzsche the most truthful relation to it is non-linguistic. Nietzsche rather advocates existential pathos as the most truthful expression of reality or of Becoming.

grammar” (TI, “Reason” in Philosophy’: §5), and recognize that we are artistic creators of our linguistic world.

It is for this reason that Nietzsche is mainly critical of the propositional or conceptual uses of language characteristic of the old correspondence theory of truth. This model of truth upholds the idea that linguistic or logical forms that correspond to the world of beings, the “true world” are statements of fact; that the statements that correspond to basic states of affairs or things are true. He rejects this model of truth as it has not only created the fiction of the ‘true world’ viewed in terms of stable substance, a world of beings, but also because it upholds the idea that language can express what is real. For Nietzsche, all language operates with stable grammatical forms, and it is in this way that language or linguistic consciousness cannot therefore articulate the dynamic flux of ‘Life’ or that which Nietzsche considers reality to be. In ‘*On the Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*’ (§1) Nietzsche rejects truth in the sense of accurate or adequate articulation of ‘Life,’ where the term “adequate expression” stands in opposition to the word ‘truth’: “with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression”. Language cannot, for Nietzsche, articulate or express reality as the dynamic flux of becoming or the inner *logos* of Becoming.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> This idea that language cannot capture reality is also expressed by Wittgenstein. Stenius in his work *Wittgenstein’s Tractatus* notes that, for Wittgenstein, there is certain kind of experience, the mystical, which cannot be expressed through language. He refers to this type of experience as ‘ineffable’ or ‘inexpressible’, the ‘unsayable’ or ‘non-sensical’. It is expressed as a feeling: “One ‘experiences’ the mystical as a form of emotional experience which in German would be called *Erlebnis* in contradistinction to ordinary fact-stating ‘experience’ that is called *Erfahrung*.” (Stenius, E., *Wittgenstein’s Tractatus*, Connecticut, Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1981, p.223) Stenius then makes reference to *The Tractatus* where he quotes Wittgenstein’s statement that “‘The contemplation of the world *sub specie aeterni* is the intuition of it as a—limited—whole’. And Wittgenstein adds: ‘This *feeling* of the world as a limited whole is a mystical feeling.’ (6.45)” (*ibid.*). (italics used by Stenius) Stenius elaborates on what Wittgenstein means by this “One could perhaps characterize this feeling as an emotional experience of the world from what one feels as God’s point of view. This has nothing to do with ‘facts’ describable in language.” (*ibid.*) This mystical experience is transcendent and as a result lies outside what is expressible in language. Wittgenstein also upholds that God is within this domain, the sphere of the inexpressible: “‘God does not reveal himself *in* the world.’ (6.432)” (*ibid.*, p.222)

There is no linguistic statement that captures the complexity and uniqueness of the “facts” or of reality; all linguistic statements, including even Nietzsche’s own metaphorical statements, involve a creative falsification and simplification of reality. Nietzsche abolishes the idea of truth in terms of the old correspondence theory; thus when he states that “facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations,” (WP: §481) he is rejecting the old correspondence theory that there is a linguistic mode of

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Life’s deepest problems are within the realm of the transcendent. Wittgenstein, alongside Kant, not only recognizes that life’s deepest problems are unsolvable by theoretical reason (Kant’s transcendental reduction) but that they are also not to be viewed problematically. Life’s deepest problems are within a different realm from the theoretical: “the deepest problems are properly speaking not *problems*’ (4.003)” (italics are used by Stenius). (*ibid.*, p.222) “For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.—The riddle does not exist’ (6.5).” (*ibid.*) In the preface to *The Tractatus*, Wittgenstein mentions that the whole meaning of the book ‘could be summed up as follows: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereon one must be silent.’ (*ibid.*, p.2, 225)

In a section entitled Wittgenstein’s ‘Transcendental Linguism’ Stenius maintains that this connection between the transcendent and the unsayable relates to Wittgenstein’s distinction between the empirical self and the transcendental self. Stenius notes Wittgenstein’s linguistic turn in terms of Kantian transcendental idealism: “the form of experience is ‘subjective’ in the transcendental sense, the metaphysical subject being the ‘subject’ which uses and understands language, and which must be distinguished from the empirical self, which is part of the world describable in language.” (*ibid.*, p.220-21) For Wittgenstein, “the limits of language are the transcendental limits of the world and since language is *my* language (the only language which I understand) the limits of language are the limits of *my* world. The Ego to which the word ‘my’ refers to is the metaphysical subject...” (*ibid.*, p.221) The metaphysical subject does not exist as an empirical object among objects, in a way it “does not exist” (5.631), because it is transcendental, it ‘does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world’ (5.632)—it is like the eye in relation to the field of sight; the eye cannot see itself (5.633-6.331). And the metaphysical subject is to be distinguished from the empirical ego: in the book ‘The world as I found it’ there is an ego which must be described, but of the metaphysical ego there could be no mention in this book (5.631)” (*ibid.*, p.221) The limit for Wittgenstein can only be drawn in language, and what lies on the other side of the limit is the unsayable, ‘non-sense,’ the realm of the transcendent. The realm of Being cannot be referred to in language; therefore it is within the realm of the unsaid. Wittgenstein argues, in a similar vein to Kant, that ‘existence is not a predicate’ or cannot be viewed as a thing or a property of a thing. It cannot be pointed to in the same way as a thing can, and therefore it cannot be referred to in language. This idea of the transcendental ego being within the realm of the unsaid, that language cannot capture the transcendent is also apparent in Nietzsche, and plays a significant role in Nietzsche’s style. It is in this way that Nietzsche rejects the propositional and theoretical uses of language characteristic of the old correspondence theory of truth, which falsely upheld that this type of language could capture the essence of things. It is for this reason that Nietzsche engages in pathos, as he recognizes the limits of language; it is a religious pathos, it is of the realm of the spiritual ‘unsaid’. The notion of a transcendental self, for Nietzsche is the higher self; it is a totality made up of the “Great Reason of the body”, the soul, and mind. Nietzsche embraces the idea of the transcendental capacity of the mind, the “transcendental mind” (Hutter, H., *Shaping the Future: Nietzsche’s New Regime of the Soul & its Ascetic Practices*, *Op. cit.*, p.173), which will be discussed in chapter three of this thesis. The higher or intuitive self is more fundamental than the transcendental mind; it is the self that brings pathos to the text. This intuitive self is a harmonized human totality that is in attunement with the whole. The relationship between the intuitive self and the transcendental mind will be explored in the third chapter where it will be discussed in the context of ‘reading and writing in blood’. (Z, I: §7)

expressing reality or the facts. He is rejecting the propositional use of language for adequately expressing reality, which is similar to Wittgenstein's argument in *The Tractatus* (6.53) However, this does not imply that Nietzsche thinks that this reality is not accessible nor is he overlooking reality; he is only rejecting reality that is viewed in terms of thing-hood or 'beings.'<sup>38</sup> He wishes to replace the old correspondence theory with a new kind of existential truth, whereby the philosopher in his experience of "rapture", "revelation", "inspiration" is an adequate expression of reality (EH, 'Z': §3) or the 'inner *logos*' of Becoming. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche mentions what "Zarathustra wants": a certain type of person who "conceives reality *as it is*," a being who is strong enough to do so, and so "is not estranged or removed from reality" in his manner of understanding or in his existence. (EH, 'Why I Am a Destiny': §5) It is for this reason that Nietzsche's own philosophical method as an intuitive mode of being is a method that is a form of valuable insight (AC: §13); his writing style emerges from rapturous insight into the 'inner *logos*' of Becoming. This is what makes it a 'Yes-saying' or life-affirmative style. In being an expression of tragic pathos, and his *ego ipsissimum* (HH, Pref: §1) his works are also in turn an expression of "the unsaid". In *The Antichrist* §59, Nietzsche discusses scientific method as the "art of reading well", a natural science which includes "the *sense for facts*", and "the good, the delicate sense of tact and taste"; these methods are to be understood as "body, as gesture, as instinct—as reality, in short." This idea of taste is reminiscent of the idea of taste expressed in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*: §3, where he associates it with a philosopher's intuitive capacity. This intuitive capacity resembles the "sense for the facts" described by Nietzsche as the "most valuable and

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<sup>38</sup> Nietzsche's rejection of the old correspondence theory of truth highlights the inadequacy of language to capture reality; however, it does not imply that reality has no meaning for us, or cannot be "accessed". This thesis contends that through tragic wisdom the highest type can glimpse the whole.

of all the senses.” (AC: §59) He mentions that the “art of reading well” as the unity of science, the “natural sciences” must include this capacity.

Nietzsche’s criticism of language rests upon his insight into reality as ‘Becoming’ or ‘Life’. His scepticism regarding the ability of language to capture truth or reality rests firmly upon a pre-linguistic insight, such that his style – wholly unlike the conceptual, theoretical or propositional uses of language – is an expression of the reality to which it relates. This pre-linguistic insight into reality forms part of a cosmic event whereby Nietzsche discovers his fate through the revelation of the truth of Becoming. As Fink (2003: 165) puts it,

The deviation from the path of metaphysics is not just a new method or mode of thought, something that man could accomplish himself. It is rather and more primordially an event which captures man or a fate which he experiences. In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche finds the language for the consciousness of his fate... Nietzsche is struck by lightning. He is burnt by a light of a new dawn of the truth of being in its entirety.

Nietzsche describes the realization of his fate as a revelation, a form of lightning, and as a “cosmic intuition”. (Fink 2003: 165) The revelatory nature of this experience implies that the body is no longer to be viewed as ‘my body’, but as part of the whole, as ‘Life’, he describes it as his becoming self (EH, ‘The Untimely Ones’: §3) that which is his most fundamental self. This self has been disciplined to wholeness by the “Great reason” of the body, and in the experience of belonging to the whole “one becomes what one is.” (EH, ‘Why I am So Clever’: §9)

In *Twilight of the Idols*, ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely Man’: §26 Nietzsche recognizes the difficulty of philosophical communication:

We no longer esteem ourselves sufficiently when we communicate ourselves. Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not communicate themselves even if they tried. That is because they lack the right word. Whatever we have words for, that we have already got beyond. In all talk there is a grain of contempt. Language, it seems, was invented only for what is average, medium, communicable. With language the speaker immediately vulgarizes himself. Out of a morality for deaf-mutes and other philosophers.

Nietzsche associates conceptual language with serving the needs of the herd rather than the individual and in this way it cannot be the medium of philosophical truth. Truth as the realm of Becoming does not express itself through the conceptual use of language. For Nietzsche, Becoming is not a thing that can be signified; it is therefore not to be viewed in conceptual terms. In engaging in the conceptual use of language through consciousness, one exchanges the personal for the social, the individual for the herd; the herd use of language forgets the individual and unique origins of social and conceptual transformations. ('On the Truth & Lies in a Non-moral Sense': §1) In *The Gay Science*: §354 Nietzsche explains that it is because of the "Genius of the Species" or of the herd that the uniquely personal and individual is exchanged for a herd or social perspective. It is for this reason that Nietzsche's style as the communication of pathos, of an inward state, of the individual and the personal is a better medium for the expression of Becoming; his intuitive style that of tragic pathos can communicate Becoming as an expression of a unique and experiential moment<sup>39</sup>. Nietzsche associates the communication of pathos with the individual and the personal, and in turn with self-knowledge, as his writings speak of his self-overcoming. It is for this reason that Nietzsche claims that his philosophy is not in the words but 'in' his experience, and in this way his style is a communication of this

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<sup>39</sup> This experiential moment is *amor fati* for Nietzsche, the loving embrace of reality as it is, and involves the feeling of tragic pathos, of ultimate joy. This tragic pathos is one he himself experiences, and he expresses it in *The Birth of Tragedy* as tragic insight and in the later works as one of "rapture" (EH, 'Z': §3). He therefore recognizes the limits of reason and language and as a result brings pathos to his writing style. In *The Birth of Tragedy* he rejects the rational justification of life put forward by the Socratic tradition, and his writing style mirrors this message. It is a 'yes-saying' life-affirmative style.

experience. It is those readers who share similar experiences as him that understand him best. He associates the herd use of language with the social need for communication, which is in contrast with his own tragic style and its connection with self-knowledge and personal experience. Nietzsche's style in being an expression of a unique personal experience, an inward state of tragic pathos, is a 'truer' expression of reality in its particularity than is possible with the conceptual or propositional use of language.

In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche also expresses that conceptual language cannot capture or express reality where he states that "the demand for an adequate mode of expression is senseless." (WP: §625) He is repudiating language as an adequate mode of expressing reality. Nietzsche rejects facts only in the sense of things or states of affairs which correspond to concepts; however, this does not imply that the philosopher has no access to primordial reality or the "inner *logos*" of Becoming. This access to reality is not acquired through conscious, rational thinking or the herd-use of language but rather through tragic pathos or philosophical insight. Nietzsche is refuting only the idea that concepts can correspond to facts or things, and it is an error to infer from this that he denies that there is a way of accessing it or expressing it. It is not just that Nietzsche wishes to acknowledge that facts in the sense of dogmatic truths are interpretations, but rather that truth or reality cannot be expressed linguistically. . Nietzsche rejects dogmatic facts that are anthropomorphic concepts taken to be the essence of things-themselves, as he claims that they are perspectives. In this way, Nietzsche's style emerges from tragic insight into reality or Becoming such that Nietzsche's works are an expression of the silent *logos*.

In recognizing that ‘our true experiences are not at all garrulous’ (TI, ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely Man’: §26), Nietzsche calls for us to view his philosophy not in his words but ‘in’ his life. He in this way prioritizes life-experience over the written word. He recognizes the inability of writing to express his philosophical meaning, and therefore turns to the more expressive medium of music. In ‘the Attempt at Self-Criticism’ (§3) at the outset of *The Birth of Tragedy* he states that he “should have sung, this “new soul”—and not spoken!” The climax of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a dancing song entitled “The Seven Seals Or: The Yes & Amen Song”. In the final aphorism of *The Gay Science* where he wishes to remind his readers of the *virtues* of “reading in the right way” (GS: §383); he expresses that *The Gay Science* is an expression of the “Kingdom of the Dance”, and suggests that to read in the right way is to enter into the musical totality that his works belong to:

I hear all around myself most malicious, cheerful, hobgoblin-like laughter: the spirits of my book are themselves descending upon me, pulling my ears and calling me to order. ‘We can’t stand it anymore’, they shout, ‘stop, stop this raven-black music! Are we not surrounded by bright mid-morning? And by soft ground and green grass, the kingdom of the dance? Was there ever a better hour for gaiety? Who will sing us a song, a morning song?... (GS: §383)

In *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche suggests that he dances with the pen, as he wishes to transcend the fixed rigidity of concepts, and also the inadequacy of words to express the *logos*.

For one cannot subtract dancing in every form from a noble education—to be able to dance with one’s feet, with concepts, with words: need I still add that one must be able to do it with the pen too—that one must learn to *write*?.. (TI, ‘What the Germans Lack’: §7)



In *Ecce Homo* he refers to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as a work where “eloquence become music” and where “lightning bolts hurled forward into hitherto unfathomed future.” (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’, ‘Z’: §6) In the same work under the section entitled ‘Why I am So Wise’ he refers to it as a “dithyramb on solitude.” (§8) In referring to writing with “lightning bolts,” Nietzsche wishes to communicate through the pre-linguistic realm of Becoming. The language of “lightning bolts” also relates to the religious or apocalyptic use of language:

What I am today, where I am today—at a height where I speak no longer with words but with lightning bolts—ah, how remote from this I still was at that time... The great calm in promising, this happy gaze into a future that is not to remain a mere promise!” (EH, ‘The Untimely Ones’: §3)

In *Ecce Homo*, he also states that “Zarathustra may be reckoned as music;” and that “certainly a rebirth of the art of hearing was among its pre-conditions.” (EH, Z: §1) Nietzsche also emphasizes that only a select few can be the listeners to the speeches of Zarathustra: “the tempo of these speeches is a tender adagio. Such things reach only the most select. It is a privilege without equal to be a listener here. Nobody is free to have ears for Zarathustra.”<sup>40</sup> (EH, Preface: §4) In the same passage Nietzsche refers to Zarathustra as the “greatest present” —it is also the *deepest*, born out of the innermost wealth of truth” and “Above, all, one must *hear* aright the tone that comes from this mouth, the halcyon tone, lest one should do wretched injustice to the meaning of its wisdom.” Zarathustra was written from his becoming self that which belongs to the whole and is in this way an expression of Becoming or ‘Life’.

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<sup>40</sup> Parkes, G., notes also the musical nature of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in an introduction to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and contends that for Nietzsche the best way to read this work is with a “third ear”, such that the art of reading coincides with the art of listening. Parkes observes that the art of reading with a “third ear” is expressed in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§246). Parkes offers a detailed discussion of the musicality of Zarathustra in terms of lengths of sentences, punctuation and use of repetition. (See Parkes, G., (ed.), *Introduction*, In: *Translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (with an introduction and notes), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, xxx-xxxii.

Nietzsche's style tries to communicate an "inward tension" of pathos (EH, 'Why I Write Such Good Books': §4) and is "always presupposing that there are ears—that there are those worthy and capable of the same pathos." The fact that Nietzsche's writing style flows from a musical whole implies that the reader will only understand the 'truth' of his writings through hearing their rhythmical effect. One does not comprehend the truth of his works if one searches for it in the words themselves. It is for this reason that he criticizes "books written in German": "What torture books written in German are for anyone who has a *third* ear! How vexed one stands before the slowly revolving swamp of sounds that do not sound like anything and rhythms that do not dance, called a "book" among Germans!" (BGE: §246) The truth of Nietzsche's writings lies in the fact that they are an expression of Becoming, an attunement to reality and it is through the Dionysian Dithyramb that the *logos* can find expression. The kind of reading that Nietzsche advocates is not one that remains on the surface that seeks meaning or truth in his words. Nietzsche's words do not bring us to the complexity of his experience; they leave us on the surface. In the Appendix to *Ecce Homo* (§2) he speaks of what is required in order to understand his works:

Silence is as much of an instinct with me as is garrulity with our dear philosophers. I am *brief*; my readers themselves must become long and comprehensive in order to bring up and together all that I have thought, and thought deep down.

This notion of the ideal reader becoming 'long and comprehensive' is reminiscent of the highest type of soul that of Zarathustra, which is described as that which "reaches down deepest—the most comprehensive soul... the most necessary soul", which "catches up with itself in the widest circle," "the wisest soul." (EH, 'Z': §6), (Z, 'On

Old & New Tablets': §19) It is this type of soul that enters into the silent *logos* of Nietzsche's thought.

It is only the intensity of the reader's own experience of 'Life', reading with a similar pathos, which enables him to understand the truth of Nietzsche's works. It is for this reason that Nietzsche states that if the reader takes his philosophy to be 'in' his texts or in the words he falsifies the text or does it an injustice. In speaking about his words as an expression of an inward pathos or of what is most painful, he mentions that these experiences can be redeemed by "the great freedom" or by the whole:

Here every word is experienced, is deep, is inward; what is most painful is not lacking: there are words in it that are virtually bloodthirsty. But a wind of the great freedom blows over everything; even wounds do not have the effect of objections. (EH, 'The Untimely Ones': §3)

Nietzsche expresses the connection between discovering his own true self, which he refers to as his "inmost being" or "centre" (Letter to Carl Fuchs Dec., 14<sup>th</sup> 1887) and those real educators of his past those who played a role in his self-discovery. These educators or influences from his past enabled his self-discovery to take place through that which his most fundamental or intuitive relation to history as the *whole*. Nietzsche calls this relationship to reality as the whole as 'my *becoming*' or as "my innermost history." (EH, 'The Untimely Ones': §3) The connection between "one's inmost being" or intuitive self, "explosive" education and history or tradition will be explored in the third chapter of the thesis. For Nietzsche, his writings are an expression of his self-overcoming; his philosophy lies 'in' his experience of Dionysian wisdom rather than in his words.

One should speak only when one may stay silent; and then only of that which one has overcome—everything else is chatter, ‘literature,’ lack of breeding. My writings speak *only* of my overcoming: “I” am in them, together with everything which was inimical to me, *ego ipsissimus* [my very own self] indeed, if yet a prouder expression be permitted, *ego ipsissimum* [my innermost self]. (HH, II, Pref.: §1)

It is for this reason that it cannot be ascertained in terms of an analysis of the relationship amongst his central concepts. This is characteristic of a theoretical approach which Nietzsche wishes to overcome. In the Appendix to *Ecce Homo* (§2), in the context of Nietzsche outlining the pre-requisites for understanding his works, he states that “Finally, I speak only of what I have lived through, not merely of what I have thought through; the opposition of thinking and life is lacking in my case. My “theory” grows from my “practice”—oh, from a practice that is not by any means harmless or unproblematic!”

The type of reading that Nietzsche advocates involves bringing a similar tragic pathos as the author’s to the text. The truth of Nietzsche’s writings lies in his experiences where those personal experiences are an expression of Becoming. It is for this reason that only “those worthy of the same pathos” can take a truthful standpoint toward Nietzsche’s works. It is those readers that share similar experiences as Nietzsche come to understand or come into correspondence with him as an author. In bringing similar experiences as Nietzsche’s to the text, not only is the reader capable of understanding the truth of his texts but also their understanding of those experiences can be deepened: “Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear.” (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §1) It is these readers that are in an attunement to an author (AC: §52); they are intuitive readers that share a similar pathos to Nietzsche, and they recognize that his writings are an expression of his

intuitive or innermost self (HH, II, Preface: §1), which are in turn an expression of reality. This truthful standpoint towards an author involves making a transition from the written word to hearing the spoken word to reading with ears, and finally to entering into the silent *logos* of an author where an author belongs to the whole or is immortalized in his writing. This type of reading stands opposed to the postmodern denial of the priority of speaking to writing: “The postmodern “author” thus becomes a substitute for the divine maker himself by sacrificing the logos that issues from his lived presence into the dead form of the written text.” (Hutter 2006: 173) Nietzsche as an author reveals himself to only a select few:

I have cast my book for the select “few,” and even then without impatience; the indescribable patience and dangerousness of my thoughts are such that a long time must pass before there are ears to hear them...  
(Letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, May 12, 1887)

It is through the reader’s “inmost self” or intuitive self that he can enter into this silent *logos*. Nietzsche speaks of the redemptive nature of a certain type of reading that “the virtues of reading the right way” (GS: §383) involve the reader entering into a dancing oneness with reality, discovering himself in the act of “Becoming what one is.” (EH, ‘Why I am So Clever’: §9) This type of reading involves taking a presuppositionless position in relation to a metaphysically independent author. This in turn entails taking a pre-linguistic or non-theoretical standpoint in relation to reality, the text or an author. For Nietzsche, there are those who take a theoretical standpoint towards reality and those in the experience of Dionysian wisdom ‘enter into’ or participate within reality. This distinction or rank order will be explored in the following chapter.

## Chapter Two

### Nietzsche's Notion of a Spiritual Hierarchy

# I

## *Nietzsche on Rank-Order and Higher Justice:*

The following chapter in exploring Nietzsche's notion of a spiritual hierarchy, it offers further insight into what reality is for Nietzsche, and argues that it is through tragic pathos and the higher self as the "Great reason of the Body" (Z, I: §4) that the highest type encounters reality *as it is*. It elucidates Nietzsche's use of the term "pathos of distance" (BGE: §257), that the highest type removes himself from the "human, all too human" in his ascent to Becoming. He experiences what is referred to as "loving-contempt"; the higher type has a profound contempt for the "human, all too human" and out of love for a reality higher than the human, he grants to man a new measure of value. (Z, Prologue: §4) It is only by way of implication that it becomes apparent that Nietzsche does not adhere to a relativism of perspectival truths (human) where truth has no meaning for us. This section argues that for Nietzsche the new measure of value is reality (non-perspectival) and also that the most fundamental or truthful relation to reality is tragic wisdom. Tragic wisdom as an interpretation of the world is therefore ranked highest. This new measure of value is love of reality, or is truth. This new measure gives meaning to the human world, which forges the way for a New Dionysian Age. In this way the chapter looks at Nietzsche as a foreseer of a new Epoch, and the spiritual hierarchy that belongs to it. It also contends that the subordination of the 'Many', the realm of the human, and politics to the 'One' of Becoming in "grand politics" coincides with the initiation of the new age. It also examines in detail the varying types of human beings, a distinction determined by their relation to truth. It also explores the conditions for encountering the truth as

reality. It expresses that rank-order presupposes the non-perspectival nature of truth, and that Nietzsche's works have a relation to this truth.

The philosophical type who engages in the 'higher' form of existence, and who suffers the "pathos of distance" (BGE: §257) is rendered distinct from herd involvements and as a result is declared the most 'worthy' of human beings. The philosophical type falls into the category of the few: the "genius" and the "great human beings", "the best and most fruitful people" (GS, I: §19, §4)<sup>41</sup> or in *Schopenhauer as Educator* (§3, 146) he is referred to as "the highest fruit of life", where the "genius" justifies and is a redeemer of life. The notion of genius and the "great human beings", Nietzsche believes, are the outcome of strict discipline, breeding, and cultural hierarchy.<sup>42</sup> In *Twilight of the Idols*, he refers to the "genius" as

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<sup>41</sup> In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche discusses the relevance of 'evil', that it is necessary in providing the "favourable conditions" for "great growth":

*Evil.*—Examine the lives of the best and the most fruitful people and peoples and ask yourselves whether a tree which is supposed to grow to a proud height could do without bad weather and storms: whether misfortune and external resistance, whether any kinds of hatred, jealousy, stubbornness, mistrust, hardness, greed, and violence do not belong to the *favourable* conditions without which any great growth even of virtue is scarcely possible? The poison from which the weaker nature perishes strengthens the strongman—and he does not call it poison. (GS, I: §19)

<sup>42</sup> In his 'The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche's Vision of Grand Politics' McIntyre discusses Nietzsche's notion of hierarchy or 'the order of rank (*Rangordnung*)', and notes its parallels with Plato's political philosophy in terms of his notion of grand politics. He claims that in spite of Nietzsche's criticism of Socrates and Plato 'as symptoms of decay, as agents of the dissolution of Greece, as pseudo Greek, as anti-Greek' (*TI*, 'The Problem of Socrates,' 2), he shares their view of hierarchy as the fundamental structure of any genuine political society. (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p.75) He notes that "hierarchy is a significant aspect of Nietzsche's work and has triggered a great deal of critical reaction that neither understands nor attempts to understand this dimension of his political philosophy." (*ibid.*) He maintains that when it comes to hierarchy in Nietzsche, the main issue is with "the meaning of inequality." (*ibid.*) He ascertains that "the principle of inequality of status as expressed in his concept of hierarchy has nothing in common with the principle of inequality of power as expressed in class structure or social stratification." (*ibid.*) Nietzsche advocates hierarchy strictly in terms of spiritual status; those who encounter the higher things or that which is higher than the human world, the 'untimely' or atopian, they are the few that are ranked highest. Nietzsche is critical of the notion of equality, according to McIntyre, as he views it as a form of subjective idealism: "For equality, as a moral idea, is a part of a subjectivist interpretation of society as a contract formed by abstract and asocial individuals: that is, the private person precedes and creates society in accordance with his free will. The assumptions of egalitarian political theory derive from two political sources: the subjective morality (*Moralität*) that



“the great destiny”, and goes on to say that “Once the tension in the mass has become too great, then the most accidental stimulus suffices to summon into the world the “genius,” the “deed,” the great destiny”, who are also referred to in the same passage as the specimens of a “higher morality.” (TI, ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely Man: §44)

The genius is understood here by Nietzsche as the “most high-spirited, most alive, world-affirming human being” (BGE: §56), as a spiritually superior person who experiences revelation as direct insight into the deepest meaning of things. (HH, I: §162), (BGE: §295) In *Beyond Good and Evil*, this type of genius is referred to as the “Genius of the Heart.” (BGE: §295) This philosophical type or rare type is one of those who experiences the most extraordinary things, “who is struck by his own thoughts as from outside, as from above and below, as by *his* type of experiences and lightning bolts; who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings...” (BGE: §292) The philosophical type, in the experience of wisdom as the deepest insight into reality, is the person who “often runs away from itself, often is afraid of itself—but too inquisitive not to “come to” again—always back to himself.” (*ibid.*)

In contrast to a pluralisation of expressions of life and health, Nietzsche rather advocates a rank-ordering of psychological types; he clearly believes that certain forms of health, in particular the “Great health” (GS: §382, HH, pref.: §4), are more

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followed the collapse of the morality of custom (*Sittlichkeit*) and the Christian concept of freedom as the free will of the abstract subjectivity.” (*ibid.*) According to McIntyre, Nietzsche’s Overman is neither a free spirit nor a tyrant but a noble individual who embodies a modesty, innocence and freedom from revenge in his experience of immersion in the joy of becoming or belonging to the whole. Hierarchy, for Nietzsche is far from being a vertical relation of domination, it is a “horizontal relation of encompassing in which the lesser is enclosed within the greater as a circle within a larger circle; the relation of ‘encompassment’ embodies a holism, whereas egalitarianism exemplifies a radical individualism in which social relations are construed as oppressive restraints that are artificial, external, and abstract.” (*ibid.*, p.76) McIntyre contends that for Nietzsche domination is more central to egalitarian relationships than to relationships of genuine hierarchy (*ibid.*, p.162) McIntyre notes this idea of genuine hierarchy as a relation between whole and part, that which encompasses and that which is encompassed from Louis Dumont (*Homo Hierarchicus*, London, Paladin, 1972, 24; cf. 114-18. He uses the following translation of *Twilight of the Idols* (R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1986).

valuable than others. Nietzsche embraces the “great health” as a condition that enables the philosophical type to enter into a unity with reality. The “Great health” is at the apex of the hierarchy of souls, and one of its distinctive features is its uniquely intimate relation to suffering the pathos of the will to power itself. The term “pathos of distance” refers to hierarchies: the term “distance” is understood as a distinction between “higher” and “lower” forms of life. It is those who suffer the pathos of distance that are ranked highest. The term “pathos” variously refers to “suffering,” “a course of events,” a “movement” and “experience itself.” Nietzsche views this “pathos of distance” in spiritual terms as a “loving contempt” that the higher type firstly feels contempt for man, and then subsequent to his experience of his ascent to reality, he can love man in granting him a new measure of value, truth. It is through the *eros* of the will to power that the higher type ascends above the human. Through the higher type’s experience of “the untimely”, he can now “love man for God’s sake” or the sake of something higher than man.<sup>43</sup> (BGE: §60) In *The Birth of Tragedy*,

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<sup>43</sup> Mc Intyre examines in detail the pathos of distance in Nietzsche in terms of “loving contempt” and “love of man for God’s sake”. In this way, he looks at truth (reality) as the new measure of value for Nietzsche. McIntyre also maintains that for Nietzsche, “the relationship between the noble individual as law-giver and his people in grand politics reveals certain similarities to Plato’s vision of political philosophy. In particular there is a difference in kind between the noble and the good and, at the very least, a difference in degree between the noble and the free spirit.” (Mc Intyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p.76) In drawing comparisons between Nietzsche and Plato on matters of hierarchy and the noble type’s ascent to higher reality, he explains what Nietzsche means by the ‘pathos of distance’: “This ‘pathos of distance’ that distinguishes the noble and his ‘seriousness in play,’ the political essence of the philosophic life, has its basis in the spiritual pathos that Nietzsche calls ‘loving contempt.’” (*ibid.*) According to McIntyre, “both Plato and Nietzsche have a profound contempt for man and the polis in general, and, accordingly, emphasize the great distance that stands between the philosopher and his political society.” (*ibid.*) They both “look down upon the human all-too-human” and condemn it “as unworthy of true seriousness” but however “grant to man a measure of consideration if and when he is brought under the rule of something higher than man” and in this way “the political thought of Plato and Nietzsche would inevitably be pervaded by this paradoxical, atopian relationship to man and politics.” (*ibid.*) McIntyre explains the term ‘atopian’ as ‘untimely’, placelessness, outside the city, above man, beyond the human, all too human. The genuine philosopher is always atopian: outside the city or above man, but nonetheless, the foundation and law-giver of true polity or ‘grand politics’. It is as a result of one’s contempt for the human, all too human that one can love what is more than human. McIntyre asserts that “For both Plato and Nietzsche, ‘loving contempt’ is the fundamental precondition of the philosophic *eros* because it determines ‘what can be loved in man’ (Z, Prologue, 4) and thus what can be taken seriously in man—that which constitutes the measure of man and that which the philosopher as law-giver establishes as the foundation of true polity.” (*ibid.*, p.77) In a section entitled ‘To Love Man For God’s Sake’ McIntyre explains that the philosophical life begins with the de-

Nietzsche views the pathos of distance in terms of the “primordial agony of individuation” or as “the transfiguring genius of the *principium individuationis*” (BT: §16): “In the heroic effort of the individual to attain universality, in the attempt to transcend the curse of individuation and to become the *one* world-being, he suffers in his own person the primordial contradiction that is concealed in things...”. (BT: §9) This “pathos of distance” not only entails being removed from the “lower” forms of existence but also being removed from the whole in the experience of disunity. It not only involves the separation of the higher types from the lower ones, but also of part from whole.

Nietzsche ranks human beings in accordance with their relation to reality and in turn by varying levels of insight into reality. He ranks highest those who acquire tragic insight into reality such that that their interpretation of the world is ranked highest. The type of individualism that that is commended by Nietzsche is attainable only through a relation to something universal. This universal value, this ultimate principle

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legitimation of the familiar, conventional world and that “the negation of this past legitimacy actually arises from a positive, new force: *eros*, will to power, the love for something higher than the human world.” (*ibid.*, p.78) McIntyre mentions that for both Plato and Nietzsche, it is this mysterious force that lies at the heart of philosophy”, and that both education (*paideia*), which Nietzsche re-thinks as cultivation (*Züchtung*), and the play of creation presuppose the erotic passion of will to power (*ibid.*) He also explains that the most paradoxical quality of *eros* is what Nietzsche calls, in referring to Moses, ‘the love of man for God’s sake’ (BGE, 60), “As the philosophic *eros* leads the spirit above its people and engenders a new love for things beyond the all-too-human, this same passion makes it possible to give the human things a certain seriousness and thus to love them. To love man for God’s or, as Nietzsche implies, for the sake of something higher than man, the *übermensch*, ‘has so far been the noblest and most remote feeling among men’...(BGE, 60)” (*ibid.*) McIntyre maintains that for Nietzsche there is a distinction in reality between higher and lower “the philosophic passion establishes an order of rank through its distinction between the higher and the lower that initially drives the spirit towards the former, and yet paradoxically its desire for the higher and the most serious things compels it to return to and love man with the higher as its measure. The philosopher’s contempt for the all-too-human emerges from the nature of the philosophic *eros* (the desire for the highest things), and yet this love that drives him beyond man also teaches him to love man and grant him a seriousness; he learns ‘seriousness in play’ (*HH*, I: 628)” (*ibid.*) The new measure of value is the higher world, which is an eternity within Becoming and the philosopher’s experience of the higher things in turn allows him to give man a higher measure of value. McIntyre uses the following translations of *Human, All Too Human* (R.J., Hollingdale (trans.), 2 volumes, Cambridge University Press, 1984) abbreviated as *HH*; of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No-One*, (R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1961) abbreviated as *Z*; and *Beyond Good and Evil* (W. Kaufmann (trans.), New York Vintage Books, 1966) abbreviated as *BGE*.

of rank-order is truth or reality. “Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His doctrine and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue; this means the opposite of the cowardice of the “idealist” who flees from reality.” (EH, ‘Why I am a Destiny’: §4) Nietzsche expresses an aristocratic politics of the soul where self-contempt provides the stimulus for inner struggle and self-overcoming.<sup>44</sup> For Nietzsche, it is the ‘hierarchical’ nature of truth that determines the ‘hierarchy of the spirit’ or the spiritual rank-ordering of types: it is the relation to the universal (reality) that determines rank. This relationship to the universal can be achieved only through a certain internal state that is the ‘higher self’ or the divine self or what is referred to by Leslie Thiele as an “aristocratically ordered soul”. (1990: 52) Nietzsche’s rank-order of the spirit is not in any way politically determined; it is a rank-order determined by one’s spiritual relation to reality. This relation is what Nietzsche refers to as “grand politics” where the empirical realm of politics and law (‘many’) is subordinated to realm of polity, the ‘One’ of Becoming.<sup>45</sup> Nietzsche’s rank-order of spirit also relates

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<sup>44</sup> This notion of self-contempt that provides the stimulus for inner struggle relates to what McIntyre draws upon in Nietzsche, the idea of ‘loving contempt’ that is contempt for oneself and contempt for others. He outlines how it plays a role in coming to love higher things and cultivate a higher self. The philosophical *eros*, or spiritual pathos of the will to power lies in the passion or love for higher things, which compels the philosopher “to think back to himself (cf. *UDH*, 10)” (*ibid.*, p.79): “To think back to the self is thus to think and cultivate a higher self, to create beyond oneself. For Nietzsche, this is the essence of love and philosophy.” (*ibid.*) According to McIntyre, the philosophic passion of loving higher things, for Nietzsche presupposes “both a self-dissatisfaction and a love for the self in order to improve itself, the desire for self-knowledge (thinking back to oneself) involves both a self-rejection (contempt) and a love for a higher self, a desire to create beyond oneself. Philosophy, education, self-overcoming, and creation coincide in ‘loving contempt,’ in the philosophic *eros*” (*ibid.*) It is in this way that education plays a role in overcoming self-contempt, in coming to know oneself and in cultivating a higher self. It is those who discover a higher self are also those that place themselves within the realm of culture or reality. For Nietzsche, both philosophy and culture coincide in the sense that both involve self-cultivation. McIntyre asserts that, for Nietzsche this “love of the higher self presupposes ‘the hour of great contempt’ (Z, Prologue, 3 cited in this form by McIntyre, *ibid.*, p.79); self-overcoming presupposes an intense dissatisfaction and contempt for oneself.” (*ibid.*) McIntyre uses the following translation of *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*. In R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), *Untimely Meditations* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. (abbreviated as *UDH*)

<sup>45</sup> McIntyre similarly argues that Nietzsche’s rank-order is spiritual and relates to the realm of polity, and is to be distinguished from the realm of empirical politics or the power politics of the state. He examines the relationship between polity and politics in terms of Nietzsche’s formula, ‘to love man for God’s sake’ (*BGE*, 60), which mirrors Plato’s conception of man as ‘serious play.’ (*ibid.* p. 80) The relationship between polity and politics reflects the distinction between Being and Becoming, where

to the division in psychological types, the distinction between those who are well-constituted and experience the “Great health” as the purification of the whole and those who are ill-constituted and embody *ressentiment*. Nietzsche’s rank-order is political only in the sense of a politics of soul, as Leslie Thiele has put it. In his work ‘*Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*’ (1990: 66-67) Thiele offers an account of Nietzsche’s aristocratically ordered soul:

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the former is concerned with the realm of Being, and the latter the realm of Becoming. McIntyre notes a significant advance in Plato’s later dialogues (especially the *Statesman*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and the *Laws*) beyond the *Republic* “by demonstrating a new sensitivity to the realm of becoming ‘co-eternal’ with the Idea/being.” (Mc Intyre, A., *ibid.*, p.80 citing Voegelin, E., *Plato*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1966, p.140). However, Mc Intyre does go on to stress that Becoming is reality for Nietzsche, (not Being) it could be inferred from Mc Intyre’s reading of Nietzsche that this reality is not necessarily the empirical. Mc Intyre then states that

It follows that the best order possible within the realm of history must reconcile being and becoming, and *nous* and *ananke*....Plato’s philosopher ascends to being through contempt for becoming and yet learns to take the latter seriously out of concern and even love for man-insofar as man becomes worthy of consideration by responding to the divine tugs of the golden cord upon his soul. (Mc Intyre, A., *Op.cit.*, p.80)

It is in this way that McIntyre views Nietzsche’s philosophical statesmanship as paradoxical, and he draws upon Ricouer’s distinction between *le politique* or ‘polity’ and *la politique* or ‘politics’ to illustrate this point. (Mc Intyre, A., *ibid.*, p.81 citing Ricouer, P., ‘The Political Paradox,’ in *History and Truth*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965, 248ff) According to McIntyre, Ricouer understands the term ‘polity’ to refer to “the ideal sphere of political rationality within which empirical politics can take place; the reality of political rule is this ideality, and this reality is not reducible to mere power or class domination.” (Mc Intyre, A., *Op.cit.*, p.81) McIntyre claims that for Nietzsche polity and politics are to distinguished as follows: “The concept of polity will be used to refer to the supra-historical horizon of culture that defines a people through its pre-reflective customs, traditions, and values...The term ‘politics’ refers to power politics as it takes place within the horizon of polity, including the actual struggle for the attainment and preservation of power within and around the state.” (*ibid.*) McIntyre also makes the point that the relationship between politics and polity or ‘grand politics’ is one of subordination, that politics is to be subordinated to polity:

In terms of this distinction between polity and politics, both Plato and Nietzsche attempt to achieve a relativization of the power politics of the state. They wish to demote politics (the state and its legal-military complex) to the secondary status of an instrument of polity or the principal reality of culture. For Nietzsche, culture is the creation of something beyond the human things by which humanity becomes worthy of serious consideration and real value. Thus, politics is a secondary reality, something less real, because both Plato and Nietzsche have carried out a fundamental displacement of reality beyond the political to culture, polity, and the supra-human-a displacement achieved through ‘loving contempt’ which grants to politics a certain seriousness by subordinating it to self-overcoming, culture, or polity, by relativizing politics to polity through ‘grand politics.’ (*ibid.*)

The higher man, in short, is the man with an aristocratically ordered soul: he serves as the measure for all men. Nietzsche was concerned with pursuing ideals, not with establishing norms. Nietzsche wished to make a rule of the exception. The higher self becomes the measuring stick against which human life is evaluated. To realize his potential, man must struggle such that his higher self may rule. One seeks, in other words, to extend the time one lives in a state of inspiration.

The mystical experience of inspiration is considered a mark of the higher self or the wise type; it is an intrinsic feature of his development or self-discovery. This type of inspiration is a form of spiritual insight. Thiele (1990: 159) also argues that, for Nietzsche, “experience of a mystical ecstasy is intrinsic to the higher soul”, and that the experience itself cannot be theorized, “nor can communication of someone else’s experience replace the real thing”. He also notes that, for Nietzsche, such communication is impossible: “To understand one another, it is not enough that one use the same words; one also has to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences; in the end one has to have one’s experiences in *common*.” (BGE: §268) The expression of truth being incommunicable not only relates to the inadequacy of words but also that true understanding of Nietzsche must arise from sharing similar experiences to him. Thiele states that, for Nietzsche, “spiritual insight, not the faculty of reason” is the “sole conveyor of the highest truths. Like his mentor, Heraclitus, Nietzsche held that truth is grasped in “rapture” through “intuitions” rather than via “the rope ladder of logic.” (PTAG: 69 cited in this form in Thiele 1990: 161) He (1990: 161) claims that Nietzsche’s mysticism “proves to be the highest potency of his individualism. For truth remains fundamentally personal and essentially incommunicable. In short, “whatever is perfect suffers no witnesses.” (NCW 665)”<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>The particular translation of *Nietzsche contra Wagner: Out of the Files of a Psychologist* (abbreviated as *NCW*) by Thiele is as follows: Nietzsche, F., *Nietzsche contra Wagner: Out of the Files of a Psychologist*, In W. Kaufmann (trans.), *The Portable Nietzsche*, New York, Viking Press, 1968, p. 665.

Nietzsche is not only an advocate of a rank-order among psychological types but declares that there is a closely related rank-order among values. He writes in the *Preface to Human, All too Human I*, that “it is *the problem of order of rank* of which we may say it is *our* problem, we free spirits.” (HH, Preface: §7) In a similar vein he expresses in *On the Genealogy of Morals* that “All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the *problem of value*, the determination of the *order of rank among values*.” (GM, I: §17) It is apparent from his early writing ‘*Human, All too Human*’ that he draws a distinction between what is ‘aristocratic’ and what is ‘plebeian’ in the spiritual hierarchy. For Nietzsche, rank-order is determined by one’s relation to reality (reality that is non-perspectival), and that tragic wisdom as an interpretation of the world is ranked highest. In this way, the truth of Nietzsche’s work is not based upon a ‘mere’ perspective, but rather upon philosophical insight into reality or divine inspiration.

Nietzsche also affirms a rank-order among values, values which provide the conditions for coming into relation with a universal. This also has implications for humanity where there is a spiritual order of rank on earth, and a new law book of values. The spiritual order of rank is conducive to the coming of an age, of a new Dionysian Epoch. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, universal value or truth determines rank-order;<sup>47</sup> however, it is the type of human being who engages in these conditions is

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<sup>47</sup> This idea that the universal or the whole determines rank-order is also expressed by McIntyre, where he contends that the world higher than the human is the measure that determines not only the rank-order among souls, but also the rank-order among values. McIntyre claims that “The philosopher comes into being, then, by turning his back on the reality of the city (the *Sittlichkeit* of his people) and creating a higher self and, from this, a higher world beyond man; and yet without abandoning his height, the philosopher seeks to make this higher world into a basis a measure for the human world of culture and politics. He seeks to establish not simply a noble type of man (an exception), but a relationship of authority between noble and base types.” (McIntyre *Op. cit.*, p.84) Through the philosopher’s experience of life-affirmation, ‘joy in the actual’, of ‘belonging to the whole’, he thereby

ranked 'higher,' as he in turn enters into an ideal relation with the universal. The

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renders reality, reality or the supra-historical realm (atopian) as the measure of value for the human world. He also because of his experience of insight into higher reality (Becoming) has spiritual authority over the lower or baser types. According to McIntyre,

Both Nietzsche and Plato demand of the philosopher, as the spiritual power underlying a culture, that he institute, first, a hierarchical, spiritual-political order of rank between noble and common souls and thus, through his 'selective and cultivating influence,' (*BGE*, 61) create a truly good or noble type of spirit to justify or give meaning to society; second, a new law-book of values enshrined as the supreme authority; and third, a culture or people which the philosopher founds and which represents the collective unity of the order of rank, the law-book (or 'holy lie'), and the institutions of the state. In short, a people is the unity of polity and politics which the genuine philosopher initiates under the authority and legitimacy of the former. (*ibid.*, p.84)

For McIntyre, the "table of values is realized in and through an order of rank (*Rangordnung*), a hierarchy." (*ibid.*, p.85) The principal features of the order of rank are outlined by McIntyre as follows: hierarchy is an order of precedence that involves spiritual status rather than power; "it is not the abstract individual of the liberal imagination who embodies the same equal rights as all other subjects that is the origin of society but the relation of whole and part;" (*ibid.*) Those who embody the whole are ranked higher than those with lesser souls, the whole takes precedence over the parts. Spiritual hierarchy does not involve mastery over others: "the criterion that determines nobility is self-mastery or autonomy; the highest status, the noble individual, holds no public power and has no common rights except his own personal privileges. It is in terms of this concept of hierarchy that Nietzsche is entitled to call the peasant the most noble type of his time. (Z, 'Conversation with the Kings,' 1)." (*ibid.*) McIntyre also examines the notion of privilege (*AC* 57), and claims that for Nietzsche, "'privilege' is then not really a 'private possession,' but rather an expression of who one is: a mark of one's release into the innocence of becoming." (*ibid.*, p.87). A privilege is "an index of one's self-overcoming" and "unlike common rights, cannot be a passive possession given by a constitution." (*ibid.*) He also argues that "by making 'right' into an expression of 'privilege,' Nietzsche goes beneath not only the underlying principle of hierarchy-the order of status that is determined by one's power to legislate oneself. Privilege, as *Vor-Recht*, represents the level of hierarchy, the level of the encompassing innocence of becoming that circumscribes the world of rights." (*ibid.*, p.88) The term privilege could also arguably be the conditions of self-overcoming, discipline, solitude, suffering, that enable the ascent towards the supra-human world of true being or what is referred to as eternity for Nietzsche, an eternity within Becoming.

McIntyre notes how Nietzsche draws a distinction between three types of men of 'divergent physiological tendency' and three castes to correspond to the former. Nietzsche identifies three types of man: 'the predominantly spiritual type'; the 'predominantly' muscular and temperamental type; and a third and residual category, 'the mediocre type' which is neither one nor the other. (*AC*, 57 cited in this form by McIntyre, *ibid.*, p.88) The highest and most important caste is 'the very few...the perfect caste' (*AC*, 57), they are the most spiritual, and they are the rulers. They rule only on the basis of what they are and on the basis of necessity; "they rule on the basis of something much deeper than the will and certainly not out of a subjective desire to dominate, which is the province of base spirits twisted with *ressentiment*." (*ibid.*) The second in rank are 'the guardians of the law' or 'the executives of the most spiritual order' and "thereby relieve the highest caste of the pettiness and coarseness of actual government" (*ibid.*, p.86). It is in this way that the philosopher legislates above the state, and politics is to be subordinated to polity. The criterion of true *politeia* or grand politics is always extra-constitutional, for Plato, who similarly to Nietzsche contends that "the noetic power of the soul, its degree of mastery over the *logos*", is what "distinguishes who rules truly from those who rule actually" (*ibid.*, p.89) In this thesis, it is similarly argued that 'the inmost centre' or 'the Great reason of the Body' of the highest types are those who in realizing mastery over themselves, in turn experience mastery over the *logos*. McIntyre uses the following translation of *The Antichrist* (R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1986.)



values that Nietzsche advocates are those that enable one to enter into a Dionysian dancing oneness with reality. They are ranked according to the extent that they render the individual existentially more in alignment with reality or that make possible the experience of *amor fati*. For Nietzsche, ‘values’ are evaluated in terms of whether they constitute the criteria for coming to the most truthful standpoint towards reality. In relation to the ‘rank order among values’ (GM, I: §17) Nietzsche outlines them in terms of what is characteristic of the individual type or what provides the ideal condition for self-overcoming. The first and most important value that determines rank-order for Nietzsche is solitude:

First question concerning order of rank: how solitary or how gregarious one is. (In the latter case, one’s value resides in the qualities that secure the survival of one’s herd, one’s type; in the former, in that which distinguishes, isolates, defends one, and makes one’s solitariness possible.) (WP: §886)

In *Beyond Good & Evil* (§263), he mentions that reverence has high ranking in the rank-order among values: “There is an *instinct for rank* which, more than anything else, is a sign of a *high* rank; there is a delight in the nuances of reverence that allows us to infer noble origin and habits.” Nietzsche as a psychologist and “reader of souls” (Thiele 1990: 52) outlines that the “task” of searching out souls is employed “in order to determine the ultimate value of a soul and the unalterable, innate order of rank to which it belongs: he will test it for its *instinct of reverence*.” (BGE: §263) This instinct of reverence is to be contrasted with the “high-speed intestines of every kind” or the “newspaper-reading *demi-monde* of the spirit.” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche rather associates the instinct of reverence with slow digestion, the art of reading as rumination (GM, Preface: §8) and concern for the essential questions that arises from a certain kind of existential experience. In a section from *Beyond Good & Evil* (§213)

Nietzsche mentions “what a philosopher is” that “it cannot be taught: one must know it from experience—or one should have the pride *not* to know it.” He expresses that there is a link between being a philosopher or philosophical states and a certain type of experience or tragic *pathos*, and that this existential pathos is characteristic of the few: “But nowadays all the world talks of things of which it *cannot* have any experience, and this is most true, and in the worst way, concerning philosophers and philosophical states: exceedingly few know them, may know them, all popular opinions about them are false.”(*ibid.*) This type of philosopher whose concern is with existential truth is to be contrasted with “most thinkers and scholars” where nothing is known from their own experience and where thinking is viewed as “something slow and hesitant... but not in the least as something light, divine, closely related to dancing and high spirits.” (*ibid.*)

The philosophical type’s concern with experience makes him in turn concerned with the “highest problems” (*ibid.*). In the same section of *Beyond Good and Evil* (§213), Nietzsche states that “ultimately, there is an order of rank among states of the soul, and the order of rank of problems accords with this” and that “the highest problems repulse everyone mercilessly who dares approach them without being predestined for their solution by the height and power of his spirituality.” These “highest problems” that are to be solved by the highest spiritual type arise from a certain existential pathos, a “philosophical pathos” or “*tragic wisdom*” (EH, ‘BT’: §3) or the pathos of suffering or the pathos of the deepest joy, of “Yes-saying” to ‘Life’. This existential pathos is to be brought to Nietzsche’s works as they themselves are a communication of such pathos. It is this type of reading, which is referred to as “reading and writing in blood” (Z, I: §7) involves bringing one’s real life experiences to the text. Nietzsche

refers to “blood”<sup>48</sup> as self-overcoming, which is a necessary prerequisite for self-cultivation: “For every high world one must be born; or to speak more clearly, one must be *cultivated* for it: a right to philosophy—taking that word in its great sense—one has only by virtue of one’s origins; one’s ancestors, one’s “blood” decide here, too.” (BGE: §213)

It is because the “highest problems” are arrived at through a certain kind of suffering that Nietzsche outlines that one’s capacity for suffering determines the order of rank of a person:

The spiritual haughtiness and nausea of every man who has suffered profoundly—it almost determines the order of rank *how* profoundly human beings can suffer... that by virtue of his suffering he *knows more* than the cleverest and wisest could possibly know, and that he knows his way and has once been “at home” in many distant, terrifying worlds of which “*you know nothing*”—this spiritual and silent haughtiness of the sufferer, this pride of the elect of knowledge...finds all kinds of disguises necessary to protect itself against contact with obtrusive and pitying hands and altogether against everything that is not its equal in suffering. Profound suffering makes noble; it separates. (BGE: §270)

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<sup>48</sup>Walter Kaufmann discusses Nietzsche’s conception of “blood” in his *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* where he mentions that ““blood” was not to Nietzsche’s mind a biologicistic conception any more than “breeding” (Kaufmann, W., *Nietzsche: Philosopher & Antichrist*, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 306), it rather refers to “giving breeding to oneself.” (EH, ‘The Untimely Ones’: §3 cited in this form by Kaufmann, *ibid.*, p.306) He explains that Nietzsche uses the term “blood” in order to overcome the idea of “pure spirit” characteristic of idealism or solipsism. Nietzsche refers to “blood” in the context of those influences that form part of a tradition that the cultivation of Nietzsche’s soul or the soul of the noble type arises from certain influences from the past, that self-cultivation requires tradition. (Kaufmann W., *Op. cit.*, p.306)

What Nietzsche means by “blood” is well illustrated by another note: “When I speak of Plato, Pascal, Spinoza, and Goethe, then I know that their blood rolls in mine” (xxi, 98). Elsewhere, Nietzsche jotted down: “My ancestors: *Heraclitus, Empedocles, Spinoza, Goethe*” (xiv, 109). (Kaufmann, p.306 citing Nietzsche, *Gesammelte Werke*)

Kaufmann outlines how his use of the terms “blood” and “breeding” are within the strict sense of self-cultivation or self-overcoming through the past or as discipline, of “giving breeding to oneself.” (EH, U: 3 cited in this form by Kaufmann, *ibid.*) He claims that Nietzsche omits any use of such words as “breeding” and “blood” for the last part of his *magnum opus*, (*Ecce Homo*, 1908) he rather uses the term “overcoming” (xviii, 345) instead, and that his last outlines introduce the conception of eternal recurrence (xviii, 348 ff.). Kaufmann uses the following translation of Nietzsche: *Werke: Gesammelte Werke, Musarionausgabe*, 23 vols. Munich, Musarion Verlag, 1920-29.

In another section of *Beyond Good and Evil* (§225) Nietzsche refers to the discipline of suffering, and the role it plays in cultivating man towards what he refers to as “divinity, and seventh day”. He views discipline as the means to cultivation of the higher souls in order to prepare them for the initiation of a new Dionysian Age. It is this “great suffering” that Nietzsche associates with “the higher problems” (*ibid.*)

The discipline of suffering, of *great* suffering—do you not know that only *this* discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, it shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness—was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? (BGE: §225)<sup>49</sup>

These values of solitude, reverence, and the capacity for suffering, and hence the higher problems are ranked high, as they provide the ideal conditions for the acquisition of truth. Truth here is to be understood in an existential sense, as the most appropriate standpoint towards reality. It is for this reason in the Preface to *Ecce Homo* that Nietzsche puts out the question in relation to truth: “How much truth does a spirit *endure*, how much truth does it *dare*? More and more that became for me the real measure of value.” (§3) The most appropriate position towards reality is insight, which Nietzsche refers to as “lightning” or as “wisdom” (Z, IV, ‘On the Higher Man: §7).

In his essay ‘*On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*’ (1873) Nietzsche outlines that justice or the “will to be just” distinguishes the genuine from the mendacious truth-seeker. In this essay he asserts that the most truthful standpoint towards reality is that of “justice”. This idea of the will to justice is discussed in the

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<sup>49</sup> Walter Kaufmann in his *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* translates the “discipline of suffering” as “the breeding [*Zucht*] of suffering” in order to make the point that breeding for Nietzsche is to be understood in the context of the discipline of suffering. (*ibid.*, p. 305)

context of “objectivity” and the “striving for truth.” (UD: §6, 88-89) Nietzsche’s conception of justice is to be distinguished from justice conceived in the political sense as the promotion of the common good. Nietzsche’s understanding of justice is similar to that of Socrates who, according to Plato, considered justice as the health or right-ordering of the human soul.<sup>50</sup> This idea of “higher justice” is viewed as the “rarest of all virtues” and those who possess it are “venerable” because “the highest and rarest virtues are united and concealed in justice.” (UD: §6, 88) The just man, rare and solitary, is “the most *venerable* exemplar of the species man.” (UD: §6, 88) The truth that the just man seeks differs from both “cold, ineffectual knowledge” and instrumental knowledge. This striving towards the truth is rare: “The truth is that few serve truth because few possess the pure will to justice, of those few only a few also possess the strength actually to be just.” (UD: §6, 89) Those few are to be contrasted with those who are driven by a variety of drives or motives such as “curiosity, flight from boredom, envy, vanity, the desire for amusement”, which have nothing whatever to do with truth, which has its roots in justice.” (UD: §6, 89) It is this sense of justice which allows the noble type to distinguish the “highest problems” from those problems that are a “matter of complete indifference.” (UD: §6, 89)

Justice, for Nietzsche, requires distinguishing between what is grand and noble and what is mean and petty and is to be viewed as distinct from objectivity conceived by modern scholars as “neutrality toward all events and individuals.” (UD: §6, 93) Objectivity that is conceived in this way does not take into account the psychological ability to decipher between noble and base types. Nietzsche condemns modern man’s

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<sup>50</sup>See Plato’s *Republic* (443c-445b, also 592b) where justice is discussed in terms of health and beauty; health as the constitution of bodily forces that “they shall master and be mastered by one another in accordance with nature”, and justice as the constitution of “the powers of the soul that shall master and be mastered by one another in accordance with nature” (Plato, *Republic*, J. Llewelyn Davies & D.J. Vaughan (trans.), Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997, p. 144).

conception of objectivity because it has its roots in weak natures, fails to recognize crucial moral differences and is oblivious to “what is worth knowing and preserving in the past.” (UD: §6, 94) Nietzsche also criticizes conventional or scholarly objectivity for the reason that it conceals or distorts the facts about the higher life and in turn overlooks the higher type.

In contrast to “this region of indifference” to the highest problems, of those who “may well succeed in becoming a cold demon of knowledge” characteristic of an age of scholars and inquirers, there is “a stern and great sense of justice” that is “the noblest centre of the so-called drive to truth.” (UD: §6, 89) The scholarly conception of objectivity is to be distinguished from justice, which demands that history serve the goal of displaying what is high and rare. Historical or conventional objectivity seeks general propositions whereas justice requires images of wholeness and beauty. The acquisition of wholeness and beauty occurs through self-cultivation and organization of the chaos within the soul; it is for this reason that he admires the Greeks who “gradually learned *to organize the chaos* by following the Delphic teaching and teaching back to themselves, that is, to their real needs, and letting their pseudo-needs die out.” (UD: §10, 122) This cultivation can occur through being influenced by past philosophers; therefore, to be cultivated towards the whole comprises of what is referred to as the noble education. (TI, ‘What the Germans Lack’: §7) Nietzsche’s conception of ‘justice’ takes into account how various historical figures play a role in the noble type coming to realize his essence or in fulfilling the Delphic dictum “Know thyself.” (PTAG: §8), (UD: §10). The realization that “all things are one” (PTAG: §3) and acceptance of the great suffering that forms a necessary pre-requisite stage to self-knowledge constitutes this idea of “higher justice.” The experience of entering into an

oneness with reality is the redemptive aspect of this ‘higher justice’. In this experience of *amor fati* or of ‘higher justice,’ the ‘highest type’ overcomes the spirit of gravity, and is rendered “capable of *golden* laughter.” (BGE: §294) Nietzsche proclaims that “*golden* laughter” determines the rank of a philosopher: “I should actually risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the rank of their laughter—all the way up to those capable of *golden* laughter.” (*ibid.*)<sup>51</sup> For Nietzsche, there are varying degrees of relating to the whole.. Nietzsche claims that there are few that are capable of truth, and that it is an experience for the rare:

Are these coming philosophers new friends of “truth”? That is probable enough, for all philosophers so far have loved their truths. But they will certainly not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman—which has so far been the secret wish and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations... In the end it must be as it is and always has been: great things remain for the great, abysses for the profound, nuances and shudders for the refined, and, in brief, all that is rare for the rare. — (BGE: §43)

It is the higher self that encounters reality , an experience which Nietzsche refers to as *transfiguration* (GS: pref., §3), *rebirth* or as an experience of the heart (WP: §161). It is for Nietzsche, a spiritual experience which is comparable to Christ’s of encountering the unsayable truth. (AC: §33)

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<sup>51</sup> In ‘The Attempt at Self-Criticism’ of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche refers to a quote from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which expresses that laughter has the highest rank: ““This crown of the laugher, the rose-wreath crown: to you, my brothers, I throw this crown. Laughter I have pronounced holy: you higher men, *learn—to laugh!*”” (Z, IV, ‘On the Higher Man’ §17-20 cited by Nietzsche in Nietzsche, F., 1967. *Basic Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche*, W. Kaufmann (trans.), New York, Modern Library, 1967, p.27)

## II

### *The Spiritual Lower Class:*

In looking at Nietzsche as a philosopher of truth and a foreseer of the earth becoming divine, this section looks at the way the lowest type is opposed to the highest type in its inability to reach the most truthful standpoint to Becoming. This idea of the spiritual lower type is reminiscent of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom were advocates of rank-order of the spirit or the soul. According to Thiele, the justification of the world through abstract thought is for Nietzsche, thought “free from any utilitarian function”, “without destination”; it is thought which carries the philosopher into a rapturous state of life-affirmation. (1990: 116) Nietzsche conveys that such a state and such feelings are the essence of philosophy, as noted by Thiele (1990: 117), this is “Philosophy as love of wisdom... not love of men, or of gods, or of truth, but *love of a condition, a spiritual and sensual feeling of perfection: an affirmation and approval out of an overflowing feeling of the power to accept.*” (Thiele 1990: 117 citing Nietzsche’s *Gesammelte Werke* 16:70) Thiele makes a reference to Goethe, Nietzsche’s philosophical model of life-affirmation, and maintains that, for Nietzsche, “one truly thinks only when that of which one thinks cannot be thought out.” (*ibid.*) Philosophy, for Nietzsche, as the most spiritual will to power, is the love of wisdom, which he refers to as “knowledge in the great and exceptional sense.” (BGE: §26) Wisdom in the most spiritual sense is not to be viewed in terms of the accumulation of knowledge or data; it rather consists of a vision of “a world justified and made perfect” or the “wonder at being.” (Thiele 1990: 117) The philosopher as a lover of wisdom views himself as distinct from the “*average man*,” but also recognizes the



necessary role he plays in his “life-history” alongside “much disguise, self-overcoming, familiarity, and bad contact.” (BGE: §26)

The motivations of the base, of “hunger, sexual lust, and vanity” (BGE: §26) are of those who are indifferent to wisdom. It is in this way that Nietzsche is similar to Plato and Aristotle with regard matters of the soul, in that, for him, the lowest part of the soul partakes in the basest pleasures. In many of Plato’s dialogues, the base motives which are prominent in the vast majority of human beings are identified in those who partake in non-philosophical forms of existence. (cf., for example, *Republic* IV: 439d) The lower self is distinguished from the unified soul or “beautifully ordered soul” (*Republic*: 443d). The same association of spiritual shallowness with base motives is to be found in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Nietzsche also emphasizes the decadent power of the lower “browner pleasures” (GS, Preface: §4):

How repulsive enjoyment is to us now, that crude, muggy, brown enjoyment as understood by those who enjoy it, our ‘educated’, our rich, and our rulers!... How the theatrical cry of passion now hurts our ears; that whole romantic uproar and tumult of the senses...how foreign it has become to our taste!”(GS, Preface: §4)

These “crude, muggy, brown” pleasures are completely removed from the tastes of the rarest type or the philosophical type who in recovering from “severe illness” or “abysses” “returns *newborn*, having shed one’s skin, more ticklish and malicious, with a more delicate taste for joy, with a more tender tongue for all good things with merrier senses, joyful with a more dangerous second innocence, more childlike, and at the same time a hundred times subtler than one had ever been before.” (*ibid.*)

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (I: §13 ‘On Chastity’), Nietzsche criticizes the satisfaction of the sexual desires that “those for whom chastity is difficult should be counselled against it, lest it become their road to hell—the mud and heat of their souls.”<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Stanley Rosen, in *The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra*, elaborates what Nietzsche means by this passage: “Nietzsche does not mean abstinence by ‘chastity,’ and he opposes the enforced chastity of Christianity,” (Stanley, R., *The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.109) however that the “return to the body and the earth must be chaste in the sense that it is a turn to the spiritual production of a new epoch or a new table of values...” (*ibid.*) Rosen emphasizes here the body; however, it can be argued that Nietzsche does embrace the idea of the soul as the intuitive (unconscious) self or as the “Great Reason” of the body (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’). Rosen maintains that for Nietzsche, “the creator is a divine figure who is detached from human beings by the loftiness of his vision and the refinement of his spirit. He cannot experience the indiscriminate lust of promiscuity, since this is a mark of humanity,” and because of this “Zarathustra is closer to Christ than he is to the pagan gods” (Stanley, R., *Op. cit.*, p. 109). Rosen then makes reference to the Zarathustra passage ‘On Chastity’: “Mud is at the ground of their souls; and woe if their mud still has spirit! (69)” (*ibid.*) Rosen goes on to explain that “In other words, the promiscuous entrepreneur, intellectual, or ideologue is much worse than the lusty peasant or worker, who is expressing an animal passion. In the case of the intellectual, lust is transformed into ideology; words and ideas are prostituted to the service of passions and are used to justify the lowest and most perverted desires.” (*ibid.*)

Rosen subsequently quotes from the same passage of Zarathustra “Would that you were as perfect [or, literally, complete] as the beasts. But innocence belongs to the beast.” He then explains that Nietzsche affirms the beast’s satisfaction of sexual desire as they act strictly from instinct, which is therefore deemed innocent and “complete”; however, with regard human beings they are not complete and “they can debase instinct by the artifice of language” and “they can become corrupt or decadent” whereas “the beasts cannot.” (*ibid.*) Human beings as rational creatures do not act purely from instinct. The type of chastity that Nietzsche embraces is in the philosophical sense and is to be contrasted with the Christian notion of chastity, as Rosen claims that “Zarathustra counsels the innocence (*Unschuld*), not the murder, of the senses. Sexual love is the natural basis of reproduction as well as of community... But Zarathustra does not associate it with spiritual creativity...” (*ibid.*) On this point he differs from Plato who “advocates the sublimation or purification of sexuality in the erotic ascent. For Zarathustra, there is no erotic ascent, but two different levels of Eros, corresponding crudely to the difference between the body and the soul, or the many and the few. His doctrine of Eros is thus distantly related to the previously mentioned distinction made by Pausanias in Plato’s *Symposium* between the Uranian and the pandemic Eros.” (*ibid.*)

The sexuality of the few is chaste or innocent, and on that point only it resembles the animals. The very few like Nietzsche himself will be chaste in the literal sense “because their energies are devoted to the highest spiritual tasks.” (*ibid.*, p. 110) According to Rosen, Nietzsche associates philosophical chastity strictly with those few souls who are destined for spiritual creativity. In this thesis, these spiritual tasks will be viewed in terms of the initiation of a higher Epoch or what is referred to as the Millennial Kingdom (Rev. 20: 2) or the kingdom of a thousand years (Z, IV: ‘On the Honey Sacrifice’), where Nietzsche will be viewed as a prophet of the “Second Coming” of Christ. Rosen also notes this point in his discussion of ‘On the Honey Sacrifice’ that certain souls will become who they are through overcoming or through activation of Nietzsche’s prophecy, and “the honey is the promise of happiness arising from the work of overcoming.” (Rosen, S., *Op. cit.*, p. 210) The reference to honey is also meant in the sense of wisdom as contemplation of the eternal return (*ibid.* p. 26-27). Rosen also notes that Zarathustra’s prediction of the coming of his kingdom of a thousand years echoes Christ (“Thy kingdom come”). (*ibid.*, p. 210). It also must be acknowledged that Nietzsche affirms chastity in the larger sense that is “compatible with an “innocent” sexual love that is in accord with nature as noted above: for reproduction, community, friendship.” (*ibid.*, p.110) Rosen also asserts that this idea of chastity in the larger sense does not imply that chastity is “universally applicable” as is expressed by Nietzsche: “Chastity is a virtue in some, but almost a vice in many (70).” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche is highly critical of the Christian conception of chastity “which conceals, distorts, intensifies, and corrupts the

The weakness of the herd type must be viewed in terms of the inadequacy of their relationship to the whole. For Nietzsche, rank-order is ultimately an order of truthfulness to be viewed in terms of degrees of truthfulness; power is to be viewed in terms of the degree of truthfulness one can attain. The herd self cannot encounter reality as it is. The lower self lacks the ability to encounter the whole not because he does not possess the ability to accumulate knowledge in the intellectual sense or possess a certain theoretical understanding. Nietzsche is actually rather critical of modernity and the way in which it associates truthfulness with superficial intellectual accomplishments. These types of 'educational' endeavours are to be distinguished from what Nietzsche considers to be the 'noble education' (TI, 'What the Germans Lack': §7) characteristic of the genuine spirit. Nietzsche addresses the shallowness of modern educational institutions in an essay entitled '*David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer*', one of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*, where he criticizes the scholarly approach to education as it does not take into account certain life experiences, the way in which a certain pathos or suffering can be brought to a text, or that one can self-overcome through reading or bring one's self-overcoming to the works. This type of education involves the noble type entering into the "highest problems" (BGE: §213) of existence; true education must take into account the "highest problems" of existence or of philosophy itself. As early as *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche draws upon a distinction between the weakness of the Socratic intellectual and the strength of the highest type to acquire insight into the 'terrible' Dionysian truth. Socrates represents theoretical man who has the "unshakable faith"

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sexual drive by denying it or identifying it with original sin." (*ibid.*) Rosen states that "the net result of Christian Puritanism, as one could put this point, is the doctrine of Freudianism. Freud reveals the nasty secret that the Christian soul is in fact a sex maniac!" (*ibid.*) Nietzsche mentions in the 'On Chastity' passage that lust behind Christian chastity is disguised and called compassion: "Is it not merely your lust that has disguised itself and calls itself compassion? (70)" (Z, I, 'On Chastity', cited in this form by Rosen, *ibid.*, p.110).

(BT: §15) that by rational thought he can penetrate the depths of existence and even correct it. He symbolizes the idea that all truth is rationally accessible and “ascribes to knowledge and insight the power of a panacea” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche maintains that *Wissenschaft*, philosophy in some of its logical and epistemological aspects, has its limits, and the “unshakeable faith.” (*ibid.*) in its power ensures that its followers press on until they reach those limits and discover for themselves its ultimate powerlessness to solve the problem of existence. At this point the powerlessness of theoretical man makes way for a new kind of awareness, *tragic* awareness, as *Wissenschaft* reaches its limits it prompts a regeneration of tragic art, of Dionysian music as “the general mirror of the universal will.” (BT: §17) Such thinkers as Kant and Schopenhauer have also used the apparatus of *Wissenschaft* to demonstrate the limits of *Wissenschaft*. The optimistic belief that the essence of reality can be explored by scientific laws is exposed as a failure and these laws are shown to be the elevation of mere phenomenal knowledge. In a tragic culture, knowledge is superseded by wisdom, which looks for a total view of life, seeking to come to terms with its essential suffering and aspiring, as in Goethe’s words, “to live resolutely in wholeness and fullness.” (BT: §18) Nietzsche relates this “deeper wisdom” to “a profound contemplation and survey of the whole”, and that its meaning “does not at all obtain adequate objectification in the spoken word” or cannot be “put into words and concepts.” (BT: §17) It is for this reason that Nietzsche is critical of opera music in ‘*The Birth of Tragedy*’, as he views it as the invention of the theoretical man, the *critical layman*, not the artist. It lacks any sense of the Dionysian depths of music; it assumes that words took precedence historically. As with the New Attic Dithyramb, this type of music aspired to nothing higher than tone-painting, in imitation of the world of phenomena: “It was the demand of thoroughly unmusical hearers that before everything else the words must be

understood, so that according to them a rebirth of music is to be expected only when some mode of singing has been discovered in which text-word lords it over counterpoint like master over servant.” (BT: §19) The connection between theoretical intellectualism and weakness is also demonstrated in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, where Heraclitus’ ability to affirm the eternal strife of Becoming is contrasted with Parmenides’ “striving for *certainty*.” (PTAG: §11) Ultimately, for Nietzsche, the weak are those who flee from reality; they are referred to as the “idealists” (EH, ‘BT’: §2), and are contrasted with the strong who can “approach the truth” and “Knowledge” as wisdom in saying Yes to ‘Life’ and embracing reality:

This ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant Yes to life represents not only the highest insight but also the *deepest*, that which is most strictly confirmed and born out by truth and science. Nothing in existence may be extracted, nothing is dispensable—those aspects of existence which Christians and other nihilists repudiate are actually on an infinitely higher level in the order of rank among values than that which the instinct of decadence could approve and call good. To comprehend this requires courage and, as a condition of that, an excess of strength: for precisely as far as courage may venture forward, precisely according to that measure of strength one approaches the truth, Knowledge, saying Yes to life, is just as necessary for the strong as cowardice and the flight from reality—as the “ideal”—is for the weak, who are inspired by weakness. (EH, ‘BT’: §2)

The psychology of the average man implies that the type of existence he engages in involves flight from reality. In his later writings, Nietzsche associates the cowardice of the idealist with the psychology of *ressentiment* or of revenge.

The distinction between the weak and strong is also a matter of physiology. Nietzsche refers to the weakest men as “men of *ressentiment*” who are “physiologically unfortunate and worm-eaten;” these are the men that, for Nietzsche, engage in “a whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge.” (GM, III: §14) Nietzsche makes explicit that the “pathos of distance” and “solitude” is to keep the task of the higher

type separate from the lower: “But no worse misunderstanding and denial of *their* task can be imagined: the higher *ought* not to degrade itself to the status of an instrument of the lower, the pathos of distance *ought* to keep their tasks eternally separate!” (*ibid.*) The highest type must remove himself from the sick “madhouse and hospitals of culture! And therefore let us have good company, *our* company! Or, solitude, if it must be!” (*ibid.*) The most typical of spiritual plebs are those who seek revenge against not only those stronger in spirit but also against reality itself.

The cowardice of the weakest type not only implies that he removes himself from reality but also that he does not seek self-knowledge. It is because this Dionysian ‘Yes-saying’ to ‘Life’, the highest and deepest insight, is incommunicable and is only experienced by those few individual selves that the herd deem it to lack utility or practicality. The spiritual lower type does not come to know himself or become who he is; he is only a ‘self’ construed by the herd. In *Daybreak* (§105) under a section entitled ‘*Pseudo-Egoism*’, Nietzsche states that

Whatever they may think and say about their ‘egoism’, the great majority nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for the phantom of their ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them and has been communicated to them; as a consequence they all of them dwell in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms—...all these people, unknown to themselves, believe in the bloodless abstraction ‘man’... and every alteration effected to this abstraction by the judgements of individual powerful figures... produces an extraordinary and grossly disproportionate effect on the great majority—all because no individual among this majority is capable of setting up a real ego...

The sole concern of the herd is species-preservation: “In ordinary “egoism” it is precisely the “non-ego, the profoundly average creature, the species man, who desires to preserve himself: if *this* is perceived by rarer, subtler, and less average men, it

enrages them. For they judge: “we are nobler! Our preservation is more important than that of those cattle!”” (WP: §873) The spiritual lower type is for this reason fearful of solitude and lives in the “market-place”, a place of noise and garrulousness. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche expresses this in a section entitled ‘On the Flies of the Market Place’: “Where solitude ceases the market place begins; and where the market place begins the noise of the great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies begins too” (Z, I: §12), and in a section entitled ‘On the Higher Man’ he expresses that the mob do not believe in the higher men:

You higher man, learn this from me: in the market place nobody believes in higher men. And if you want to speak there, very well! But the mob blinks: “We are all equal.” (Z, IV: §13)

Nietzsche refers to the garrulous type who engages in a certain type of reading and writing as the “scribbling rabble”: “We have tried to get away from the rabble, all these scream-throats and scribbling blue-bottles, the shopkeepers’ stench, the ambitious wriggling, the foul breath—pew for living among the rabble.” (Z, IV: §3) In the section entitled ‘On Reading & Writing,’ Nietzsche dissociates writing with blood from the type of writing characteristic of the masses: “That everyone may learn to read, in the long run corrupts not only writing but also thinking. Once the spirit was God, then he became man, and now he even becomes rabble.” It is these type of people that remain in “a surface—and sign-world” (GS: §354), a world removed from one’s true self, inward states of tension, and pathos. It is because they are unable to think beyond language that they are disconnected from tragic pathos or unconscious activity that which is most worthy and divine.

For Nietzsche, there is a distinction between the conscious self,<sup>53</sup> and the higher self, or the self which embraces the dictum “to become who you are.” (GS: §270), (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §9) This distinction in turn informs his distinction between the herd self and the higher self. The herd self does not self-overcome and develop his unconscious self. The spiritual aristocrat cultivates his higher self, the “true nature” or self that Nietzsche considers is “not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you.” (*Schopenhauer as Educator*: §1)<sup>54</sup> He will also wear “masks” when

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<sup>53</sup> The idea of a higher self, for Nietzsche, is distinct from the self as substance or as linguistic illusion (WP: §484), the Cartesian ego. (GM, I: §13).

<sup>54</sup> In *Schopenhauer as Educator* (§1), Nietzsche claims that one must firstly recognize one’s true self before one can realize it, and the most revealing question is “what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it?” The answer will show you that “your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least that which you usually take yourself to be.” This work is a *Meditation* on *Schopenhauer as Educator* which is Nietzsche’s own attempt to discover his own true self by considering those traits he admired in Schopenhauer but also all of which shaped him “our friendships and enmities, our glance and the clasp of our hand, our memory and that which we do not remember, our books and our handwriting.” (*ibid.*) He also recognizes Schopenhauer’s honesty and integrity and also his “cheerfulness” (§2) and he also meditates on Schopenhauer’s “separation” from the universities, and on the dangers of loneliness and of the “despair of the truth” (§3). Later in *Ecce Homo* as an autobiographical text which is subtitled ‘*How One Becomes What One Is*’ Nietzsche reveals his true self, his innermost or becoming self, while referring to his third and fourth *Meditation*, he claims that he had pictured then “Schopenhauer and Wagner or, in one word, Nietzsche” (EH, ‘The Untimely Ones’: §3), and he elaborated:

Plato employed Socrates in this fashion... in *Schopenhauer as Educator* my innermost history, my *becoming*, is inscribed. Above all, my promise! What I am today, where I am today—at a height where I speak no longer with words but with lightning bolts... But I beheld the land... it is admittedly not “Schopenhauer as Educator” that speaks here, but his opposite, “Nietzsche as Educator.” (*ibid.*)

In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche also mentions that “To become what one is, one must have the faintest notion *what one is*.” (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §9) Here, he claims that there is no single route to reaching one’s goal and that some of our detours turn out to eventually to have been invaluable. It is possible to claim that his tribute to Schopenhauer was a detour and that Nietzsche as the author of the *Untimely Meditations* did not yet have the “faintest notion” of what he himself was. This idea of an individual essence or “true nature” is not pre-given to us by nature; it is rather given to us as a task, a spiritual task to be taken up by those individuals, those select few. In *Schopenhauer as Educator* (§3), it is referred to as a “transfigured *physis*” or a “productive uniqueness” and he claims that only few realize it, as the many are too lazy and afraid: “Most find this unendurable, because they are, as aforesaid, lazy, and because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended from this uniqueness.” However, life for the “singular man who encumbers himself with this chain, life withholds almost everything—cheerfulness, security, ease, honour—that he desired of his youth; solitude is the gift his fellow men present to him.” Solitude is again emphasised as the necessary requisite stage to self-fulfilment. He also speaks of the dangers of solitude: “Where there have been powerful societies, governments, religions, public opinions, in short wherever there has been tyranny, there the solitary philosopher has been hated” but that in turn that “philosophy offers an asylum to a man into which no tyranny can force its way, the inward cave, the



he enters the “market place” as he knows that nobody believes in higher men in the market place (Z, IV: ‘On the Higher Man’), and he also knows that his philosophical self or that type of *tragic* pathos is “incommunicable”: “A great man—a man whom nature has constructed and invented in the grand style—what is he?... He knows he is incommunicable: he finds it tasteless to be familiar; and when one thinks he is, he usually is not. When not speaking to himself, he wears a mask.” (WP: §962) The idea of the higher man wearing a mask, for Nietzsche is a means of overcoming his inability to communicate his deepest insight. It is also possible to infer from Nietzsche’s style as the communication of a particular type of pathos that his works are aimed at the same type of self as Nietzsche himself at the level of pathos, blood (unconscious) and insight. His books were in no way written for the conscious self or the herd self that is the socially conditioned self. In an essay entitled ‘*Nietzsche and Postmodern Subjectivity*,’ Kathleen Higgins (1990: 192) criticizes the postmodern portrayal of Nietzsche and in doing so comments that Nietzsche “aims at direct and personal encounter”, while the “Postmodernists, in contrast, do not seem particularly concerned with personal subjectivity”.<sup>55</sup> Nietzsche’s works are rather written for the

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labyrinth of the heart: but there too lurks the greatest danger”, and that the second danger is that to “despair of the truth” (*Schopenhauer as Educator*: §3), and the third that he “harbours a profound desire for the genius in him.” (*ibid.*)

<sup>55</sup> In the same article, Higgins maintains that many postmodern commentators wrongfully reject the idea of a unified subjectivity and in turn the author’s presence and personal encounter with the reader. She asserts that “the full human subject is absent from postmodern discourse” (Higgins, K., *Nietzsche and Postmodern Subjectivity*, In: *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, Clayton, Koelb (ed.), Albany, The State University of New York Press, 1990, p.192), and that

One of the reasons that it becomes difficult to say who postmodernists are, as we have observed, is that they typically reject as illusory any unified subjective being or experience. A postmodernist stance in writing is thus typically the stance of one who claims to be “elsewhere” (as contemporary debate about the “author” in relation to the text reveals). Perhaps one can, in a sense, “define” the postmodernist as someone else the last time, someone who will be someone else the next time. In this sense, Nietzsche is far from a postmodernist. His writing aims at direct and personally invested encounter far more than at a demonstration of the impossibility of “being there.” (*ibid.*)

philosophical self that engages in a tragic pathos, the type of person who can bring similar personal experiences to the text. Nietzsche rather claims that his books are written for the “subterranean man” for the self who “tunnels and mines” (*Daybreak*, Pref.: §1) beneath the conscious “surface—and sign-world.” (GS: §354)

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She then quotes Nietzsche’s phrase ‘writing in blood’ as this type of writing is writing from personal experience: ““Of all that is written, I love only what a man has written with his blood”” (Z, I: §7, cited in this form in Higgins, *ibid.*, p.192) In the following chapter it will be argued in similar terms that Nietzsche as an author is present, and it will be explored what the ideal relation between reader and author is. This will be discussed within the context of Nietzsche’s idea of a unified subjectivity, and a noble education.

### III

#### *The Spiritual Middle Class*

This section looks at the way that Nietzsche argues that the “intellectual scholar” overlooks pathos, true insight into Becoming in their adherence to conventional or rational approach to objectivity. Nietzsche views this as the Socratic rationalist approach to truth that is to be overcome in order to retrieve a more fundamental way of relating to reality. Nietzsche’s first experience of scholarly criticism was when his first book *The Birth of Tragedy* was ill-received. *The Birth of Tragedy* is itself an expression of contempt for the scholarly approach to philosophy.<sup>56</sup> It not only marks a transition from the scholarly approach to philosophy, it is an expression of a pathos which is of no concern to the scholar. In *Beyond Good and Evil* (§213), Nietzsche criticises the scholars, as he recognizes that they are removed from the “genuinely philosophical combination, for example, of a bold and exuberant spirituality that runs *presto* and a dialectical severity and necessity that takes no false step;” this combination is unknown to the scholars from their own experience and those who speak of it are deemed “incredible.” (*ibid.*) Only an “exceedingly few” experience true philosophical states. The experience of the Dionysian or of the ‘Yes-saying’ pathos is strictly for the few. The spiritual weakness of the scholars renders them inadequate to the solution of the “*great* problems and question marks”, of the great existentialist questions, as they do not participate in the mystery of Becoming or its “*ambiguous* character.” (GS: §373)

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<sup>56</sup> In spite of Nietzsche’s criticism of the scholarly approach to philosophy, he recognizes the necessary role it played in his life in acquiring discipline. He identifies it as a necessary stage in his own self-development and acknowledges that the scholarly tradition places no value on discipline in education or in relation to self-knowledge. The following chapter will explore the relevance of discipline in education, for Nietzsche, or its relevance in what Thiele refers to as the “art of arranging the soul.” (Thiele, L., *Op. cit.*, p.171)

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche devotes an entire section entitled 'We Scholars' to the problem of 'the scholar, the average man of science.' (BGE: §206) Nietzsche criticizes the scholar's equation of philosophy with scholarship. Nietzsche also admonishes the scholars for their "fear of masked mysticism and a correction of the limits of knowledge leaped forward" and "their lack of respect for individual philosophers that had involuntarily generalized itself into lack of respect for philosophy." (BGE: §204) The scholar shows no concern for the "great problems" as he is only a believer in utility values. They do not experience insight into 'Life' or reality, and they also view it as inadequate as it has no utility or practical value.

In the second of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations*, 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,' he criticizes the scholarly approach of the academic historian. In this essay he criticizes the "impersonal" stance of the scholar which cuts him off from his own self and thus from all philosophy. The scholar upholds the position that the more impartial the stance the more truthful it is; for that reason, he fails to take the self into account, which is actually the most fundamental position to reality. The supposed 'impartial' position of the scholar is actually representative of their spiritual weakness or their adherence to herd-values. For Nietzsche, the mask of 'objectivity' conceals a petty egoism of the scholar. In 'On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life' the scholar is compared to the academic historian whose weak and self-deluded human character, which is caused by oversaturation with history, leads to the degradation of "the most truthful of all sciences, the honest naked goddess philosophy." (UD: §5, 85) In replacing philosophy with scholarship, the attempt to fulfil the "law of philosophy" in Life is abandoned. Instead, scholars undertake the

project of mounting for public exhibition the now extinct philosophical doctrines. (UD: §5, 85) This scholarly approach to education involves overlooking the works themselves and their relation to reality and the focus is on the history of the author or his biographical data. (UD: §5, 87) The scholar who adheres to the conventional notion of objectivity or dogmatic truth does not fulfil the “law of philosophy” or the “law of life”<sup>57</sup> (GM, III: §27) or “the law of the necessity of “self-overcoming” in the nature of life” (*ibid.*); he does not experience redemption or purification of the whole. It is in this way that the scholar shows no concern for self-reflection, self-knowledge or in fulfilling the maxim to “become what one is” (EH, ‘Why I am So Clever’: §9), and for this reason becomes twice removed from reality in adhering to an ‘impartial’ standpoint. Nietzsche criticizes the pursuit of disinterested knowledge as a form of ““unselfing””, which also forms part of the “depersonalization of the spirit.” (BGE: §207) The scholar in no way seeks out the personal in philosophy. In this way, the scholar is representative of a *wissenschaftlich* age where the personal is not taken into account when it comes to matters of truth.

For Nietzsche, the reduction of philosophy to “theory of knowledge” (BGE: §204) or scholarship is an expression of the later Socrates and the rise of *Wissenschaft* or what he refers to as ‘*the problem of science.*’ (BT, ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’: §2) He associates *Wissenschaft* with the term ‘*Wissen*’, knowledge and the process of cognition in general. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, the term ‘*Wissenschaft*’ is treated as

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<sup>57</sup> In the third essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche expresses the nature of the “law of life” in the context of Christianity as a dogma bringing about its own self-destruction by its own morality. The term ‘the law of life’ is a purely formal demand of self-overcoming whereby anything that stands outside it is destroyed. Elsewhere, the term mainly ties in with Nietzsche’s concept of justice, and its redemptive nature as is expressed in *The Untimely Meditations* and in *Daybreak* (§4). He uses the term ‘justice’ in the metaphysical sense to refer to a particular relation between the individual type and the world or ‘reality as a whole’. It consists of an accordance that obtains between the just person and the world, an affirmative standpoint in *amor fati*, in the realization that ‘all things are one.’ (PTAG: §3, 39)

another compound from *Wissen*, cognate with the “high pyramid of knowledge in our own time” (BT: §15) or such concepts as “ocean of knowledge” (BT: §18) and “intellectual culture” (*ibid.*), which are all the products of man’s “hunger for knowledge” (BT: §15), his “hunger for insatiable and optimistic knowledge”. Nietzsche claims that when the limits or “boundaries” of science and logic are recognized or when the optimism of science “suffers shipwreck” (BT: §15) that a new form of insight breaks through, *tragic insight*, “when they see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail—suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, *tragic insight...*” (*ibid.*) In *The Birth of Tragedy*, it is Socrates who is the archetypal *Wissenschaftler*, he is the “mystagogue of science” (BT: §15) and the embodiment of hypertrophied reason. (BT: §13) In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche criticizes Socrates for creating the “profound illusion” in “the unshakeable faith that thought, using the thread of causality, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of *correcting* it.” (BT: §15) His criticism of Socrates re-emerges in *Twilight of the Idols* in a section entitled ‘The Problem of Socrates,’ where he admonishes him for creating the idea that thought can capture reality. It is with Socrates that thought begins to get ideas above its station; it aims at universality and believes it can “fathom the nature of things” (BT: §15), which leads to what Nietzsche considers an insidiously optimistic belief in progress that he condemns as a form of escapism, an evasion of the Schopenhauerian, pessimistic truth of the gravity and senselessness of existence. Nietzsche rather advocates the possibility of tragic insight or “mystic intuition” into reality. Socrates, Nietzsche considers, counted the new ‘theoretical’ standpoint in philosophy as higher than any claim to superior insight. In *Twilight of the Idols*, he ranks Socrates, and claims that he belongs in the “lowest class” among the plebs. (TI,

‘The Problem of Socrates’: §3) In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche notes that both Kant and Schopenhauer recognize that truth in the theoretical sense or the view that logic solves the riddles of the universe only “elevates mere phenomenon:” (BT: §18)

The extraordinary courage and wisdom of *Kant* and *Schopenhauer* have succeeded in gaining the most difficult victory, the victory over the optimism concealed in the essence of logic—an optimism that is the basis of our culture. While this optimism, resting on apparently unobjectionable *aeternae veritates*, had believed that all the riddles of the universe could be known and fathomed, and had treated space, time, and causality as entirely unconditional laws of the most universal validity, Kant showed that these really served only to elevate the mere phenomenon, the work of *māyā*, to the position of the sole and highest reality, as if it were the innermost and true essence of things, thus making impossible any knowledge of this essence or, in Schopenhauer’s words, lulling the dreamer still more soundly asleep. (*ibid.*)

Nietzsche identifies Socrates as the plebeian character who, in a democratic *polis*, introduced dialectics and theoretical knowledge so that everyone could have the truth equally. It is theoretical truth that needs to be proven inter-subjectively; it is in this way that truth becomes levelled out or reduced to public criteria or inter-subjective criteria of validity. Nietzsche’s main criticism against the democratic spirit of scholarship is that it reduces truth to something that is accessible by all. Nietzsche also criticizes the Socratic, rational or theoretical approach to philosophy as he sees that it has led to the demystification of the world. He condemns it for its excessive reliance on logic and science and its attempt to correct being (reality) by knowing in the rational sense. Nietzsche rather advocates tragic pathos as ways of glimpsing reality as it is. His criticism of Socratic optimism or the elevation of mere phenomena ties in with his critique of the oldest appearance that of absolute space being made into a metaphysics, which will be explored in the final chapter of the thesis.

## IV

### *The Spiritual Highest Type or the Wisest Type:*

The following section looks at the way Nietzsche identifies the spiritual, noble type with the philosopher, that is, the concrete human being who takes the most truthful standpoint towards reality. It is in this way that he plays a formative role in forging the way for a new age. It also contends that the higher type's ascent to Becoming, an "eternity" within Becoming as the "joy in the actual" is comparable to Plato's "descent of creation". He favours philosophy in its existentialist or practical form over "philosophy" as scholarship, as a disembodied theoretical structure of "knowledge". For Nietzsche, philosophy in its existentialist form is spiritual; it is on a par with what he refers to as Christian praxis. In *The Antichrist* (§33), Nietzsche emphasizes the divine nature of Christian praxis as the experience of "blessedness" or of redemption, as a form of "evangelical practice" that "leads to God, indeed, it is "God"!" The practical existentialist relation to reality is more fundamental than the theoretical standpoint. It is for this reason that the individual type is to be admired in his concrete relation to reality. It is the individual who embraces the whole and it is this universal truth that Nietzsche values. He criticizes the intellectualist tradition for claiming that thought can capture reality; and in doing so, he maintains that in embracing mere logical abstractions they are actually turning away from reality. This parallels Kierkegaard's account of the 'aesthetic man' in volume I of *Either/Or*.

Nietzsche's main concern is with the 'personalities' of the great philosophers, as he claims that philosophy is always a reflection of the personal: "Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal



confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.” (BGE: §6) The philosophy is an expression of the personal or of who the philosopher *is*: “In the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to *who he is*—that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.” (*ibid.*) It is through the personal that one gains insight into philosophical types and their relation to reality. In contending that every philosophy is expressive of the personal, Nietzsche mentions that the “drive to knowledge” cannot be viewed as the father of philosophy, as there is another drive behind this. Nietzsche in the same section goes on to associate the supposed ‘impersonal’ approach of the scholar who does not become “*who he is*” with his real “interests”, that is with his family, the pursuit of money or politics:

To be sure: among scholars who are really scientific men, things may be different—“better,” if you like—there you may really find something like a drive for knowledge, some small, independent clockwork that, once well round, works on vigorously *without* any essential participation from all the other drives of the scholar. The real “interests” of the scholar therefore lie usually somewhere else—say, in his family, or in making money, or in politics. Indeed, it is almost a matter of complete indifference whether his little machine is placed at this or that spot in science, and whether the “promising” young worker turns himself into a good philologist or an expert on fungi or a chemist: it does not *characterize* him that he becomes this or that.” (*ibid.*)

In Heraclitus, Nietzsche recognized a kindred spirit and in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* he identifies him as the paradigmatic philosophical type. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche mentions that he treats the name of Heraclitus with the “highest respect” (TI, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy”: §2), in whose proximity he felt “altogether warmer and better than anywhere else,” and whose understanding of strife and eternal becoming were more closely related to Nietzsche’s own philosophy “than

anything else thought to date.” (EH, ‘BT’: §3) The Heraclitean world of constant flux is seen by Nietzsche as the reflection of a man strong enough to accept the terrifying instability of the world of Becoming. Nietzsche upholds the view that the philosophy is inseparable from the personality of the philosopher or that both philosophy and philosopher are one and the same. It is in this way that Nietzsche views Heraclitus’ doctrine of Becoming as inseparable from the man himself. It is therefore possible to infer that it is an expression of those character traits which Nietzsche associates with the philosophical or individual type such as solitude, independence, strength and courage. It is also expressive of a wisdom that sees the harmony and ‘justice’ behind the universal strife of existence as the “one” of Becoming. The wisdom of Heraclitus recognizes the necessity of suffering, its potential and its benefit. (PTAG: §7, 61-62)

This is the wisdom of the ascending soul, the soul in search of order:

Do guilt, injustice, contradiction and suffering exist in this world? They do, proclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human mind which sees things apart but not connected, not for the con-tuitive god. For him all contradictions run into harmony, invisible to the common human eye, yet understandable to one who, like Heraclitus, is related to the contemplative god. Before his fire-gaze not a drop of injustice remains in the world poured all around him; even that cardinal impulse that allows pure fire to inhabit such impure forms is mastered by him with a sublime metaphor. In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibits coming to be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence. (*ibid.*)

In particular, Nietzsche affirms solitude as a disposition of the higher self that reveals reality *as it is* or enables the noble type to encounter the universal whole. Zarathustra tells his followers: “Now I go alone, my disciples. You too, go now, alone. Thus I want it.” (Z, I, ‘On the Gift-Giving Virtue’: §3) Nietzsche emphasises the necessity of solitude as the medium in which one individual type encounters the whole. Solitude is not advocated as a criterion by which one follows, but rather is a spiritual condition that provides the self-overcoming necessary to encounter Dionysian ecstasy in the

experience of the whole. It is only a select few that experience this type of solitude; it is the spiritual condition that necessitates the confrontation of individuality. The highest type or philosophical type “has solitude not because he wishes to be alone but because he *is* something that finds no equals.” (WP: §985) In *Beyond Good and Evil*, solitude is deemed a “virtue” by Nietzsche alongside “courage, insight, sympathy.” (BGE: §284) The type of solitude that Nietzsche advocates is not the solitude of a “nun” that “leads to a fruitless, perhaps melancholy solitude. It has nothing in common with the solitude of the *vita contemplativa* of the thinker” (D: §440), as the true thinker finds in solitude his greatest fruitfulness. For Nietzsche, that which makes solitude a heroic virtue is its *agonal* character or that it consists of an internal *agonal* struggle. The solitary is not only his own best friend, but also his own worst antagonist.<sup>58</sup> The internal struggle of the solitary is a torment, but it also enables him

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<sup>58</sup> In an essay entitled ‘*The Wanderer and His Shadow*’ (*Human, All Too Human: vol.: II*), Nietzsche makes it apparent his own inner struggle or his struggle with himself. In the same essay he mentions that the thinker is his own worst critic: “This thinker needs no one to refute him: he does that for himself.” (HH, II, ‘The Wanderer and his Shadow’: §249) The shadow is one of Nietzsche’s most enduring images, which follows the wanderer as his alter ego, and is reflective of the friend-foe relationship that Nietzsche maintains with himself. The wanderer cannot escape his shadow, and in his shadow he finds both a companion and a critic. In an aphorism entitled “*From the seventh solitude*” he speaks of the torment of solitude: “—One day the wanderer slammed a door shut behind him, came to a halt, and wept. Then he said: ‘This penchant and passion for what is true, real, non-apparent, certain—how it exasperates me! Why does this gloomy and earnest oppressor follow *me* of all people! I want to rest, but he won’t allow it.’” (GS: §309) For Nietzsche, the life of a solitary must consist of echoes and shadows: “*In solitude*.—When one lives alone, one neither speaks too loud nor writes too loud, for one fears the hollow echo—the criticism of the nymph Echo. And all voices sound different in solitude!” (GS: §182) The idea of the solitary contending with echoes and shadows is reminiscent of Socrates’ inner voice or inner daemon, which was an unrelenting critic, a critic Socrates always met while he was alone. Nietzsche refers to this inner voice in *The Birth of Tragedy* (§13) as the “‘*daimonion* of Socrates’”, a divine voice, an “instinctive wisdom”, which appears for Socrates “only in order to *hinder* conscious knowledge”. Nietzsche affirms the voice as an instinctive wisdom, but criticizes Socrates for making instinct the critic, and consciousness the creator, which he exhorts is “—truly a monstrosity *per defectum!*” (*ibid.*) He notes that “in all productive men it is instinct that is the creative-affirmative force, and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively” (*ibid.*) It is for this reason that he refers to Socrates as a non-mystic: “Socrates might be called the typical *non-mystic*, in whom, through a hypertrophy, the logical nature is developed as excessively as instinctive wisdom is in the mystic” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche rather takes a mystical approach, and associates the inner voice with intuition and the instincts. This mysticism is also evident in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* where Nietzsche tells Zarathustra to inform his listeners of the plight they face in the practice of solitude: “But the worst enemy you can encounter will always be you, yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in caves and woods.” (Z, I: ‘On the Way of the Creator’) The practice of solitude ties in also with the art of writing and its discipline, which is another form of internal struggle, for Nietzsche. The art of writing and its ability to discipline the writer towards the whole will be explored in the following chapter.

to encounter the most profound joy that of Dionysian ecstasy in becoming one with the totality of reality.<sup>59</sup> The basis of solitude is intense suffering and in man's suffering there exists a tension between himself as individual and the totality of reality, which is expressed as the principle of individuation or '*principium individuationis*' in *The Birth of Tragedy*. (BT: §1, §2, §4, §16 & §21) It is through self-overcoming that this distinction is abolished and man becomes one with the whole of reality. In this experience man and God or man and reality are identical and this unity involves a state of ecstasy. In the third essay of *The Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche refers to these solitary types as "demi-gods" whose solitude drives "them so deep into themselves that when they re-emerge it is always as a volcanic eruption." (*Schopenhauer as Educator*: §3, 140) Nietzsche emphasizes the explosive power that comes with overcoming this kind of solitude, those demi-gods who "can endure to live, and live victoriously, under such terrible conditions..." where their works of genius evidence their victory. (*ibid.*) It is these types who live the great style whose lives encounter the whole; they are the true lovers of wisdom, they are the types of genius that Nietzsche advocates.

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<sup>59</sup> John McGowan, in his work *Postmodernism and its Critics*, notes Nietzsche as one of the main precursors of postmodernism. He also looks at the modernist strain in Nietzsche and its opposition to the postmodernist standpoint, in particular on solitude. McGowan looks at Nietzsche's affirmative freedom in terms of the modernist notion of the individual separating himself from the herd or societal values, he associates Nietzsche with "high modernism's goal of separating itself, in the name of purity and autonomy, from its surroundings." (McGowan, *Postmodernism and its Critics*, London, Cornell University Press, 1991, p.84) He also notes a passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* (§284) where Nietzsche speaks the modernist language of purity: "For solitude is with us a virtue: it is a sublime urge and inclination for cleanliness which divines that all contact between man and man—'in society'—must inevitably be unclean. All community makes somehow, somewhere, sometime—'common.'" (McGowan, *ibid.*, p.84-85 quoting Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), England, Penguin Books, 1973, p.195) McGowan contends that the ability to endure separation is the very key to experiencing freedom or affirmation of the real in Nietzsche: "The ability to endure separation is the very key to freedom, since it is our fear of solitude that acts as the strongest reason to heed the herd instinct." (*ibid.*, p.85) According to him, the strong individual for Nietzsche must disentangle himself from society but "only to encounter the real, existential, ennobling conflict with a tragic universe." (*ibid.*) He also notes that postmodernists overlook solitude and the realm of the real or the existential in Nietzsche, as they claim that one cannot escape one's social or historical determinants.

In an essay entitled ‘*The Socratic Nietzsche*’, Ran Sigad examines what truth is for Nietzsche, and identifies the various human conditions for enabling reality to reveal itself. This type of life embraces philosophy as “love of wisdom” and in this sense is essentially Socratic, where Nietzsche’s philosophy is similar to that of the early Socrates that of the early dialogues. Sigad notes that for Nietzsche this type of life is experienced by the higher type or the noble type, and that suffering and solitude play a pivotal role in the realization of the good life. He recognizes Nietzsche’s identification of suffering as a way of life that reveals reality as it is, as a struggle of forces which is “not disguised by any contrivance of reason.” (1986: 112)<sup>60</sup> Suffering

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<sup>60</sup> Sigad outlines in his essay how Nietzsche is critical of the so-called ‘objectivity’ of human reason. “Human reason is not objective, but on the contrary, it is the expression of the interest to eschew suffering and achieve security through the knowledge of reality.” (Sigad, R., ‘The Socratic Nietzsche,’ In: *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, Y., Yovel (ed.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 1986, p. 111) Conceptual knowledge is a “generalization of similar aspects in the phenomenal world” that disregards “everything which is different and incompatible, is an interpretation of reality.” (*ibid.*) Sigad goes on to explain that “although the interpretation is legitimate, reason usually exhibits its interpretations as the necessary and only manifestation of truth. Therefore, reason falsifies reality by contradicting it, for any interpretation that is only partial exhibits itself as total runs counter to the truth.” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche’s criticism of reason is in terms of its “pretension to be capable of revealing truth” (*ibid.*) Sigad expresses that Nietzsche considers the philosophy of reason to be pretentious: “Reason presumes to know what Nietzsche’s critical speculations show to be impossible to know. In fact, the philosophy of reason does not desire truth at all. It does not aim to reveal reality as it is, but rather has an interest in imposing the values of reason, i.e. of a certain way of life, upon reality.” (*ibid.*) The type of truth that Nietzsche advocates is truth that is “to be identified as a way of life, the ongoing activity which consists of self-overcoming; the overcoming of anything that is *not* total criticism. In other words, the love of wisdom, itself, when raised to a way of life constitutes truth.” (*ibid.*, p.110) Sigad explains that thinking is critical only when its instinctive impulse is “aiming at the one and total truth, which is the disclosing of reality as it is, i.e. as will to power.” (*ibid.*, p.112) He goes on to further emphasize that reason as rationalization is a falsification of this impulse and it is for this reason that it is not critical. Reason is viewed to be erroneous for its pretensions that it can attain total knowledge of reality. For Nietzsche, true philosophy consists of the awareness of the impossibility of this knowledge and a desire to live in accordance with this understanding, and an ability to withstand the suffering that this understanding brings.

Sigad also makes the point at the outset of the essay that Nietzsche’s criticism of reason is not based upon personal preference but is “a true description of reality.” (*ibid.*, p.109) Sigad maintains that Nietzsche’s thought is “above all critical” (*ibid.*), that is, that his instinctive impulse is aiming at the disclosure of reality as it is:

This entails that his extreme negative attitude towards reason and the aspiration for truth is not capricious, but grounded on critical speculations that lead to the position where reason is taken to be a falsification of reality. Nietzsche’s underlying attitude, then, is that reality should be grasped as it is, hence we should do all that we can *not* to falsify it. Here Nietzsche’s philosophy is no different from any other. Yet, given Nietzsche’s view of reason as a false method of understanding, this implies that there is another way that is superior, that it is possible to grasp reality

is useful for Nietzsche only in the sense that it enables the overcoming of ordinary utility which is “the overcoming of the will to find security and resolutions of suffering through reason.” (1986: 112-113) Sigad maintains that this entails the supreme suffering that comes with the realization of the meaninglessness of existence and that the true thinker “sets himself beyond communication and chooses total solitude.” (1986: 113) Sigad also states that man’s “solitary individuality” is also his redemption. In a section entitled “The Ecstatic Identification of Man with God”, Sigad maintains that the suffering of solitude can result in “redemption from falsification and openness to the totality of reality.” (*ibid.*) The desire to become one with reality is the instinctive desire of the true thinker and is what constitutes the true philosophy as love of wisdom or love of truth. Sigad explains that it is only certain kind of individual, the noble type that can live according to this desire: “but living according to this desire exclusively constitutes being a different kind of man.” (*ibid.*) He then goes on to mention the pivotal role self-overcoming plays in the identification of man with reality (God), which shows that not only does Nietzsche have an affinity with

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as it is without falsifying and Nietzsche undertakes to explicate this through his writings. (*ibid.*)

According to Sigad, if Nietzsche’s philosophy did not grasp reality as it is, it would carry the same significance as any other philosophy; he mentions that for Nietzsche “it would be senseless to dismiss reason—any manner of life and thought would be of equal weight and significance. The rejection of reason would constitute nothing more than personal preference, as would the adoption of any alternative.” (*ibid.*) He claims that Nietzsche is in no way a relativist although he may appear to be one:

In fact, Nietzsche himself seems to adopt this relativistic position. He tells us that to choose reason as a way of life is possible as well as legitimate, for it too expresses the Will to Power in a certain form. But if we take this at face value, then Nietzsche’s preference for a life ruled by instinct and desire would merely constitute another form, and his choice would reflect personal taste. Nietzsche, however, speaks of a life ruled by instinct and desire as a preference that is not falsifying. According to the very nature of life there is a preference for instinct over reason, for only the former does not falsify reality. Thus, Nietzsche’s choice is not simply personal, for at the same time as it is considered one legitimate alternative among others, it is also critical, a true description of reality. (*ibid.*)

metaphysical truth but also that it is through the individual that one enters into an oneness with the totality:

One can raise himself to this point only through overcoming the needs and motives of ordinary life, which means self-overcoming. In what follows, this particular quality proves to be identical to reality itself, as well as to truth. The true thinker stands alone in meaningless reality and has to attach a value to it. Hence, he inherits God, for he must give reality a value which is at the same time strictly individual and entirely total. The arbitrary choice to affix such a value is the desire for truth, for understanding reality as it is and not in a partial, one-sided way. Indeed, Nietzsche himself admits (*Gay Science* 344) that he belongs to the cultural tradition as far as searching for metaphysical truth is concerned (*ibid.*).<sup>61</sup>

The discovery that one cannot know reality through reason, and the subsequent loss of old values based upon it bring with it the suffering of nihilism. However, it is through this suffering that the true philosopher can overcome this nihilism, of perceiving reality as it is, without meaning or value. There is a certain sense of victory which comes with transcendence, what Sigad refers to as “a most intense feeling of power” which “increases proportionally to the difficulty of overcoming.” (1986: 114) The most supreme sense of power is achieved by overcoming the anthropomorphic notion of truth or of grasping reality through reason. Sigad reiterates the importance of self-overcoming in acquiring wisdom or in generating the true philosopher, as it makes him one with the totality of reality: “Man and God become identical, since self-overcoming is only achieved if based on a *general principle*, i.e. total reality that is free from inner contradiction that is due to fragmentation.” (*ibid.*) The sources of this fragmentation are suffering, solitude and individuation, and in overcoming this suffering there no longer resides a tension between man and the totality of reality.

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<sup>61</sup>Sigad uses the following translation of *The Gay Science* (Nietzsche, F., Kaufmann, W. (trans.), New York, Random House, 1974.

Sigad explains that becoming one with reality is the most joyful experience, a “Dionysian ecstasy,” and he refers to this experience as an objective truth “in that it is without purpose and does not turn into a law which reason imposes on reality.” (1986: 116) The individual creation of a great style is objective only in the sense that it is identical with the rhythm of reality itself or “he exemplifies in his very way of life the inner logic of the eternally becoming reality.” (*ibid.*) For Nietzsche, there is an existential correspondence between man and reality, an account which replaces the old correspondence theory of truth, which falsely assumed that the propositional use of language could capture reality. This idea of creating a great style through self-overcoming is at the same time discovering reality as it is. It is only through a process of individuation or of self-overcoming can one come to experience the Absolute. It is only through being fully subjective that philosophy can be objective (*ibid.*) or only if “it is motivated by the interest to see reality as it is, devoid of egotistic interests, is it objective.” (*ibid.*) The ego that projects its own interests onto reality is not truly objective. The type of subjectivity that Nietzsche embraces is one which is “cleansed of all egotistic interests” and one which is an overcoming self that “affirms nothing but the power of negating and destroying” (*ibid.*) This negating power or an ability to overcome, which negates all that is fixed and is eternally in flux, corresponds to reality in its ability to do the same. For Nietzsche, to experience objective truth is a form of intoxication; the true philosopher is intoxicated by the power to overcome, and comes to experience the whole. Experiencing the new totality comes not in the form of knowledge but in the form of feeling (*ibid.*), a feeling of ‘intoxication’ or ‘rapture’. (EH, ‘Z’: §3) The experience of Dionysian ecstasy as love of wisdom constitutes man’s desire to experience the whole of reality. Sigad claims that it is in the experience of Dionysian ecstasy that we realize that “truth is located in the very



love of man for reality” (1986: 116), and looks at the correlation between Nietzsche and Spinoza on matters of truth and that “since man is but a part of reality, we should say that truth is the love of reality for itself (as Spinoza has argued).” (*ibid.*)

Sigad (1986) also makes the important point that the overcoming of old values does not imply the creation of new ones in the sense of laws. There is only self-overcoming, as there are no fixed laws; therefore, the only value is that of self-overcoming, and the discovery of reality as will to power or as self-overcoming. It is the act of overcoming the old values, this self-overcoming which is valued: “His [true thinker] valuating action is no more than refuting the existing values.” (*ibid.*) It is in this way that the only new value is “the discovery of reality as will to power, as self-overcoming. Since reality is constant overcoming, and since the true thinker identifies himself with it in his life and thought, we find that truth too is in his self-overcoming, self-negating and self-creating” (*ibid.*) The true thinker’s truth is in his self-overcoming, as he can identify himself with reality which is in constant becoming: “The understanding of reality is possible only by living in accordance with the process of becoming itself. Hence, reason cannot reveal reality. What we find is rather that reality is disclosed only to the true philosopher, to the one who loves true reality.” (1986: 117) For the lover of wisdom, it is ultimately reality that is valued; hence the experiences of overcoming in solitude and suffering are in turn valued, as they bring one into identification with it. Sigad identifies Nietzsche’s love of wisdom with “love of truth”

Love of truth makes the lover totally involved in the results of philosophical investigation no matter what they be. Only thus can one be God in his conduct while negating everything else in the world. Truth gives itself totally to whomever gives himself totally to truth. (*ibid.*)

Redemption, for Nietzsche, is the higher form of Justice as is expressed in ‘*On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*’; it is experienced at the moment of overcoming. This experience of wisdom is similar to the wisdom of Heraclitus who recognizes that suffering cannot be overcome by the limited human mind whose power is insufficient to see its necessity, its potential and benefit. (PTAG: §7, 61-62) In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche emphasizes that one liberates oneself from suffering by means of its transformation into joy, as the joy of a new life compensates for the pain of the pangs of birth. The greatest exercise of will is the transformation of the agony of existence into the jubilation of life:

Creation—that is the great redemption from suffering, and life’s growing light. But that the creator may be, suffering is needed and much change. Thus are you advocates and justifiers of all impermanence. To be the child who is newly born, the creator must also want to be the mother who gives birth and the pangs of the birth-giver. (Z, II: ‘Upon the Blessed Isles’)

This experience of redemption also includes complete reverence for the self,<sup>62</sup> as it is through “the inmost centre” of the self or what is referred to as the “Great Reason” of the body that one experiences the universal. The “inmost centre” of the individual is the locus of truth that belongs to the whole; it is the true self as the overcoming self, the divine self. The solitude of the highest type as a spiritual condition involves being removed from the herd and in turn involves an act of turning away from the herd-constituted self. The noble type favours his own true self over the socially determined self. The self of the aristocrat or the spiritually noble type is an overcoming self that identifies with reality as it is. It is in this way that reverence for truth and reverence

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<sup>62</sup> Leiter in his work ‘*Nietzsche on Morality*’ notes that the higher man, for Nietzsche, has self-reverence. He explains that there is a connection between reverence and being “severe and hard” (BGE: 260): “Self-reverence is not, as it were, a matter of putting oneself on a pedestal; it means being “severe and hard” with oneself *not* out of doubt and self-loathing, but as a result of “fundamental certainty” about one’s own worth and mettle, as someone who is capable of severity and hardness as needed.” Leiter, B., *Nietzsche on Morality*, London, Routledge, 2002, p.121. Leiter uses the following translation of *Beyond Good and Evil* (W. Kaufmann trans., New York, Vintage, 1966).

for self are one and the same. The self that lives the spiritual condition of solitude is the higher self, which belongs to the whole whereby Becoming reveals itself. The spiritual condition of solitude does not involve an abstracted conscious ego that is closed off from reality. The condition rather involves abstraction from the contingent empirical or socially determined self so that the becoming self can be attuned to reality. The personal experience of belonging to the whole would be viewed as impersonal by the herd or the scholar as it does not relate to what he considers 'personal' gain or what Nietzsche refers to as the "real interests" of the scholar. (BGE: §6)

The spiritual condition of solitude is viewed by Nietzsche as a form of asceticism, what he refers to as a higher asceticism: "The most spiritual men, as the *strongest*, find their happiness where others would find their destruction: in the labyrinth, in hardness against themselves and others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest; asceticism becomes in them nature, need, and instinct." (AC: §57) Nietzsche considers the philosophical or noble ascetic as not being weak, resentful or cowardly, that his renunciation of this-worldly affairs is to be viewed as an act of strength. These ascetic tendencies are in the service of the Dionysian faith. The philosophical ascetic knows the powers of his instincts and makes their investigation, development and sublimation his life's work. His sole concern or task is the accumulation and channelled release of this energy. Nietzsche himself also acknowledges himself as an ascetic, as he expresses in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§227), "Let us remain *hard*, we last Stoics!" who have been "spun into a severe yarn and shirt of duties" (BGE: §226). Nietzsche also mentions that all of his achievements had arisen from a severe asceticism or hard discipline; "asceticism and Puritanism are almost indispensable

means for educating and ennobling”, and asserts in the same passage of *Beyond Good and Evil* that “the paths to higher spirituality” involve testing “the feelings of great self-overcoming, of silence and solitude.” (BGE: §61) In a section of *The Will to Power* entitled “What has been ruined by the church’s misuse of it” (§916), he acknowledges the church’s misuse of asceticism and claims that its true role or “its natural utility” is “its indispensability in the service of the education of the will”. The philosophical type of asceticism allows for greater creativity and spiritualization. The true ascetic ideal, the one of the higher sort, for Nietzsche, has been intrinsic to “the lives of all the great, fruitful, inventive spirits,” and forms “the most appropriate and natural conditions of their *best* existence, their *fairest* fruitfulness.” (GM, III: §8) Kaufmann (1967) in his introduction to *On the Genealogy of Morals*, §4 also mentions that Nietzsche himself “was certainly no stranger to ascetic ideals.” A higher asceticism is required in making the transition from both the camel and lion stages in the development of the spirit; Nietzsche “wants us to climb higher” where “we return to the image of pregnancy: the third stage is represented by the child” or “a sacred “Yes”. Kaufmann (1967) outlines that, for Nietzsche, a higher asceticism is required in order to overcome the asceticism of bad conscience: “Without ascetic ideals, without self-control and cruel self-discipline, we cannot attain that self-mastery which Nietzsche ever praises and admires.” (*ibid.*) For Nietzsche, there is a distinction between a life-denying version of the ascetic ideal that is the priestly or Kantian ‘ascetic ideal’, and a philosophical or life-affirming version. The experience of solitude for the noble type involves the withdrawal from this-worldly affairs, i.e., the church, the world of politics, popular culture, and all the benefits associated with worldly involvement. In this way, it could be argued that Nietzsche’s philosophical asceticism is an even more radical withdrawal from what is considered the ‘world’

than the ascetic ideal of the priests. Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic ideal of the priests, as their idea of a withdrawal from this-world involves a focus on eternal redemption in an ‘other-world’ as the ‘after-life’. He not only criticizes it for its focus on happiness in the after-life, and its continual deferral, but also because it is not knowledge of truth, as it is actually a mere life-denying perspective. Nietzsche comes to this conclusion because of Kant’s claim that knowledge of the noumenal realm is impossible, and that according to Kant, the only possible knowledge is mind-dependent epistemic knowledge, or knowledge of the phenomenal realm.<sup>63</sup> Both ascetic ideals involve a withdrawal from worldly affairs (phenomenal reality); however, Nietzsche’s type involves genuine insight into reality<sup>64</sup> as Becoming by a

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<sup>63</sup> Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic ideal as a non-perspectival truth or ‘God’s eye view’ on the grounds that it is not only a contradiction, but also that reason alone, as Kant himself recognizes, cannot capture the noumenal realm. However, this does not imply that Nietzsche rejects asceticism entirely, as he is an advocate of an asceticism that involves the sublimation of the senses. It also does not imply that Nietzsche’s rejection of non-perspectival truth entails that he does not embrace an asceticism. Nietzsche’s idea of a higher asceticism leads to insight reality in a moment of *amor fati* or of life-affirmation.

<sup>64</sup> In his *Nietzsche on Morality*, Leiter notes the problem of reconciling Nietzsche’s perspectivism with reality itself or what Kant had originally referred to as the noumenal realm. He explains that Nietzsche views Kant as a denier of “reason”, as a philosopher who also expresses the ascetic ideal with his doctrine of transcendental idealism; the doctrine that the only knowable world as we humans experience it, i.e., the phenomenal world, as distinct from the way the world really is in-itself, i.e., the noumenal world. (Leiter, B., *Nietzsche on Morality*, *Op. cit.*, p. 269) In the third essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche mentions in relation to the ascetic that he is said ““to deny” his “own “reality”” by denying not just “the senses” but also denying “reason” itself.” (*ibid.*) Leiter notes that Nietzsche paraphrases this “ascetic self-contempt and self-ridicule of reason” as follows: ““there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is *excluded* from it!” (GM, III: 12)” (cited in this form in Leiter, *ibid.*) He also acknowledges that Nietzsche is critical of Kant’s transcendental idealism on the grounds that “far from vindicating knowledge, actually undermined it by putting the *real* “realm of truth and being” out of bounds.” (*ibid.*) Leiter goes on to explain the Kantian way: “The Kantian way, of course, entails that the *really* objective world, the noumenal world, is unknown to us humans, but within the phenomenal world—the world as we experience it—objectivity is possible insofar as this world conforms to categories that the human mind necessarily imposes upon experience. (Nietzsche, remember, is supposing, in keeping with his critical view of transcendental idealism, that genuinely objective knowledge would involve knowledge of the noumenal world.)” (*ibid.*) It is possible to infer from this that Nietzsche actually disagrees with Kant for putting the *real* “realm of truth and being” (GM, III: §12) out of bounds and that genuine objective knowledge would be knowledge of this realm. Leiter then recognizes the problem of reconciling the idea of a noumenal realm with Nietzsche’s perspectivism. (Leiter, B., *Op. cit.*, p. 276) He then argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is the only alternative knowledge to ‘genuine objective knowledge’ of the noumenal realm. Leiter’s objective as it is in his essay entitled ‘*Perspectivism in Genealogy of Morals*’ is to argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not entail scepticism. He is doing this in order to overturn the postmodern view of Nietzsche or what he refers to as the ‘received view’. (Leiter, B., ‘*Perspectivism in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals*’, *Op. cit.*, p. 334) Lampert offers an alternative solution in arguing that tragic

certain individual through the “Great reason” of the body or the intelligent drives. According to Nietzsche, Kant’s idea of the ascetic ideal denies the role of the senses or pre-conscious activity. (GM, III: §12) This higher asceticism or discipline that is characteristic of the most genuine philosophy provides the ideal conditions for participating in the truth or belonging to the whole. The asceticism of the individual type lies in the pathos of struggle; all genuine striving for truth is the product of the struggle of self-overcoming. It is the *agonal* spirit of the individual type whose love of struggle provides the stimulus for self-overcoming, the drive to reach beyond oneself so as to achieve excellence. It is through self-overcoming that one can re-emerge stronger, as Nietzsche expresses in the maxim in the preface to *Twilight of the Idols*: “The spirits increase, vigour grows through a wound.” (TI, Pref.) In *The Will To Power*, Nietzsche refers to the act of self-overcoming as a spiritual process of growth, of “inward change” that brings about re-birth: “The “Kingdom of Heaven” is a condition of the heart...it is an “inward change in the individual” it is “something that comes at every moment and at every moment has not yet arrived—” (WP: §161) The path of self-overcoming is the most difficult one, and it is only undertaken by those whose strength and courage allow the transformation of existential pain into spiritual pleasure. In a section entitled the ‘*Wisdom in Pain*’ of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche

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insight as an interpretation of the world in some way solves the scepticism charge against Nietzsche. Tsarina Doyle similarly wishes to argue in her work ‘*Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics*’ that Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not entail scepticism, or the claim that there are no known truths about the world. She solves this in arguing that for Nietzsche, there is a mind-independent phenomenal realm (Becoming) and that there is perspectival knowledge of it. It is in this way that his perspectivism is not sceptical, as it does capture reality. She notes the way in which Nietzsche overturns the idealist approach to Kantian phenomenal knowledge. However she does not explore the idea of tragic insight or his artist’s metaphysics. Doyle does introduce the idea of the intrinsicality of force in Nietzsche in order to argue that, although forces in reality or the whole are relational, they are the same time independent of one another. In this thesis, I will argue that this introduces the idea that there is a higher dimension to reality that makes reality *real* and independent of us.

mentions that the individual or “heroic type” finds in his suffering his “greatest moments,” a “Saturnalia” of the soul:

There is much wisdom in pain as in pleasure: like pleasure, pain is one of the prime species-preserving forces... True, there are people who hear exactly the opposite command when great pain approaches and who never look as proud, bellicose, and happy as when a storm is nearing—yes, pain itself gives them their great moments! They are the heroic human beings, the great *pain-bringers* of humanity, those few or rare ones who need the same apology as pain itself—and truly, they should not be denied this! They are eminently species-preserving and species-enhancing forces, if only because they resist comfort and do not hide their nausea at this type of happiness (GS: §318)

Ultimately, for Nietzsche, the strong individual is a product of the struggle with his own isolation. This struggle does not take place within the public realm as the most worthy struggle occurs within the soul or in the form of self-mastery. As Thiele (1990: 47) puts it, “Ultimately, the strong individual is a product of the struggle with his own isolation.... For the worthiest struggle is not waged within the public realm. True heroism, according to Nietzsche, slakes its agonal thirst within the soul.” In the higher man’s experience of asceticism he removes himself from the public realm or that aspect of the world that he refers to as the rabble: “And some who turned away from life only turned away from the rabble: they did not want to share well and flame and fruit with the rabble.” (Z, II: ‘On the rabble’) The noble type who has “turned away from life” or the rabble, through a form of asceticism, directs his “will to power” towards a level of reality, a higher dimension<sup>65</sup> or an eternity that is within

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<sup>65</sup> This idea of the will to power being directed towards a higher dimension of reality is also reiterated by McIntyre in his work *The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche’s Vision of Grand Politics*. McIntyre argues that Nietzsche’s grand politics flows directly from his philosophy of will to power as an erotic force, which directs the philosopher-god to the higher than human realm. McIntyre outlines that the vision of the philosopher-statesman presupposes that, first, that he removes himself from the marketplace or city or rebels against the city (in contempt for its values) and “ascends, through knowledge, to the supra-human realm of true being; then, he descends again to the human world and attempts to persuade the city to order itself according to the supra-human measure.” (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p. 91) It must be noted that this realm for Nietzsche is Becoming, which is mentioned by McIntyre in chapter six of his work. McIntyre refers to the return to the people (or at least its higher types) in terms of the Platonic phrase, the ‘descent of creation’ (a term McIntyre notes is explored by Voegelin, E., in *Plato*)

Becoming which the spiritual pleb has no experience. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche speaks of the higher self who can “fly” to the “highest spheres” the realm of the “well of eternity”, which is far removed from the rabble.” (Z, II: ‘On the Rabble’) The glory of the spiritual aristocrat rests on his spiritual status: “The “higher nature” of the great man lies in being different, in incommunicability, in distance of rank, not

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(*Op. cit.*, p. 202). The phrase relates to the problem of the philosopher returning to the Cave after the ascent of his soul towards the Idea of the Good or the vision of the Agathon, the problem of the imposition of Idea on formless Becoming, and of persuading the people of his vision. McIntyre makes clear why ‘loving contempt’ “constitutes the fundamental experience of the philosopher-statesman, for both Nietzsche and Plato as “the principle of ascent - contempt for the city and love for the higher-than-human things - eventually becomes the principle of descent whereby the philosopher (and his play of creation) brings a higher order down to the human world; his contempt for man is the condition of his love and creativity.” (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p.92) According to McIntyre, Plato’s demiurge like Nietzsche’s philosopher-god is confronted with permanent resistance of becoming to his noetic persuasion, and therefore his creativity as law-giver is mediated by the political world. McIntyre also notes Michel Haar’s excellent point that

The Overman is not the fulfilment of humanity, and must be distinguished from any form of ‘higher man’. Radically different from any human type, the Overman embodies Nietzsche’s vision of the ‘more than human’ which will nevertheless exist alongside the all-too-human. The political implications of this heterogeneity manifest themselves in terms of ‘a *reign* that is not at all a *domination*,’ in which the noble type possesses neither political power nor wealth nor any effective governing force. As the embodiment of a supra-human affirmation, grand politics can be called a nonviolent ‘Caesarism of the Overman.’ (*ibid.*, p.17)

McIntyre uses the following translation of (Haar, M., ‘Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language,’ in D.B., Allison (ed.), *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*, New York, Dell Publishing, 1977, p.24, 26). This thesis uses the same translation whereby it is also noted that Haar refers to the Overman as the ‘More- than- human’ or “the highest form of life and a universal” (*ibid.*, p.25) who will “flash, in sparse solitude, the “lightning” of the More-than-human.” (*ibid.*, p.24)

The Overman’s love for the More-than-human comes from the erotic force of the will to power being directed towards the highest things. In the same way that Nietzsche’s Overman ascends to the supra-moral, Plato’s philosopher ascends towards the Idea of the Good or the beautiful through *eros* or mania. For both Plato and Nietzsche, there is a distinction between the genuine philosophical or noble spirit and the tyrannic soul. The Overman views the tyrannic soul as that which he has overcome: “The *eros* for the higher things must grow out of the affirmation of the ‘lower’ things, as Nietzsche proposes in the notion of *amor fati*.” (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p.95) The Overman is also to be distinguished from the free-spiritedness of Caesar, Borgia, and Napoleon, figures whom Nietzsche only affirms them as they emerge in times of moral disintegration whereby the spirit of the philosopher is set free “and the possibility of an ascent to nature is opened” (*ibid.*, p.96) Kaufmann also asserts that Nietzsche did not consider Napoleon an übermensch, and proclaims that “tyranny over other is not part of Nietzsche’s vision.” (Kaufmann, W., *Op. cit.*, p.315-16) His aspiration to wholeness and the innocence of becoming and a going up to nature is to be distinguished from the notion of free will (subjective idealism). The ascent to nature is carried out through discipline and asceticism, whereby nature is viewed not in primitive terms but as higher reality. McIntyre notes this elsewhere in the same work “nature is not an origin ‘back there’ to which one ‘returns,’ but an indeterminate, cultural sovereignty to which one aspires and ascends...” (McIntyre *Op. cit.*, p.24) The asceticism of the philosopher is what distinguishes him from the free-spirit, whose freedom does not involve constraint.



in an effect of any kind—even if he made the whole globe tremble.” (WP: §876) His spiritual status lies in being different from the rabble, which in turn leads to isolation. The individual type becomes removed from the rabble in the sense that their unique experiences cannot be shared or communicated.<sup>66</sup>

The process of solitude involves a withdrawal from herd-conceptions of self-hood; it is a way of being faithful to one’s true self. The spiritual condition of solitude ties in directly with the fulfilment of the maxim ‘Become who you are.’ (EH, ‘Why I am So Clever’: §9) Although Nietzsche rejects the concept of self as metaphysical subject or ‘substance’ as a simple abiding ‘thing’, he nonetheless believes in some kind of ‘essential self’. This type of self is an overcoming self or becoming self and is in no way a fixed entity. The role of the process of individuation or the ‘*principium individuationis*’ (BT: §1) is to make one become more and more removed from one’s empirical contingent self or socially-constituted self so that the self that remains, that is the true self, can partake in the tremendous moment of Dionysian rapture or

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<sup>66</sup> Thiele in his ‘*Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of the Soul*’ outlines why Nietzsche claims that it cannot be communicated:

Experiences are never truly shared, only their simulacra. This is not simply because the written or spoken word is a poor reflection of thought. Thought itself is a lame transmitter of experience. Consciousness is deemed an anti-individualistic development, the effect of a herd existence. It is the ultimately futile attempt to turn the individual’s monopoly of experience into common, communicable knowledge... Communication, or the making common of what is individually experienced, involves a necessary falsification. We can communicate our experiences, but at the cost of robbing them of their essential uniqueness. For communication marks a threefold corruption. Words never adequately or unequivocally portray thought, and thought never fully corresponds to experience. In turn, the recipient can only interpret the communication according to his own pool of (unique) experiences. (Thiele, L., *Op.cit.*, p. 35-36)

This idea of the incommunicability of the higher type’s unique experiences has been aforementioned in the first chapter of this thesis to establish the inadequacies of language and consciousness in their inability to capture reality *as it is*. It is relevant to this chapter, as it explains not only the uniqueness of the higher type’s experiences and its affinity with reality as it is, but also it explains the reason why the higher type becomes removed from the rabble or the herd.

intoxication. (EH, ‘Z’: §3)<sup>67</sup> It is this element of the complex self or the “Great reason” of the unconscious self as the necessary self, which partakes of eternity or the inner *logos* of Becoming. Although Nietzsche rejects soul atomism, he retains the idea of the soul and declares it to be “only a word for something about the body.” (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’) He then goes on to describe the soul in the same passage as the “Great reason” of the body.<sup>68</sup> (*ibid.*) However, Nietzsche maintains that

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<sup>67</sup> Leiter in his work entitled ‘*Nietzsche on Morality*’ notes that Nietzsche’s account of the higher man is reminiscent of Aristotle’s notion of *megalopsychia* in book IV of *The Nicomachean Ethics* (1123b-1125a16), which has been translated as “*Greatness of soul*” or magnanimity (Leiter, B., *Op. cit.*, p.121). He also takes note of Kaufmann’s account of the comparison between Nietzsche and Aristotle, and also states that Kaufmann neglects to explore it in any detail. There are various similarities to be noted, which is evident from Aristotle’s passage on magnanimity in terms of his association of solitude, independence, graciousness, and love of one enemies with the higher soul: “a person is considered to be magnanimous if he thinks that he is worthy of great things, provided that he *is* worthy of them” (1123b); “honour conferred by ordinary people for trivial reasons he will utterly despise” (1124a10); “and he cannot bear to live in dependence upon somebody else, except a friend because such conduct is servile” (1125a); “He does not nurse resentment, because it is beneath a magnanimous man to remember things against people, especially wrongs; it is more like him to overlook them.” (1125a); “For this reason he is not abusive either, not even of his enemies, unless he intends to be insulting” (1125a). Kaufmann in his work entitled ‘*Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*’ also notes that for Aristotle, the good man is a lover of self: “So it is right for the good man to be self-loving, because then he will both be benefited himself by performing fine actions, and also help others. But it is not right for the bad man, because he will injure both himself and his neighbours by giving way to base feelings” (1169a) (Kaufmann *Op. cit.*, p. 382). Kaufmann also takes note of a passage from *The Will to Power* (§984) where Nietzsche mentions that greatness of soul or spiritual greatness cannot be separated from greatness of mind: “greatness of soul cannot be separated from greatness of mind. For it involves *independence*; and without greatness of mind this should not be permitted, as it causes mischief.” (WM 984)” (*ibid.*, p.384). In a similar vein as Aristotle, Nietzsche associates ultimate happiness (*eudaimonia*) with greatness of soul, which is only represented by “the fewest”. (*ibid.* p. 385) Kaufmann notes that for Nietzsche ultimate happiness consists of a state called “power” (*ibid.*). According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche contends that the mediocre lack such power, and therefore cannot find such happiness. All references to *The Nicomachean Ethics* in this thesis are from the following translation: J.A.K. Thomson (trans.), London, Penguin Books, 1953. Kaufmann uses the following translation of *The Will to Power*, Kaufmann, W., (trans.), New York, Random House, 1967, and is abbreviated as WM.

<sup>68</sup> Fredrick Appel, in his “*Nietzsche’s Natural Hierarchy*”, discusses Nietzsche’s distinction between the different types of instinct (Appel, F., “Nietzsche’s Natural Hierarchy”, *International Studies in Philosophy*, 29:3, 48-62, 1997) He also emphasizes that Nietzsche repudiates the reason-passion dichotomy altogether, as he insists that emotion and practical reason are not mutually exclusive. For Nietzsche, there is always an intelligent element to the passions as every passion contains “its quantum of reason” (*ihr Quantum Vernunft*) (WP: 387)” (*ibid.*, p. 50). However, it is only the noble type that acts on his ‘intelligent’ impulses:

Although Nietzsche insists that all of us are driven by visceral, “animal” instinct, he also believes that only some of us—a minority—possess *noble* instincts, while the rest embody instincts of a base variety. The key difference between finer and baser persons does *not* therefore lie in the former’s ability to transcend animal instinct. Whereas both types of character evince animality, the issue is the *type* of animality, or (what is for

it is only some of us, the individual type that possesses noble instincts or ‘intelligent instincts’ as the “great reason” of the body while the rest, the herd, embody instincts of a base variety. It is the distinction in their drives that implies that there is a distinction in their relation to reality. It is the “great reason” (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’) of the body that enables the higher type to encounter the whole. The higher self as an overcoming self finds himself in a struggle with the herd, as the herd constantly challenges the philosophical life, the life of solitude and the notion of a true self. To separate himself from the herd, his socially-determined or herd self involves the ambition to find his true self in his lone ascent to the highest mountain top.<sup>69</sup>

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Nietzsche the same thing) the quality of the desires, passions and drives in the individual in question. (*ibid.*)

Appel insists that “what matters for the aristocratic-minded Nietzsche is always the quality of the impulse; if it is of an elevated, refined order, it belongs by definition to the elevated, refined sort of person, who is justified in following it unhesitating.” (*ibid.*, p.58) Appel notes Nietzsche’s identification of the “Great Intelligence” of the body (Z, I: ‘ODB’) as the discerning aspect of the self that differentiates the noble type from the base. (*ibid.*, p.49) He also explores the idea for Nietzsche that the highest types can create his own meaning and order that they can “inject a form of willed artifice in their lives that is not a pre-given by nature.” (*ibid.*, p.52) Appel examines the way in which Nietzsche rejects soul as substance or as “an all powerful entity” that is separate from natural things” and “directing them in light of its own master plan.” (*ibid.*, p.53) He also acknowledges that Nietzsche retains the notion of Nature: “Many commentators have also taken Nietzsche’s rejection of pantheistic, teleological conceptions of Nature to entail a refusal to attribute any sort of significance to the concept of nature... A close reading of the texts, however, reveals that Nietzsche treats the concept of nature with the utmost seriousness.” (*ibid.*, p.54) Appel goes on to explain that although Nietzsche’s new philosopher criticizes “many erroneous ways in which nature has been invoked to justify oppressive, dogmatic moralities, religious traditions, political movements, etc.,” that this critique is “mounted from the standpoint of “that eternal basic text” that is *homo natura*.” (*ibid.*) The new philosopher overcomes the many interpretations and secondary meanings that have been “scribbled and daubed over that eternal basic text *homo natura*” (BGE: 230, cited in this form in Appel, *ibid.*). According to Appel, Nietzsche views Nature as the “eternal basic text”, a text which “points those of us with insight and courage to read it towards a (re) discovery of our highest potential, a realization of the hierarchical natural order, and a burning desire to be other than the rest of nature—i.e., those people and things naturally below us.” (BGE: 9 cited in this form in Appel, *ibid.*) It is only those with a certain “insight and courage” can read this “eternal basic text”, which in turn coincides with the realization of one’s potential or that one creates order or meaning in one’s life. The following are texts used by Appel (Nietzsche, F., *The Will to Power*, New York, Vintage Books, 1986.) abbreviated as WP (Nietzsche, F., *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1972) abbreviated as Z and “On the Despisers of the Body” abbreviated as “ODB”, (Nietzsche, F., *Beyond Good and Evil*, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1990), abbreviated as BGE.

<sup>69</sup> Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the mountain or the climb to express the overcoming nature of Life. He also makes clear at various points throughout his works that the true philosophers must have the ability to endure high mountains or the ability to overcome. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he asserts that “Life wants to build itself up into the heights with pillars and steps; it wants to look into vast distances and out toward stirring beauties: therefore it requires height. And because it requires height, it requires steps and contradiction among the steps and the climbers. Life wants to climb and to overcome itself

Zarathustra calls upon his listeners, and tells them that the way of solitude is the way to yourself:

Is it your wish, my brother, to go into solitude? Is it your wish to seek the way to yourself? Then linger a moment, and listen to me.

“He who seeks, easily gets lost. All loneliness is guilt”—thus speaks the herd. And you have long belonged to the herd. The voice of the herd will still be audible in you. And when you will say, “I no longer have a common conscience with you,” it will be a lament and an agony. Behold, this agony itself was born of a common conscience, and the last glimmer of that conscience still glows on your affliction.

But do you want to go the way of your affliction, which is the way to yourself? Then show me your right and your strength to do so. Are you a new strength and a new right? A first movement? A self-propelled wheel? Can you compel the very stars to revolve around you?

Alas, there is so much lusting for the heights! (Z, I: ‘On the Way of the Creator’)

Nietzsche expresses the dangers of reaching the summit, the experiences of solitude, “silence” (BGE: §61), and the growing difficulty of living with the herd, and the way in which these experiences are misunderstood by the herd. (*Schopenhauer as Educator*: §3, 139) In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche expresses that there are those “preparatory human beings” who can “pave the way for a still higher age”, those who live the dangers of the philosophical life, “human beings who know how to be silent, lonely, determined, and satisfied and steadfast in invisible activities; human beings profoundly predisposed to look, in all things, for what must be overcome...” (GS:

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climbing.” (Z, II: ‘On the Tarantulas’) In the preface to *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche also expresses that the real measure of value, is to what extent a spirit can endure the truth. The practice of philosophy involves the experience of living on high mountains, a metaphor for the experience of enduring reality: “Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived, means living voluntarily among ice and high mountains—seeking out everything strange and questionable in existence...” (EH, Pref.: §3) To reach the peak whereby “the world is surveyed as from a mountain” is to solve “the great problems” of existence, which is the definition of “the pathos of philosophy” for Nietzsche. (CW: §1) He also relates mountains to the sacred: “I draw circles around me and sacred boundaries; fewer and fewer men climb with me on ever higher mountains: I am building a mountain range out of ever more sacred mountains.” (Z, III: ‘On Old and New Tablets’) For Nietzsche, parasites are the lowest species do not climb mountains; they are “creeping, cringing worms” who nest on the “little secret sores” of the “noble all-too-soft.” (*ibid.*) He then uses the opposing metaphor of the valley, as a flat spatial quality, which reflects the levelling and vengeful ideas of those who symbolically inhabit it, i.e., the herd or the lowest type.

§283) These are human beings, according to Nietzsche, who can, in “*living dangerously*,” encounter the “greatest fruitfulness of existence”: “For—believe me—the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is—to *live dangerously*! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into uncharted seas!” (*ibid.*) For Nietzsche, this philosophical existence is the most spiritually challenging, and requires the utmost strength, as he expresses in *Beyond Good and Evil*: §39 that “the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of the “truth” one could still barely endure—”.

Thiele (1990: 180) notes that, for Nietzsche, the challenge facing the solitary is to “see how much truth can be endured, and his truth is none other than his life sentence of spiritual solitude” and that the “extent to which he can transform this condemnation into a triumphant celebration of the self is the mark of his heroism. He becomes a demi-god.” The philosopher in giving himself up to truth must experience periods of illness (GS, Pref. §2) but in overcoming them by way of compensation rises to the “Great health” of Dionysian life-affirmation. In the Preface to *Human, All Too Human* (§4), he mentions that from periods of “morbid isolation” can come “tremendous overflowing certainty and health which may not dispense even with wickedness, as a means and fish-hook of knowledge, to that *mature* freedom of spirit which is equally self-mastery and discipline of the heart and permits access to ... that superfluity of formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces which is precisely the sign of *great health*...”. The philosopher in giving himself up to truth is the person who goes on to encounter the whole or the inner *logos* of Becoming. This truth-relation to reality involves an overturning of the Socratic approach to truth, that ties truth into a theoretical framework, a framework that Nietzsche declares falsifies reality. It also

involves overcoming the Socratic prejudice against the emotions, and redefining the 'standpoint' of the most truthful man.

## Chapter Three

### Nietzsche on the Sacred Art of Reading & Writing

# I

## *The Art of Philology: A Primordial Relation to the Author*

The following chapter looks at the “art of reading well” (AC: §52) as a way of relating to “the untimely” or Becoming through tragic pathos and the unconscious or higher self. It will be argued that Nietzsche’s art of philology is intended to guard us against the falsifying affects of language and conscious thinking. It also examines the way Nietzsche prioritizes pathos and unique experience over conscious, linguistic thinking in relating to an author primordially. It also looks at “reading and writing in blood” (Z, I: §7) as a philosophical condition for the higher type’s ascent to Becoming, which is a pre-requisite stage to him forging the way for a New Dionysian Age. The ideal readers for Nietzsche are those who possess the requisite tragic insight and pathos, and in bringing this to the text come to a true understanding of his works. It is through an understanding of the personal in Nietzsche that one comes to truly understand the objective or the universal in his thought. His works are a reflection of his personal experiences and unconscious, and it is through an examination of the personal that one comes to a true understanding of his writing. His works are not for those readers whose “interests” are other than the philosophical or the ‘love for the higher-than-human’.<sup>70</sup> Nietzsche criticizes those “interested” readers who do not

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<sup>70</sup> This idea of ‘love for the higher than human’ is explored by Alex McIntyre, as has been aforementioned in the previous chapter, in his work *The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche’s Vision of Grand Politics*, *Op. cit.*, p.74-99. This idea of love for something higher than the human world is presupposed by education (*paideia*), which is rethought by Nietzsche as cultivation. This philosophical *eros* or love for things beyond the all-too-human, as the desire for the higher things, is the force behind education. Education as cultivation or self-discipline in the form of ‘reading and writing in blood’ enables the overman or the ‘more than human’ to encounter the highest things. This highest realm is the universal in Nietzsche or what could be referred to as reality or Becoming or more specifically an “eternity” within Becoming. . It is in this way that philosophical reading involves encountering the ‘more-than-human’; however, it also entails encountering the non-anthropomorphic universal or the ‘more-than-human’ through relating primordially to the author, and in enabling both the author and text



acknowledge the metaphysical independence of the text and the author. (AC: §52) For Nietzsche, philosophical reading, as the art of philology or the “art of reading well” (AC: §52), an art that has “the *sense for facts*” (AC: §59) must aim to acknowledge the text in its own being, and its relation with the whole or the universal<sup>71</sup>: “What is here meant by philology is, in a very broad sense, the art of reading well—of reading facts without falsifying them by interpretation, without losing caution, patience,

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to reveal itself. Nietzsche’s idea of philosophical education of ‘reading and writing in blood’ provides the ideal conditions for encountering the whole or affirming life, such as solitude, discipline and isolation. This type of reading and writing in blood engages the whole body, and in turn it involves participation within the whole.. It is a type of education that is best expressed by the metaphor of the mountain climb, as reading for Nietzsche involves the feeling of vertigo. The metaphor of the tree of life is also used by Nietzsche as the paradigm of the new philosopher (GM, preface: §2), which also conveys the idea of ‘growing in height’ (GS: §371)

—for we ourselves keep growing, changing, shedding old hides; we still shed our skins every spring; we become interestingly younger, more future-oriented, taller, stronger; we drive our roots ever more powerfully into the depths—into evil—while at the same time embracing the heavens ever more lovingly and broadly, and absorbing their light ever more thirstily with all our sprigs and laves. Like trees we grow—it’s hard to understand, like all life!—not in one place, but everywhere; not in one direction, but upwards and outwards and inwards and downwards equally; our energy drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once; we are no longer free to do anything individual, to *be* anything individual...This is our lot, as I have said: we grow in *height*; and even if this should be our dark fate—for we dwell ever closer to the lightning!—well, we do not honour it less on that account; it remains that which we do not want to share, to impart: the dark fate of height, *our* fate.

<sup>71</sup> Nietzsche advocates the art of philology as the “art of reading well” (AC: §52) in contrast to philology in its dogmatic form, as “reading rightly” where there is a single “true meaning” to the text. He also rejects the “bad philology” of Christian theologians (BGE: §52), whose dogmatic interpretations mask their own interests. This type of philology is allegedly disinterested, but actually rather reflects the interests of the philologist. This rejection of philology in its dogmatic form has led to what is called perspectival interpretation (interested), and to the unbounded play of textual appropriation. Nietzsche considers this the fate of bad philology, a perspectival relativism where the text eventually disappears under the interpretation. (See BGE: §38) Nietzsche’s return in his later writings to philology as the “art of reading well” (AC: §52) is actually intended to guard against the relativistic tendencies of his perspectivism. He introduces the art of philology as a transvalued notion of philology. He claims that the demands of philology require that we keep the text separate from its interpretation or that we “read off a fact without falsifying it by interpretation.” (AC: §52) This entails that there is truth or a text that is independent of interpretation. This chapter looks at the art of philology in terms of taking into account the truth of the text, i.e., the relationship between the text and the totality (truth) from which it emerges. It also examines the art of reading as coming into an attunement with this totality (musical). This type of reading also involves controlling one’s social, herd or pragmatic interests in order to let the text reveal itself. It is an experience of the “select few”. It involves relating to him by way of similar experience, the same tragic pathos. His early work, *The Birth of Tragedy* is a model of this new philology.

delicacy, in the desire to understand. Philology as *ephexis* in interpretation—” (AC: §52) He wishes to guard us against the falsifying crudities of language. The art of philology requires an *ephexis*, the root of the phenomenological *epochē*, that one controls his interests while letting the text reveal itself.

In his essay ‘*Perspectivism and Interpretation*,’ Jean Granier indicates that Nietzsche recognizes that his perspectivism can lead to the dissolution of the “text” in “the swirl of different interpretations” such that he wishes “to teach philosophers “the inestimable art of *reading well*,” to instruct them in principles of *rigorous philology*.” (1977: 195) He claims that Nietzsche “calls for a return to the book of nature, he seeks to reveal “natural man.”” (*ibid.*)

To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of *homo natura*; to see it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of the old metaphysical bird-catchers.<sup>72</sup> (BGE: §230, cited in this form in Granier 1977: 195-96)

In referring to section (§52) of *The Antichrist*, Granier makes it clear that “Nietzsche demands that the real “facts” be disentangled from “beliefs,” that the text be separated

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<sup>72</sup> This quote expresses that Nietzsche wishes to return to ‘Nature’ ; and in turn overcome or become “master of” our many anthropomorphic projections onto reality or “the many vain and overly enthusiastic interpretations of reality.” (BGE: §230) Karl Jaspers also looks at how the text or Nature for Nietzsche can become “almost non-existent” because of a “multiplicity of meanings”: “When seen in these connections, the text, precisely because of its multiplicity of meanings, is almost non-existent, and thus there is a tendency to lose sight of it as the standard for the truth of the interpretation.” (Jaspers, K., *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity*, Charles, F., Wallraff & F.R., Schmitz (trans.), London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, p.290) He then goes on to state that “in another connection, Nietzsche insists all the more that the genuine text must be preserved from contamination by mistaken exegesis. In this vein he asks that man be sent back into nature.” (*ibid.*) In referencing Nietzsche, he also states that we must overcome or “become master of the many vain and fanciful constructions and secondary meanings that up to the present have been scribbled and painted over the eternal, basic text *homo natura*.” (Jaspers *ibid.* p. 290 citing BGE: §230) Nietzsche asserts that the genuine philosopher overcomes anthropomorphic or human truths that are projected onto reality or “the eternal, basic text *homo natura*.” (BGE: §230)

from the interpretations that obscure its original meaning.”<sup>73</sup> (Granier 1977: 196) He also notes that in section (§47) of *The Antichrist*, that for Nietzsche, this approach in philology of recognizing the metaphysical independence of the text, or of reality, as the “seriousness for *true* things”, which rests upon “the instinct for reality” “is completely lacking in Christianity.” (Granier 1977: 196) He states that for Nietzsche,

A religion like Christianity, which is at no point in contact with actuality, which crumbles away as soon as actuality comes into its own at any point whatever, must naturally be a mortal enemy of the “wisdom of the world,” that is to say of *science*... Paul *wants* to confound the “wisdom of the world”: his enemies are the *good* philologists of the Alexandrian school—upon them he makes war. In fact, one is not philologist and physician without also being at the same time *anti-Christian*. (AC: §47, cited in this form in Granier 1977: 196)

He also examines an underlying antinomy that disturbs Nietzsche’s whole reflection.

He contends that Nietzsche seems to oscillate between

... a wholly *perspectivist phenomenism*—which results in identifying truth with value, and, ultimately, abolishes the very notion of “text”—and a definition of authentic knowledge as strict “philology,” which, taken literally, risks issuing into *dogmatism*. Sometimes the text becomes exhausted by a multitude of interpretations, each claiming to justify itself according to some criterion of “vital utility” (i.e., “value”). Sometimes the text seems to recover complete independence from its interpretations and to attain a univocal sense; the task of the good philologist would be to restore this sense to its original truth.” (Granier 1977: 197)

Granier claims that Nietzsche “overcomes this antinomy between relativism and dogmatism on the basis of his intuition of Being as interpreted Being.” (*ibid.*)<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Granier uses the following translation of the quotation from *The Antichrist* (§52): “Here, philology should be understood, in a very general sense, as the art of reading well—being able to pluck out the facts *without* falsifying them by interpretation, *without* losing caution, patience, subtlety in the search for understanding”. (Cited in this form in Granier, J., ‘Perspectivism and Interpretation’, In: D.B., Allison (trans.), *The New Nietzsche*, London, The MIT Press, 1977, p.196).

<sup>74</sup> Schrift in his ‘*Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation*’ also notes this antinomy that is recognized by Granier in his work ‘*Le problème de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche*’ as a ““radical ontological problematic.”” (Schrift, A., *Op. cit.*, p.167) Schrift’s reference to this problematic is from Granier, J., *Le problème de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche*, Paris, Editions du Seuil,

Granier argues that the art of philology is not a form of dogmatism, as he recognizes that Nietzsche in a letter to Fuchs (26 August 1888) insists upon the impossibility of a definitive interpretation. (1977: 197) He recognizes that there are interpretations, that Being is “*interpreted Being*” but reality or Being itself cannot be reduced to a perspective. For Granier, Nietzsche is to be understood as holding that “we do not have the right to spirit away the text and substitute the idea of a fundamental chaos—...The text *is*, it has its own subsistence, and all perspectives on it are not equally legitimate.” (1977: 197-198)

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1966, p.325. He claims that according to Granier, “Nietzsche’s rigorous philological method proposes the *epochē* of our anthropomorphic perspectives in order to facilitate our reading the primordial “text” of interpreted-Being honestly and justly.” (Schrift, A., *Op.cit.*, p.167) Schrift references from ‘*Le problème de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche*’ what Granier considers Nietzsche’s passion for knowledge to consist of: “The passion for knowledge is the manifestation of that intransigent intellectual probity which forbids us to interpret Being as a function of our needs and wishes, that is, in an anthropomorphic manner, and which commands us to have absolute respect for the “text.”” (cited in this form in Schrift, *ibid.*, p.167) (Schrift’s reference to Granier asking us to have absolute respect for the text is from: Granier, J., *Le Problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche, Op. cit.*, p.501-2) Schrift offers an alternative view to Granier given by Sarah Kofman, a follower of Derrida, who wrote a review of Granier appended to her work ‘*Nietzsche et la métaphore*’. In this review, she criticizes Granier’s “ontologization” of Nietzsche for remaining within the Heideggerian problematic of the question of Being. Kofman rather looks at Nietzsche as a genealogist rather than as a philosopher of Being.

Whereas the task of philology, for Granier’s Nietzsche, is to decipher Being as that which *constitutes* perspectival interpretations, Kofman’s Nietzsche views “Being” itself as a text constituted *by* the primary interpretations of the spontaneous instinctual evaluations which need to make life intelligible. (*ibid.*, p.167) (Schrift’s reference to Kofman is from Kofman, S., *Nietzsche and Metaphor*, Paris, Payot, 1972, p.201)

Kofman accuses Granier of dogmatism that to have “absolute respect for the text” is to have a dogmatic viewpoint, and not recognize an interpretation as interpretation. In ‘*Perspectivism and Interpretation*’ it is possible to consider Granier rather arguing against the idea of dogmatism in Nietzsche, in claiming that Nietzsche resists the idea of one correct definitive interpretation of the text. See Granier, J., *Perspectivism and Interpretation, Op. cit.*, p.197. Granier rather claims that Nietzsche argues for the metaphysical independence of Being or of the text from interpretation, and that Being is always open to interpretation (*ibid.*). He claims that Being is always interpreted Being but at the same time he contends that there is a more fundamental relation to the text than a utility perspective. Schrift who also follows the same line of argument as Kofman reduces reality and the text to interpretation, “the interpretation *is* the text,” which could be argued to be a postmodern approach to interpretation in Nietzsche. (Schrift, A., *Op. cit.*, p.196)

The original antinomy between relativism and dogmatism, according to Granier, has been congealed into independent poles, when the limits of Nietzsche's thought should be viewed with more flexibility. (Granier 1977: 198) It seems that Granier is claiming that there are varying degrees of appearance in interpretation; that the more pragmatic the interpretation the more apparent it is, but the art of philology demands that one recognize what is real, the text that *is*. He refers to Jaspers on this point,

... Nietzsche's contradictions show us what he is driving at. Existence both provides and is a product of exegesis. It is regarded as a circle that renews itself constantly while seeming to annul itself. It is now objectivity and now subjectivity; it appears first as substance and then as constantly annulled substance; though unquestionably there, it is constantly questioning and questionable; it is both being and not-being, the real and the apparent. (Granier 1977: 198, quoting Jaspers 1969:290)

Granier mentions that these "limits" "mark the double gradient of Nietzsche's meditations." (1977: 198):

On the one hand, by accentuating the creative, dominating, and Caesarian aspects in the notion of interpretation, one is led to the doctrine of *perspectivist pragmatism*, according to which "to know" means "to introduce sense into the world"—thus bending the latter to one's own vital interests. *Here, knowledge is annexation, effort of appropriation, will to dominate reality*. Consequently, insofar as it renders as much violence to reality as does every center of Will to Power, a perspectivist pragmatist interpretation is necessarily a "falsification." On the other hand, if one is concerned with the objective side of interpretation—that is, with the text that bears each of the interpretations—one is led to contest the ultimate validity of the criterion itself (vital utility) and to deny that any interpretation is admissible as soon as it favors the expansion of one type or another of Will to Power. (Granier 1977: 199)

Granier mentions that "the rules of true philology require that we sacrifice interest and utility for the demands of a textual understanding, one that would restore, to the extent to which it is possible, the original meaning of the text." (*ibid.*) He goes on to state that for Nietzsche, "The text is not a plaything of human subjectivity; 'basically there is within us, way 'down below,' something unteachable—a granite of spiritual fate."

(*ibid.*)<sup>75</sup> Here we must set out to discover this primordial ground, upon which every interpretation grows.” (*ibid.*) It seems that Granier wishes to argue that primordial reading as presuppositionless reading does not involve utility perspectives; it must arise from a primordial ground that is way ‘down below’, which can be argued to be

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<sup>75</sup> This quotation is a reference made by Granier to *Beyond Good and Evil* (§231), which alludes to the idea of the metaphysical independence of the soul from interpretation or empirical data. (Granier, J., *Op. cit.*, p.199) It is also noted by Jaspers in his ‘*Nietzsche: An introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*’ where he claims that, for Nietzsche there is an unchanging ‘that is I’ or what is referred to in this thesis as the higher self, the “Great reason of the Body” or the ‘inmost centre’ (Letter to Carl Fuchs dec.14<sup>th</sup>, 1887), which, like the text, exists independent of interpretation:

... although the text to be read is both outside of me and within me and I myself am indeed only the text that I can read, still Nietzsche points out a possible boundary. The process does not proceed *ad infinitum*: although I constantly undergo change as I provide exegeses, I do eventually strike bedrock. There is something firm and constant that is not resolved into interpretation and is not even touched by it. (Jaspers, K., *Op. cit.*, p.291)

He also goes on to make a reference to *Beyond Good and Evil* (§231),

Basically there is within us, way ‘down below,’ something unteachable—a granite of spiritual fate.... In connection with every cardinal problem, an unchanging ‘that is I’ speaks. .... At times one finds certain solutions of problems .... perhaps one calls them his ‘convictions.’ Later on he sees in them only... road signs pointing to the problem that we are—more correctly, to the great stupidity that we are, and to our spiritual fate and our incorrigibility way ‘down deep.’ (BGE: §231, cited in this form in Jaspers, *Op. cit.*, p.291)

Graham Parkes also examines this image of the soul captured by Nietzsche in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§231) in his work ‘*Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology*’ in a section entitled ‘Earth, Rock and Stone’. In examining Nietzsche’s conception of the soul, he identifies its background with Schopenhauer: “The immediate background to this idea of an immutable foundation to the human psyche is provided by Schopenhauer, who argued that the empirical character is unalterable on the grounds that it is the unfolding of an act of the will, which stands outside time altogether.” Parkes, G., *Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.135 This is a reference made by Parkes to *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer, A., 1:55, trans. E.F.J. Payne, New York, 1966. Parkes also claims that “Nietzsche alludes to this idea in his essay on Schopenhauer when he writes that a person’s true educators and formative teachers (*Bildner*) “show the true primal sense and basic material of your being, something absolutely ineducable and unmalleable [*unbildbar*], but in any case difficult to get to, bound and paralyzed” (*SE 1*).” (Cited in this form in Parkes, G., *Op. cit.*, p.135) This Schopenhauerian idea of the soul standing outside of time, which influenced Nietzsche, is viewed in this thesis as the necessary self, the higher self that participates within the ‘untimely’. In the third section of this thesis, this “granite” (BGE: §231) or “basic material” (*Schopenhauer as Educator*: §1) of one’s being will be viewed in relation to education, and the role of the educator as liberator in Nietzsche. Parkes also states that it is such “a fitting image for the very bottom of the soul, for that in us that we cannot change, a fate of which we are innocently unconscious—and which we become aware of only slowly and with difficulty, if at all. It constitutes the core of our being, which reaches back down through the deepest strata of history.” (Parkes, *Op. cit.*, p. 136) It is this ‘I’ that withholds an untimely relation to reality, and enables an untimely education to take place.

the higher self in Nietzsche, or one's unconscious more specifically the "Great Reason of the Body".<sup>76</sup> The most presuppositionless standpoint from which interpretations can take place is an unconscious horizon that belongs to the whole; it is an impersonal self. Granier claims that there is one voice which reveals truth "much louder" than through one's vital interests:

For the noblest and most courageous spirits, one voice speaks louder than that of their own vital interests, commanding us to *do justice* to nature, to reveal things as they are in their own being. Philological probity cannot accommodate itself to the falsifications of a biased biology; rather it animates an authentic "passion to know," attached to reality itself, preferring dispiriting truth to fallacious ideals. (1977: 199)

Philology, for Nietzsche, in demanding that the reader "be able to read off a text as a text without interposing an interpretation," (WP: §479) implies that not only is there a text that is metaphysically independent of interpretation but also that there is an approach to the text that does not falsify it. Nietzsche asks of the reader to suspend all presuppositions such as theoretical constructions or conscious or utility perspectival points of view in order to attain a primordial relation with the text. Those 'interested' readers who project their own subjective perspectives or interests onto the text, fail to communicate with Nietzsche, as genuine communication operates at a level prior to conscious or linguistic interests. It rather operates at the level of spiritual pathos (non-linguistic) through which a reader brings similar experiences to the text as the author;

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<sup>76</sup> This 'granite of spiritual *fatum*' (BGE: §231) that both Granier and Jaspers refers to above is what is referred to in this thesis as the higher self, or what Nietzsche refers to as one's ipsissimosity (HH, II, pref.: §2), a becoming self or an unconscious horizon that enables interpretation to take place. This has already been expressed in chapter one, sec.5. This idea of the self is that which is one's closest relation to reality in Nietzsche; it is the realm of the "unsaid", of silence or of pathos. In this chapter it will be argued that in order to enter into a primordial relation with Nietzsche, the author, it requires of the reader to be able to share the same pathos, and in turn the same soul. This primordial relation is the most presuppositionless position, as it the 'ground' of one's being, and does not withhold any conscious, social or herd interests. It is this 'I' that is referred to in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§231) which is the self that can be attuned to reality in the experience of *amor fati*. It is from this presuppositionless position that Nietzsche's writings flow, from 'deep down,' from his "granite of spiritual *fatum*" (BGE: §231), which is in turn in attunement with reality. This in turn further compounds the argument that Nietzsche's style emerges from his metaphysics of Becoming.

and it is at this level that the reader does not falsify the text. The goal of philosophical reading is not to discern the ‘opinions’ of the author but rather to come to a deeper understanding of an author through relating to his personal style, as the communication of a tragic pathos, or through thinking about those essential questions, “the great problems” (*The Case of Wagner*: §1), the deepest existential ones which Nietzsche himself thought about. In collecting various ‘opinions’ on an author it can culminate in what is supposedly referred to as a ‘philosophical education’, which consists of mere accounts of what the philosophers have said. Philosophical education or cultivation rather involves entering into the blood of an author or recognizing the life-experiences that is brought to writings, experiences that are closest to or approximate towards ‘Life’.<sup>77</sup> In the final aphorism of *Beyond Good and Evil* (§296), Nietzsche shows that the immortality of writing lies in its untimely relation to the whole such that writings are an expression of the unconscious and in turn the silent logos. Nietzsche refers to this life-experience that approximates towards Becoming as insight, as “rapture” or “inspiration” (EH, ‘Z’: §3), and sees it as a form of silent revelation (non-linguistic). In *Ecce Homo*, he notes that this revelation as an experience that comes closest to reality is one that “merely describes the facts” (*ibid.*) or things as they are themselves.

It is when a reader fails to take into account the whole that reading results in a collection of bloodless concepts and mere authors’ opinions. For those readers who

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<sup>77</sup> This experience shows that his writing style is an expression of “overpowering forces” (EH, ‘Z’: §3) or of reality itself.. It is in this way that it can be further argued that Nietzsche’s style emerges from his metaphysics. His style for this reason flows from ‘inspiration’, which is in turn an expression of the whole. In being an expression of truth, Nietzsche’s writings cannot be argued to fall victim to the acclaimed problem of self-referentiality, or what is referred to as ‘the Liar’s paradox’, a paradox that claims that his writings in being mere perspectives bears no relation to truth, and therefore lose their metaphysical credibility.



put all the emphasis on words and concepts, philosophy degenerates into endless interpretations which offer only superficial or surface readings of Nietzsche. The genuine reader of Nietzsche must aim to see behind the words of the author, and identify the true meaning of the text with the author's life experiences, a form of silent revelation in the case of Nietzsche<sup>78</sup> or in the self-reflection that underlies the works themselves. On the one hand, philosophical reading entails taking into account the

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<sup>78</sup> This thesis examines Nietzsche's most fundamental relation to 'things as they are', and argues that it is through silent tragic insight, pathos or revelation that one is closest to things themselves. Derrida's critique of logocentrism or phonocentrism (voice had received privileged status by the western rationalist tradition whereby it was viewed as a medium for gaining direct access to things themselves or reality) implies that he emphasises the written word, and subordinates speech to writing. In this chapter, it will be maintained that Nietzsche rather subordinates writing to speech and in turn he makes the transition to subordinating speech to silence. It is also important to note that Derrida falsely associates Plato with speech; Plato is rather an advocate of a silent approach to things as they are, and in taking this point into account it is possible to identify a connection between Nietzsche and Plato. For a criticism of Derrida's interpretation of Plato, see Rosen, S., 'Platonic Reconstruction', In: *Hermeneutics as Politics*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987 where Rosen claims that "In the Platonic dialogues, there is again no ontology (no discursive *logos* of Being). Socrates encourages the madness of a silent and direct approach to the Ideas; indeed, he refers to this erotic ascent as "divine madness"" (*ibid.*, p.53) Rosen also hopes in the same essay "to show that Derrida's central insight into Plato is also a profound (and therefore fruitful) misunderstanding. ... " (*ibid.*, p.54) He then goes on to explain that

To anticipate, Derrida is quite mistaken to associate speech in Plato with a metaphysics of presence and to infer from this association an ontological meaning in Socrates' criticism of writing. Speech, more specifically *human* speech, is as much a mark of absence as is writing. Derrida fails to appreciate the significance of the fact that *logos* means neither speech nor writing in Plato's vocabulary and hence that it can be used in a secondary sense for either the one or the other. The distinction between speech and writing that Derrida finds in Plato ... is imposed onto the text by a contemporary or post-Kantian incapacity to detach oneself from language, from the sign as signifier, not of a being (to say nothing of Being), but of another signifier. (*ibid.*)

Rosen notes that Derrida overlooks Plato's subordination of speech to silence: "Derrida never sees this, because for him, the primordial nature of writing makes silence impossible. And this why there can be no difference in Derrida between reading and writing. Derrida cannot read at all, because reading requires a moment of silence in which we *see* the text. For Derrida, however, seeing is already writing; hence reading is a displacing or rendering absent of the text." (*ibid.*, p.77) Rosen claims that the "Derridean soul" is "neither erotic nor mantic. His madness (if that is the right term) is postmodern, hence neither divine nor human." (*ibid.*) The free play of the signifier be it in the form of language or conscious interpretation implies that it cannot capture the signified (text or reality). The signified as the thing-in-itself cannot be accessed (Kantian prohibition against the accessibility of reality). However, it can be argued that reality can be accessed through tragic pathos that is non-linguistic, the realm of silence. Nietzsche does reject the 'in-itself' in the after-worldly sense but this does not imply that he rejects reality or its accessibility.

metaphysically independent author; the ideal reader of Nietzsche enters into a primordial relation with the text in sharing a similar pathos. On the other hand, philosophical reading requires that the reader develop his higher self, which highlights its educative aspect. The type of reading Nietzsche advocates is one which disciplines one towards the whole or attunes one towards reality in the experience of *amor fati*.

## II

### *Nietzsche on Writing as the Cultivation of a Higher Self & Reading as the Exploration of the Autobiographical Nature of his Works*

Philosophical reading requires taking into account the existential character of Nietzsche's philosophical activity. It is for this reason that Nietzsche always takes his 'self' into consideration in highlighting its connection with the philosophical activity of participating within the whole. Nietzsche refers to himself with the prolific use of the word 'I' as he recognizes how inseparable his 'inmost being' or unconscious is from Becoming.<sup>79</sup> The higher self or the "Great reason of the Body" is the necessary

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<sup>79</sup> Karl Jaspers explains that, for Nietzsche, the source of philosophical knowledge "is not to be found in thinking about mere objects or in investigating mere facts but rather in *the unity of thought and life*, so that thinking grows out of the provocation and agitation of *the whole man*, —all this constitutes for Nietzsche's self-consciousness the real character of his truth: "I have always composed my writings with my whole body and life"; "All truths are bloody truths to me." "I do not simply present mental processes, I only speak of *experienced* things." (Jaspers, K., *Op. cit.*, p.386, quoting Nietzsche). Beatrice Han also notes that Nietzsche wrote with his whole body and life: "Thought has to its non-theoretical meaning by being linked anew to the life of the thinker...Theoretical comprehension must be rooted in existential experience: understanding something means living it, 'I have always written my writings with my whole body and life. *I do not know what purely intellectual problems are*'. (Han, B., *Nietzsche and the 'Masters of Truth'*, In, Nietzsche and the Divine, John Lippit and Jim Urpeth (eds.), Manchester, Clinamen Press, 2000, p.129, quoting Nietzsche) Jaspers emphasizes that true philosophical thinking or "truly knowledgeable thinking" arises from a subjectivity that belongs to the whole or takes place within "the subjectivity of a life that enters existence and the world, and that itself *is* all of this. "We belong to the character of the world. ...We have no access to it except through ourselves." (Jaspers, K., *Op.cit.*, p.386-387) He goes on to explain that "thinking with the "whole body and life"—is at the same time the way to the complete man who, as such, becomes really aware of the character of the world. Such a one "conceives reality *as it is*, ...is not estranged from or transported out of it...for he is reality itself." (*ibid.*, p.387) For Nietzsche, his life serves as the basis of philosophical knowledge, it is for this reason that he brings his life experiences to the writing of his works, and he also asserts that those who truly 'know' him bring similar life-experiences to the text. Nietzsche proclaims that through reading and writing in blood or with one's whole body, one's intuitive self that one participates within the whole. Jaspers claims that for Nietzsche there is a distinction between truly philosophical knowledge and knowledge of things. It is in this way that Nietzsche as a psychologist is not an empirical observer "seeking to grasp his facts ...with a view to causal explanation; rather his psychology consists in a philosophical illumination of *Existenz*." The type of psychology that illumines *Existenz* is self-understanding as opposed to self-observation where self-observation relates to empirical existence or the observation of one's self as an object. According to Jaspers, Nietzsche maintains that self-understanding takes place through self-reflection rather than self-observation:

In contrast to the misunderstood ways of psychological self-observation and endless self-reflection stands *self-understanding* as illumination through the *inner activity* of philosophizing. This involves *not* merely *my*

self and is opposed to the contingent empirical self. It should be noted that by certain commentators the idea of the unconscious and its relation to reality is overlooked and, in turn, the idea of the author is also rejected. There are commentators who reject the presence of the author as a result of their rejection of the transcendental signified as a stable substance, which has culminated in what is referred to as the death of the author.<sup>80</sup>

This chapter will explore not only the role of the author and to acknowledge his independence from interpretation but also to argue that the true meaning and value of a text is in the self-reflection that underlies it. The philosophical meaning of reading and writing lies in its relation to the development of the philosophical self or the higher self, and in turn its relation to Becoming. Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the

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*individual existence* (subjectivity), and *not* merely affairs that concern *men generally* (objectivity), but *Existenz* which is inherent in both. *Existenz* is the self-being that I alone *am*, in that I am in the world, have to deal with many things, and live within the whole. Self-understanding relates to the individual who, as possible *Existenz*, is what he is through the manner in which being shows itself to him. Thus, within self-being, self-understanding touches upon something *general* or something exceptional but still generally essential. Nietzsche's thinking is, in large part, a self-understanding by way of specific contents which, as such, he again understands within the whole. As a young man he wrote: "I am trying to discover in what respect my misery is general, and I shun any opportunity to become personal" (to Rohde, May, '74) (*ibid.*, p. 385)

Jaspers uses the following reference for Letters to Rohde: Friedrich Nietzsches Gesammelte Briefe (Friedrich Nietzsche's Collected Letters), Leipzig, Inselverlag, vol. II: Nietzsche's correspondence with E. Rohde; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.

<sup>80</sup> Sean Burke in his *The Ethics of Writing: Authorship & Legacy* points out the two postmodern authors who uphold this position as Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, and references their works as follows: Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author,' In: Stephen Heath (trans. & ed.), *Image-Music-Text*, London, Fontana, 1977, pp. 42-48 and Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author?,' In: D., Bouchard and Sherry Simon (trans. & eds.), *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays & Interviews*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 113-38, 138. Burke mentions that Foucault upholds the poststructuralist view of writing as the radical dispossession of authorship whereby writing is free to roam about the place, in the absence of its father or author. (Burke, S., *The Ethics of Writing: Authorship and Legacy in Plato and Nietzsche*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2008 p.36) He also expresses that postmodernists reject authorship as a logocentric category, as a transcendental signified within a metaphysics of presence, rested upon a counterintuitive association of 'authorship' with *presence* metonymically registered as 'voice'." (*ibid.* p.37-38) According to Burke, Derrida assumes that authority, for Plato, is invested in the idea of speech as presence, and expresses that this is a misreading of Plato. (*ibid.*, p. 37)

tree of life to express that there is a necessary connection between the life of a writer and his work, and that there is in turn a necessary link between the work and the oneness of Becoming; both the life and work of an author is an expression of the whole:

We have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts grow out of us with the necessity which a tree bears fruit—related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of *one* will, *one* health, *one* soil, *one* sun. (GM, Preface: §2)

In viewing the author as belonging to the total union of Being, Nietzsche advocates its immortality:

That author has drawn the happiest lot who as an old man can say that all of life-engendering, strengthening, elevating, enlightening thought and feeling that was in him lives on in his writings, and that he himself is nothing but the grey ashes, while the fire has everywhere been rescued and borne forward.—If one now goes on to consider that, not only a book, but every action performed by a human being becomes in some way the cause of other actions, decisions, thoughts, that everything that happens is inextricably knotted to everything that will happen, one comes to recognize the existence of an actual *immortality*, that of motion: what has once moved is enclosed and eternalized in the total union of all being like an insect in amber. (HH, I: §208)

All philosophical works are a reflection of the personal nature of the philosopher and it is through the personal or the subjective that one encounters the realm of Becoming as objective reality. The philosophical self, for Nietzsche, is oriented to one thing alone and that is to truth, something universal; it is the site of belonging to truth. It is from this universal position that Nietzsche writes his works; and it is in this way that they transcend the ‘human, all-too-human’.

—Shall my experience—the history of an illness and recovery, for a recovery, was what eventuated—have been my personal experience alone? And only *my* ‘human, all-too-human’? Today I would like to believe the reverse; again and again I feel sure that my travel books were not written solely for myself, as sometimes seems to be the case—. (HH, II, Preface: §6)

In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche reflects upon one of his untimely meditations, *Schopenhauer as Educator* and expresses that the goal of philosophical education lies in the development or realization of one's true self or higher self, or in what draws the soul upward or "immeasurably high above." (§1) This idea of the soul being drawn upward is reminiscent of the soul being in attunement with the 'more than human realm' or reality. The meditation on Schopenhauer is thus introduced as Nietzsche's attempt to discover his own true self. In *Ecce Homo*, he refers to himself as 'Nietzsche as Educator' the opposite of 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' where he recognizes the role of Schopenhauer in his own becoming, and concedes that he was "many things and in many places in order to be able to become one thing—to be able to attain one thing," (EH, 'Why I Write Such Good Books', 'U': §3) that is his task or his higher self. He is also critical of the scholar or what he refers to as "academic "ruminants"", and contrasts them with what he understands the philosopher to be, "a terrible explosive."<sup>81</sup> However, he at the same time recognizes that he himself had been a scholar, and that it was a necessary stage in his own self-development. Nietzsche notes the role writing plays in his own self-development through the sublimation of his most painful experiences, and through the discipline it instils in him as a writer. This relates to the idea of philosophy as autobiography or as life-writing that an author writes from his life experience (HH, I: §208) where writing is not only an expression of his unconscious activity but of his "ipsissimosity," an impersonal horizon that is open-ended to the future (HH, II, Preface: §1) In *Beyond Good and Evil* (§6), Nietzsche examines the connection between the personal and the universal,

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<sup>81</sup> In *Schopenhauer as Educator* (§8), Nietzsche again criticizes academic philosophy, and rather advocates philosophy that is "dangerous" or "hurtful". The following section will explore what Nietzsche means by philosophy being "explosive" or "hurtful"; it will argue that he views reading as a 'warlike' process in terms of the acquisition of wisdom.

and argues that philosophy cannot be disconnected from the personal: “every great philosophy so far has been ... the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.” This type of writing is also not only an expression of present experiences but also of layers of experiences that run deeper than those of the individual. In the preface to *Daybreak*, Nietzsche mentions how an author’s writing speaks from the depths of history or tradition.<sup>82</sup> He writes that philosophers with “the conscience of artists” are “heirs” of a tradition of millennia” (§4); their works are an expression of the tradition or the whole. In terms of being educated by previous philosophers in his own self-development, Nietzsche participates within this whole. In reading the works of others, he experiences “literary wounding”; he shares in the blood of another, and it is in this way that he proclaims that he is “every name in history.”<sup>83</sup> (Letter to Jakob Burckhardt, Jan 6<sup>th</sup>, 1889)

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<sup>82</sup> In the introduction to his work ‘*Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology*,’ Graham Parkes, in a section entitled ‘Philosophy as Autobiography,’ also notes that when Nietzsche’s “writing speaks from his experience, it is not only that the *life writes itself* (enacting the parts of “auto-biography”); such writing is written also from other, earlier experiences, from layers of life deeper than the particular person’s.” (Parkes, *Op. cit.*, p.9) It is in this way that Parkes is examining the relation between the personal, and the impersonal in terms of Nietzsche’s view of philosophy as autobiography. Parkes then goes on to pose the question: “Supposing one accepts Nietzsche’s invitation to regard philosophy as autobiography, as a writing of the life of the self, the question arises: the life of *which* self? of the same self as is writing?” (*ibid.*) In addressing the various possibilities he poses the ultimate possibility: “Or is it after all some impersonal self or selves, though they may speak through many masks (*personae*) of the personality, do so from some locus higher or deeper than the perspective of the personal and from a time more distant than the present?” (*ibid.*) The answer to the above, according to Parkes is in the form of a yes, that that the philosopher must transcend “the personal, all too personal” or the “human, all too human.” (HH, II, Preface: §6, cited in this form in Parkes, *ibid.*, p.9) The idea of an impersonal self is referred to in this thesis as a self that belongs to truth or a universal. Parkes notes that he “goes on to recommend his “travel books” (*Wanderbücher*, chronicles of journeys to foreign climes of the soul) to those who are afflicted with any kind of “past”—a recommendation that remains enigmatic until we appreciate the sense in which Nietzsche regards us as heirs of a long tradition and better understand the relations between the personal and the impersonal.” (Parkes, *Op. cit.*, p.11) The reader of Nietzsche must recognize that his personal experiences are an expression of the impersonal or of “a long tradition” (*ibid.*)

<sup>83</sup> D. B., Allison also notes in his introduction to ‘*The New Nietzsche*’ that Nietzsche’s innermost self must be understood as “having its genesis in conditions outside himself.” (D.B. Allison, *Op. cit.* p. xiii) Nietzsche’s texts in being an expression of the personal are at the same time an expression of the universal:

The texture of the text, therefore, is itself woven from “the hieroglyphic chains” of these universal conditions or forms of existence. Indeed, it is in this sense that Nietzsche will repeatedly criticize the very notion of a

Nietzsche in this way recognizes how previous philosophers played an important role in enabling him to accede to his true nature or in realizing his higher self. Nietzsche acknowledges the role that those various “types” of human being played in shaping and forming him, and as a sign of gratitude, he associates them forever with his immortality. In the introduction to *Ecce Homo*, Kaufmann expresses the gratitude that Nietzsche feels that is encapsulated in the experience of *amor fati*:

For all that, is Wagner represented in a Manichaeian spirit, as the force of evil, as a dragon? On the contrary, the portrait is imbued with gratitude and love—with *amor fati*, love of fate. *There is no “if only” in this autobiography, and there are no excuses.* A man who is in physical agony much of his adult life and warned by his doctors not to read or write much lest he strain his half-blind eyes, does not once complain. He is thankful for his illness and tells us how it made his life better. (EH, Editor’s Introduction: §2)

Nietzsche expresses the role of intuition in shaping his thought, life and works; it is for this reason he is “self-consciously autobiographical”, as he is aware of the unconscious origins of his works.<sup>84</sup> Nietzsche makes explicit the autobiographical

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personal self or ego as being a “grammatical fiction,” or state that the individual consciousness is merely “surface phenomena” of unconscious forces and drives—and in the same breath claim, “I am every name in history.” (*ibid.*)

<sup>84</sup> Parkes also contends that Nietzsche is aware of the unconscious origin of his works or that his own philosophy is an “unconscious memoir” (BGE: §6) such that this implies that Nietzsche is “*self-consciously* autobiographical.” (Parkes, *Op. cit.*, p.10) He also cites the first section of *Beyond Good and Evil* (§6) “On the Prejudices of the Philosophers” where Nietzsche attacks the idea that philosophy as an objective enterprise has nothing to do with the personal. Parkes asserts that it is in this way that, for Nietzsche, the philosopher needs to be a psychologist as well: “If philosophy is motivated unconsciously by the basic drives of human nature, the good philosopher will need to become familiar with those drives—and especially with the way they play through his own life and thought.” (*ibid.*) He also notes that “at the time of *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche’s writing takes an explicitly autobiographical turn as he goes back to several of his earlier works (*The Birth of Tragedy*, the two volumes of *Human, All Too Human*, *Dawn of Morning*, and *The Joyful Science*) and writes prefaces for them that emphasize their depth psychological dimensions.” (*ibid.*, p.11) This term “depth psychology” comes from Nietzsche’s conclusion to the first section of *Beyond Good and Evil* where he calls for psychology to dare finally to “descend into the depths” (BGE: §23, cited in this form in Parkes, *Op. cit.*, p.11) Parkes also states that in the preface to *Dawn of Morning* that Nietzsche “refers to the author of the text as an “underground man,” one who “bores, mines, and undermines” as he undertakes “work in the depths.” (*ibid.*) He also expresses that Nietzsche in “anticipating similar claims by Freud and Jung” goes on to claim: “At that time I undertook something that not everyone may undertake: I descended into the depths, I bored into the foundations.” (DM, P2, cited in this form in Parkes *Op. cit.*, p.11)



nature of his works in the prefaces to such works as *Human, All Too Human II*, *Daybreak*, and *The Gay Science*. He emphasizes that these books are an expression of his unconscious self, or his “inmost being”. He mentions how his ill-health led to periods of convalescence.<sup>85</sup> Although writing for Nietzsche is an expression of his self-overcoming or of ‘digested’ experience, the act of writing itself can also be a form of self-overcoming or of self-victory.

*Writing and the desire for victory.*—Writing ought always to advertise a victory— or an overcoming of *oneself* which has to be communicated for the benefits of others; but there are dyspeptic authors who write only when they cannot digest something, indeed when it is still stuck in their teeth: they involuntarily seek to transfer their own annoyance to the reader and in this way exercise power over him: that is to say, they too desire victory, but over others. (HH, II: §152)

Nietzsche self-overcomes through writing; it is in this way that in a letter to his friend Rohde, July 15<sup>th</sup> 1882 he refers to his writings as “home-brewed medicine”. He speaks in this letter about having written for himself<sup>86</sup> and that his writings are a cure

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<sup>85</sup> Parkes also notes this point in examining the preface to *Human, All Too Human II* (*ibid.*, p.11). He observes that Nietzsche in the preface speaks as an author who has overcome ill-health, and looks at it as a gift: “the author expresses ill health for preventing him from drifting away from his task in life (4)... Illness alienates us from our everyday existence, while recovery allows us to return to ourselves with a completely new perspective on our lives... On recovering, we return to life not only wiser but also grateful for the enhancement that our experience has undergone, enormously grateful for “the smallest, tenderest, most fleeting gifts” life gives us. (*ibid.*)

<sup>86</sup> Horst Hutter also cites this passage in his work ‘*Shaping the Future: Nietzsche’s New Regime of the Soul & its Ascetic Practices*’. (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.124) He notes that the phrase ‘*Mihi ipsi scripsi*’ which translates as “I have written for myself” sums up Nietzsche’s first part of his task as an author, that is to write for himself. However, Hutter contends that the other half of Nietzsche’s task is to write for others that is, his “writing for the future” (*ibid.*) His ambition is to “become the authority of a new spiritual and political dispensation. He wishes to found new houses of being, as it were, within which future philosophical legislators will create the codes of conduct for new political regimes of both soul and city.” (*ibid.*, p.125) He writes for the few not the many, as he is aware that the many will follow the few in their efforts at self-creating. Hutter claims that in this way his works reflect an “aristocratic radicalism.” (*ibid.*) It is in this way that there is a link between Nietzsche’s spiritual hierarchy and his account of education or the ability to self-fashion through reading.

for his own depression, where he becomes an advocate of writing as therapy. He states that

This is actually my only excuse for the kind of things which I have been writing since 1876; it is my prescription and my home-brewed medicine against weariness with life. What years! What wearisome pain! What inner disturbances, revolutions, solitudes! *Who* has endured as much as I have?—certainly not Leopardi. And if I stand above all that, with the joyousness of a victor and fraught with difficult *new* plans—and, knowing myself, with the prospect of new, more difficult, and even more inwardly profound sufferings and tragedies and *with the courage to face them!*—then nobody should be annoyed with me for having a good opinion of my medicine. *Mihi ipsi scripsi*— [“I have written for myself”] and there it stands; and thus everyone should do for himself his best in his own way—that is my morality, the only remaining morality for me. If even my physical health reappears, whom have I to thank for that? I was in all respects my own doctor; and as a person in whom nothing stands separate, I have had to treat soul, mind, and body all at once and with the same remedies. (Letter to Rohde, July 15<sup>th</sup>, 1882)

Written words, for Nietzsche, mark the victories of inner struggles that make way for new growth, self-renewal and transfiguration. An author’s spiritual journey involves the introspective examination of life experiences, channelling those experiences into writing, and overcoming them through the discipline of writing itself. Nietzsche often observes the level of suffering involved in the production of philosophical works, and he always views this kind of discipline as directed towards compensation, overcoming and transfiguration. Nietzsche also claims that in overcoming illness one can raise oneself to a higher level of existence through the realization of a higher self in the experience of “Great health” (GS: §382). For Nietzsche, there is a connection between sickness and creativity, as he maintains that the best works can only be produced under conditions of ill-health. In *Ecce Homo* he speaks of the conditions of ill-health under which he wrote *Daybreak*:

The following winter, my first one in Genoa, that sweetening and spiritualization which is almost inseparably connected with an extreme poverty of blood and muscle, produced *The Dawn*. The perfect brightness and cheerfulness, even exuberance of the spirit, reflected in this work, is compatible in my case not only with the most profound physiological weakness, but even with an excess of pain. (EH, 'Why I Am So Wise': §1)

In *Ecce Homo*, he explains the function of forms of rebirth and the spiritual transfiguration that his perfect readers can experience; such as those of internal renewal, overcoming of illness and loss of self. Philosophical education can enable the ideal reader to overcome this sense of loss of self or self-rejection in the cultivation of a higher self. Nietzsche speaks of *Zarathustra* as representative of the “air of the heights” or the highest reality, and it rewards those who “hear” it aright, those who are also capable of reaching the “heights”:

Among my writings my *Zarathustra* stands to mind by itself. With that I have given mankind the greatest present that has ever been made to it so far. This book, with a voice bridging centuries, is not only the highest book there is, the book that is truly characterized by the air of the heights—the whole fact of man lies *beneath* it at a tremendous distance—it is also the *deepest*, born out of the innermost wealth of truth, an inexhaustible well to which no pail descends without coming up again filled with gold and goodness... Above all, one must *hear* aright the tone that comes from this mouth, the halcyon tone, lest one should do wretched injustice to the meaning of its wisdom. (EH, Preface: §4)

Nietzsche explains how he, as an author, and his readers can experience stages of decay or death, such as those born out of the “spirit of gravity” and then those expressive of energy, renewal, growth and spiritual rebirth. His style embodies the life force of nature with its organic cyclical changes. Nietzsche, in speaking about *The Gay Science*, mentions how it represented those moments of resurrection within his own soul. In the preface, he mentions that he has been “resurrected.” (GS: Pref.: §1) Nietzsche overcomes through his writing, and these changes in his thinking are one and the same as the changes in the cycles of the seasons those of life and death. He

also in the same preface expresses the importance of sharing similar experiences to the author:

This book might need more than one preface: and in the end there would still be room for doubting whether someone who has not experienced something similar could, by means of prefaces, be brought closer to the *experiences* of this book. It seems to be written in the language of the wind that brings a thaw: it contains high spirits, unrest, contradiction, and April weather, so that one is constantly reminded of winter's nearness as well as the *triumph* over winter that is coming, must come, perhaps has already come... Gratitude flows forth incessantly, as if that which was most unexpected had just happened—the gratitude of a convalescent—for *recovery* was what was the most unexpected. 'Gay Science': this signifies the saturnalia of a mind that has patiently resisted a terrible long pressure—patiently, severely, coldly, without yielding, but also without hope—and is now all of a sudden attacked by hope, by hope for health, by the intoxication of *recovery*... This entire book is really nothing but an amusement after long privation and powerlessness, the jubilation of returning strength, of a reawakened faith in tomorrow, of a sudden sense and anticipation of a future, of impending adventures, of reopened seas, of goals that are permitted and believed again. (GS, Preface: §1)

For Nietzsche, readers should investigate the life influences of a writer, the instincts or drives, and the life experiences that constitute the writer's philosophical *eros* of the will to power. Nietzsche argues that philosophical thought can be born out of pain, as the writer's internal condition can be transformed into spiritual form or channelled into creativity. (GS, Preface: §3)

Nietzsche's writings represent a will to power that aspires to the 'heights', a philosophical *eros* or love for the 'more-than-human', which signifies a life-affirmative culture that is in an ascendant state of the will to power.<sup>87</sup> For Nietzsche, philosophical writings portray the state of the creator's soul; they are representative of an inner spiritual struggle, as they are the excrement of digested experience. In the

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<sup>87</sup> Philosophical works can signify decadence or a decline in the will to power of the writer himself, which is also symptomatic of the cultural conditions in which the philosopher lives. Texts can be indicative of the type of culture that the philosopher is writing in or can signify the type of culture that is to come, a higher dancing culture (HH, I: §278), as in Nietzsche's case. Nietzsche's writings as an expression of the *logos* are an expression of culture or reality that is beyond the human realm.

Preface to *Human, All Too Human II*, Nietzsche states that his works always speak of something he has overcome: “But it has always required time, recovery, distancing, before the desire awoke within me to skin, exploit, expose, ‘exhibit’ (or whatever one wants to call it) for the sake of knowledge something I had experienced and survived, some fact or fate of my life.” (HH, II, Pref.: §1) According to Nietzsche, the philosopher’s writings and his experiences are one and the same, and he makes the important point that readers cannot understand him unless they have experience of the Dionysian. In this way, the reader must gain spiritual insight into the author, and also the reader must be familiar with her own emotional experiences, life cycles, and ascending and descending patterns of the will to power.

The best kind of reading or writing must be the product of the right kind of life experience. Nietzsche outlines how an ideal reader is the person who shares an author’s experiences or who takes into account an author’s unconscious, or the pathos of his works. Nietzsche requires of his readers that they go beyond any surface level of meaning to the level of feeling, of unconscious states, and of mood such that they recognize the will to power of the text, that it is expressive of “the air of the heights.” (EH, Pref.: §4) Reading, as Nietzsche suggests, is never simply about conveying an opinion or uncovering a hidden meaning; it is about identifying with the pathos of the text. Nietzsche proclaims that those related to him in the desire to cultivate a higher self will experience the ecstasy associative of philosophical education:

But whoever is related to me in the height of his aspirations will experience veritable ecstasies of learning; I know abysses into which no foot ever strayed. (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §3)

Nietzsche often claims that there are necessary preconditions for an understanding of his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, one of which is the necessity to have gone through the same experiences that his works are based on. In speaking of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he expresses the need to have had similar experiences as him as an author: “But for others to feel this will require whole generations to *catch up with* the inner experiences from which that work could arise.” (Letter to Karl Knortz, June 21, 1888)

Nietzsche in many of his letters expresses his personal connection to the work *Zarathustra* in particular. The work is not only an expression of his philosophy but also an expression of his deeply personal experiences as well as the overcoming of these painful experiences. It is in this way that his works are a reflection not just of his philosophy but also of his life and his development and self-overcoming:

When Dr. Heinrich von Stein once complained very honestly that he didn't understand a word of my *Zarathustra*, I told him that this was perfectly in order: having understood six sentences from it—that is, to have really have experienced them—would raise one to a higher level of existence than “modern” men could attain. Given this feeling of distance, how could I possibly wish to be read by those “moderns” whom I know! (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §1)

Many of Nietzsche's works illustrate that he worked out of himself or that he sublimated his own painful experiences through his writing. He also claims that this is how the philosopher is to work:

The lack of personality always takes its revenge: a weakened, thin, extinguished personality, one that denies itself and its own existence, is no longer good for anything good—least of all for philosophy. ‘Selflessness’ has no value in heaven or on earth; all great problems demand *great love*, and only strong, round, secure minds who have a firm grip on themselves are capable of that. It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them a destiny, his distress, and his greatest happiness, or an ‘impersonal’ one, meaning he is only able to touch and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought. In the latter case nothing will come of it, that much can be promised... (GS: §345)

It is in this way that Nietzsche is an existential thinker, as he brings his own experiences to his works such that his life experiences are closely related to his thinking. For Nietzsche, personality or one's unconscious is more fundamental than 'pure philosophy' or any particular intellectual position. It also follows from this that he advocates the development of one's higher self toward one's goal. In doing so, one can affirm one's life or encounter reality as it is, where one reaches the "heights."  
(WP: §512-513)

It is only those in tune with themselves and who have had similar life experiences to Nietzsche will be able to explore appropriately the autobiographical nature of his writings. It is only those who also view the connection between his life and his works that are best prepared for understanding the Dionysian.<sup>88</sup> Nietzsche contends that style

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<sup>88</sup> Nietzsche notes the importance of the reader's state of soul as an important element to his indirect, stylistic communication of personal experience. The reader can only connect with Nietzsche if he also has experience of the Dionysian in such a way that he can identify emotional states, life-patterns and life-cycles in his life. The reader is motivated to self-examine in order to re-encounter the Dionysian; to overcome self-rejection and to encounter the 'more-than-human' or reach the "air of the heights." (EH, Preface: §4) Nietzsche looks at ways in which the reader can use his life course with its patterns and cycles as a "means of knowledge": "your desiring with all your strength to see ahead how the knot of the future is going to be tied, you own life will acquire the value of an instrument and means of knowledge." (HH, I: §292) In order for the stylistic communication of personal experience to succeed, it can only do so with those individuals who already share similar experiences as the author. The identification of such experiences and the motivation to understand them creates an ideal relation between the experience of the reader and the style used by the author or the instinctual pathos that is deployed. For Nietzsche, the reader must have past experiences out of which equip her in her understanding of the communicative act that the book represents. According to Nietzsche, the reader's Dionysian experiences make her responsive to the text as Kathleen Higgins puts it in her article entitled '*Nietzsche's View of Philosophical Style*' that the reader "at the time of reading might have had experiences that make his less-than-conscious inner being responsive" (Higgins, K., *Op.cit.*, p.74) These Dionysian experiences, like those of ritual form in Greek tragedy that are expressed in *The Birth of Tragedy*, are those that constitute a reversal "from sorrow to joy, from darkness and sights of inexplicable terror to light and the discovery of the reborn God Dionysus" (Harrison, J., *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*, London, Merlin Press, 1989, p.342). The Greek God is explained by Harrison to represent "the drama of the Death and Rebirth of the Year Spirit" (*ibid.*), the year spirit or 'eniautos-daimon' was also ascribed to the primitive dithyramb which involved "a contest between the year spirit and its enemy, and proceeded through the sacrificial death of the spirit to its glorious resurrection or epiphany—the whole ritual symbolizing the cyclic death and rebirth of Nature" (M.S. Silk & J.P. Stern, *Nietzsche on Tragedy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.143). The Dionysian wisdom that Nietzsche himself encounters alongside his ideal reader has its origin in the experience of the ultimate unity of things, a Dionysian oneness that involves overcoming the spell of individuation as the source of one's suffering. The God Dionysus is reinvented in the mature philosophy and becomes the paradigm of his life-affirmative philosophy as the God of cosmic energy

is ultimately a communication of an inward state and the reflection of an inward state: “Good is any style that really communicates an inward state.” (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §4) It is for this reason that one can understand Nietzsche only through understanding the pathos of his works. Nietzsche asserts that the best style finds “expression for the most desirable state of mind, the state, that is to say, which it is most desirable should be communicated and conveyed: that of the spiritually joyful, luminous and honest man who has overcome his passions.” (HH, II: ‘The Wanderer and his Shadow’: §88) Nietzsche expresses how his writings convey his own inward state by showing how his account of tragedy serves as an exemplum or parable of his own inward experience of the Dionysian. (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books,’ BT: §2)

Nietzsche recognizes that writing is a direct reflection of who one is and is an expression of one’s heart, life and blood; and for this reason he maintains that to write about one’s life is to write about one’s works. It is in this way that *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche’s autobiography, is a work about his writings; it is in this work that he is at his most self-consciously autobiographical.<sup>89</sup> It is also for this reason that Nietzsche’s

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renewal and dancing. The concept of the ‘Year Spirit’ can be viewed in light of the reader’s life patterns and cycles; it also correlates with the “great year of Being or eternity” (GS: §276), the experience of necessity in the *amor fati* moment.

<sup>89</sup> Horst Hutter states that Nietzsche, in being self-consciously autobiographical, was able to realize his “life-task.” (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §9) Nietzsche is self-consciously autobiographical or practices what Hutter refers to as “writing the self” in the sense that he is aware of the impact writing has on his unconscious. This awareness entails mentally focusing upon the impact writing has on his unconscious, in this way mentations are self-reflective. (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.114) Hutter further on in his work ‘*Shaping the Future: Nietzsche’s New Regime of the Soul and its Ascetic Practices*’ maintains that for Nietzsche this awareness involves engaging the “transcendental mind.” (*ibid.*, p.171) In this way it is possible to infer that this idea of a transcendental mind is a reevaluation of the Cartesian self-reflective ego, which is a mode of consciousness that reflects upon itself. It is non-solipsistic as writing the self for Nietzsche enables the philosophical type to encounter reality as it is. Hutter maintains that for Nietzsche, this involves engaging the “transcendental mind” (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.171) or the self-reflective ego, which is a mode of consciousness that reflects upon itself. The transcendental mind is that which enables the writer to gain indirect insight into his unconscious, and in turn the writer may get in touch with the “Great Reason of the Body” or with one’s “life task.” (*ibid.*) It is in this way that



*Ecce Homo* represents the “high point” in his life; he is at his highest point where he realizes his life “task” as a prophet or foreseer of humanity reaching its own “high point”. It is in this work that Nietzsche is most aware of the role reading and writing played in the realization of his higher self, or in the restoration of himself to a unified

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Nietzsche got in touch with his life-task. The mental focus upon the impact of writing on his unconscious not only led him to become more attuned to his body, but it also enabled him to form a higher self. The impact on the unconscious itself enables the “Great Reason of the Body” to develop a higher self or restore the self to a unity, and in turn to the Whole. Hutter explores the way in which writing the self led to the formation of a new self in great detail. Writing, for Nietzsche provided the “eye of the other” in his moments of solitude; it enabled him to observe himself. Hutter argues that in this way that Nietzsche is a Christian; “he follows the well-established Christian practice of the examination of conscience which already in late antiquity had been linked with a practice of autobiographical writing.” (*ibid.*, p.114) Hutter notes that writing provided moments of intense self-awareness, which have been linked to spiritual development in some pagan philosophical schools, notably the stoics. (*ibid.*) He claims that for Nietzsche, writing creates a *logistikon*,

... the act of mental focusing gathers together the “quanta of reason” of the different drives, thereby purifies them and makes them more intelligent. It helps each drive participate in the inner parliament of voices, thereby creating an autonomy of thinking in which each drive engages in conversation with all other drives and thus creates, as it were, a constitution of the psychic regime. It helps to build what in Plato is called the *logistikon*, meant to be the ruling portion of the whole soul. Writing provides a recorded memory of the development of this *logistikon*, in which the automatically proceeding mentations become self-reflective. Thereby the animal mind acquires a transcendental cast which in turn increases inner freedom.” (*ibid.*)

According to Hutter, writing the self, for Nietzsche, “the “*sibi scribere*”, increases the mirroring of consciousness by consciousness, which in that act provides the center of the development of a self.” (*ibid.*) He maintains that as writing provides self-observation, it in turn is a form of opposition, or inner opposition to be more precise. (HH, II: Vorrede 1, cited in this form in Hutter, *ibid.*, p.115) As a result, the “original and narcissistic identification of the human soul with all mental acts occurring in it, called “love” by Nietzsche, is thus broken and refracted. This broken love, the nucleus of the developing *logistikon*, involves a subtle form of “enmity” and cruelty toward oneself.” (*ibid.*) Hutter maintains that reading Christian written dogma led to the formation of the Christian self, a self linked to self-hatred. This type of self that has the ultimate internal split or conflict is what Nietzsche refers to as a “consciousness-vivisection.” (WP: §295, cited in this form in Hutter, *ibid.*, p.114) This form of self cruelty enables the development of the “inner phenomenal world”, which in turn enables the formation of a self. (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.114) Hutter identifies this cruelty with Christian asceticism, a “second nature” that Nietzsche inherited from the Christian tradition; and it is only through writing that Nietzsche can overcome this morality: “It is the writing in which he destroyed his Christian identity, but was sufficiently snake to shed his acquired second natures as outworn skins, so as to find his path, quite uncertain ever to reach it, “to the self-overcoming of morality.” (Daybreak, Pref.: §1, cited in this form in Hutter, *ibid.*, p.124) Writing led to the formation of the Christian self, and it is through a different type of writing that will lead to the formation of a new self, a truly philosophical one. For Nietzsche, the former is a necessary prerequisite to the formation of the latter. Reading Nietzsche’s writings also involve ‘an internal split’ or inner struggle within the reader, a true asceticism that enables the overcoming of the old ascetic ideal. In the following section, it will be discussed as a form of asceticism that enables the reader to encounter reality or the whole. Nietzsche refers to a certain type of reader that is capable of overcoming through reading as the warrior noble. (GM, III: §6-10) See Owen, D., *Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality*, Stocksfield, Acumen, 2007, p.113-114 for a discussion of Nietzsche’s distinction between the two types of asceticism.

subjectivity.<sup>90</sup> Nietzsche was “many things and in many places” (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’, ‘U’: §3) before becoming Nietzsche himself. It is as “Nietzsche” that he realizes what he refers to as his “involuntary mission.” In rejecting claims about his “eccentricities” or madness, in a letter to Carl Fuchs Dec 14<sup>th</sup> 1887, he writes that this misunderstanding arises as “people do not know where my centre is, they will find it hard to know for certain where and when I have till now been “eccentric”—for example, being a classical philologist; this was being *outside* my centre (which fortunately, does not mean that I was a bad classical philologist)”. (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec 14<sup>th</sup> 1887) Nietzsche recognizes the role discipline plays in restoring him to unity. In the same letter to Carl Fuchs, he states that

Likewise today it seems to me an eccentricity that I should have been a Wagnerite. It was an inordinately dangerous experiment; now that I know that it did *not* ruin me, I know also what meaning it has had for me—it was the strongest test of my character. To be sure, one’s inmost being gradually disciplines one back to unity; that *passion*, to which no name can be put for a long time, rescues us from all digressions and dispersions, that *task* of which one is the involuntary missionary. (*ibid.*)

In describing how he “becomes himself,” Nietzsche refers to metaphors used in *Schopenhauer as Educator*, those of “the road”, of “the ladder”, a ladder that is to be climbed in order to reach a “self,” that unity of self that grows in his unconscious but is not buried away in his depths but situated above him, and brings him to the “highest

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<sup>90</sup> Thiele in his ‘*Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*’ notes that, for Nietzsche, the higher man has an overwhelming project to unify a multiple soul. “This effort to “impose upon becoming the character of being” is the mark of the supreme will to power.”” (WP: §330, cited in this form in Thiele, *Op. cit.*, p.212) Thiele notes that “The higher man’s self-appointed destiny is to make a cosmos of his chaotic inheritance.” (Thiele, L., *Op. cit.* p.212) He maintains that Nietzsche’s emphasis on the higher man’s ability to unify his subjectivity is disregarded by deconstructionist literature: “Much of the recent (deconstructionist) writing on Nietzsche is occupied with his diffusion, dispersion, fragmentation, or the destruction of the subject or self. In disregarding his eulogies of and proposals for its creative unification, however, these commentaries fail to take into account for Nietzsche’s primary concern as an educator, a philosopher, and an aesthetic stylist.” (*ibid.* p.212n3) The role education plays in the creation of a higher self or in the unification of a self or its attunement to reality will be explored in the following section.

point” in his life. Nietzsche states that there are “revered objects” that have “drawn the soul aloft...”, and he requests us to “Compare these objects one with another, see how one completes, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now.” (*Schopenhauer as Educator*: §1) In *Ecce Homo*, he engages in language that is expressive of the height he has reached, the language of lightning bolts. (EH, ‘The Untimely Ones’: §3) This is the height of the ‘more-than-human,’ where he speaks with bolts of lightning; he speaks as a soothsayer and apocalyptic thinker who stands “between past and future” where he is “prepared for lightning and the redemptive flash, pregnant with lightning bolts that say Yes and laugh Yes.” (Z, III: §16) It is this language that he characterizes as Dionysian in the section he devotes to *On the Genealogy of Morals* in *Ecce Homo*; he refers to his aphorisms as “gruesome detonations” that bring with them “the creation of new truth.” (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: ‘GM’) In using the language of lightning bolts and detonations as characteristic of the Dionysian, he suggests that it is accessible only to those who like him are “Hyperboreans.” (AC: §1) He asserts that his ideal readers are those that are made for the “heights”, the ‘more-than-human’, reality or the ‘heavenly.’<sup>91</sup> “Those

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<sup>91</sup> In this thesis I am arguing that it is in the experience of amor fati that the philosophical type experiences the “heavenly”; it is the feeling of eternity or the “Kingdom of Heaven that is within you” (AC: §34), it is “a state of the heart”. It is through the personal that one comes into attunement with Being. Jaspers identifies in Nietzsche the three types of awareness of being, which results from the development of Nietzsche’s own experience of being. Subsequently three stages can be discerned: (1) *contemplative vision*; (2) *mystical oneness with being*, and (3) *Dionysian intoxication*. (K., Jaspers, *Op. cit.*, p. 345) The first stage of the awareness of being as contemplative vision is encountered on ‘high mountains’ in the ‘air of the heights’. Jaspers asserts that “*in contemplative vision* the truthful man experiences what he himself is and what being is as “the great enlightenment about existence”: “Something inexpressible, of which happiness and truth are mere idol-like copies, comes over him, the earth loses its weight, the events and forces of the earth becomes dreamlike. ...The visionary feels as though he were just awakening. ...” (*ibid.*) He arrives “in the pure air of alps and ice, where beclouding and veiling no longer exist and where the basic constitution of things is expressed roughly and rigidly but with unmistakable clarity!” (*ibid.*) In this experience “one’s view extends “over the immense hieroglyphics of existence, over the petrified doctrine of becoming.” (*ibid.*) Jaspers claims that according to Nietzsche the soul in this experience is transformed: “The soul, thinking of it, grows lonely and boundless; ...its state ...this new and enigmatic agitation without excitement” ... spreads over existence “as a glowing, red-colored light inundating the world.” (*ibid.*) Jaspers claims that in this state

who can breathe the air of my writings know that it is an air of the heights, a *strong* air. One must be made for it. Otherwise there is no small danger that one may catch a cold in it. The ice is near, the solitude tremendous—but how calmly all things lie in the light! How freely one breathes! How much one feels *beneath* oneself!” (EH, Preface: §3) Nietzsche’s works are a reflection of who he is, as they are written out of

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of soul, it is as “though one tried to resist the tremendous experience through which alone he becomes truly human.” (*ibid.*) According to Jaspers, the state of contemplative vision contains the germ of his later awareness of being, and as a contemplative state it is what Nietzsche considers the “ultimate revelation of being.”

It can also be inferred from Jasper’s account of the contemplative vision that there is a similarity between Plato and Nietzsche on matters of contemplation. For both Nietzsche and Plato the philosopher’s education (*paideia*) must involve a “turning around of the soul” or what is referred to as the *periagoge* in Plato’s parable of the cave. (Voegelin, E., *Op. cit.*, p.115) Voegelin notes that according to Plato, it is erroneous of such thinkers as Protagoras to claim that true knowledge or *episteme* can be put into the soul (*The Republic*: 518b-c): “For the kind of vision (*opsis*) that enables a man to see the Agathon must exist in a soul, as a man must have eyes to see (518c). The educator can do no more than turn this organ of vision, if it exists in the soul of a man, around from the realm of becoming toward being and the brightest realm of being—“and that, we say, is the Agathon” (518c) Hence, Paideia (518b) is “the art of turning around [periagoge]” (518d).” (*ibid.*) The apprehension of the idea of the Agathon is referred to as a “divine contemplation” (517d) or a state of Eudaimonia (*ibid.* p.116). Similarly, for Nietzsche, the educator can only enable the ‘turning around of the soul’ or what is referred to in this thesis as the liberation of the essential self toward the realm of Being. In *Schopenhauer as Educator* (§1), Nietzsche outlines the means of coming to know oneself or fulfilling the dictum ‘know thyself’, and claims that to discover how one truly becomes oneself, one must pose the question, “what have you truly loved up to know, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it?”. He claims that the “revered objects” that enables the soul to be drawn aloft are what “give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self” (§1). He also claims that one’s true self, “the true, original meaning and basic stuff of your nature is something completely incapable of being educated or formed and is in any case something difficult of access, bound and paralysed.” (§1) In the same way that Plato claims that the “organ of vision” must exist already in the soul, and the educator can only turn this “organ of vision” if it exists in “the soul of man, around from the realm of becoming toward being...”, Nietzsche also maintains in *Schopenhauer as Educator* that one’s true self or the true meaning of one’s nature cannot be taught, that it already resides with you and that “your educators can be only your liberators.” (§1) The educator for both Plato and Nietzsche can only liberate the soul or turn the soul around, but only in those who already have a soul. Although Nietzsche and Plato differ on what they consider education to consist of, both of these thinkers hold the similar view that education is cultivation towards the whole. Plato associates the acquisition of education with the soul as the “organ of vision”, whereas Nietzsche associates it with the soul as heart, as the “genius of the heart.” (BGE: §295) This idea of the “organ of vision” relates to an ocular-centrism of the metaphysical tradition which Nietzsche wishes to overturn, that the ‘image’ of reality exists in the ‘mind’s eye’. In this tradition the reality of entities becomes equated with their image. The phenomenal realm or the realm of appearance is the mind, and is in a dualistic relation with reality.

Jaspers then goes on to mention that the next stage of the awareness of being, for Nietzsche is a mystical union with being, and relates to the ‘Nietzsche’ of the Zarathustra period. It is uttered in songs such as “Homecoming,” “The Seven Seals,” and “The Drunken Song.” (K., Jaspers, *Op. cit.*, p. 346) The final stage of experiencing being is referred to as the “Dionysian” for Nietzsche; it is state of life-affirmation where one reaches the most sublime heights and encounters the highest spirituality (*ibid.*, p. 347).

his experiences, out of which he developed his sense of commitment to himself, a faith in his own self.

Nietzsche speaks of the man who has not acceded to the development of his higher self, who is still undetermined and unformed, as “un-form, a material, an ugly stone that needs a sculptor.” (EH, ‘Z’: §8) Nietzsche himself, as an “ugly stone,” required a sculptor in order that his divine self, his necessary or essential self be ‘carved’ out to the point of hardness. Nietzsche’s use of “granite words” at the end of the third book of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* represents the formulation of a destiny. (EH, ‘GS’) In *Ecce Homo* he erects himself as a sculpted stone like “a powerful pyramidal rock not far from Surlei.”<sup>92</sup> (EH, ‘Z’: §1) This stone compares with what he describes as the “diamond beauty of the first words of Zarathustra” (EH, ‘GS’); a book that is also to be reckoned as music, where the “rebirth of the art of *hearing* was among its preconditions” (EH, ‘Z’: §1)

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<sup>92</sup> This is the place where Nietzsche was first struck with the idea of the eternal recurrence where the stone represented for him the divine moment of the realization of his fate, his destiny. In realizing himself as a prophet, he views himself as the destroyer of old resentful values and the creator of new ones. He lives at a pivotal apocalyptic moment where he refers to himself as “a force majeure, a destiny—[who] breaks the history of mankind in two. One lives before him, or one lives after him.” (EH, ‘Why I Am A Destiny’: §8) His life was also then at a pivotal moment, the ‘great noon’: “My task of preparing the moment of the highest self-examination for humanity, a great noon when it looks back and far forward, when it emerges from the dominion of accidents and priests and for the first time poses, as a whole, the question of Why? and For What?” (EH, ‘Dawn’: §2) He also suggests that as a destiny he experiences ‘god-like’ states, those that are of the highest points in his life: ““God” as the moment of culmination: existence an eternal deifying and un-deifying. But is that not a high point of value, but a high point of power.” (WP: §712) This idea of Nietzsche erecting himself like a powerful pyramidal rock is also reminiscent of the image of the very bottom of the soul, the “granite of spiritual fate” (BGE: §231), one’s necessary self, which becomes attuned to reality in the experience of *amor fati*.

### III

#### *Nietzsche on Reading in Blood: Cultivation of a Higher Self & Entering into the Silent Logos of an Author*

A philosophical reading of Nietzsche is one which brings one's higher self or unconscious self to the text and in this way brings to light the most fundamental relation with him as an author.<sup>93</sup> It involves bringing one's 'innermost self' (HH, II, Preface: §1) into view with that of Nietzsche, or reading him from one's unconscious horizon. The importance of coming to know oneself and self-reflection is expressed in the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals*. In that preface he also expresses the essential role self-reflection plays in reading him as an author. This evokes a parallel between the preface to Plato's *Phaedrus* and the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals* where both philosophers begin their prefaces by raising the question of self-knowledge and end them with a discussion of reading. In the preface, Nietzsche criticizes these "men of knowledge," (GM, Preface: §1) the scholar and the scientist, as they overlook the importance of the self in relating to the whole. His concern is with the way in which these men are focusing too much on the object of knowledge for self-knowledge to take place:

We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it ever happen that we should ever *find* ourselves? It has been rightly said: "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also"; ... there is one thing we really care about from the heart—"bringing something home." (*ibid.*)

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<sup>93</sup> A philosophical reading of Nietzsche is one which involves the most fundamental way of relating to him as an author. This relation involves taking a primordial standpoint to the text. This type of relation to the objective, metaphysically independent text, as an inter-subjective relation is one of pathos. It is through one's unconscious that ideal the reader enters into the most fundamental relation to the author. It involves the reader entering into the realm of the "unsaid" or silence through bringing a similar pathos to the text. Nietzsche warns us not to confuse the self with thingness. This relates to Wittgenstein's argument for the existence of the metaphysical ego; one cannot view oneself as an object within one's own visual field, as one cannot step outside oneself (see footnote no.37, chapter one, section IV).

Nietzsche tries to overturn a theoretical approach to knowing reality and rather advocates an existential relation of participating within the whole as this is argued to be more fundamental. It is through the self rather than through abstract knowledge that one comes into correspondence with reality.. Nietzsche argues that philosophical *eros* or love for reality compels the philosopher “to think back to the self”<sup>94</sup> (UDH: §10) in order to create a higher self. However, this philosophical passion presupposes both a self-dissatisfaction and a love for the self in order to improve itself; therefore, the desire for self-knowledge involves both a self-rejection and a love for a higher self.<sup>95</sup> The cultivation of a higher self requires education in the form of ‘reading in blood’ (Z, I: ‘On Reading & Writing’) where the reader can sublimate painful experiences, or self-overcome, through reading in order that the self can improve itself. In the last section of the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals* (§8) Nietzsche refers to the type of reading as “rumination”, and he also mentions that it is removed from “modern man”. The last section of the preface is intimately connected with the first section where the importance of self-knowledge is outlined. This is the type of reading that enables the cultivation of the higher self; it is reading with one’s whole body and life where one participates within reality *as it is* or the whole. On the one hand, reading as rumination provides the conditions for attunement towards the whole

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<sup>94</sup> Alex McIntyre discusses the relationship between the love for something higher than the human, as philosophical *eros* or will to power and self-knowledge, that the *eros* or passion compels one to think back to the self (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p.79). The realization of a higher self can only occur if the philosophical type not only desires a higher self, but also experiences self-contempt, as this provides the stimulus or self-overcoming that enables its cultivation. This experience of both self-love and self-contempt is referred to as ‘loving contempt’ by McIntyre (*ibid.*); contempt for the all-too-human emerges from the desire for the higher than human realm, which in turn impels the desire for a higher self. This thesis will explore the concept of ‘loving contempt’ in the following chapter in relation to the idea of a redeemer (GM, II: §24), a “redeeming man of great love and contempt” whose isolation is “his absorption, immersion penetration *into* reality,” and who emerges once again and “brings home the *redemption* of this reality”. This redeemer out of love for higher reality overcomes the old ascetic ideal and the ensuing nihilism that came with its collapse.

<sup>95</sup> See McIntyre on the idea that philosophic passion (*eros*) or love for something higher than the human world presupposes both a self-dissatisfaction and a love for the self in order to improve itself (*ibid.*).

or leads to the *amor fati* moment, and on the other hand, reading as rumination or reading with one's whole body is reading as participation within the whole. This type of reading engages in the universal or the objective realm through engaging in the subjective or personal, the unconscious of the reader. Reading enables one to cultivate one's higher self and in turn encounter the whole or the 'more-than-human,'<sup>96</sup> through the discipline,<sup>97</sup> isolation and self-overcoming it provides.

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<sup>96</sup> This idea of the 'more-than-human' is explored by Michel Haar in his essay 'Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language' in terms of the type of man that can affirm life by encountering the universal. This idea has been aforementioned in chapter 2, and has been already noted by Alex McIntyre (*ibid.*, p.17).

<sup>97</sup> Thiele in his work "*Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*" examines Nietzsche's notion of the educator from a passage of *The Will to Power*, and notes the educator's role in disciplining his student in order that his soul be driven "toward the heights" (WP §512-513) Thiele cites the passage from *The Will to Power* as follows: "An educator never says what he himself thinks, but always only what he thinks of a thing in relation to the requirements of those he educates... He must be capable of employing every means of discipline: some he can drive toward the heights only with whips of scorn; others, who are sluggish, irresolute, cowardly, vain perhaps only with exaggerated praise. (WP 512-513)" (Cited in this form in Thiele, *Op.cit.*, p.170). He then compares this to Socrates of the *Republic*: "Like Socrates of the *Republic*, the educator stokes or dampens the passions of his disciples the better to pursue justice in the human soul." (*ibid.*, p.170) According to Thiele, there is an individualistic notion to education, which is "a consequence of the educator's need to reveal himself selectively, according to the needs of his students." (*ibid.*) This individualism in education entails that there is a "personalized form of discipline" (*ibid.*) He maintains that, according to Nietzsche,

Education, in effect, is a protracted discipline (BGE 92-94). It has little to do with the accumulation of knowledge and much to do with the learning of self-control. The understanding is that eventually the student will internalize the force of education, coming to discipline himself. He will, in effect, learn to be the master, or perhaps better said, the coordinator, of his instincts. (Cited in this form in Thiele, *ibid.*, p.171)

It is in this way that it is being argued in this thesis that Nietzsche looks at reading as a form of self-overcoming at the level of the drives or that reading has an impact on the drives. It is in this way that Nietzsche works on the drives of the reader; he works on them indirectly. Thiele claims that for Nietzsche, "the task of the educator, then, is to prune the instincts of his students, cutting some back in order that others might receive more light and nourishment." (*ibid.*) He summarizes what the main role of the educator is, for Nietzsche: "In sum, the educator trains his student in the art of arranging the soul, and training always involves authority and discipline." (*ibid.*) He expresses that for Nietzsche, education's main role is in ordering the soul or in terms of pursuing justice within it. In this thesis, education or 'reading in blood' is being argued to imply for Nietzsche that through this ordering of the soul entails that the soul is in turn enabled to encounter the whole or reality. He also argues that education, for Nietzsche is not to be viewed in terms of the accumulation of facts but as "the transmission of passion and will from teacher to student... what the teacher has to teach is simply not transmissible to a crowd. He is not a purveyor of knowledge, a talking book, but a purveyor of personality, a model of an ordered soul." (*ibid.*, p. 172) In referring to the third essay of the *Untimely Meditations* entitled *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Thiele examines what Nietzsche considers the teacher to be, the "revered object" that prompts the student to discover his own laws and ideals." (*ibid.*) He contends that for Nietzsche, "The educator is effectively a catalyst that allows the student to achieve the hierarchy of instinct that most enhances his power." (*ibid.*) He then cites the following passage from *Schopenhauer as Educator*, a passage already referred to in this chapter:



Nietzsche uses the metaphor of rumination in order to convey that reading is an activity that is analogous to “digestion” or “metabolization” or the creation of new forces at a bodily level. Reading takes the form of digestion or bodily self-transformation; one is transformed at an instinctual level through self-overcoming. Nietzsche associates the mind’s power to assimilate material with the power of digestion and, in drawing a comparison between mind and stomach, Zarathustra states that the mind works in the same way as a ‘digestive system.’ (Z, I: ‘On Old & New Tablets’: §16)

Nietzsche’s use of such metaphors as “digestion” and “metabolization” evoke the idea that the text can be a form of nutrition for the body. Nietzsche’s “life-texts” as embodiments of the philosophical *eros* of the will to power are to be “digested” by those readers capable of reaching the “heights” where they can have a transformative impact upon the body and can lay the ground for periods of health, growth and self-enhancement. Nietzsche’s texts can be internalised, transformed and metabolized into “thoughts,” where the soul *as* body takes in that which is most useful for the spirit or what the body requires for such enhancement or growth to take place:

The choice of nutrition; the choice of climate and place: the third point at which one must not commit a blunder at any price is the choice of *one’s kind of recreation*. Here, too, depending on the degree to which a spirit is *sui generis*, the limits of what is permitted to him, that is, profitable for him, are narrow, quite narrow... Reading is precisely my recreation from my own seriousness. (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §3)

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Your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be. Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true basic material of your being is, something in itself ineducable and in any case difficult of access, bound and paralyzed: your educators can only be your liberators (UM 129) (Cited in this form in Thiele, *ibid.*, p.172 )

Horst Hutter, in his work *Shaping the Future: Nietzsche's New Regime of the Soul and its Ascetic Practices*, notes that, for Nietzsche, "The act of reading is an act of interpretation in which a given "food," prepared by an other, a "friend," is taken in, transformed, and metabolized into "thoughts." It is a form of learning that changes us just as all other feeding does." (2006: 169) He also contends that for Nietzsche, the act of reading "belongs to a form of relaxation in which a spirit that is *sui generis* is allowed to take in only that which is useful for this spirit..." (*ibid.*) He claims that, for Nietzsche, reading is analogous to eating, "for eating is followed by a period of fullness and a period of digestion which then issues in excretion and the transformation of substances into agencies of maintenance and growth of "foods for other beings." (EH, 'Why I Am So Clever': §3, cited in this form in Hutter 2006: 169) In the chapter, 'Nutrition and the Casuistry of Selfishness', Hutter examines the virtues of Nietzsche's art of reading, one of which is that the art of reading must involve "an incorporation of appropriately nutritious substances into one's own being. Everything read has to be integrated and made one's own thinking in which the thought products of others sustain and increase one's own meditation. Reading that does not issue in thinking may actually be harmful and dangerous, if it is not merely useless."<sup>98</sup> (Hutter 2006: 169)

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<sup>98</sup> Hutter maintains that for Nietzsche it is serious reading that leads to thinking. Serious reading is reading that instils self-overcoming in Nietzsche's readers. It is in this way that for Nietzsche writing implies a responsibility to the future, as Hutter mentions the importance of the role of the author: "Someone wishing to become an author thereby indicates his wish to be an authority, a name-giver and a leader of souls." (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.109). Serious reading comes with the disciplined labour that goes into learning how to think: "Serious writing is done for serious readers who may learn to think by their efforts of exegesis, that is to say, to dance with concepts". (Z, I, 'On Reading & Writing'; TI, 'What the Germans Lack', cited in this form in Hutter, *Op. cit.*, p.109) Hutter explains that Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the dance to describe accomplished thinking (*ibid.*, p.110): Just as the seeming ease of professional dancing, the fluidity of movements—and their gravity—defying grace are the result of much hard labor and long enslavements to self-discipline, so the freedom of graceful thinking results from the similar enslavements to the discipline of learning it as a craft." (*ibid.*) Hutter reiterates that Nietzsche's responsibility to the future is in his ability to teach his readers "the dangerous ability of how to think." (*ibid.*) This ability to teach readers how to think ensures the "avoidance of what is aptly

The form of spiritual nutrition that Nietzsche discusses, reading as rumination, has many implications on how he wishes that his books be read. He advocates the art of *slow* reading, and asserts that it is only within the slow reader that self-transformation can take place. In the Preface to *Daybreak*, he mentions that the tempo of his writing is at a slow rate, as he wishes to obviate those modern readers who read large quantities of books at rapid speed, which has led to inadequate bodily growth or transformation.<sup>99</sup> Nietzsche recommends an art of exegesis that teaches “slow reading”:

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dubbed logorrhoea, that is to say, the rather mindless production of great quantities of “texts” whose authors frequently are celebrated as culture cardinals on the basis of the number of pages involved. The larger the number of pages, the scantier often appears to be their mental content. No struggle, no effort of thinking seems to be involved in so many of modern books, especially academic ones.” (*ibid.*) Hutter maintains that Nietzsche “counters the tendency to this kind of literature, prevalent already in his lifetime, by using his writings to express his efforts at self-struggle.” (*ibid.*) In this thesis, it is being argued that Nietzsche’s role as a writer and prophet is to initiate struggles of self-overcoming in his free-spirited readers. He wishes to assist in the formation or development of his readers’ soul and in turn to prepare those select readers for the initiation of the millennial Kingdom or the “Zarathustra Kingdom of a thousand Years” (Z, IV: ‘The Honey Sacrifice’) See Robert Wiley, *The Bible and Christian Traditions: Keys to Understanding the Allegorical Subplot of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra*, for a comparison of Nietzsche’s idea of the Zarathustra Kingdom to the Millennial Kingdom of the *Book of Revelation* (New York, P. Lang, 1990, p. 302).

<sup>99</sup> Hutter also notes that reading at speed is characteristic of modern readers, readers who read fast as to read more (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.170). It is in this way that these readers “tend to read with less understanding and also think less profoundly and become ever more superficial. They are able to chatter about many things, pretend “knowledge” about things of which they do not even grasp shadows.” (*ibid.*) In this thesis it is being argued that this type of superficial reading does not involve reflecting upon the “truly *great* problems and question marks” (GS: §373), or it does not wish to come close to grasping reality *as it is*. Slow reading takes into account the author’s intention; it involves the task of becoming wholeheartedly engaged in understanding his writings and then having to apply them to oneself (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.110). Reading must be slow as to accommodate reflection upon one’s own life experiences, prior to bringing them to the text. Hutter argues that reading at speed that is prevalent in the modern academic world results in the “production of ever larger numbers of books and articles, with judgements of quality based entirely on criteria of quantity of materials read and written.”; and in the “production of vast amounts of culture barf” they are “the results of logorrhoea which are presented for the consumption at ever lower levels of redigestibility.” (*ibid.*, p.170) Hutter also notes the affects that reading at speed has on the body:

It is as if people were exhorted to eat ever larger amounts of foods at ever increasing speeds, resulting in ever larger and more rapidly accumulating amounts of excretions. The result is, indeed, serious mental and spiritual intellectual entrails, which seem to measure the current trends to obesity and the functional malnutrition observable among people of plenty. And all of it is called “higher education.” (*ibid.*)

Nowadays it is not only my habit, it is also to my taste—a malicious taste, perhaps?—no longer to write anything which does not reduce to despair every sort of man who is ‘in a hurry’. For philology is that venerable art which demands of its votaries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, to become still, to become slow—it is a goldsmith’s art and connoisseurship of the word which has nothing but delicate, cautious work to do and achieves nothing if it does not achieve it *lento*. But for precisely this reason it is more necessary than ever today, by precisely this means does it entice and enchant us the most, in the midst of an age of ‘work’, that is to say, of hurry, of indecent and perspiring haste, which wants to ‘get everything done’ at once, including every old and new book:—this art does not so easily get anything done, it teaches to read *well*, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers... My patient friends, this book desires for itself only perfect readers and philologists: *learn* to read well!— (Daybreak, Pref.: §5)

Reading as “rumination” or as “digestion” does not necessarily imply making the text one’s own, in terms of breaking it down into one’s own liking. It rather includes the art of exegesis where reading ruminatively involves making an effort to focus on what the author’s intention may be or what is being said by the text.<sup>100</sup> This type of reading requires intense mental focus on the text, which in turn has an impact on the body. It is this impact on the body that is reading as rumination. However, it is only in the context of focusing on the author’s intention that rumination takes place. For Nietzsche, right reading must include the art of exegesis or the attempt to grasp the author’s intention or to take the metaphysical independence of both author and text

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<sup>100</sup> Hutter reveals that Nietzsche has mistakenly been related to the denial of authorial meaning and as a result he has become “a legitimating voice for “creative misreading” where a “critic asks neither the author nor the text about their intentions but simply beats the text into a shape that will serve his purpose. He does this by imposing a “grid,” in Foucault’s terminology, ““on the text which may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author.”” (*ibid.*, p. 171) Hutter also makes the point that Foucault’s own use of “grids” “always remained faithful to the meanings inherent in these texts, only stretching them so as legitimately to incorporate his own times and experiences. These grids thus remained entirely within the parameters and strictures of a Nietzschean exegesis.” (*ibid.*) He claims that for Nietzsche that “creative misreading” has resulted from “modern culture” and is “proof of a serious decline in the art of reading that Nietzsche would be the author invoked as an authority for a manner of “reading” a text that denies the very existence of any authorial intention.” (*ibid.*) He contends that this “creative misreading” is part of the postmodern trend, and acknowledges Nietzsche’s own words on this issue: ““The worst readers are those who proceed like plundering: they take things out for themselves which they can use, dirty, and confuse the text and bewitch the whole.”” (Assorted Opinions & Maxims: §137 cited in this form in Hutter, *ibid.*, p.172) He claims that these “methods of interpretation” are far removed from “any serious exegesis which always honours the work as a whole, tries to understand it as well as the author’s intent, and only then applies the meaning thus gained to the different life circumstances of the reader.” (*ibid.*)

into account. It is this attempt that requires exhaustive efforts all of which have an impact on the reader's unconscious.

An Aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been “deciphered” when it has been simply read; rather, one has then to begin its *exegesis*, for which is required an art of exegesis. To be sure, one thing is necessary above all if one is to practice reading as an *art* in this way, something that has been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays—and therefore it will be some time before my writings are “readable”—something for which one has almost to be a cow and in any case *not* a “modern man”: *rumination*. (GM, Preface: §8)

Hutter (2006) argues that, for Nietzsche, the art of exegesis must take into account the intention of the author and in doing so, the reader must move between two poles:

In exegesis a text is made one's own and becomes a permanent property of one's own being. Exegesis moves between two poles: on the one hand, what an author intends to say has to be grasped as closely as possible. It may be impossible ever to approximate the intention of an author, but if the effort is not made, then it would seem unnecessary to read anything at all. A written text is a form of communication across an expanse of time in which the writer is the (silent) “friend” and the reader his partner in dialogue. The other pole of exegesis requires that the intention of the author, once grasped (with due allowance being made for the elusiveness of all texts), be brought into context with the object of the text as it is filtered through the experience of the reader. (Hutter 2006: 170-171)

Hutter suggests that the reader must take into account the truth validity of the text or its relation to reality: (2006: 171)

The art of reading must begin with focusing on the written word; the reader must focus on the written word or on what is being said by the author in order that the author's intention can be grasped.<sup>101</sup> It is in the process of grasping the meaning of the

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<sup>101</sup> In this thesis, it is being argued that the meaning of Nietzsche's works lie in his *ipsissimosity* (HH, II: Preface, §1), his higher unconscious self, and pathos and in turn in their relation to reality. It does not lie ‘in’ in the words of his works. Hutter holds a similar contention; however, he argues that the reader must begin to focus on the written word with the intention of grasping the meaning of his works, and this mental focus instigates creative acts of self-shaping. These acts lead to the development of the reader's higher self through the “Great reason of the Body”, and in turn educate or discipline the reader to the whole or reality (untimely). The reader in self-overcoming at an unconscious level is

text that one must concentrate and focus on what is being said. However, the reader must also mentally focus on the impact the text has on his unconscious. Reading ruminatively “forces a concentration and a focusing of the conscious mind on both what is being said and the impact of what is said on oneself via a selective judgement about its validity.” (Hutter 2006: 171)<sup>102</sup> It is in this way that good reading is slow; for Nietzsche, the art of reading like a cow that is ruminatively involves reading “slowly, deeply, looking backwards and forwards with afterthoughts and doors left open, with tender fingers and eyes.” (D, Preface: §5, cited in this form in Hutter 2006: 171) Hutter claims that reading in this manner “irrespective of which profound text is being read, is as such already a spiritual exercise.” (*ibid.*) The reader who examines the

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experiencing an untimely relation to an author. In bringing a similar pathos to Nietzsche’s works, he in turn relates to Nietzsche at the most truthful level.

On the one hand, philosophical reading requires grasping the objective meaning of the text, which in this thesis is being argued to be Nietzsche’s *ipsissimosity*; the meaning of his works lies in his ‘blood’ or pathos. On the other hand, philosophical reading, for Nietzsche enables the reader to return to his self, and to encounter reality *as it is* in the moment of *amor fati* where Becoming reveals *itself*. This type of reading as a discipline is a form of self-overcoming; it enables the reader to form a new self. This discipline has an impact on the unconscious. It is through the transcendental mind that the reader focuses upon the impact the text has on his unconscious, which will be discussed next in this section; it is a mode of consciousness that is reflective upon itself, the self-reflective ego. (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.173) It is referred to by Hutter as the reading self or the writing self. This is another aspect to the higher self; it is a principle of philosophical thinking that enables self-knowledge to take place. It is a new ‘metaphysical’ ego that is non-solipsistic and that cannot be viewed in terms of substance, or Descartes’ *cogito*. At a subjective level, in terms of the reader’s self-overcoming through reading and then focusing upon its impact on the unconscious, Nietzsche as an author is concealed. Nietzsche reveals himself as an author in his ‘ipsissimosity’ or in his inmost being, his tragic pathos that is the meaning of his works. It is then in bringing a similar pathos to the text that the reader enters into the most fundamental relation with him as an author. It is for this reason that there are moments of revealing (indigestion) and concealing (digestion) when it comes to reading Nietzsche as an author.

<sup>102</sup> Hutter elaborates on the notion of self-overcoming through mental focus in chapter four of his work entitled ‘Writing the Future/Reading the Self’; he states that in the process of fully understanding Nietzsche, the reader undergoes a series of inner struggles. He also claims that because Nietzsche “eschews a *technical* philosophical vocabulary and uses different modes of describing the same or similar phenomena, reading him requires the utmost concentration and a constant mental attention, not to the words used, but to the phenomena designated by the words.” (*ibid.*, p.110) It is in this way that according to Hutter, Nietzsche “transmits the labor of mental concentration that has gone into his art of writing to his readers.” (*ibid.*) Hutter asserts that Nietzsche’s affinity with his readers and his ability to make them work hard is reminiscent of Plato: “Of both Nietzsche and Plato it may be said that their writings are extremely difficult to access, and deliberately so. Both aim to shape their readers by making them work hard, requiring intensive mental focus as well as attention and memory and thereby inducing processes of self-transformation in their readers’ souls.” (*ibid.*, p.112) Hutter claims that neither Plato nor Nietzsche wishes to impart doctrines, and as a result “they do next to nothing for their readers.” (*ibid.*)

impact a text has on his unconscious sharpens his mental focus, and in turn, it strengthens and nourishes the transcendental mind of the reader.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Hutter outlines elsewhere the reason why, for Nietzsche, the reader must strengthen his transcendental mind. The reader must do so in order to get in touch with the “Great reason of the Body,” and in turn one’s “life-task”. Hutter discusses that Nietzsche requires of his readers “to pay attention to the very important notion of the “life-task” that dwells unconsciously in each individual body and that needs to be awakened for someone to become who he or she is.” (Hutter, H., *ibid.*, p.135) He mentions the consequences, according to Nietzsche, of failing to recognize one’s life-task: “Failure to become aware of this life-task is a failure to achieve the place allotted to an individual by his fate. This life task need not be equally lofty or grand for everyone, as it was for Nietzsche, but missing it is missing one’s highest joy.” (*ibid.*) This life-task is also viewed in terms of the “organizing idea” that is in the depths of the reader. (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §9) According to Nietzsche, this idea that grows in the depths cannot be consciously willed: “It is given to each individual as a deep potentiality that may be missed” (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.135) In *Ecce Homo*, he claims that his task guided him unconsciously before revealing itself: “My memory lacks any kind of awareness of struggling; of “waiting,” of “striving,” envisioning a ‘wish’—all of these I do not know from experience.” (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §9, cited in this form in Hutter, *ibid.*, p.135-136) Nietzsche did not force himself into anything but just let himself be, or let his unconscious task eventually come to reveal itself. (*ibid.*, p.136) According to Hutter, Nietzsche views conscious thinking as “only a small and fragmentary portion of the whole of mentations by which the body conquers its future”, and is to be contrasted with the unconscious. (*ibid.*, p.134) The intelligence ruling the whole of the human being is vastly superior to conscious thinking; it is what Nietzsche refers to as the “Great Reason of the Body.” He maintains that Nietzsche wishes for the reader to understand his unconscious and to get in touch with the great reason of the body. This can only be done indirectly through examining the mood patterns of the body, as they are a manifestation of unconscious activity, and an examination of them gives us indirect insight into the unconscious: “Moods and feelings are hence prime parts of the text of our bodies that we need to read. Pleasure and displeasure indicate growth and diminution of power, respectively.” (*ibid.*) It is important to get in touch with the great reason of the body, as one may miss one’s task or one’s guiding principle. It is for this reason Nietzsche maintains that the reader should examine one’s life, its patterns and cycles and in doing so, one may discover this organizing “idea”. Also through autobiographical thinking or writing the self, where the writer views his writings as an expression of his unconscious, he can indirectly gain insight into his unconscious. Hutter maintains that the aim of Nietzschean askesis or of a spiritual working on oneself is to “harmonize our conscious willing with our unconsciously guiding “idea in the depths.”” (*ibid.*, p.136) This is to be carried out through “chosen solitudes, cultivation of enmity-friendships, nutritional care, and using reading and writings as ways to write oneself” and in doing so “we strive to harmonize our “minds” with our “bodies.”” (*ibid.*) Hutter refers to the mind that examines the unconscious indirectly as the transcendental mind. He ascertains that in examining the unconscious indirectly that it is a form of self-awareness and self-reflection. It is through this type of self-reflection that the human mind acquires a transcendental cast. It is similar to Husserl’s idea of the Epoche, the horizon from which self-reflection is carried out by the transcendental ego, where the unconscious is only attainable through interpretation or translation. The transcendental ego or self-reflective ego is a mode of consciousness that reflects upon itself. It is through the transcendental mind being sharpened in its focus that it ensures that one may not miss one’s “life task”. The transcendental mind or self-reflective ego that reads the self or focuses upon the impact reading has on the self is expressive of the link Nietzsche emphasizes between self-knowledge and reading (GM, Preface: §1). In getting in touch with one’s life-task, through the transcendental mind that one in turn acquires self-knowledge. The self that *knows* in this sense is not the self as object, but rather the metaphysical self that cannot be referred to as an object (the self cannot be viewed within its own visual field); it is in this way that self-knowledge is not knowledge of an object. Wright in her work entitled *The Philosopher’s “I”: Autobiography and the Search for the Self* notes that when it comes to obeying the Delphic oracle ‘Know thyself,’ the self cannot be referred to as an object. (Wright, J.L., New York, State University of New York Press, 2006, p.28 She draws a distinction between the rhetorical self, the self as referent of particular statements, and the ontological self or inner self, the self as active creator of one’s statements. (*ibid.*, p.5) The ontological self is the writing self and the rhetorical self is the author-subject both coincide to form a higher form of self-unification. (*ibid.*, p.28)

Right reading, for Nietzsche, not only requires grasping the author's intention, it also, at a subjective level, involves the development of the reader's higher self. The art of exegesis involves the aphorism having an impact on the unconscious of the reader, and in turn, it enables the development of a higher self through the "Great Reason" of the body. (Z, I: 'On the Despisers of the Body') The art of exegesis not only requires that the reader grasp the meaning of the text but also that he focus upon the impact it has on his unconscious. Reading, for Nietzsche, makes possible the formation of a new self through enabling the reader to overcome his Christian self; it enables the development of a higher self, one that can be attuned to reality. The aphorism plays an important role in instigating a series of thoughts in the reader, and in turn in forming a new self for the reader. Hutter notes that the genre chosen by Nietzsche for expressing his philosophy, the aphorism, "is a form of writing peculiarly designed to initiate sequences of thinking in its readers." (2006: 139) On the one hand, the reader self-overcomes through the discipline of reading; on the other hand, Nietzsche's writings themselves enable the reader to overcome through changing his ways of thinking. It is in this way that reading as rumination, or "reading in blood" (Z, I: §7) is a form of asceticism, a true asceticism, a higher spirituality that enables the reader to encounter the whole. Nietzsche's ideal readers, the select few are "tall and lofty" in stature with a philosophical *eros* or desire for the highest things or the 'more-than-human'; their reading requires leaps, strength, and self-overcoming: "In the mountains the shortest way is from peak to peak: but for that one must have long legs. Aphorisms should be peaks—and those who are addressed tall and lofty." (Z, I: §7) He writes elsewhere, "In the mountains of truth you will never climb in vain: either you will get up higher



today or you will exercise your strength so as to be able to get up higher tomorrow.”

(HH, II: §358)

The aphorism, for Nietzsche, is open-ended to the future and needs to be completed in the acts of reading, and in this way the reader has to finish “writing” the aphorism<sup>104</sup>

(Hutter 2006: 139). The first step to “writing” the aphorism is undoing one’s Christian self:

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<sup>104</sup> Hutter explains how Nietzsche can enable his readers to self-create as his works are “open-ended to the future”; they aim to create. It is for this reason that Nietzsche’s works are non-dogmatic and do not withhold doctrines. Hutter also notes that Plato’s writings are also non-dogmatic, and open-ended: “Plato’s writings seem like invitations to his readers to create for themselves “invisible cities” in their souls” (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.116) Hutter earlier notes that there is a distinction to be drawn between Plato and Platonisms, the latter adopted Plato to their own liking such as in the case of the Christian Platonists, and hence rendered Plato a dogmatic. (*ibid.*) As Nietzsche’s writings are open-ended to the future, “his manner of writing is hence oriented entirely to being the founding legislator of the invisible cities of the souls of free-spirits who venture to freely create themselves in experimental modes of living.” (*ibid.*, p.125) It is due to the open-endedness of his works, that they “require readers who “write” themselves in their acts reading” (*ibid.*) It also implies that they are in a way “unfinished and cannot be finished in mere acts of reading and new writing, no matter how profound and philological. They can only be completed in acts of creative living, to which reading and writing are necessary stimuli.” (*ibid.*) It is in this way that Nietzsche’s readers must “finish” his writings in their creative efforts of self-shaping. In “finishing” his writing, and creating a higher self, the reader in turn relates to truth.

Hutter notes a similarity between Nietzsche and Plato on matters of self-fashioning through reading philosophical texts. He expresses that Plato is the only thinker before Nietzsche to have “thought and wrote with comparable intensity and lucidity about the philosophical significance of the literary form chosen to express and transmit a form of self-fashioning and moulding of cities of the soul.” (*ibid.*) He claims that Plato’s dialogues are also open-ended to the future and do not aim to transmit “true” doctrines. (*ibid.*) They rather involve the creation of “truths” in acts of creative and philosophical reading, each of which results in a Platonism of the soul that shapes a way of living” (*ibid.*, p.126) Similar to Nietzsche, Plato’s dialogues are addressed to the few who in turn inspire the many to acts of self-shaping. (*ibid.*) According to Hutter, Nietzsche has chosen a particular mode of writing that is open-ended to the future and hence instigates self-shaping in his readers. It is “writing in blood” or writing in aphorisms. (*ibid.*) The aphorism of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is also a replacement for the Platonic dialogues and Christian Gospels; it is what Hutter refers to as a “new gospel” or “fifth gospel” (*ibid.*)

Hutter also notes that there are many distinctions between Plato and Nietzsche, one of which is in their style of writing: “One absolutely striking difference between Plato’s and Nietzsche’s styles of writings is that Plato’s dialogues are completely impersonal, whereas Nietzsche’s aphorisms are entirely personal.” (*ibid.*, p.126) In referring to the preface of *Human, All Too Human II*, Hutter writes that “Nietzsche in his aphoristic writings is present everywhere; they begin in his life, write of his ways of life that have been overcome, and always point to himself, to his “ipsissimosity.”” (*ibid.*) Hutter also explains that in spite of the very personal nature of Nietzsche’s aphoristic style, his writings are still open-ended to the future, they aim to create. “Nietzsche’s aphoristic writings thus reflect his movements away from his innermost self (ego ipsissimus) toward his innermost self (ego ipsissimum).” (*ibid.*) His writings reflect a movement away from writing for himself, his very own self to writing for others; they are in this way impersonal.

An attentive reader is led by the aphorism first to deconstruct the habits and ways of thinking established in the soul in the form of the culturally transmitted center of thinking, the *logistikon*. All heirs of Christian and Platonic culture have a more or less strongly developed, automatically functioning *logistikon*. Nietzsche partially conceives his task to lie in providing the impetus to undo these habits of thinking which, it must be remembered, are also habits of valuation. The undoing of one's *logistikon* at least partially, is the first step taken by an attentive reader in finishing the writing of an aphorism. (Hutter 2006: 139)

The aphorism, for Nietzsche is designed to “effect changes,” to instigate change in the reader: “Aphorisms are thus almost irresistible temptations to change oneself and one's habits of mind and heart.” (Hutter 2006: 140) It only instils change in those select few who can undertake the arduous challenge of reading the aphorism, and of subsequently undoing oneself. It in this way requires excess time and otium. In the preface to *Human, All Too Human*, I (§8), Nietzsche speaks of the demands the book puts on the reader: “It demands too much! It is addressed to human beings without the pressure of rough duties, it demands refined and sophisticated sensibilities, it needs superfluity, excess time, brightness of heart and heaven, otium in the most daring sense—all good things which we Germans today do not have and hence cannot give.” (HH, I: §8 cited in this form in Hutter 2006: 140) Hutter mentions that the excess time required to rewrite oneself is reiterated by Nietzsche when he demonstrates how the aphorism prefixed to the third essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals* requires the entire third essay for its interpretation.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Hutter seems to be claiming that aphorisms, for Nietzsche, require exhaustive interpretation such that the reader self-overcomes through reading them. Then he goes on to state that Nietzsche himself is doing a written interpretation of an aphorism, which is prefixed to the third book of *On the Genealogy of Morals*. This is Nietzsche offering us an example of what is actually involved in interpreting an aphorism. Nietzsche suggests at the end of the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals* that the third essay of the book is a lesson in reading. He tells the reader that he is offering an “example” of what he regards as “exegesis,” an aphorism is prefixed to the third essay, “the essay itself is a commentary on it.” (GM, Preface: §8) The essay itself is entitled ‘What Is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?’, and the aphorism to which Nietzsche is referring to is as follows: “Unconcerned, mocking, violent—thus wisdom wants us: she is a woman and always loves only a warrior.” It is from a section entitled ‘On Reading & Writing’ of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. He mentions that he is offering an example in the same passage where he discusses the “art of exegesis”: “An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been “deciphered” when it has been simply read; rather, one has then to begin its *exegesis*, for which is required an art of exegesis.” Hutter seems to look at the third essay as an example that is offered by

The second stage in a reader's completion of the aphorism lies in the formation of a new self: Nietzsche as educator appeals to the inner voice of the reader, to the "idea" at work in his depths or his unconscious; he wishes to enable the reader to realize his "life-task." (EH, 'Why I Am So Clever': §9) Nietzsche offers us the metaphor of "wounding"<sup>106</sup> in a passage entitled 'On Reading & Writing' of *Thus Spoke*

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Nietzsche that shows the level of interpretation required to interpret an aphorism. Hutter does not discuss the aphorism itself directly, which itself happens to be about reading and writing. Many commentators have examined the relationship between the aphorism and the essay, and what it tells us about the art of exegesis. See Jill Marsden '*Nietzsche and the art of aphorism*', In: A Companion to Nietzsche, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006, 22-37 and John T. Wilcox, '*What Aphorism Does Nietzsche Explicate in Genealogy of Morals, essay III?*', Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 35, no.4, Oct 1997, pp. 593-610). Their concern is with whether or not the essay is an interpretation of the aphorism; Marsden argues that it is an interpretation of the aphorism whereas Wilcox argues the contrary. Hutter seems to look at the third essay as a written commentary of the aphorism. The exhaustive levels of interpretation lead to creative acts of self-fashioning, and the development of a higher self, which is a necessary part of the art of exegesis.

The third essay as a written commentary on the aphorism does offer us insight into the aphorism, which itself is about reading and writing. It is an aphorism that expresses the nature of aphorisms themselves, as it expresses their wounding nature. The reader must be a warrior who can endure the spiritual wounding that Nietzsche instils in reading him; the reader as warrior is then, therefore enabled to overcome the old ascetic ideal. Nietzsche's use of the aphoristic style of language "works" upon the unconscious of the reader, and in turn, it enables the reader to overcome old values or ways of thinking. The reader also is a warrior in overcoming through the discipline of reading itself. It is in this way that "reading in blood" is a true asceticism, according to Nietzsche, as it enables the reader to overcome his life-denying values and affirm his life in *amor fati*. The reader who is a warrior then loves wisdom, as reading can attune him to the most truthful relation to reality through the development of his essential self. The distinction between the two types of asceticism is mentioned in the second essay, and is explored further in the third essay. In the third essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, the asceticism of the warrior noble is referred to as "self-discipline," "self-surveillance," and "self-overcoming." (GM, III: §16) The asceticism of the warrior noble relates to mastering the expression of the instincts, through their intelligence or the "Great Reason of the Body," which in turn enables the higher, essential self to encounter reality as it is. On the one hand, as Hutter states aphorisms are to be written about, as the third essay is a written commentary of the aphorism prefixed to the essay. The exhaustive process can indirectly have an impact on the reader's unconscious. On the other hand, aphorisms have a 'direct' impact on the reader's unconscious, as they overturn a reader's ways of thinking.

<sup>106</sup> Walter Kaufmann, in his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, also notes the metaphorical use of the word 'warrior' or 'war'. He does so in examining a different passage from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* entitled "On War and Warriors". He claims that Nietzsche's use of the word must be viewed in metaphorical terms and that "Nietzsche is not speaking of soldiers" (Kaufmann, W., *Op. cit.*, p.386). Kaufmann declares that a more literal interpretation has led to fascist interpretations of Nietzsche, which is false: "Nietzsche, however, is surely not speaking of "war" in the literal sense any more than he is speaking of soldiers. It is the quest for Knowledge that he discusses, and he evidently believes that it need not be an entirely private affair: it can be a contest, as it was in Socrates' day; and the goal might be truth rather than winning an argument." (*ibid.*) Kaufmann in this way suggests that the warrior is the person who is a seeker of knowledge, as the passage from "On Reading & Writing" suggests, he is a lover of wisdom. This wisdom lies in the existential experience of *amor fati* or in relating to reality at the most fundamental level. The warrior or noble reader of Nietzsche can engage through reading in a personal *agon* or an internal struggle, in overcoming old values and forming a new

*Zarathustra*, a metaphor that stands for the pain that comes with self-overcoming through “reading and writing in blood”. Hutter reiterates the wounding nature of reading Nietzsche as follows:

Nietzsche at work on oneself involves frequently a wounding as well as a being delighted, as he himself is very much aware. The wounding comes from losing old habits of the mind and the heart which, even though they were based on lies and illusions, nevertheless were lies to which one may have become fondly attached. In this way, wrong habits of mind, soul, and body, established in us for centuries, may be, as it were, forms of badness that no longer appear as bad because of their antiquity and because of human flexibility. (Hutter 2006: 141)

However, this wounding is a necessary prerequisite to the joy of creating a new self, of coming to realize one’s inner life-task:

If the wounding leaves a reader on the road to convalescence, delight arises at the experience of freedom, once one’s inner guiding spirit shows the way to a new way of life. The gradual unveiling of one’s “idea in the depths” then may lead to the ability to freely use the material provided by Nietzsche for the construction of a new *logistikon*. This would be each reader’s own and “inimitable song of necessity.” (*ibid.*)

Reading, as a form of therapy or spiritual working on oneself, enables the reader to identify a disease within his soul and initiate its overcoming by which self-transformation through the text can take place. In the Preface to *Assorted Opinions & Maxims*, Nietzsche refers to the therapeutic nature of the book; he refers to it as a “sharp-pointed and ticklish work” where his most painful experiences are impaled with the “point of a needle” into the reader “where a certain amount of blood occasionally flows.” (HH, II, Preface: §2) Nietzsche himself refers to “*Assorted*

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self. This idea of a spiritual *agon* can occur between both author and reader, as Nietzsche’s aphorisms can be said to “wound” its reader. It is in this way that Nietzsche indirectly works on the unconscious of the reader. The wounding occurs in overcoming old habits of thought. In *Twilight of the Idols*, in a passage entitled ‘Morality as Anti-Nature’ Nietzsche discusses “the spiritualization of *hostility*”, that “it consists in a profound appreciation of the value of having enemies” and he also expresses the value and “fruitfulness” of the ““internal enemy.”” (TI, V: §3)

*Opinions and Maxims*” and “*The Wanderer and his Shadow*” as “a continuation and redoubling of a spiritual cure, namely of the *anti-romantic* self-treatment that my still healthy instinct had itself discovered and prescribed for me against a temporary attack of the most dangerous form of romanticism.” (*ibid.*) He also in the Preface to *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* refers to the various aphorisms of the book as “precepts of health that may be recommended to the more spiritual natures of the generation just coming up as a disciplina voluntis [discipline of the will].” (HH, vol. II, Pref.: §2) Nietzsche speaks of that reader who calls a book “harmful” or “dangerous” that “perhaps one day he will admit to himself that this same book has done him a great service by bringing out the hidden sickness of his heart and making it visible.—” (HH, vol. II, ‘Assorted Opinions & Maxims’: §58) This point is clearly expressed by Danto (1986: 5) when he suggests that for Nietzsche, the aphorism “attacks” a reader in cutting into the reader’s soul, such that the reader can dispense with his diseased self, the self that encompasses the ascetic ideal. Danto (1986: 4) states that the language of the aphorism is “used in a way as to bypass the faculties used ordinarily in reading”. Danto maintains, while quoting Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morals*, that the aphorism for Nietzsche “when properly stamped and molded, has not been ‘deciphered’ when it has simply been read.” (Danto 1986: 4, citing GM, preface: §8) The aphorism “implants” itself in the reader, and it transforms the reader “into a different type of person—the sort of person the philosopher requires the reader to be if the philosophy is to reach him. So we have to realize that in reading Nietzsche we are being attacked...” (Danto 1986: 5) This “wounding” leads the reader to form a new self, whereby the reader becomes aware of his “life-task”, a task that originally grew in the unconscious of the reader.

The act of overcoming through reading is represented by the reader experiencing pain through the lodgement of aphorisms, and in turn overcoming the ascetic ideal. This reiterates the therapeutic nature of reading Nietzsche's works whereby the reader can overcome a disease, which is the ascetic ideal in his case. The therapeutic force of aphorisms as noble pieces of writing or peaks, as the embodiment of noble thought, which are above "the cloud" of "blackness and gravity" (Z, I: 'On Reading & Writing') can be experienced by the philosophical type. Those who "digest" or metabolize the aphorisms can transcend the ascetic ideal or the "spirit of gravity" and raise their souls to noble forms of laughter and dancing. Zarathustra himself believes only in a god who dances: "Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now a god dances through me." (Z, I: 'On Reading & Writing') Nietzsche speaks out against those who "chew and digest everything"; he acclaims those who have selective tastes with "choosy tongues and stomachs, which have learned to say "I" and "yes" and "no". (Z, III, 'On the Spirit of Gravity': §2) These higher types of human being are selective in the choice of material that they read. The clouds become "tragic plays and tragic seriousness" (Z, I: 'On Reading & Writing'); however, those who are elevated to nobility and see from above are able to laugh a laughter which destroys the "spirit of gravity": "Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. Come, let us kill the spirit of gravity!" (*ibid.*) This elevation to nobility consists of a love for 'the more-than-human', of philosophical truth, the desire for something higher than the human world.<sup>107</sup> Love of "the highest things" or philosophical *eros*, for Nietzsche, is

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<sup>107</sup> According to Lampert, those addressed in the passage entitled "On Reading & Writing" (Z, I) are "taught to harden their hearts against what lies beneath them" (Lampert, L., *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, London, Yale University Press, 1986, p.44) In his notes, he mentions that the achievement of this state can also be noted in the Bible (see Ps. 95:8, Matt. 19:8; Mark 10:5; 16:14; Heb. 3:8) (*ibid.* p.318). He maintains that in order to reach what is higher those who Nietzsche addresses must be pitiless: "In refusing to look down, in looking only upward to what is higher, Zarathustra's followers are to become fearless and to feel themselves exempt from what befalls others" (*ibid.* p.45) Through the process of "reading in blood", the reader can experience 'spiritual wounding', as the author lodges the aphorisms in his heart. He asserts that for Nietzsche, aphorisms are

the medium of self-elevation to nobility, or is the means to self-knowledge, a view which emphasizes the role love plays in philosophical education.<sup>108</sup> Through reading Nietzsche, the reader comes to realize his higher self or his “organizing idea” in the depths (EH, ‘Why I Am So Clever’: §9), and comes to realize that his goal is “to

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aimed at those “fit by nature for the spiritual warfare to which Zarathustra attracts” they are aimed at the “proper readers”, the “worthy few” (*ibid.*)

Lampert notes that Nietzsche’s art of writing is similar to Plato’s writing in that it is not for the common, “the literary form of aphorism, avoids what is shameful in writing and what corrupts spirit by turning it into something common... just as Platonic writing modelled on Socratic speaking plants its seeds ... only in carefully prepared ground. (*ibid.*, p.46) In his notes, he mentions the passages of the *Phaedrus* 258d, 273d, 274b-278b, which reiterate this point. (*ibid.*, p.318) He also states that there are other remarkable similarities between chapters ‘On Reading & Writing,’ ‘On the Tree on the Mountainside” (Z, I: §7, §8) and the *Phaedrus*. Lampert informs us of Socrates’ conversation in the *Phaedrus* with one young man, which takes place under a very tall tree outside the city and concerns what moves one beyond the city. The aim of the conversation is for Socrates to draw the young man “away from a passion that holds him down.” (*ibid.*, p.318) They rather “speak of love, the passion that leads the soul upward” (*ibid.*), whereby the soul flies with divine madness, the gift of Dionysus, the dancing god, “the god of purifications who releases the dancer from what weighs him down by dancing through him.” (*ibid.*) McIntyre also draws upon this similarity between Plato and Nietzsche in terms of what Nietzsche refers to as ‘loving contempt,’ a contempt for the city or the human realm and love for the ‘more-than-human’: “...‘loving contempt’ constitutes the fundamental experience of the philosopher-statesman, for both Nietzsche and Plato: the principle of ascent—contempt for the city and love for the higher-than-human things—eventually becomes the principle of descent whereby the philosopher (and his play of creation) brings a higher order down to the human world; his contempt for man is the condition of his love and creativity.” (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, p.92)

<sup>108</sup> McIntyre explores in great detail this notion of *eros* or “the love for something higher than the human world”, and claims that for both Plato and Nietzsche that this mysterious force is at the heart of philosophy. (*ibid.*, p.78) He examines the link between the desire for self-knowledge and love of the more than human: “The essential manifestation of the erotic lies in the passion for the higher things, which compels him to think back to himself (cf. UDH, 10)” (Cited in this form in McIntyre, *ibid.*, p.79) To think back to the self, or the desire for self-knowledge is thus to think and cultivate a higher self, to create beyond oneself (*ibid.*) It is the nature of the self to create beyond itself or self-overcome because it is driven by the will to power, the erotic passion of life to transcend itself. McIntyre notes that this self-overcoming is not only the nature of the self but also of culture. He then cites a passage from *Schopenhauer as Educator* (§6), which not only highlights that self-overcoming is the nature of culture, the common life of all human beings but that love of the higher than human is behind the desire for a higher self:

By coming to this resolve he places himself within the circle of *culture*; for culture is the child of each individual’s self-knowledge and dissatisfaction with himself. Anyone who believes in culture is thereby saying: ‘I see above me something higher and more human than I am;...’ It is hard to create in anyone this condition of intrepid self-knowledge because it is impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow on the soul, not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet still concealed from it. (SE, 6) (Cited in this form in McIntyre, *ibid.*, p.79)

It is erotic power of the noble soul that enables him to ‘build beyond himself’, and in turn to elevate himself toward Nature or the experience of joy in the actual.

become a necessary chain of rings of culture and from this necessity to recognize the necessity inherent in the course of culture in general.” (HH, I: §292) The realization of the inner necessity of the self and of reality itself not only involves forgiveness for what one has become but a climb upwards to the higher self:

*Forward.*—And with that, forward on the path of wisdom with a bold step and full of confidence! However you may be, serve yourself as your own source of experience! Throw off discontent with your nature, forgive yourself your own ego, for in any event you possess in yourself a ladder with a hundred rungs upon which you can climb to knowledge. (*ibid.*)

The art of philological reading requires not only that the reader takes into account the reality from which his style flows but also that he must relate to this reality in the same way that the text does. The meaning of Nietzsche’s texts lies in his blood, unconscious and the tragic pathos from which his works fundamentally arose. The ideal reader not only takes the author into account but also associates the meaning of his text with Nietzsche’s own experience of existential truth. He must take into account the reality from which Nietzsche’s writings flow, and in turn attunes himself to this reality through a certain type of reading. In reading with ears, one attunes oneself to the musical whole from which Nietzsche’s writings flow.<sup>109</sup> This idea of

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<sup>109</sup> Nietzsche’s musical use of language stands in a closer relation to reality than the ordinary use of language, which he argues rather falsifies reality. Kathleen Higgins in her article ‘*Nietzsche on Music*’ outlines with reference to *The Birth of Tragedy* that for Nietzsche, “Music is closer to the source of Dionysian insight than words, for music ““speaks”” from ““the heart of the world”” (Cited in this form in Higgins, *Nietzsche on Music, Op. cit.*, p.669) In her article, she argues that, for Nietzsche, there is the notion of a “universal ground of the world” (*ibid.*, p.665) or “ground of being” (*ibid.*, p.670-71), and that music is a direct expression of this reality. In this thesis, it is argued that Nietzsche’s style, in being musical, is a direct expression of reality. Higgins notes that Nietzsche’s idea of the oneness of the universe, or the universal ground of being, is indebted to Schopenhauer’s idea of the will. Schopenhauer in a similar vein to Nietzsche adheres to the idea that music bypasses the phenomenal world and “appeals to the will directly” (cited in this form in Higgins, p.668 with reference to Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, 2vols., E.F.J. Payne (trans.), New York, vol. 1, p.257). Higgins also makes reference to Nietzsche’s work “On Music and Words” where Nietzsche refers to universal ground of the world as the “tonal subsoil,” “comprehensible beyond the difference of language.” (Cited in this form in Higgins p.665) (Nietzsche, F., ‘On Music and Words,’ in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar Levy, vol.2, *Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays*, Maximilian A. Muegge (trans.), London, 1911, 31-32.)



reading with ears relates to what Nietzsche considers the relationship between speech and writing to be. He claims that writing is based upon live speech, which is in turn based upon the rhythmic movements of an author's creative thinking. Nietzsche does not follow the postmodern trend of rejecting speech as live presence, a trend which prioritizes writing over speech. He rather acknowledges that writing itself is based upon the oral voice, and is in this way subordinate to speech.<sup>110</sup> It is writings that are created taking into account the priority of speech over writing and, in turn make the transition to prioritizing silence over speech engage in what he refers to as the *grand style*. For Nietzsche, it is this type of writing that takes into account the superiority of

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Liébert, Georges in his work '*Nietzsche and Music*' mentions that we find in Nietzsche "a recurring aspiration to song, to speech that has been born out of music", all of which finds "free expression in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and in his poetry" (Liébert, G., *Nietzsche and Music*, Parkes, G., & D. Pellauer (trans), London, The University of Chicago Press, 2004, p.4) He notes that Nietzsche's view of music as a metaphor of Life ties in with his criticism of language; he contends that, as a composer, Nietzsche confides that "sounds allowed him to say certain things that words were incapable of expressing." (cited in this form in Liébert, *ibid.*, p.4) In a section referred to as "To Read is to Listen" of his chapter entitled "Without Music Life would be an Error", he notes that Nietzsche compares his works to compositions, that he speaks of *The Genealogy of Morals* as a sonata in three movements, and he speaks of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as a "symphony" (cited in this form in Liébert, *ibid.*, p.5) He mentions that the "musical kind of reading that Nietzsche practices and recommends is a privileged means of comprehension." (*ibid.* p.5) It is only "A refined auditory awareness will easily perceive the inner movements of works, their tempo that conveys their key" (*ibid.*) Liébert's chapter title is a reference to Nietzsche's quote "Without Music Life would be an Error", and is also noted by Higgins in her article 'Nietzsche on Music' (Kathleen, Higgins, *Op. cit.*, p.669) where she refers to the original Nietzsche reference (Letter to Peter Gast, Jan. 15, 1888). For a detailed discussion of the musical structure of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* see also Graham Parkes, '*The Symphonic Structure of Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Preliminary Outline*', in *Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Before Sunrise*, James Luchte (ed.), London, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008.

<sup>110</sup> For a detailed discussion of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and its affinity with *logoi* or speeches see Graham Parkes' essay 'The Dance from Mouth to Hand (Speaking Zarathustra's Write Foot Foreword)', in *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, *Op. cit.*, pp. 127-141). In the introduction to the book 'Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra', Koelb notes that Parkes calls into question the idea of Nietzsche as a postmodern writer, as he examines Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, a book "so full of directly quoted speeches." (*ibid.*, p.13) Koelb mentions that for Parkes, "Nietzsche's Zarathustra often resembles Plato's Socrates ("he who does not write") more than he does a postmodern grammatologist..." (*ibid.*) However, for all the speechmaking that takes place in *Zarathustra*, there is, according to Parkes, a shift from speech to singing, and in turn from singing to writing as dancing. Koelb notes that for Parkes, "The act of writing is, like dancing, "a divine affair which requires an inversion of the natural attitude: standing on one's head, one's ear to the ground, keep's one's feet pointed towards heaven." (*ibid.*) He asserts that for Parkes "This sort of writing, then, involves the whole body in a continuous process of response to the "music" of becoming. It is not a secondary activity parasitic upon "living" speech but instead the result of a total commitment of the resources of life." (*ibid.*) Nietzsche's writing style is rather based on the oral or singing voice than dialogue; it is a dancing style that is in attunement with a musical whole that is closest to reality itself.

the oral voice that is an expression of a musical whole or unity. It is the reader with a “third ear” who reads the written word taking into consideration its oral basis. This reader is in a harmony with the musical whole out of which Nietzsche’s writings are an expression. To read with an understanding of the ‘truth’ of Nietzsche’s works, the reader must grasp the rhythm of the written text, which imitates the rhythmic movement of the spoken word and in turn the silent *logos* of his thought.<sup>111</sup> This implies that the philologist can perceive the inaudible, the most silent words, the “ stillest words ... Thoughts that come on doves’ feet” (Z, II: ‘The Stillest Hour’), for the world “revolves *inaudibly*” (Z, II: ‘On Great Events’).<sup>112</sup> It is those readers with “delicate ears” that are made aware of the world becoming silent, the “eve of a seventh day ... at noon” (Z, IV, ‘At Noon’) and of the “good tidings” that “the earth shall yet become a site of recovery” (Z, I, ‘On the Gift-Giving Virtue’: §2) where the “Zarathustra’s Kingdom of a thousand years” will come into realization.

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<sup>111</sup> In this thesis, it is being argued that to enter into the silent *logos* of an author is the most truthful standpoint towards an author, that silence is the most fundamental disposition towards reality; it is the site of Being revealing itself. Nietzsche’s works are based upon his most fundamental self, his ipsissimosity (unconscious), or the Great reason of the Body which is the realm of the ‘unsaid,’ of pathos the most fundamental realm. The reader who enters into the silent *logos* of an author brings his most fundamental self to the text. It is in this way that author and reader share the same souls or the same selves.

<sup>112</sup> For a discussion of Nietzsche’s art of silence see Claudia Crawford, ‘Nietzsche’s Dionysian Arts: dance, song, and silence,’ in Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts, S. Kemal, I. Gaskell, and Daniel W. Conway (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 310-341. In this chapter, Crawford identifies a hierarchy of types of silence: conscious use of silence, silence in which the Self speaks to one, and silence as the non-expression of the highest experience of humans, a realization of the perfection of oneself and humans. (*ibid.*, p.338) She also makes reference to the passage entitled “The Stillest Hour,” which she claims “presents us with an example of how the Self reveals its uniqueness to us, if we listen.” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche emphasizes in many places that “the greatest events—they are not our loudest but our stillest hours. Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values does the world revolve; it revolves inaudibly”. (Z, II: ‘On Great Events’) The third and highest level of silence is the mystical perfect silence, which occurs in the experience of “Dionysian Power and Yes to life”. (*ibid.*, p.339) This type of silence is best expressed in the passage entitled “At Noon” of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. According to Crawford, the votaries of Dionysus in the experience of silence, that “when they say “I,” they are the “moving centre of the world—” their selves are “not the same as that of the waking empirically real men, but the only truly existent and eternal self resting at the basis of things” (BT 5)” (Cited in this form in Crawford, *ibid.*, p.339) This seems to imply that there is a distinction between the empirical self and the essential self, a distinction that is explored in this thesis. This experience involves reaching the highest spheres, a silence that does not last: “Instead of sinking into the well of eternity, of flying away from earth and earthly things” that the higher men must rise up and teach their descendents of entering into “the eternal round of sacred Dionysian dance, song and silence” (*ibid.*)

It becomes more evident what is meant by Nietzsche's style as the communication of an inward state, an inward tension of pathos of sublime superhuman passion, when one considers the art of reading with ears. To read with ears also calls upon us to read aloud; it requires the physiological acts of breathing, swelling and coming down within the breath of a period such as those performed by classical orators like Demosthenes and Cicero. In bringing musical rhythm and tone back into language, he returns passion and pathos to the art of communication. (BGE: §247) His communication engages unconscious musical rhythms, the tempo of that music and the art of unconscious bodily gestures, which requires 'a finer ear' (BGE: §10) or 'more subtle ears' (BGE: §54); in speaking of the Zarathustrian speeches he states that "an infinite abundance of light and depth of happiness falls drop upon drop, word upon word" and that "the tempo of these speeches is a tender adagio" where "Such things reach the most select. It is a privilege without equal to be a listener here. Nobody is free to have ears for Zarathustra." (EH, Preface: §4) The true philologist must not only be a reader, but above all be a 'fine ear,' a musician. Nietzsche's style as a tension of pathos has a seductive quality; his style consists of the art of seduction, in his Attempt at Self-Criticism, he refers to it as a "contrapuntal vocal art and seduction of the ear" (§7).<sup>113</sup> In this section, Nietzsche refers to himself as a "pied-

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<sup>113</sup> Claudia Crawford in her article entitled '*Nietzsche's Great Style: Educator of the Ears and of the Heart*' (Nietzsche-Studien, 20, 1991, pp.219-37) discusses the seductive nature of Nietzsche's style that entices the reader to listen. (*ibid.*, p.212) She contends that Nietzsche's style, entails that communication can only take place where the two or more participants (*communia*) already share a common sympathy. She then refers to Nietzsche's older notes entitled 'On Reading and Writing' to reiterate this point:

Language is at base a question of one's fellow human, whether he shares the same soul with me; the oldest sentences appear to me to be questions, and in their intonation I suspect the echo of that oldest question of the soul to itself, but in another abode, do you recognize yourself once again?—this feeling accompanies every stance of the speaker; he attempts a monologue

piper” that emanates sounds for young “ears” and “hearts”, he also in *Ecce Homo* refers to himself as the “pied-piper” of the Genius of the Heart who, as an old psychologist, seduces his readers “to follow him even more inwardly and thoroughly” teaching the reader to listen. (EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §6) He emphasizes that his style communicates an inward pathos that a reader must share with an author, that this communication can only ideally take place with a reader who

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and conversation with himself. (cited in this form in Crawford, *ibid.*, p.212)

In her essay, she expresses how Nietzsche wishes to return to language its ability to express feelings or tone, which she argues for Nietzsche is a direct ‘unmediated’ expression of the will. (*ibid.*, p.215) The “greatest measure of the feelings cannot be expressed through words” but rather through music (*ibid.*, p.216). She contends that Nietzsche breaks from the metaphysical basis of his theory of language and music that he comes to the conclusion that it does not speak of the will. (*ibid.* p.216) In this thesis, it is being argued, on the contrary, that Nietzsche in his later philosophy still upholds that music is a direct expression of reality. Higgins in her article ‘Nietzsche and Music’ suggests that in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche expresses that in the Dionysian Dithyramb, the body becomes subordinate to a Dionysian unity (Higgins, K., *Op. cit.*, p.670), and she also refers to a passage entitled ‘The Tomb Song’ from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which expresses that Nietzsche takes the dance to be the parable of the highest things “Only in the dance do I know how to tell the parable of the highest things” (Z, II, §11, cited in this form in Higgins, *ibid.*, p.670) This reference suggests that Nietzsche relates the dance to the realm of the ‘more-than-human,’ or what McIntyre refers to as the realm of the highest things or of ultimate reality. (McIntyre, A., *Op. cit.*, pp.74-99) In this way, it can be inferred that Nietzsche’s later philosophy not only has an even stronger affinity with music and dance, and that he views it in terms of a relation to an Absolute. Despite Crawford’s failure to take into account the connection between music and reality in Nietzsche’s later philosophy, her essay is very insightful in her exploration of Nietzsche’s style, and its relation to music. She emphasizes that Nietzsche’s style wishes to reach the reader’s heart:

When in *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche stresses rhythm, tempo and gesture he is describing a style which, by putting the tone, the music back into written language, returns feeling, passion and pathos to the art of communication allowing us to see how that style teaches us to listen, how it educates our ears in order to reach our hearts. (Crawford, C., *Op. cit.*, p.219-20)

She also explores Nietzsche’s song entitled ‘*The Seven Seals or The Yes and Amen Song*’ in terms of its use of periods, rhythm which impels his use of superlatives, heightening of tension, exaggerated climax, and then his use of tone or melody, gesture, and harmony. She also mentions that his style in this song is a “musical, choral-dance style.” (*ibid.*, p.237) It is an harmonious song where the reader is transfigured along with the lyric singer of the dithyramb in an “ultimate epiphany.” (*ibid.*, p.236) She also refers to it as a “pledge song in which the voice of the reader joins in the choric refrain, is seduced into becoming one with the singer and the God.” (*ibid.*) Harmony is a transcendent experience whereby the reader becomes the very dance and melody of the song and experiences the loss of individuation. Crawford outlines that through harmony the most fundamental form of communication can take place: “Words, rhythm, melody attempt to sing the meaning, the intellect (both conscious and unconscious) of the communication... But harmony ties these together, and a communication of a more fundamental sense takes place.” (*ibid.*) She goes on to claim that “Harmony, through the heightened pathos, intensifies the other arts of the stanza, tempo, rhythm, melody into the pure tone and measured dance beat of “*Denn ich liebe dich, oh Ewigkeit.*” (cited in this form in Crawford, *ibid.*, p.237) This translates as “For I love you, O eternity” (Z, III: ‘The Seven Seals (Or: The Yes and Amen song)’)

shares similar experiences, who is also a “genius of the heart.” (BGE: §295) The ideal reader is for Nietzsche, the reader with a “soul flute” (EH: ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §4), a musical soul that is in tune with the unconscious of Nietzsche’s style. In *Beyond Good and Evil* (§246), Nietzsche discusses the art of listening:

That one must not be in doubt about the rhythmically decisive syllables, that one experiences the break with any excessively severe symmetry as deliberate and attractive, that one lends a patient and subtle ear to every *staccato* and every *rubato*, that one figures out the meaning in the sequence of vowels and diphthongs and how delicately and richly they can be coloured and change colours as they follow each other—who among book-reading Germans has enough good will to acknowledge such duties and demands and to listen to that much art and purpose in language? In the end one simply does not have “the ear for that”; and thus the strongest contrasts of style go unheard, and the subtlest artistry is *wasted* as on the deaf. (BGE: §246)

In sharing the same pathos as Nietzsche<sup>114</sup>, or the same self, ones’ innermost being, one also relates to the reality that his works belong to. This type of reading involves examining the autobiographical nature of his works; the existential experience behind his writings, in particular his experience of illness and pain. The reader must firstly, however, focus on the written word before making the transition to reading with ears, and then, in turn, entering into the silent logos of the text.<sup>115</sup>

The meaning of his works is not ‘in’ the words of the text but in their relationship with reality. The objective meaning of Nietzsche’s writings lies in their relation to

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<sup>114</sup> See EH, ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’: §1: “Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks from experience one will have no ear.” See also chapter one, section V above, where this quote is also referred to.

<sup>115</sup> Hutter also maintains that for Nietzsche, writing is subordinate to speech, and as a result, Nietzsche is an advocate of reading with ears. He stresses the importance of this distinction and that it “tends to be effaced in postmodern interpretations of Nietzsche.” (Hutter, H., *Op. cit.*, p.3) He also stresses that Nietzsche’s works contain “frequent injunctions to his readers to translate the written logos into the silent logos of thinking via the oral logos.” (*ibid.*, p.3) He makes further reference to it in his work with regard to the art of philological reading, that it requires for Nietzsche that “one translate the written text into the oral voice that is its basis, and this voice in turn into the thinking which a past author thus aimed to immortalize in writing.” (*ibid.*, p.173)

truth or reality, which is in their dancing-musical rhythms and tragic pathos. Therefore, the ideal reader must read with ears in order to be attuned to the musical totality that his works belong to. Nietzsche wishes to attune his ideal readers to reality; the goal of reading is not to find some ‘objective meaning’ in the words. In this way Nietzsche values reading, as a form of self-overcoming, as it enables the reader to cultivate a higher self, and in turn to enter into the most primordial relation to reality. The reader can only self-overcome through reading by way of focusing on the word; therefore it is one of the necessary stages to the “art of reading well”. It is through the cultivation of one’s unconscious self that one encounters reality *as it is* in *amor fati*. This implies that “reading and writing in blood” enables the higher type to be “warrior-like”, and overcome and in turn acquire insight into reality or tragic wisdom in the form of entering into a dancing oneness with reality. (Z, I: §7) It is through tragic pathos or one’s unconscious, that one enters into the silent *logos* of an author and of Becoming. To participate in this silence is to enter into the realm of Becoming, that is the metaphysically independent author and text. (AC: §52) It is through the art of reading that one can cultivate oneself towards the “more than human”, which is what renders it one of the most spiritual exercises for Nietzsche. The following chapter further explores what reality is for Nietzsche and illustrates that it is through pathos and the unconscious that one experiences the “untimely” or an “eternity” within Becoming.

## Chapter 4

### Nietzsche on the Eternal Recurrence and the Innocence of all Becoming

## I

### *Nietzsche's Quest for a New 'Yes-Saying' Totality*

The following section explores Nietzsche's metaphysics of Becoming where his refutation of the Christian moral God lays open the way for a new Divine God. This section maintains that the main impetus behind Nietzsche's yearning for a new totality, as a "Yes-saying" one is the death of God. The effect of the death of God, and the deep feeling of his loss, is best expressed in the madman passage of *The Gay Science* (§125).

*The madman.* –Haven't you heard of that madman who in the bright morning lit a lantern and ran around the marketplace crying incessantly, 'I'm looking for God! I'm looking for God!' Since many of those who did not believe in God were standing around together just then, he caused great laughter. Has he been lost, then? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone to sea? Emigrated? –Thus they shouted and laughed, one interrupting the other. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. 'Where is God?' he cried; 'I'll tell you! *We have killed him*—you and I! We are all his murderers...God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How can we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers! The holiest and mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us?...What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves? Is the magnitude of this deed not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to become gods merely to appear worthy of it? There was never a greater deed—and whoever is born after us will on account of this deed belong to a higher history than all history up to now!' Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; they too were silent and looked at him disconcertedly. Finally he threw his lantern on the ground so that it broke into pieces and went out. 'I come too early', he then said; 'my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder need time; the light of the stars needs time; deeds need time, even after they are done...

When Nietzsche proclaims that "god is dead" he is rejecting a particular conception of God, the Christian moral conception of God or the God that has been metaphysically determined as *causa sui*. Nietzsche's cry in the madman passage is to be distinguished from those of the marketplace. Nietzsche cries incessantly: "I'm looking for God!"



this is a man who separates himself from those of the marketplace, those who do not believe in God. They do not feel the loss of God to the same extent as Nietzsche. Nietzsche's cry "I'm looking for God!" does not imply a plea to return to a faith in the old God, which is no longer believed in but it rather implies that he feels deeply its loss. In his essay entitled '*The Death of God and The Revaluation*' Kaufmann expresses that the death of god parable is not just a proclamation of the death of God but is also an experience. In comparing Nietzsche to the Old Testament prophets, Kaufmann observes the felt experience of Nietzsche:

Sometimes prophecy seems to consist in man's ability to experience his own wretched fate so deeply that it becomes a symbol of something larger. It is in this sense that one can compare Nietzsche with the ancient prophets. He felt the agony, the suffering, and the misery of a godless world so intensely, at a time when others were yet blind to its tremendous consequence, that he was able to experience in advance, as it were, the fate of a coming generation. (1980: 11)

The death of God re-opens the search for a new "God", not the Christian God, the God of Judgement that demands prayer and repentance but rather a new divine God that of "Dionysus" of the early Greek tragedies or of "God" as eternal return of the same. This is not God as an object of worship or God as *causa sui* or "cause" of all existence, which is actually a human category projected onto God. Nietzsche rejects God whereby one projects onto it human categories or attributes.<sup>116</sup> If there is a new

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<sup>116</sup> Schacht, R., in his work '*Nietzsche*' argues that not only is Nietzsche's death of God proclamation a diagnosis of culture, such that he is very interested in the psychological consequences of the death of God (cultural and social) but also that Nietzsche clearly repudiates the existence of a transcendent deity. (Schacht, R., *Nietzsche*, London, Routledge, 1983, p.120) Schacht cites *The Gay Science* (§343) that "the belief in a Christian God has become unbelievable" it is a belief that we no longer may suppose to be tenable. (*ibid.*p.121) He also argues that God is rejected by Nietzsche in terms of the projection theory, "one sets up one's own type as the measure of value in general; one projects it into things, behind things, behind the fate of things—as God" (Schacht, R., p.125 citing WP: §205) In spite of Schacht's argument that Nietzsche rejects God and the way in which human beings project their own attributes onto God, there are commentators such as Lampert who claim that Nietzsche recognizes what is referred to as the "god-creating instinct" (Lampert, L., *Nietzsche's Philosophy & True Religion*, In

God in Nietzsche, such as a life-affirmative one, this in turn raises questions as to whether this God again is a representation of the human? or is there a “God” as a reality that is irreducible to the human? There are commentators who argue that in spite of Nietzsche’s rejection of God in the monotheistic sense that perhaps Nietzsche is embracing God in the pantheistic sense. This is the idea of God as a new totality of “power” or “energy” not moral power, and in turn relates to his notion of time. He advocates that one worships oneself not God that one withholds reverence for the self in overcoming life’s most difficult challenges and experiencing *amor fati*. It is an experience whereby one becomes “god-like” in encountering a superabundance of “joy” or “power”, whereby one encounters eternity in eternal return of the same. Nietzsche’s rejection of the Christian moral absolute, as a “No-saying” totality is replaced by a new one that of the Innocence of Becoming, a “Yes-saying” totality as the “eternity” within Becoming. In this way the death of God slogan expresses an event, a transitional phase such that the destruction of the old world shaped by an old absolute makes possible the creation of a new world. Nietzsche could possibly be argued to be a foreseer of a new Dionysian age whereby “eternity” becomes manifest in the world. This type of eternity does not take the form of a transcendent static realm set apart from the world but is rather one that manifests itself in the world. This also raises the complex question of how Nietzsche connects the temporal with his notion of “eternity”. In spite of Nietzsche’s rejection of the Christian tradition of life-denying

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K.A. Pearson (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, p.144) that humans by nature raise what they passionately desire to the highest plane.” (*ibid.*) As a result of gods reflecting human passions there is for this reason both healthy and unhealthy gods. Lampert notes that Nietzsche labels the gods of Platonism as unhealthy, “punitive gods serving fear and vengeance by reinforcing the fiction of cosmic moral order” such that Platonism was the “home of a punitive monotheism” (*ibid.*) He also suggests that for Nietzsche, “that now that God is dead thanks to the long fight against him, the spiritual warfare between science and religion purposely set in motion by modern philosophers like Bacon and Descartes. The preface to *Beyond and Good* ends suggesting that the goal now is a new philosophy plus *its* popularization as the next great event in our history.” (*ibid.*, p.145) Lampert contends that the book ends with the return of Dionysus and Ariadne, gods of healthy life-affirmation and of the whole. If there is a new God to be embraced it is only in the form of a this-worldly eternity or in terms of a ‘yes-saying’ totality.

values that ties in with a concept of “eternity” as a transcendent static realm that he ironically embraces a Christian idea of the immanence of eternity or the fullness of the moment.

It is in *The Madman* passage that Nietzsche expresses his feeling of loss of belief in the old totality, a loss that he deeply agonized, as it culminated in a nihilistic relativism. However, he wishes to overturn this nihilistic relativism through rediscovering a new one. Nietzsche’s death of God proclamation does not imply the complete rejection of a totality but only in its Christian guise. For Nietzsche, it entails the rediscovery of the genuine ‘Yes-saying’ or life-affirmative one. He rejects human considerations of God where human values are in turn projected on to it; it is in this way not a genuine absolute but rather a human anthropomorphism. The Christian idea of God comes under attack not just as a human consideration of an absolute, but in that it represents life-denying values. In *The Antichrist* (§47) Nietzsche exhorts that he does not deny God as such but rather the Christian conception of God:

That we find no God—either in history or in nature or behind nature—is not what differentiates *us*, but that we experience what has been revered as God, not as “godlike” but as miserable, as absurd, as harmful, not merely as an error but as a *crime against life*. We deny God as God. If one were to *prove* this God of the Christians to us, we should be even less able to believe in him. In a formula: *dues, qualem, Paulus creavit, dei negatio*.<sup>117</sup>

The Christian God as a life-denying God is rejected on the grounds that it is a “crime against life.” (*ibid.*) His rejection of the Christian God does not imply a rejection of God *per se*, as Nietzsche embraces a new totality in its Dionysian form, as a “Yes-saying God” that of Dionysus or as a life-affirmative one. He repudiates God as a

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<sup>117</sup>Kaufmann offers the following translation of the above Latin quote “God, as Paul created him, is the negation of God.” (Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, *The Portable Nietzsche*, W. Kaufmann (trans.), Penguin Books, New York, 1976, p. 627)

Feuerbachian projection of human consciousness, as human consciousness and the world is presupposed by the will to power. In *The Will to Power* Nietzsche's God is characterized: "God the *supreme power*—that suffices! Everything follows from it; "the world" follows from it." (WP: §1037)

The section next looks at the relationship between reality and a new value-system, which is non-nihilistic. Nietzsche is an advocate of an eternity within Becoming, a "Yes-saying" totality which is irreducible human thought. Nietzsche can be argued to view reality in terms of Becoming, a realm that can be accessed through Dionysian insight, or transfiguration.<sup>118</sup> Nietzsche recognizes that with the death of God, there is

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<sup>118</sup>Tyler T. Roberts in his work '*Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion*' notes what Nietzsche means by transfiguration, that it is the affirmative self that takes shape in a "transfiguration" or "spiritualization" of the religious self. (Roberts, T.T., *Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1998, p.67) This term "transfiguration" refers to Nietzsche's description of philosophy as a practice of creative spiritualization: "A philosopher who has passed through many kinds of health, and keeps passing through them again and again, has passed through an equal number of philosophies; he simply *cannot* but translate his state every time into the most spiritual form and distance—this art of transfiguration just *is* philosophy." (GS, Preface: §3, cited in this form by Roberts, *ibid.*, p. 67) Roberts mentions that for Nietzsche the philosopher artist's "body transfigures into spirit", and then as spirit shines forth in idealized form; he is an expression of reality in perfected form. (*ibid.*) Nietzsche's idea of transfiguration expresses a recapitulation of the spirit-body relationship, where body and spirit are to be viewed as modulations of one another. Roberts also looks at the way Nietzsche's idea of transfiguration was influenced by the episode of "The Transfiguration" in the New Testament. He then explains the episode as follows: "There, Jesus ascends a mountain, talks with Moses and Elijah, and is "transfigured" so that "his face shone like the sun and his garments became white as light." (Matthew 17: 1-8, cited in this form by Roberts, *ibid.*, p.68) In theological terms, Roberts claims that this epiphany "echoes the baptism of Jesus and foreshadows both the Passion and Parousia." (*ibid.*, p.68) He then explains that in German, this episode "is generally referred to as *die Verklärung*" and that "beyond its specifically Christian use, *Verklärung* means "glorification," and as a verb (*verklären*), it means to rise above the earthly or to appear in clear light." (*ibid.*) Although it is most often associated with religious phenomena, it is used in the context of art, for Nietzsche. According to Roberts, "in *The Birth of Tragedy*, for instance, he writes of the "*Verklärungsschein* of art"" (BT: 143, cited in this form by Roberts p.68) Roberts then refers to the Kaufmann translation as "transfiguring illusion," and that Kaufmann mentions in a footnote that "*Verklärungsschein*" might also be translated as "transfiguring halo" (BT: 143, n.2 cited in this form by Roberts, *ibid.*) Roberts also notes Nietzsche's use of the term 'transfiguration' in *The Gay Science*, and that it is rarely used in German, and only refers to the transfiguration of Christ. (*ibid.*, p.68) Nietzsche's use of the term tells us something not only about the way he considers philosophy, but also the way in which he views the relation between body and spirit; that their relation is not fundamentally hierarchical. Roberts maintains that "in the biblical transfiguration, the spirit of Jesus does not leave the body; instead, *he*—body and soul—shines ...for Nietzsche spirit is not something opposed to body, but an aura or a shining, or raiment, by which the body and one's whole being is glorified." (*ibid.*, p.69) He then highlights that the term is in general used in relation to Nietzsche notion of artistic idealization, which for him is the "function of art—the clearest expression of affirmation." (*ibid.*) The Dionysian artist's relation to reality is the most fundamental representation of reality, and can be argued to be the

the loss of the value-system that it embodied, and as a result there is the need to replace the loss of this value-system. Nietzsche in this way offers a new centre of valuation of life-affirmation, whereby the genuine philosopher encounters reality *as it is*. In engaging reality as it is, the philosopher can affirm his life. For Nietzsche, in this way life-affirmation and the new totality are interlinked. The new measure of value is reality “the more-than-human”, and that which in turn enables the individual to attune himself to the whole such as solitude, suffering, self-overcoming, and “reading and writing in blood.” (Z, I: §7) This experience is one of *amor fati*, and includes life and the self becoming the new ‘centre’ of valuation: “reverence for oneself; love of oneself” go hand and hand with Nietzsche’s “revaluation of all values” (AC: Preface).

In being attuned to Becoming, the philosophical type affirms his life, and in turn he experiences redemption; the Dionysian totality in Nietzsche is therefore intimately connected to his idea of redemption. The Christian “No-saying” totality and Nietzsche’s new one are both related to this concept in different ways. In a similar vein the Christian totality is supposedly redemptive in nature; however, its redemptive capacity is oriented to a beyond, and is therefore life-denying. Nietzsche’s idea of redemption is Dionysian in nature and is best expressed by the term “transfiguration”, which is to experience “the heavenly” on earth, to experience reality *as it is* on earth.

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“lightest shade of appearance” (BGE: §34) or “reality once more” (TI, ‘Reason’: §6, cited in this form by Roberts, T.T., *Ecstatic Philosophy*, in Nietzsche and the Divine, J. Lippitt & J. Urpeth (eds), Manchester, Clinamen Press, 2000, p.216) This idea of the varying shades of appearance will be discussed later in this chapter, in terms of the human subject’s relation to reality, and in terms of the varying shades or dimensions of reality itself. This idea of the philosopher artist or Nietzsche as a ‘writer in blood’ will be mentioned in the final section as the most truthful standpoint to reality, the experience of transfiguration, is an experience of feeling eternity, or glimpsing the ‘eternity’ within Becoming, an eternity that has become manifest in the world. This however is not to be misunderstood as after-worldly joy. This touches upon the transfiguring capacity of ‘writing in blood’ for Nietzsche, which has been discussed in chapter three and will also be explored later in this chapter in terms of an artist’s metaphysics.

The quest for a new totality in Nietzsche is completely driven by the metaphysical need for redemption, and truth, as tragic insight into reality for Nietzsche has this redemptive quality which he seeks. The redemptive nature of the new totality is genuine as it not only involves life-affirmation and the justification of one's life, but also because it is irreducible to human thought.

The distinction between Nietzsche's totality and the Christian one relates to the distinction between the God of Jesus and the God of the Church or the Christian God.<sup>119</sup> Although Nietzsche offers a scathing critique of Christianity in *The Antichrist*, as the subtitle of this work suggests "an attempt at a critique of Christianity, he draws a distinction between Christ and Christianity: "The very word "Christianity" is a misunderstanding: in truth, there was only *one* Christian, and he died on the cross...only Christian *practice*, a life such as he *lived* who died on the cross, is Christian" (AC: §39) For Nietzsche, Christian dogma and faith is a gross

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<sup>119</sup> Altizer in his work *The New Gospel of Christian Atheism* notes how Nietzsche is similar to both Blake and Kierkegaard with regard to this distinction. Christ is to be associated with life-affirmation or "Yes-saying" to life, whereas Christianity embodies the very opposite; it denies life.

Blake and Nietzsche, above all others, even including Kierkegaard, profoundly know historical Christianity as an absolute reversal of Jesus. Each could know the uniquely Christian God as the pure opposite of that ultimate life which Jesus enacted, as most clearly manifest in the absolute transcendence of that God, a transcendence reversing the primal words and praxis of Jesus. Thus the Yes-saying of Jesus becomes an absolute No-saying in Christianity, the forgiveness which he embodied is reversed into an absolute guilt, and the joy which he enacted is transformed into an ultimate impotence.(Thomas, J.J. Altizer, *The New Gospel of Christian Atheism*, Aurora, The Davies Group Publishers, 2002, p.94)

See the following essays for a further discussion of the distinction between Christ and Christianity, which also include discussions of Nietzsche's affinity with Christ: W. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche's Repudiation of Christ*, In, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974, pp.337-390; Evans, J.C., *Nietzsche on Christ Vs Christianity*, Soundings 78: 571-88, 1995; Biser, E., *Nietzsche's Relation to Jesus: A Literary and Psychological Comparison*, In Nietzsche and Christianity, Geffré, C., J.P., Jossua and M Lefébure (eds.), Edinburgh, T& T Clark, 1981; Thomas, J.J., Altizer, *Nietzsche and Biblical Nihilism*, In Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Language and Politics, T. Darby, B. Egyed, B. Jones (eds), Canada, Carleton University Press, 1989, pp.37-44.

misunderstanding of the original teachings of Christ.<sup>120</sup> Nietzsche's new "Yes-saying" totality parallels the God of Jesus and has the same redemptive quality. Roberts (1998: 69) too notes the distinction between the God of Jesus and that of the Church, the "Christian" God: "The latter is "God degenerated to the *contradiction of life*, instead of being its transfiguration (*Verklärung*) and eternal Yes!" (AC: §18, cited in this form in Roberts 1998: 69) The God of Jesus as a totality is redemptive in the same way as Nietzsche's one that is life-affirmative. Nietzsche's redemptive act of transfiguration is also used in his discussion of Jesus in *The Antichrist*. The blessedness that Jesus refers to is, according to Nietzsche, the "transfiguration of all things". (Roberts 1998: 68) Blessedness or transfiguration, for Jesus is a "state of the heart" (AC: §34); it is a state that is made possible by the *practice* of a divine life here and now:

The life of the redeemer was nothing other than *this* practice—nor was his death anything else. He no longer required any formulas, any rites for his intercourse with God—not even prayer...he knows that it is only in the *practice* of life that one feels "divine," "blessed," "evangelical," at all times a "child of God." Not "repentance," not "prayer for forgiveness," are the ways to God: *only the evangelical practice leads* to God, indeed, it *is* "God"! (AC: §33)

This type of redemption that Nietzsche has an affinity with is a blessedness that is to be found in Jesus; it is to feel oneself "in heaven", it is "the feeling of eternity", on earth and it is to experience the Kingdom of God that is within you. (AC: §33-§34) This touches upon the radical distinction between Christian dogma and Christian *praxis*.

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<sup>120</sup> Nietzsche in *The Antichrist* claims that the original teachings of Christ were mistranslated by the church (AC: §34) in particular his teaching of the Kingdom of God. In the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5-7), Jesus is more explicit about what he means by the Kingdom, the Kingdom is of the earth, and refers to the fulfilment of bodily needs; the Kingdom revolves around concrete, personal and earthly things. The keys of the Kingdom are forgiveness (Matthew 16:19), the achievement of perfection, love of one's enemies (Matthew 5: 38-48), the experience of the heart (Matthew 6:21), and the feeling of joy, glory, and eternity.

The deep instinct for how one must *live*, in order to feel oneself “in heaven,” to feel “eternal,” while in all other behaviour one decidedly does *not* feel oneself “in heaven”—this alone is the psychological reality of “redemption.” A new way of life, *not* a new faith. (AC: §33)

This feeling of eternity correlates with Nietzsche’s idea of *amor fati*. As Roberts (1998: 201) states, “Divinity, for Nietzsche, is realized in the affirmative human being, in the transfiguration of reality accomplished in and through the reality of an affirmative life, in a love that reaches beyond, beneath the self and turns even the encounter with the demonic into a declaration of the divine.” He also argues that “Nietzsche’s reflection on Jesus applies equally to his affirmer.” (*ibid.*) According to Nietzsche, the notion of “the innermost” and its relation to reality, as the most fundamental relation to reality, is also emphasized by Jesus. In a similar vein to Nietzsche, Jesus’ emphasis on the “innermost” is to be contrasted with the fixity or “solidity” of language:

Using the expression somewhat tolerantly, one could call Jesus a “free spirit”—he does not care for anything solid: the word kills, all that is solid kills. The concept, the *experience* of “life” in the only way he knows it, resists any kind of word, formula, law, faith, dogma. He speaks only of the innermost: “life” or “truth” or “light” is his word for the innermost—all the rest, the whole of reality, the whole of nature, language itself, has for him only the value of a sign, a simile. (AC: §32)

For Nietzsche, what is of essential importance is the manner in which Jesus lived. In Nietzsche’s reconstruction of the psychology of the redeemer type (AC: §29), this type of person does not care about words, ideas or doctrines, but only immediate, inward states. Like Jesus, Nietzsche repudiates the idea of redemption that is linked with faith, the forgiveness of sins or with doctrine. He also associates it with the direct consequence of a pathological inability to bear even the most minute pain, and a refusal to love one’s enemies. It is in Nietzsche’s terminology decadent; that is, a



symptom of declining, waning life. Nietzsche's approach to redemption is in terms of the psychological; he calls it, true to his "bodily" or "physiological" approach.

World redemption for Nietzsche is the world reaching its highest state whereby eternity becomes manifest in the world. The Kingdom of God as eternal recurrence or as a reversal of the church implies that eternity is immanent in the world. The Kingdom of God as Eternal Recurrence is only a comparison that can be inferred through the distinction between Christ and Christianity. Altizer in his essay entitled '*Nietzsche and Apocalypse*' discusses the relationship between eternity and the world in Nietzsche. He notes that the previous notion of eternity of the Christian Godhead is one that is "absolutely beyond the world and time" (Altizer 2000-2001: 10), and that the apocalyptic Godhead in the thought of Nietzsche relates to the "forward movement of eternity"; it is one "embodying rather than disembodying time and the world." (*ibid.*) In this way, eternal recurrence involves "ushering in an absolutely new totality which is the total embodiment of time and the world." (*ibid.*)

Now if it is possible to understand that Christianity has truly and absolutely reversed Jesus' enactment of the Kingdom of God, and that the uniquely Christian God is the absolute reversal of that Kingdom, then it is possible to understand that Nietzsche's enactment of Eternal Recurrence is a genuine renewal of the Kingdom of God. Thereby a backward movement to eternity is purely and totally reversed into a forward movement to eternity, a primordial totality or Godhead is reversed into an apocalyptic Godhead or totality, and it is time and the world that are now eternity itself. (Altizer 2000-2001: 10-11)

The immanence of eternity brings about world redemption, a Kingdom of Heaven on earth or the Millennial Kingdom or what Nietzsche refers to as the "Zarathustra kingdom of a thousand years" (Z, IV: 'The Honey Sacrifice') or the "seventh day."<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>121</sup>Nietzsche relates woman to the seventh day of creation where the figure seven is symbolic of the notion of completeness: "The complete woman of every era is the idleness of the creator on that

This new epoch where the world or the earth reaches its highest state, in an ascending stage of the will to power is what is referred to as a Dionysian apocalypse.<sup>122</sup> It is in this way that Nietzsche is a foreseer of world redemption, the bringer of the “glad

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seventh day in the creation of culture, the repose of the artist in his work.” (HH, II: §274) In the *Book of Revelation*, the figure seven refers to the seal of creation; it is the Sabbath rest of the Millennial Kingdom that is “the thousand years” (Rev. 20: 7-10), which is comparable to Nietzsche’s idea of “the Zarathustra kingdom of a thousand years.” (Z, IV: ‘The Honey Sacrifice’) The perfect woman is complete like the world on the seventh day; she is what is complete in the creator, and she is the “great victory; seventh day; the leisure of a god...” (EH, ‘How One Philosophizes with a Hammer’: §3)

<sup>122</sup>Altizer in his *The New Gospel of Christian Atheism* explores the apocalyptic notion of the Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche. Altizer notes that in *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche affirms *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as the consequence of “the most ultimate revelation that has ever occurred” and that although its intention is to “be an absolute reversal of Christianity, it embodies a new and apocalyptic redemption from the uniquely Christian God.” (Thomas, J.J. Altizer, *The New Gospel of Christian Atheism*, *Op. cit.*, p.67) Altizer also contends that it is “our only major modern work that is written in the genre of the original gospels” and that the new redeemer as Zarathustra comes to reverse the old Persian Zarathustra, a figure who “was the very origin of our history, an origin that the new Zarathustra came to reverse, and to reverse by an ultimate enactment of the death of God.” (*ibid.*) Altizer argues that Nietzsche advocates the eternal recurrence as the Kingdom of God that is the absolute opposite to the Christian God. Nietzsche associates the Christian God with an Absolute No-saying, however as Altizer argues this No-Saying is inextricably linked to an absolute Yes-saying, which shows that Christianity is a necessary prerequisite evil to a new era:

Both Nietzsche and Blake could celebrate that *absolute novum* with a total Yes, but this is a Yes inseparable from an absolute No, an absolute No that is an absolute self-emptying. This is the apocalyptic Yes that Blake celebrates as the apocalyptic Jesus or the New Jerusalem, but is this the Yes that Nietzsche names as Dionysus and Zarathustra, and is Zarathustra Nietzsche’s name of the apocalyptic Jesus? Certainly not if we know Jesus as he has ever been known before, but if that Jesus has truly disappeared, this could make possible an absolutely new Jesus who is the embodiment of a new humanity and a new world. (*ibid.*, p.69)

This relates to the apocalyptic notion that the death of God is a transitional phase whereby the annihilation of the old epoch embodied by the Christian absolute is to be replaced by a new one, one embodied by an absolute Yes-saying. In this way the death of God implies the overcoming of nihilism:

Just as Nietzsche knows nihilism more profoundly than any other thinker, this is a nihilism that he knows as a fully dawning historical actuality, one that he foresees as being fully incarnate in our world. If that world embodies an ultimate ending, it embodies an ultimate beginning as well, an absolute beginning that is inseparable from an absolute ending, and yet an absolute beginning that is a pure and total grace. (*ibid.*, p.119)

Altizer refers to the Eternal Recurrence “as an eternally predestined Yes-saying” which can be enacted with the death of God: (*ibid.*, p.120)

If only the death of God makes possible this enactment...the enactment of Eternal Recurrence is not only possible but inevitable, and inevitable as an absolutely necessary transfiguration of that absolute nothingness that the death of God releases. That transfiguration embodies an absolute joy, and a joy only possible by way of a transfiguration of this nothingness, so that an absolute nothingness is essential to this absolute joy, just as an absolute evil is essential to a uniquely Christian redemption. (*ibid.*)

tidings” (AC: §33, §41), and is in turn is a prophet of a redeemer, of the “second coming of Christ.”<sup>123</sup> This redeemer is a Zarathustra-like figure who represents the epoch to come, and is the first and most ideal incarnation of life-affirmation. Life-affirmation involves saying-yes to the earth, and as the earth becomes the new ‘centre’ of valuation, this enables the earth to be raised to the highest level. In this experience of *amor fati*, the highest type glimpses an “eternity” within Becoming or an eternity that is immanent in the world. The glad tidings are on a par with the teachings of Christ, which imply the elimination of any distance between God and man.

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<sup>123</sup>This could possibly be argued to be a feminine figure, as the “Bride of Christ” who in the Bible is representative of the Millennial Kingdom. There is the apocalyptic idea of “the interruption of history by Christ and his bride ...” (Toole, D., *Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy & Apocalypse*, Colorado, Westview Press, 1998, p. 206) and the figure of the bride stands for “Our Lady”. This figure of the bride is a metaphor for Christ’s apocalyptic partner who brings about world-redemption.

## II

### *The Eternal Return of the Same: Nietzsche on an “eternity” within Becoming*

This section explores further Nietzsche’s metaphysics of the later period that of Becoming focusing in particular on Nietzsche’s notion of eternal return of the same. The eternal return requires a Dionysian attitude to ‘Life’ that the most painful experiences can be affirmed in a rapturous moment of life-affirmation. This existential attitude towards reality in the experience of eternal return is first mentioned in a passage from *The Gay Science* (§341) entitled “*The Heaviest Weight*.” In this passage the eternal return can be perceived either as a burden or as a god. It is those who perceive it as a god who can embrace it: “You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine.” It is referred to as the “ultimate eternal confirmation and seal.” (GS: §341) The reality that is affirmed in the experience of eternal return is expressed in his early writings such as *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* as Becoming. Nietzsche views the existential relation to this reality, as the experience of transfiguration. He himself refers to his experience of the Eternal Return as being “reborn”; it involves a rediscovery of the self in the highest affirmation of ‘Life’ itself. In *Ecce Homo*, he mentions that he had an experience of that kind in 1881, which he associates with that of his friend Peter Gast, “who was also reborn.”<sup>124</sup> (EH, Z: §1) In the same year Nietzsche discovers the idea of eternal return, “the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable, belongs in August 1881: it was penned on a sheet

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<sup>124</sup>Alistair Kee in his work entitled ‘*Nietzsche against the Crucified*’ also notes this reference in *Ecce Homo*, and examines its relation to the idea of rebirth in the Bible. He mentions what the New Testament means by “repentance” (*metanoia* or change of mind): it refers to a new understanding of the self, of the world. (Kee, Alistair, *Nietzsche against the Crucified*, London, SCM Press, 1999, p.130) The idea of a new understanding of the self entails affirmation of life, which for Nietzsche is the “real” life (WP:§170), the “true life” and “Eternal life, the eternal return of life” (TI, X: §4)

with the notation underneath “6,000 feet beyond man and time.” (*ibid.*) However, for Nietzsche, the flux of Becoming and the Eternal Return are not equivalent. The Eternal Return introduces the notion of “eternity” and raises the question of how this term fits with reality as the flux of Becoming. The idea of Eternal Return arises in Nietzsche’s later philosophy, and he considers the problem of how “Becoming”, a reality that is in continual flux is actually to be affirmed. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, the reality to be affirmed as the “Primal One” is a reality that is ‘behind’ the Apollonian world of appearance. In his later period he is apprehensive about this, as is evident by the way he dropped the term and his criticism of his early work in his “Attempt at Self-Criticism” (1886). He therefore tries to find another solution to affirming a reality that is constantly in flux. The flux of Becoming can only be affirmed as a reality through willing the eternal return of the same. Becoming as a reality is guaranteed by the *constant* return of the self-same that is that something is *attained* at every moment and is always of the same. It is because there is something to be attained in every moment and always of the same that there is a reality to be affirmed. It guarantees the ‘isness’ of Becoming, which in turn raises the ontological status of Becoming. Reality, for Nietzsche is no longer to be viewed as the flux of Becoming but rather in terms of an “eternity” that is within Becoming. In this way, Nietzsche affirms some kind of eternity but that is neither “another-world” nor a “primal one”; he advocates strictly an immanent this-worldly eternity. The ontological status of Becoming is raised when all past moments and all future moments not flow from each other in endless contradiction but link up in the ‘ring’ of eternal return. In this experience of the same one is released into the enigma of the ring of Dionysus or the “well of Eternity”. The eternal return has a redemptive aspect that as a mystery, it is to be experienced in “a tremendous moment” (GS: §341), or in what Nietzsche calls

“Noon”. It is possible to argue that eternal return doesn’t necessarily imply the eternal repetition of all events within history, but as Kaufmann (1974) rather states it rather involves the “supreme exaltation of the moment.”<sup>125</sup> The ring of eternal return is not a ring of endless repetition but relates to the whole; it is “the wedding rings of rings” that Zarathustra places on the finger of eternity. (Z, III: ‘The Song of Yes and Amen’) This idea of whole involves a conjoining of all opposites in the innocence of all Becoming. It is the ring that links up all events both past and future into one. This section will refer to Jaspers’ (1997) discussion of the term “being” as the concept of “eternity” in Nietzsche, an eternity that is within Becoming. It also includes an account of Altizer’s (1977) discussion of the idea of an immanent eternity in Nietzsche that is the “being that is in the now” which is drawn from the animal song<sup>126</sup> of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The section also includes Stambaugh’s (1972) discussion of Nietzsche’s idea of the Eternal Return of the Same where she contends that in the Innocence of Becoming, the Eternal Return as ‘the Ring’ is the highest form

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<sup>125</sup> Kaufmann in his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* also emphasizes that the eternal recurrence involves the “supreme exaltation of the moment”, and for Nietzsche is to be experienced by the overman. (Kaufmann, W., *Op. cit.*, p.321) He mentions that by the second meditation, Nietzsche repudiated the idea of the eternal recurrence in its Pythagorean form, “we find that the point of his critique was merely that events do not, and cannot recur within the span of known history—and about this he never changed his mind.” (*ibid.* p.319) He declares that this however doesn’t imply that Nietzsche rejects the necessity of the course of events within history. Kaufmann argues that the supra-historical represents the later doctrine of eternal recurrence, which includes the idea that the world is finished in every moment and its end attained. (*ibid.*) As the section unfolds it will become apparent that this is something similar to Jaspers (1997) and Stambaugh’s (1972) argument. The ultimate apotheosis of the supra-historical outlook is the “supreme exaltation of the moment.” (*ibid.*, p.321)

<sup>126</sup> In spite of Altizer’s reference to the animal song from ‘The Convalescent’ passage in order to argue that for Nietzsche ‘Being or God is the centre that is everywhere’ or that there is an immanent eternity in Nietzsche, it must be acknowledged that in this chapter of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra suggests that the animals have made a ‘hurdy-gurdy’ song of eternal return. The redemption of the animals is to be distinguished from that of Zarathustra. Lampert in his work *Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* examines this distinction. (Lampert, L., New Haven, Yale University Press, 1986, p.214) The specifics of the distinction will be mentioned further on in the section, and also that Lampert does claim that in spite of these distinctions that redemption of the animals is not entirely removed from that of Zarathustra. Altizer’s interpretation of the animal song explores the idea of the immanence of eternity in Nietzsche whereas Lampert discusses the animals’ song in terms of their relation to the temporal and becoming. Lampert in spite of his assertion that there is life-affirmative gods in Nietzsche, he would not explore the idea of “God as the centre that is everywhere” in Nietzsche.

of affirmation. She also argues that Eternal Return is not to be wrongfully conflated with the flux of Becoming (time as duration).<sup>127</sup> This also ties in with what she refers to as Nietzsche's pantheism the idea that 'God is in every moment', the relationship in turn between God and the temporal. This in turn overturns any nihilistic considerations of the Eternal Return. Nietzsche's view of the Innocence of Becoming implies that all determinateness and space itself is absorbed by time, the Moment that continually ends into eternity. This consideration of time is what is referred to as "the untimely," as it is not in opposition to eternity.

In a section entitled "The Affirmation of the Concept of Being" in his *Nietzsche: An Introduction to an Understanding of his Philosophical Activity*, Jaspers notes the distinction between endless Becoming and what Being is for Nietzsche. He begins by explaining that although Becoming cannot be intelligibly grasped, "philosophizing"

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<sup>127</sup> Joan Stambaugh refers to reality for Nietzsche as the Innocence of Becoming in her work *The Problem of Time in Nietzsche*. (Stambaugh, J., London, Bucknell University Press, 1987, p.184) In this thesis it is referred to as the 'inner logos' of Becoming. The reality that is to be affirmed as the innocence of Becoming is not to be confused with the mere "flux" of Becoming. In her work *Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return* she notes Nietzsche's very important question: to which reality do we belong?: "Where, where do we belong?" (Stambaugh, J., The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1972, p.35 citing Nachlass (Kroner ed.), vol. 83, p.401; See footnote no.137 of this section where she argues that, for Nietzsche, it is Eternity, Eternal Return of the Same as God and not the mere flux of Becoming. However, she contends that Nietzsche considers the Eternal Return of the Same as the innocence of Becoming. Therefore, the question arises that there must be a distinction between the Innocence of becoming and the mere flux of becoming. Stambaugh notes this distinction, and argues that Nietzsche rejects the flux under two considerations 1) in terms of it as the emancipation from being in *The Birth of Tragedy* 2) The past as the decisive factor of Becoming. (Stambaugh, J., *The Problem of Time in Nietzsche*, p. 38-42) Stambaugh argues that Becoming as the emancipation from Being is to be identified in *The Birth of Tragedy*, that Becoming as eternal individuation and contradiction continually rebels against the primal unity, which is a causal ground (being); it emancipates itself from Being. (*ibid.*, p.39-40) In this thesis, I am claiming that Nietzsche rejects the flux of becoming as the emancipation from being in the philosophy of Anaximander. Nietzsche's rejection of the flux as the emancipation from being is to be noted in his early work *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*; "coming-to-be [becoming] is an illegitimate emancipation from being." (PTAG: §4, 46)

Stambaugh notes a second consideration of Nietzsche's rejection of the flux as the past (time as duration), which is also noted in this section in a discussion of the passage 'On Redemption' from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Therefore, in this thesis it is being maintained that the Becoming that Nietzsche embraces is not Becoming 1) as emancipation from Being 2) as flux or time as duration.

can still take place when Becoming approaches or approximates Being. Jaspers firstly outlines in a section entitled “*The transcending restitution of being in the philosophy of becoming*” the most important references made by Nietzsche on the relation between Being and Becoming as follows: “The fact that everything recurs is the closest approach of the world of becoming to that of being”, and Jaspers notes that this thought originated in Nietzsche’s own vital philosophizing: “To *imprint* the character of being upon becoming—that is the *highest will to power*.” (WP: §617, cited in this form in Jaspers 1997: 351)<sup>128</sup> These references show that Being is restored again—as the eternal recurrence. He notes that for Nietzsche there is a distinction between this Being which, for “philosophically transcending thinking,” proceeds from becoming, and being which “derives from the will to power as it firstly establishes what is intelligible for it, and in doing so, provides a knowledge of things in the world”. (1997: 351) He explains that, for Nietzsche, when it comes to knowledge of beings, absolute Being disappears; it disappears “as an object of thought.” (*ibid.*) Jaspers maintains that for Nietzsche Being “is *eternity* as the source and boundary of all objectivity and all existence.” (*ibid.*) Jaspers (1997: 352) notes how the eternal recurrence for Nietzsche is set against the threat of relativism associated with “the senseless futility of mere becoming”

When the present age with its complete dissolution of principles and its relativizing of all being and all values becomes “the image of universal existence” and when, as a consequence, the negation of life, born of aversion to the senseless futility of mere becoming, begins to threaten, Nietzsche seizes upon his thought, so to speak, as a means to salvation. “I set *eternal recurrence* against the paralyzing sense of universal dissolution and incompleteness.” (Jaspers 1997: 352 citing Nietzsche)

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<sup>128</sup>Jaspers does not provide a reference for the above quotation. It comes from section (§617) of *The Will to Power*. This thesis offers the following translation: “To impose upon becoming the character of being—that is the supreme will to power...That *everything recurs* is the *closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being*:—high point of the meditation.” (WP: §617)



For Nietzsche, the basic thought of *amor fati* is introduced against the nihilism of viewing one's existence in relation to "aimless Becoming":

When indifference to one's own existence arises as a result of the vision of aimless becoming and the dissipation of being into the boundless, then the obsession with becoming turns into the yea-saying assimilation of the present: the basic thought of *amor fati*. (*ibid.*)

Nietzsche's own experience of eternal recurrence is the source of his thought. This source is not "a playful intellectual reflection" but, as Jaspers states, "the experience of being in a moment that itself received decisive metaphysical significance from the very thought to which it gave rise." (1997: 357) Nietzsche's own experience of eternal recurrence has both existential and historical significance. He contends that the eternal recurrence is to be viewed in terms of the "significance" which "the moment attains through its philosophical substance." (Jaspers 1997: 358) He emphasizes that the eternal recurrence involves the revelation of Being: "If the moment is at once *revelation of being* and, in this sense, eternity, then recurrence is merely a symbol for this eternity." (*ibid.*) It is through the eradication of time that Being reveals itself "(in the flash) of the moment." (*ibid.*)<sup>129</sup> The revelation of Being in the lightning flash of the moment occurs at "the perfect noon hour"<sup>130</sup>:

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<sup>129</sup>The connection between timelessness and eternal recurrence will be explored later in the section. It is the fullness of time; it is not time as duration or succession. Time is not to be viewed in opposition to eternity. Jaspers notes the similarity between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in terms of the relation between the moment and eternity or of conceiving the moment in relation to eternity. Kierkegaard, in a similar vein to Nietzsche distinguishes between three ways of conceiving the moment in relation to eternity. Jaspers firstly poses the question what does the eternal mean for Nietzsche: "Even in *one word* this meaning is constantly present: Nietzsche does not say "endless recurrence" but "*eternal recurrence*." What does "eternal" mean?" (Jaspers, *Op. cit.*, p.366) The answer lies in the correlation between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on the eternal. Kierkegaard distinguishes three ways of conceiving the moment in relation to eternity. The first way is as follows: "If the moment is *not essential*, then eternity appears from the rear, as *the past* (just as the path of a man who walks without direction and goal appears only behind him, as the distance covered)." (*ibid.*) The second way is "If the moment is *essential*, but merely as a decision, then *the future* is eternity."(*ibid.*) But finally "if the moment itself is *eternity*, then eternity is "*the future returning as the past*." (Jaspers, K., *ibid.*, p.366 citing Kierkegaard) According to Jaspers "This last concept is, for Kierkegaard, the *Christian* one: "The concept around which all Christianity revolves...is the fullness of time; it is however the moment as eternity, and yet this eternity is at once the future and the past."(Jaspers, K., p 366 citing Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's

Still! Still! Did not the world become perfect just now? ...What happened to me? Listen! Did time perhaps fly away? Do I not fall? Did time perhaps fly away? Do I not fall? Did I not fall—listen!—into the well of eternity? (Z, IV: 'At Noon')

Noon symbolizes for Nietzsche “the world-historical moment,” the moment where he begets the thought of eternal recurrence. It is in this moment that Nietzsche is not only “the historical Existenz of an individual” or the “one who creates decisively for the history of a whole people and of all humanity” but most importantly he is “the entire axis of all being.” (Jaspers 1997: 358) The world-historical moment is an apocalyptic one where Nietzsche as a prophet stands “between past and future.” (Z, III: 'The Seven Seals') This implies that humanity is entering into the fullness of time as a result of his thought; he marks the beginning of a new era of relating to eternity.

The highest affirmation of life which the thought of eternal return brings forth has, according to Nietzsche, a redeeming character. The eternal return is not simply a concept to be grasped and subsequently accepted, it must be lived, experienced in a moment of rapturous affirmation. It must emerge from the torments of nihilism, allowing the ultimate redemption from the greatest affliction. Nietzsche advocates that all of existence is inextricably linked, or that “all is One.” (PTAG: §3), (Z, II: 'On Redemption')

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Works, trans. Schrempf, vol.87) It is the final way of conceiving eternity that is an approximation to Nietzsche.

<sup>130</sup> Jaspers on the one hand refers to the Noon period as a “world-historical moment”, and on the other hand he refers to passages where Nietzsche uses the phrase “the hour”. He himself does not note this distinction. In this section “the untimely” is referred to as the moment, but it must be noted that he refers to it also as the hour. Both the hour and the moment can be argued to refer to “the untimely.”

Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes too to *all* woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, “You please me, happiness! Abide, moment!” then you wanted *all* back. All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored—oh, then you *loved* the world. Eternal ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you say: go, but return! *For all joy wants—eternity.* (Z, IV: ‘The Drunken Song’ §10)

Nietzsche uses the expression *amor fati* to refer to the affirmation of eternity that is at the same time an affirmation of the being of one’s own existence. Jaspers notes that there is a distinction between “being dissipated in a great affirmation of all being” and returning from this extreme “to the present historicity of my existence in this actual world and am, through this historicity, at one with being itself.” (1997: 367) Jaspers, in drawing upon Nietzsche’s emphasis on the moment, notes that once “one becomes conscious of its Existenz in this moment, of its “curious existence in this specific Now,” life can no longer find its significance in complete assimilation to some general class or other.” (Jaspers 1997: 368) This highlights the inadequacy of intellectual thinking when it comes to addressing the “truly *great* problems and question marks” (GS: §373) of existence or to living one’s existence in its most bare form, in its most fundamental relation to eternity. This also shows that human systems have intellectually distracted us from finding our true selves and from feeling being itself. (*ibid.*) Jaspers claims that in order to cross the “river of life” to one’s true self and a genuine encounter with being that is within becoming, one must firstly descend into the depths of existence. (*ibid.*) The being or eternity within becoming that Nietzsche expresses as the eternity of recurrence, is, according to Jaspers, to be viewed as the very demand for this descent:

In becoming, everything is hollow, illusory, flat ... The riddle which man must solve can be solved only through being, a being that is just what it is and cannot perish. Man is now beginning to gauge the depth of his fusion with becoming and with being. (Jaspers 1997: 368 citing Nietzsche)

Being can only be reached through “a loving embrace of truly present existence, through *amor fati* which finds the way from the stream of mere becoming to the historicity of the presently fulfilled *Existenz* and seizes being within becoming.” (Jaspers 1997: 368) For Nietzsche, *amor fati* is the affirmation of necessity itself, “it amounts to the unity of becoming and being in the destiny of the individual within his world.” (Jaspers 1997: 369)

The doctrine of the eternal recurrence involves this necessity entitled fate; it is this necessity that claims that if everything happens necessarily, then “it is apparent that I myself am a link in the chain of necessity—am myself a part of fate.”(*ibid.*) It is only when the true necessity of fate transcends any definite category,<sup>131</sup> can *amor fati* then be reached. In this thesis, it will be maintained that redemption forms the basis of Nietzsche’s conception of *amor fati*; fate becomes a sort of providence for those capable of transforming accident into necessity. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche first introduced the term *amor fati* as something yet unachieved:

I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them—thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love from now on! ... And, all in all and on the whole: someday I want only to be a Yes-sayer! (GS: §276)

The extent to which one embraces the *amor fati* principle reveals one’s affinity with reality:

My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary— but *love* it. (EH, II: §10)

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<sup>131</sup>Jaspers firstly outlines that the type of necessity that Nietzsche rejects. This type of necessity which Nietzsche rejects is the category of necessity that applies to causal processes subsumed under natural laws and pertaining to mechanism. Necessity as a human category is to be distinguished from *Fatum*. (Jaspers, *Op. cit.*, p.369)

Nietzsche's desire for *amor fati* is an expression of his inmost self, as Jaspers states "What Nietzsche desires first of all, he will soon express as his essence" (Jaspers 1997: 370): "what is necessary does not hurt me; *amor fati* is my inmost nature." (EH, 'The Case of Wagner': §4)

Nietzsche expresses the Dionysian attitude towards eternity in the affirmation of one's existence. *Amor fati* is the "highest state" attainable to man, constituting a "Dionysian relationship to existence." (WP: §1041) Fate can in no way be equated with the category of necessity conceived of as a natural law or of any intelligible order. Fate actually resists any attempts to understand it; it is the "transcending expression of the essence of being that cannot be categorized." (Jaspers 1997: 370) In this way "Nietzsche's fatalism, like the Christian lack of free will before God, does not express passivity but rather the impetus to authentic noble activity that can transcend any *recognizable* necessity in the world because it faces a necessity of a different kind." (*ibid.*) Jaspers (1997: 370) notes that Nietzsche actually hailed 'being', that is an eternity within Becoming like a deity in a Dionysian Dithyramb entitled '*Fame and Eternity*'. It is a dithyramb that marks Zarathustra's journey to full enlightenment:

Oh night, oh silence, oh deadly still noise! ...  
I see a sign,—  
from farthest regions  
a stellar shape sinks slowly sparkling towards me ...  
Highest star of being!  
With eternal shapes engraved!  
You come to me?—  
Shield of necessity!  
Highest star of being  
—by no wish attained,  
by No never sullied,  
eternal Yes of being,  
eternally am I your Yes:  
for I love you, oh eternity!<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>132</sup>Jaspers does not reference the above quotation. He is actually referring to one of Nietzsche's Dionysian Dithyrambs entitled 'Fame & Eternity.' For an alternative translation which is also bilingual see Nietzsche, F., *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), London, Anvil Press Poetry, 1984, p. 71. Hollingdale's translation also offers notes on this Dithyramb. He mentions that it originally was

Jaspers notes the divine nature of experiencing everything as interlinked for Nietzsche. He cites quoting Nietzsche that “Where I feel everything as necessarily connected, I experience every being as divine.” (Jaspers 1997: 360, citing Nietzsche)<sup>133</sup> Jaspers claims that in the affirmation of all being is implied the idea that “within the process of becoming, something is attained in every single one of its moments,” and “always the same thing”. The something cannot be expressed as “a generality,” “as transcendence” or “even as anything capable of being defined.” (Jaspers 1997: 360) The truth of being cannot be defined: “inexhaustible in its endless definable aspects, it is pure immanence.” (*ibid.*) For Nietzsche, “every moment of becoming is justified (or escapes evaluation—and this amounts to the same thing),” then it follows that “the present is not to be justified for the sake of the future nor the past for the sake of the present.”(*ibid.*)

Nietzsche’s ontological claim that “all is One” (Z, II, ‘On Redemption’), (Z, III, ‘On Old & New Tablets’: §3), (PTAG: §3) implies that past, present and future are interconnected; they belong to eternity. It is in this way that the Yes of eternal recurrence implies the redemption of all that is past. Zarathustra addresses this matter in a section entitled “On Redemption”: “To redeem those who lived in the past and to

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intended to be a poetic epilogue to the autobiography *Ecce Homo*, which he considers “would have been sensible, since this miniature poetic cycle is itself autobiographical.” (*ibid.*, p.93) The reason for this is, according to Hollingdale that the poem records the four stages of Zarathustra’s enlightenment: part one is “ferociously depressive,” truth arises in the thunderstorm, as flashes of lightning. (*ibid.*) He summarizes part two as follows that it appears to repudiate “fame,” that it “actually repudiates the purchase of fame by the substitution of virtue for truth—the trimming of truth to the world’s moral demands.” (*ibid.*, p.94) He notes that the third and fourth parts “transport us to the end of Part Three of *Zarathustra*, the ecstatic conclusion of Zarathustra’s spiritual odyssey and his attainment of full enlightenment.” (*ibid.*) Finally, Hollingdale outlines that the *key* to unlocking the poem is in a passage from *Ecce Homo*, which has been already mentioned above: “My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*...Not merely to endure what happens of necessity—but *love* it”(EH, II: §10) In this way, enlightenment can be argued to be *amor fati* as a feeling of necessity, of Eternity.

<sup>133</sup>Jaspers offers no reference for the above Nietzschean quotation.

re-create all ‘it was’ into ‘thus I willed it’—that alone I call redemption.” (Z, II: ‘On Redemption’) The will being impotent regarding the past is wrathful and full of vengeance.<sup>134</sup> Nietzsche takes revenge to be the ill will against past time: “Thus the will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his inability to go backwards. This, indeed this alone is what *revenge* is: the will’s ill will against time and its ‘it was.’” (*ibid.*) Everything past is fragment and accident and the will looking backwards in despair encounters revulsion against time and ‘it was’. It is through the eternal recurrence that the will to power as the will to joy and overabundance reaches its most potent expression. It is through eternal recurrence where all is carried together into “One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident” (*ibid.*) that the will is redeemed. The will to power in its creative aspect does not simply say “But thus I willed it.” It also says “But thus do I will it; thus shall I will it.” (*ibid.*) The creative *will* takes possession of the past but also it wills that the past return as the future, within the cycle of things. The will to power as will to joy makes possible the eternal return as “intense joyful affirmation”<sup>135</sup> as “...joy wants eternity. Joy wants the eternity of *all* things, *wants deep, wants deep eternity.*” (Z, IV: ‘The Drunken Song’, §11) It is the will to power in its life-affirmative capacity that is no longer vengeful towards the past or all that was. It is in this way that there is a link between the Oneness of reality and a new conception of time, of eternity that is the Now. It is through reconciliation with time that the will is transformed into a will that is a “redeemer and joy-bringer.” (Z, II: ‘On Redemption’) The will is reconciled

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<sup>134</sup>See Joan Stambaugh in her *Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return* for an explanation of what Nietzsche means by revenge: “Nietzsche does not simply mean a subjective, “human” emotion. The latter would correspond to Nietzsche’s concept of *ressentiment*. Revenge is an *ontological* concept, which means it is a possibility—according to Nietzsche, *the* exclusively dominating actuality of Life itself up to now.”(Stambaugh, J., *Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return, Op.cit.*, p.10) She also mentions that the will of the “On Redemption” passage is comparable to the Schopenhauerian will (*ibid.*, p.78)

<sup>135</sup>See Joan Stambaugh in her work entitled ‘Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return’ where she discusses the link between the will to power and eternal return (*ibid.*, p.16)

in being redeemed from revenge; it is reconciled with time, it is something higher than any reconciliation: “For that will which is the will to power must will something higher than any reconciliation”. The will in being reconciled with time is a life-affirmative will; it is redeemed from the sheer flux of things (mere becoming) and from the “punishment called existence.” (*ibid.*) The will no longer feels separated from time but rather loses itself in the moment or in eternity that is the Now. It is in this way that there is a link between the redemptive ‘One’ and the ‘Now’ that is eternity or “Being” that is in the Now. This connection is explored in a passage entitled ‘The Convalescent’ in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; it is also the passage which shows that there is the idea of the immanence of eternity in Nietzsche:

“O Zarathustra,” the animals said, “to those who think as we do... Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being. Everything dies, everything blossoms again; eternally runs the year of being. Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally the same house of being is built. Everything parts, everything greets every other thing again; eternally the ring of being remains faithful to itself. In every Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere There. The centre is everywhere. Bent is the path of eternity.” (Z, III: ‘The Convalescent’, §2)

Altizer (1977) in his essay entitled ‘*Eternal Recurrence & Kingdom of God*’, Nietzsche expresses that the eternal recurrence is a celebration of the wheel of “Being”. The wheel of “Being” is the “Dionysian symbol of Eternal Recurrence which reflects the ultimate reality of things themselves.” (Altizer 1977: 242) The image of the wheel parallels with the image of the Ring, the Circle or a Cycle; it is used to convey the Oneness of all things. The word ‘faithful’ in the above passage suggests ‘loyalty’ to the cycle of Being, that all pain is transformed into “a feeling of necessity” or “into the highest order of perfection” which is best symbolized by the circle. (Altizer 1977: 243) Altizer explores the above passage entitled ‘The Convalescent’ from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. He examines the passage in particular its



last three lines which he declares are the most important lines Nietzsche ever wrote<sup>136</sup>: “Being begins in every Now.” (*ibid.*) He then goes on to say that the death of God for Nietzsche as an ending is an eschatological one, such that it is a “radical new beginning”. (*ibid.*) The death of God, Altizer explains brings an end to the transcendence of the beyondness of eternity, which makes Being manifest in every Now. This entails that Being takes on a new meaning, and is no longer eternal; rather, it begins or dawns in every actual moment: “When life or existence is most deeply affirmed, Being becomes identical with the Now: the actual moment of existence

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<sup>136</sup> In spite of Altizer making the claim that these lines or what is referred to as the “animal song” are the most important that Nietzsche ever wrote, these lines that speak of the eternal recurrence are dismissed by Zarathustra. He states that they have made “a hurdy-gurdy song” of it. This suggests that there is a distinction between the animal song and Zarathustra’s song of “Yes and Amen”. Lampert in his *Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* outlines this distinction. The question can then be posed is the animal song inadequate? Altizer’s discussion of the song is being introduced in this thesis not to stress that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of ‘Being’ but rather to stress that there is the idea of the immanence of eternity within Nietzsche’s philosophy. Lampert teases out the distinction while at the same time arguing that the animal song is not so inadequate. He notes that the animals contradict what Zarathustra says, “...for in response to his claim to “dance away over all things” they say that “all things themselves are dancing.”” (Lampert, L., London, Yale University Press, 1986, p.214) There is a distinction between Zarathustra and the animal in that Zarathustra actually experiences the redemption of eternal recurrence whereas they only speak of it. According to Lampert, the animals “belong to the dancing things; they do not fly over them as he does, and in this way Lampert notes that Zarathustra calls the song ““a lyre-song”, a ditty, trivializing thing.” (*ibid.*, p.214) He also stresses that although their song cannot be Zarathustra’s, “it is not for that reason simply false or simply trivial”. (*ibid.*) He also criticizes Heidegger for maintaining so, who takes “the animals to be like the Dwarf, symbolic of inattentive humanity blameable for not grasping the essential matter in eternal return.” (*ibid.*) Lampert goes on to state that “It would hardly be fitting at the climax of the book to record a beautiful song by the honoured animals and mean it to say nothing at all about the teaching for which the book exists. Moreover, what the animals say is close to what Zarathustra said in his vision and what he will say in the next chapter; to speak of redemption as willing the past is quite in keeping with the animals’ interpretation of a joyful recurrence.” (*ibid.*) It seems like Zarathustra experiences the redemption of eternal recurrence whereas the animals don’t experience it, and is trivialized by Zarathustra for this reason. The difference between Zarathustra and the animals is one of perspective according to Lampert, the perspective gained by Zarathustra is singular, “the action of the most spirited of beings, while the perspective sung by the animals is general, the response of beings to the most spiritual blessing on mortal things.” (*ibid.*) Lampert also outlines the animals’ relation to the term ‘Being’, Zarathustra encounters the whole whereas the animals speak freely about the whole, in speaking freely of being, they transform the whole of being into becoming, as Zarathustra himself had done.” (Lampert, *ibid.* p.215 citing Z, III: 9) He states that the animal song is for Nietzsche “metaphysical poetry”, which “celebrates time and becoming; it is praise and justification of the transitory.” (*ibid.* p.215) Lampert, like Altizer above stresses that the animals celebrate “an endless joyful ring in which all things dance” (*ibid.*) However, Altizer emphasizes that the line “Being is in the every Now” implies the immanence of eternity. Eternity and the temporal become one such that eternity becomes immanent in the world, however, as is clear from Lampert any form of redemption is not experienced by the animals but only by Zarathustra. Zarathustra’s songs are more expressive of the experience of redemption whereas the animal song is more expressive of reality as becoming and of time.

becomes Being. The act, the affirmation, the willing of the moment is the eternal creation and recreation of everything. (*ibid.*) Altizer next considers the phrase: “the world of There revolves about every Here.” For him this means that if every moment is Being itself, then all moments of being are equivalent, because every moment must coincide with every other: The idea that all things flow into one another and are interlinked refers to the idea that all things form part of the whole or “all is One” (Z, III: ‘The Yes & Amen Song’) which expresses what he means by redemption. In this passage of the “Yes & Amen Song” he refers to the whole; it is “the blend-mug in which all things are well-blended.” (*ibid.*), there is the redeeming salt which “makes all things blend well in the blend-mug.” (*ibid.*) It is through the eternal recurrence that the veil of Being is dissolved, which brings an end to all those worlds and eternities created by man, the realm of appearance. (Altizer 1977: 243)

Within Nietzsche there is the prophetic idea of a new historical destiny (a new Dionysian existence), a reversal of no-saying, and this idea of a new Dionysian life wants all things, and wants them eternally the same and to truly know the sameness of the same is to know that “the centre is everywhere”. Altizer (1977) notes that the phrase “the centre is everywhere” involves the dissipation of the “here” and “there” of things, such that every unique, singular and absolute centre disappears and with that disappearance, all hierarchical judgement becomes impossible. The traditional symbol of the centre is meaningful only when a chasm between it and the void is assumed. However, that chasm disappears when God is dead, and with it disappears every chasm or ultimate distance whatsoever. In this way, all transcendent centres pass into total immanence, and “centre” as such ceases to be singular or distinct. For Nietzsche, the idea of any real distinction becomes impossible; it is no longer possible to place

boundaries between things, to know a “this” which is “other” than a “that”. In this sense, all things are firmly bound together, no lines or limits are possible, and all things spontaneously flow into each other. Now everything is a centre, because the centre is everywhere. For Altizer, it is possible that for Nietzsche, God is the Centre that is everywhere, but only when God in the absolute sense is dead, only when the negation of his sovereignty and transcendence invests every point and moment with the totality of Being. Stambaugh (1972: 101) defines Nietzsche’s pantheism as the revelation that the world is complete and fulfilled in every moment that God is in every moment. This makes clear what Nietzsche means by the glad tidings of the symbolic teachings of Jesus, which imply the elimination of any distance between God and man. (AC: §33, §41)

Altizer states that the final phrase “Bent is the path of eternity”, reveals that the way of eternity is not only curved or bowed, it is also crooked and circuitous and that “there is no logos of eternity when its path is both curved and crooked, both circular and circuitous.” (1977: 244) In Zarathustra’s drunken midnight song, he sings:

Woe implores: Go! But all joy wants eternity—Wants deep, wants deep Eternity.” Zarathustra himself interprets these words: “joy, however, does not want heirs, or children—joy wants itself, wants eternity, wants recurrence, wants everything eternally the same. (Z, IV: §19, cited in this form in Altizer 1977: 244)

Altizer (1977: 245) claims that this affirmation or yes-saying refutes the very possibility of theoretical or cosmological understanding: “No metaphysical cosmology lies here at hand, nor even an “idea” of Eternal Recurrence, but rather a total existence in the present Now, a now that is here and there, a centre that is everywhere.” He explains that Zarathustra’s symbol of Eternal Recurrence is radically distinguished

from the historical language of Christianity. He maintains that a decisive consequence of Christianity's loss of its original eschatological symbol of the Kingdom of God was that it was thereby led into an apprehension of pure and total love as being "other" than the world. In this respect, historical Christianity, apart from its radical apocalyptic seers, was distantly removed from the proclamation of Jesus, for his "glad tidings" were a proclamation of the advent here and now of the Kingdom of God.

In her work *Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return*, Joan Stambaugh explores the idea that "the centre is in every moment", that is the Eternal Return of the Same as Nietzsche's notion of God. She also argues that the Eternal Return of the Same as the highest form of affirmation is not to be wrongfully conflated with the flux of Becoming.<sup>137</sup> In a section entitled "Nihilism and the Thought of Eternal Return: The

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<sup>137</sup>She argues that in light of Nietzsche's rejection of the traditional metaphysical idea of a causal *ground* to the world, "one is inclined to take his thought of eternal return to mean a world of endless Becoming in which a finite part is allotted to man." (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.35) She contends that Eternal return as "vision and enigma" is an answer to Nietzsche's tremendous question: "Where, where do we belong?" (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.35 citing *Nachlass* (Kroner ed.), vol.83, p.401) She argues that Nietzsche's answer to this question is that the Self enters the abyss of Eternity or belongs to Eternity, which will be discussed further on in the section. She firstly discusses the passage "On the Vision and the Riddle" of Zarathustra not only to elaborate on what Nietzsche means by the moment but also to argue that for Nietzsche, it is the Self that experiences Eternity, which is the non-spatial and not the flux. It is referred to as "The Gateway" in the passage. The moment itself is spatial: "It has nothing to do with the past or the future, or for that matter with the present: it simply lets the flux of time roll through it." (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.39) However, "the meeting of past and future in the moment is *not* spatial". (*ibid.*, p.40) This implies that eternity is not spatial, and that it is objective reality. (See Moles, A., *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology*, Peter Lang, New York, 1990, p. 247-258 for a discussion of Nietzsche's argument that space is not objective reality) Stambaugh holds a similar contention where she mentions Nietzsche's critique of the traditional metaphysics of space and substance. (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.70) She also claims earlier in the same work that eternity for Nietzsche is not spatial. (*ibid.*, p.21) She then mentions that Nietzsche's use of the word "contradiction" of the two paths of past and future in the same passage implies that the individual is forced into the moment itself. (*ibid.*, p.40) The flux of time cannot produce a contradiction. It is that element of time which is a hindrance to eternity, which is mentioned in the "On Redemption" passage. (Z, II: 'On Redemption') A contradiction can only occur in the moment. Past and future meet in the moment and nowhere else. Past and future, and thus all time, thus the eternal return itself, are *in the moment*. (*ibid.*, p.41) When the contradiction is resolved, past and future form a circle. (*ibid.* p.38) Robin Small mentions in his 'Zarathustra's Four Ways' that "The Hour" (Z, III: 'The Wanderer') draws the past and future into itself, whereby they no longer contradict one another as in "The Moment." The "Hour" will be discussed in the final section; it is the homecoming for the dispersed self (Small, R., *Zarathustra's Four Ways: Structures of Becoming in Nietzsche's Thought*, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 9: 1, 83-107, 2001, p.104.) The homecoming involves

Eternal Return of the Same as the Most Extreme Nihilism” of the same work, Stambaugh outlines Nietzsche’s account of the two extreme possibilities of his thought with reference to a passage from *The Will to Power*: §55. (Stambaugh 1972: 16, citing WP: §55) It is either firstly, the most extreme form of nihilism or secondly, the self-attainment of the Same in every moment. The eternal recurrence in its nihilistic form is viewed as “duration with an “in vain,” without goal or purpose, is a most paralyzing thought.” (WP: §55) Its other extreme consideration is eternal return as the “Ring” as the highest form of affirmation; “something is attained in every moment” (WP: §55), which relates to Nietzsche’s new pantheism that is non-static and non-moralistic. (Stambaugh 1972:19) In arguing that Nietzsche adheres to the latter consideration, she then goes on to ask important questions on how Nietzsche relates that “timeless moment” to the rest of time: “...how is one to think the relation of that one “isolated” moment to the rest of time, especially if there is no static eternity sitting off somewhere apart from time?” (Stambaugh 1972: 7) She states that Nietzsche attacks the idea of the moment being opposed to the rest of time or to the continuous flux or extension (duration). (*ibid.*) The term “in every moment” is not to be viewed as the flux of time as duration. She again raises the question “what is the relation of the moment to the “in every moment”? ... The moment and the “in every moment” seem to be incompatible. If the moment is a unique state, then the “in every moment” lies outside that state as the endless flux of time which cannot be contracted into the moment along with it and to annihilate its standing by forcing it to flow on.” (Stambaugh 1972: 25)

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overcoming homelessness or nihilism with the death of God, and it is also argued in this thesis to involve an encounter with the non-spatial, objective reality that is eternity, as the “heavenly.”

However, she maintains that Nietzsche rather set the phrase “in every moment” against duration, that the term “in every moment” does not imply the flux as duration. This is the Eternal Return of the Same in its nihilistic form. She then claims “if something were attained in every moment and if the individual were to experience this as *his* own being, he could triumphantly affirm all existence in every moment.” (*ibid.*) In this way the phrase “in every moment” emphasizes the absolute lack of any kind of duration in the universe. She then references a passage from Nietzsche’s *Nachlass*:

But then it [the individual] discovers that it is itself something changing and has a changing taste. It discovers in its freedom the mystery that there is no individual, that in the smallest moment it is something other than in the next moment...the *infinitely small moment* is the higher reality and truth is the lightning flash out of the eternal flux. (Nachlass, XII: 45, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 25)

She later in the same work extrapolates the relation between the phrase “in every moment” and “The Moment”:

The Moment is not an isolated instant somehow lifted out of the chain of temporal succession. The question of how the moment is related to the rest of time is a spurious one. Only what is extended also in the sense of enduring and remaining, can be “related” as one thing is to another. The moment does not relate to the rest of time, because the rest of time never *is* in the sense of persistence. The moment “relates” to every moment in such a way that one moment *is* every moment...something can be attained at every moment—and always the Same. (Stambaugh 1972: 107-108)

In this way there is no distinction between the phrase “in every moment” and the moment; and it is for this reason that eternity and time do not stand in opposition to one another, and the phrase “in every moment” is not to be looked at as duration. Nietzsche’s concept of eternity does not present itself as something that stands in opposition to time, but rather as a dimension of time itself: the ground is removed for such an opposition, and “eternity brightens at noon”. (Stambaugh 1987: 184) Stambaugh again notes the passage from *The Will to Power* (§55) where Nietzsche

overturns the nihilistic consideration of eternal return: “Can we remove the idea of a goal from the process and then affirm the process in spite of this?—This would be the case if something were attained at every moment within this process—and always the same.”<sup>138</sup> (Stambaugh 1972: 108) This notion that something is attained in every moment relates to Nietzsche’s notion of God:

The dichotomy between “one” and “every” disappears because it is precisely the “no end” quality of one moment which allows every moment to arise and allows the world to be “the attained release of God in every moment.” (BT, ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism,’ §5, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 114)

Thus Nietzsche can speak of the “absolute instantaneity of the Will to Power” (Nachlass, XII: 62, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 114) and can say that “every power draws its ultimate consequences in every moment.” (WP: §634, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 114)

In the same work, Stambaugh explores this idea of the “circle” as the highest form of affirmation, and relates it to the eternal return as the ring of rings, and in turn to Nietzsche’s idea of God. It is in the phenomenon of power that the non-moral affirmation of “God” is to be found: “The only possibility of maintaining a meaning for the concept “God” would be: God not as driving force, but God as maximal state, as an epoch.” (WP: §639) Stambaugh notes that with the word “epoch” Nietzsche defines power as a “holding to itself,” a “checking itself.” (Stambaugh 1972: 100) This checking is not related to any kind of external hindrance blocking the Will to Power. It is a self-checking, a self-ruling. It is in this way that God is not to be thought of as initiator of the world or as its driving force, but rather God as the maximal state

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<sup>138</sup> See also Stambaugh’s later work *The Problem of Time in Nietzsche, Op.cit.*, p.184.

or, as expressed in another passage, as the moment of culmination. Stambaugh contends that for Nietzsche “God” as moment of culmination implies that existence is an eternal becoming and disappearance of the godlike: ““God” as the moment of culmination: existence an eternal deifying and un-deifying. But in that not a high point of value, but a high point of power.” (WP: §712, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 100) She also notes the passage from *The Will to Power* (§1037) where Nietzsche mentions that the world “follows” from God. (Stambaugh 1972: 100) She then argues that he characterizes the word “follows” as “around”: “Around the hero everything becomes tragedy, around the demi-god everything becomes satyr-play; and around God everything becomes—what? perhaps ‘world’?” (BGE: §150, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 100) This passage suggests the image of a centre of power from which the world radiates. It seeks to describe the “ring of rings” in its aspect of power and what follows from that power. (Stambaugh 1972: 100) It is also reminiscent of the “wheel rolling out itself” (Z, III: ‘The Convalescent’), and the ring that is referred to as the blend-mug.<sup>139</sup> (Z, III: ‘The Seven Seals’)

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<sup>139</sup> Alan White in his work *Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth* examines what the ring means for Nietzsche. In the “Seven Seals” this ring is described as the “wedding ring of rings,” it is a ring of “high time,” and at the end of each of the seals Zarathustra proclaims: “Oh, how should I not lust after eternity and after the nuptial ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?” (Z, III: §16) This idea of “high time,” like the ring, is closely linked with the doctrine of return. White notes that “long before Zarathustra confronts the thought of the return, he knows that it is “high time” (Z, II: §18; Z, III: §3) for him to do so.” (White, A., *Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth*, London, Routledge, 1990, p.98) At his “highest time,” Zarathustra affirms the “ring of return” as the ring that binds future to past, joy to pain and even noble to base. White makes a reference to the fourth of the Seven Seals, entitled “Of the Ring of Rings” in Nietzsche’s fair copy of the manuscript, which clearly reveals that the function of the “ring of rings” is the conjoining of opposites. In the fourth seal, Nietzsche praises the whole or the One, with all its conflicting and contradictory parts, with reference to the “blend mug in which all things are well blended.” (Z, III: §16.4) White explains that the ring of return praised in “The Seven Seals,” is not a ring that rolls; as understood by the dwarf and by Zarathustra’s animals, it is not a ring that rolls, it is not a ring of repetition, but rather of *unification*. White acknowledges that the idea of “eternal return,” has been interpreted as “hypothesis, as perspective, and as challenge,” and as “endless sequential repetition;” (White, A., *Op. cit.*, p.69) however, he also wishes to consider another sense of “eternal return” (*ibid.*, p.70) that of the ring of return that severs Zarathustra’s “deep, deep, eternity” from any state of mindless oblivion or repetition.



Stambaugh maintains that in spite of Nietzsche's denial that there is a causal ground to the world, affirmation is possible; something is attained in that process in every moment, and it is always the Same. She explains that the attainment of the Same in every moment is what he calls a God beyond good and evil. (Stambaugh 1972: 101) This link between power and God relates to what Nietzsche calls his kind of pantheism:

Nietzsche's pantheism does not say "God is everywhere" or "God is everything"; rather, it emphasizes that God is in every moment. This is a "temporal" determination of God, or power, temporal not in the sense of making God finite but as a way of thinking that is not spatial." (*ibid.*)

This way of thinking that is not spatial is what Nietzsche refers to as *thought*, which is to be distinguished from factual thinking.<sup>140</sup> Eternal return is to be regarded as a *thought*, not as a fact: "The fundamental meaning of the word "thought" here is not that of an idea *about* something existent. "Thought" points to the possibility of

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<sup>140</sup>Stambaugh mentions that the Will to Power relates to the "what" of the world or the "last facts" at which we can arrive. The will to power is the givenness of the world, in the sense of what is *there*, than to its essence, or *what* is there. She also states that "If the Will to Power is in any sense the "what" of the world, it is the "what" in that it is the last *fact* at which we can arrive." (Stambaugh, *Op.cit.*, p.101 quoting *Nachlass* Kröner ed., vol. 83, p.288) This consideration of the will to power relating to the what of the world reveals that Stambaugh was influenced by Heidegger, and his account of the will to power in his work '*Nietzsche vol. III*' (Heidegger, N., *Nietzsche III*, J. Stambaugh D.F., Krell & F.A., Capuzzi (trans.), New York, Harper One, 1991) Stambaugh actually notes Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche as "the last thinker of Western Metaphysics" in terms of the essence/existence distinction (what/how distinction of the world) of traditional metaphysics. (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.94) In spite of this consideration of the will to power, she also mentions that it is not simply a natural force: "In its fully developed form it includes the "higher" manifestations of consciousness. The living being does not strive for happiness; it strives for power, for the More in power. Joy is a symptom of power." (*ibid.*, p.81) Stambaugh is referring to passage (§688) of *The Will to Power* with regard to Nietzsche's notion of "becoming more." The higher manifestation of consciousness is not the mere conscious *ego* but insight that can glimpse Eternity. The More is the Eternal Return of the Same as God or Power. In this way it can be inferred that the higher type becomes god-like in his striving for Power, a power that it ultimately manifests itself in joy.

In this thesis I am claiming that the will to power is a "philosophical eros" in light of Alex Mc Intyre's work '*The Sovereignty of Joy*'. It is an eros that attunes the higher self to reality; it brings one to the limit, which points to an Ultimate or a Beyond (God). It is being argued in a similar vein to Stambaugh that the self in its experience of eternal return is transformed through "root awareness" or the most fundamental thought. (*ibid.*, p.101) It is an experience of a dimension that is non-spatial, of objective reality or which is being argued in this thesis to be eternity.

transformation through root awareness.” (*ibid.*) Eternal return offers the possibility of a joyous affirmation of the “Same” in the world. This “same” is, according to Stambaugh, Nietzsche’s experience of the Self: “It is the meeting of “my own return” with “the ring of rings.””(1972: 102)

Who are you, my soul?... oh, heaven above me, ... when will you drink this strange soul—when, well of eternity! You serene, awesome abyss of midday! When will you drink my soul back into yourself? (Z, III: ‘Midday’, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 102)

This experience of the self negates time as succession; it involves the experience of timelessness. In two chapters of *Zarathustra*, “Midday” and “The Drunken Song,” Nietzsche describes Zarathustra’s experience of “no time.”<sup>141</sup> In both chapters the

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<sup>141</sup>Nietzsche’s experience of “no time” does not imply a complete rejection of time as duration. Stambaugh mentions that Nietzsche doesn’t deny duration, but only denies the eternal recurrence viewed in terms of duration, which is eternal return viewed in its nihilistic form. According to Stambaugh, this would involve an overly simplistic interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought of eternal return: “everything, including man, is born, lives its life, dies, and in some unfathomable way is reborn. Time moves in continuous cycles, bringing everything back again in repetition.” (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.104-105) It is possible to argue that Nietzsche does not deny duration but that he contends that eternal return and duration should not be wrongfully conflated. Stambaugh then poses the question: “What would happen to the thought of eternal return if one took away this framework of time?” (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.105) This framework of time (duration), if it were removed, “Recurrence,” or return, would take place in an instant, in every instant” (*ibid.*)

It seems that Stambaugh is arguing that time as duration is necessarily experienced by man throughout his life from birth to death, but that “momentarily” man experiences eternal return as “no time” or timelessness. Her point may require further extrapolation, which is as follows: this experience only has meaning because of the experience of time as duration. There are, for Nietzsche rather different dimensions of time, and when it comes to experiencing the eternal return, time as duration is negated. Time as duration, as the flux is no longer experienced by man, in glimpsing Eternity as the Eternal Return of the Same. It is only in this sense that time as duration is rejected, as the source of truth. Stambaugh does not use the term “negate” but rather states in another of her works entitled ‘*The Problem of Time in Nietzsche*’ that “the structure of time *changes...*” (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.183) Stambaugh claims that The Moment that is experienced is not to be viewed as existing “outside” time as duration, as the term “outside” is a spatial category. The Eternal Return of the Same Moment is rather a different structure of time from time as duration. For Stambaugh’s argument that the moment does not arise out of the flux, or exists alongside the flux (simultaneously) see her other work entitled ‘*The Problem of Time in Nietzsche*’ (*ibid.*,p.184) It is only those who self-overcome go on to experience this kind of time. In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche mentions that “The Kingdom of Heaven is a condition of the heart...it is... something that comes at every moment and at every moment has not yet arrived—” (WP: §161) It may come at every moment but may not be experienced as The Moment until a certain point in one’s life. For Stambaugh, Nietzsche’s experience of eternal return or of “no time” involves “fragmentary, momentary insights”; it is the “stroke of lightning.” She then refers to a passage from his *Nachlass*:

“well of eternity” is referred to, which relates to an experience of “eternity” that has nothing to do with endless persistence in some transcendent realm. Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the well to express what he means by eternity; it is used to convey the purely vertical experience of vertigo when released from horizontal or successive time. Both “midday” and “midnight” are the “same:” “Midday emphasizes the blinding flash of lightning striking consciousness; midnight emphasizes the dark, deep well reabsorbing consciousness.” (Stambaugh 1972: 106) Eternity as the ring of rings has no teleology in the mechanistic sense. It is not causally or mechanistically determined, it rather circles back into itself; its whole being is return. (Stambaugh 1972: 107) It is for this reason there is no “God” as substance in the Christian sense. There is God only as the highest *power* from which follows the world. Eternity, for Nietzsche is not static persistence, but rather sheer activity:

Nietzsche was able to glimpse eternity as sheer occurrence, not as static persistence. Eternity *is* eternal return of the Same. The Same is not a thing or a person recurring in endless cycles of absolute time. The Same *is* return. Return can “occur” only in the moment. It can never be constituted by durational cycles, for these cycles never meet, never produce a return; they are only endless, meaningless recurrence.<sup>142</sup>(*ibid.*)

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You think you have a long rest until rebirth—but do not fool yourselves! Between the last moment of consciousness and the first appearance of new life lies “no time”—it passes by like a stroke of lightning, even if living creatures measure it in terms of billions of years or could not measure it at all. Timelessness and succession are compatible as soon as the intellect is gone. (Stambaugh, p.106 citing Nietzsche, *Nachlass* (Kröner ed.), vol. 83, no.1341)

The disappearance of the intellect occurs in such chapters as “At Noon” and “The Drunken Song.” (Z, IV, At Noon; Z, IV: ‘The Drunken Song’) She makes reference to the *Nachlass* where Nietzsche speaks of the experience of the Same by the Self, and states that it involves the pledge of one’s own return to “the ring of rings”, and a release into the enigma of Dionysus. (Stambaugh, p.106 quoting Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, XVI: 315) She notes that this release into the enigma is not an intellectual disposition. In being released (in the sense of *solvere*) into the enigma of Dionysus one is pledging oneself to the ring of rings through pledging one’s return not to “the world of endlessly repeated cycles, but into the abyss of “eternity,” which is the ring of rings. (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.107) In her *The Problem of Time in Nietzsche* she states that he who does not believe in the “doctrine,” “has a *fleeting* life in consciousness. He experiences “time” as the flux of becoming. (Stambaugh, J., *Op.cit.*, p.184)

<sup>142</sup>This relates to Stambaugh’s earlier argument that the relation between the phrase “in every moment” (WP: §55) and The moment is a spurious one in ‘Nietzsche Thought of Eternal Return.’ It relates to the notion that God as the highest power is in every moment. (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.107/114) It is also relates to the instantaneity of the moment, which is one of the characteristics of time. (*ibid.*, p.11. The vertical notion of eternity is a spatial concept; however, eternity itself is non-spatial, for Nietzsche. As

In the passage from Zarathustra cited above from “Midday” or “At Noon”, there is reference to the experience of falling into the well of eternity, a metaphor for the vertical nature of time, which is to encounter the heavenly. Zarathustra speaks to the strange soul who sighs, “O heaven over me!” It is the strange soul that drinks of the well of eternity; Zarathustra asks of the heavenly “when will you drink this drop of dew which has fallen upon all earthly things?” or “When will you drink my soul back into yourself?” (Z, IV: ‘At Noon’) The earthly like the worldly is an expression of God, the world or earth radiates from the “Supreme Power.” (WP: §1037) The experience of being released into the well of eternity is an un-worldly experience; it is an experience of the heavenly (eternity) on earth or in *this* life. The experience of the non-spatial can be argued to be comparable to Christ’s experience of the “feeling of eternity” (AC: §34) an experience Nietzsche declares that presupposes a distinction between Christ and Christianity. For Nietzsche, objective reality is not spatial or to be viewed as external reality; therefore the experience of the objective must be through the subjective or is within you. This is comparable to what Christ means by the Kingdom of God (eternity/objective) that is within you. (AC: §33-34) This is not to deny objective reality but to contend that it is not to be wrongfully conflated with space or what is humanly perceived as external reality.

Nietzsche’s idea of God as Eternity that is in every moment relates to the idea of God as the Ultimate.<sup>143</sup> Eternity as the Ultimate is a kind of “absolute” in terms of being

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Stambaugh explains that the spatial concept of the vertex is used only to show that Nietzsche has strayed from traditional (horizontal) time. (*ibid.*)

<sup>143</sup>Nietzsche’s notion of God as Eternity that is in every moment does not imply that God is reducible to time. Stambaugh maintains that Eternity is irreducible to time. She notes that Nietzsche did not uphold the traditional distinction between eternity and time; however, this does not mean that he simply

“released” from the world. However, Nietzsche’s consideration of the absolute as temporal implies that it must be distinguished from traditional conceptions of the absolute. There is a parallel between Nietzsche’s Ultimate as God and Anselm’s God as Beyond.<sup>144</sup> Stambaugh also notes this similarity in her work *Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return*: “Transferring the general formulation of Anselm’s argument to the setting of Nietzsche’s thought, that beyond which it is impossible to go (an expression of the highest transcendence) might become that after which nothing more can come: the Ultimate.” (Stambaugh 1972: 124) She then examines these two phrases: “unable to go beyond” and “nothing more can come”, and the way in which they differ. She looks at the second phrase firstly: “First of all, the second phrase lacks an explicit emphasis on thought. This is in keeping with Nietzsche’s rejection of the cogito (and thus indirectly of Anselm’s *quo maius cogitari nihil possit*) and his avoidance of the

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equated them. The strict “immanence” of Nietzsche’s thought does not reduce eternity to the level of time. (*ibid.*, p.5)

<sup>144</sup>Anselm in *The Proslogion II* outlines an argument for the existence of God as “something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.” For an outline of the argument see Brecher, R., *Anselm’s argument: The Logic of Divine Existence*, Vermont, Gower Publishing Company, 1985, p.36. Descartes’ formulation of the argument is known to be an ontological one. Kant criticizes the argument for being ontological in the sense that it conforms to a subjective idealism (God as concept exists in the mind therefore God exists in reality), and also argues that existence cannot be a predicate, where the predicate “perfect” is assigned to God or existence. Existence, like “Being” (God) is not a thing which has a predicate. Existence is not a property; it is rather a metaphysically necessary condition for the instantiation of any properties. Anscombe (a student of Wittgenstein) reformulates the argument (anti-cartesian) and argues that for Anselm, God is Being and not a mental representation. For a discussion of Anscombe on Anselm see Hopkins, J., *A New, Interpretative Translation of St. Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion*, Minneapolis, The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986. There is in this way a similarity between Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on Being as God.

Stambaugh also sums up Anselm’s argument in her ‘*Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return*’ as follows:

Anselm, for instance, defined God as that than which nothing greater can be thought. In contrast to Descartes, who subsequently turned Anselm’s “than which nothing greater can be thought” into the highest being, Anselm preserved the element of an absolute transcendence of God. Whereas for Descartes God is the highest being reached by thought, for Anselm God is always still beyond thought, no matter how far thought transcends the world. One could formulate Anselm’s idea in a more general fashion and say that God is that which thought cannot go beyond, which implies also that thought cannot actually attain God, for what has been attained is at the same time in a certain sense transcended. (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.123-124)

later development of that *cogito* as transcendental reflection.” (*ibid.*) Secondly, the first phrase “unable to go beyond” (in thought) becomes: “nothing more can come.” For Stambaugh, “The first phrase expresses the absolute limit of transcendence. The second phrase expresses the absolute ending of occurrence.” <sup>145</sup> (*ibid.*) She explains that the shift from the first to the second phrase represents the difference between the transcending movement of thought (going beyond finite things) and the ending movement of time as sheer occurrence, which encompasses possibilities of thought and “being.”(*ibid.*) She then explains the difference between transcending and ending: “Transcendence “climbs over” things, leaving them behind in order to approach something which it can no longer transcend. Standing on the foundation of transcended finite things, thought stops short before an absolute limit which it cannot transcend.” (*ibid.*) Transcendence shows the inadequacy of human thinking or mere conscious thinking in the face of an absolute. There is only a certain type of awareness and insight that can glimpse the absolute and that is philosophical transcending thinking. It is in this way that philosophical transcending thinking is opposed to intellectual thinking, which knows “beings” or things; the former kind of thinking is the most fundamental, and in turn, it allows the Ultimate to reveal itself.

Stambaugh then explains what is meant by ending, and the way in which it is opposed to transcendence; ending “is the self-release of the moment. It is not an end or a limit which must be transcended. An end or a limit closes something off, sets its boundaries...ending as the self-release of the moment neither closes something off nor

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<sup>145</sup>Stambaugh explains what is meant by eternity as the absolute ending of occurrence (*ibid.*, p125) Eternity is that in which occurrence ends. Occurrence or time ending into eternity implies that nothing is “left over”, which necessitates further occurrence or repetition. (*ibid.*) At a human level, one is constantly repeating actions or events, whereas with eternity there is no repetition or re-occurrence at this level. In this way “in eternity a finality is attained which we normally associate with the past...The condition of that finality is the *absence* of something...Eternity, however, can never be past, because it is never “in time.” Eternity preserves this element of finality *in presence.*”( *ibid.*)

leaves anything behind, but rather allows things to be.” (*ibid.*) It relates to the instantaneity of time, there is a constant release of the moment or ending into eternity. Things can only be the product of such activity: “Only the self-release of the moment makes the unobstructed being of things possible.” (Stambaugh 1972: 125) It is because eternity is the absolute ending of occurrence, that there is a finality attained in it, which is “a finality *in presence*.” (*ibid.*) Eternity is not some changeless static absolute having nothing to do with time or occurrence; it is “changeless” only in the sense that what is attained can never be lost, because nothing can come after it. (*ibid.*) Eternity is neither “in time” nor out of time in the sense of being the changeless absolute that excludes it. Eternity is not the changeless absolute, but rather the absolving (*ab-solvere*) of time. (Stambaugh 1972: 126) She explains that time as the instantaneous again and again of the moment *ends into* eternity; it is in this way that eternity is the absolving of time. Eternity is not the instantaneous again and again of the moment, it is rather the “absolved never again.” (*ibid.*) She also mentions that “eternity is not the ‘goal’ of time in the sense that it could be attained by a directed process. Instantaneous time lacks the continuity to build up such a cumulative process. It does not accumulate processually. It culminates into the extreme ultimate.” (*ibid.*) This culmination into the extreme ultimate<sup>146</sup> is what is referred to as “God.”

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<sup>146</sup>Stambaugh earlier in her work ‘*Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return*’ criticizes eternity as the general whole. She ascertains that God as Power is a “More”, and as a growing tension (the true whole) differs from endless Becoming, that which endures or persists. The extreme ultimate is not to be confused with the old absolute. She contends that “Power as More is not a universal, general whole which subsumes and includes the sum of manifold things in the world.” (*ibid.*, p.20) According to Stambaugh, if it was the case that Power was a universal generic present at all times, it would make, for Nietzsche existence into a monstrosity. (*ibid.*) It would also imply that time would not have a reality of its own, and time and eternity would be mutually exclusive of one another. (*ibid.*) This however is not the case: “The “absolute” quality of eternity is not an unapproachable freedom (absolute); it is rather a freeing (*ab-solvere*). (*ibid.*) Stambaugh also claims that in opposition to the traditional absolute, eternity can have no relation to extension or space. (*ibid.*)

The eternal return is not only expressed in *The Gay Science* (§341) and in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* but also in *Beyond Good and Evil*. In part three of *Beyond Good and Evil* entitled 'What is religious', Nietzsche rather ambiguously suggests that eternal return could be God, "*circulus vitiosus deus*" or the ring of eternal return. The passage that Nietzsche expresses the eternal return as "*circulus vitiosus deus*" is as follows:

Whoever has endeavoured with some enigmatic longing, as I have, to think pessimism through to its depths and to liberate it from the half-German narrowness and simplicity in which it has finally presented itself to our century, namely, in the form of Schopenhauer's philosophy; whoever has really, with an Asiatic and supra-Asiatic eye, looked into, down into the most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking—beyond good and evil and no longer, like Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the spell and delusion of morality—may just thereby, without really meaning to do so, have opened his eyes to the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive and world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have *what was and is* repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably *da capo*—not only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle, and not only to a spectacle but at bottom to him who needs precisely this spectacle—and who makes it necessary because again and again he needs himself—and makes himself necessary—What? And this wouldn't be—*circulus vitiosus deus*? (BGE: §56)

It is clear from this passage that Nietzsche embraces some sort of new ideal, a new one that is life-affirmative whereby one enters into an ideal relation with reality as eternal return of the same. This new ideal is identified with redemption, with one who has "made his peace" with whatever was, and who "makes himself necessary." (BGE: §56) This "ideal" is referred to as the "opposite ideal"; it is the attainable ideal. In spite of Nietzsche's many references where he rejects God, that is in the Christian and moral sense, the question does arise again from this passage, could Nietzsche be advocating a God? If so, it is only in the strict sense of God as the ring of eternal return. This is God in the pantheistic sense where God and world are one, that this is God as "*circulus vitiosus deus*". The attainable ideal as *amor fati*, for Nietzsche is the experience of the glimpse into eternity.



Lampert in his work “*Nietzsche’s Task*” also comments on the passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* (§56), which shows the necessary connection between the will to power and eternal return. He states that Nietzsche in the same passage hints “that it is a vindication of God to see the world from the inside as will to power and nothing else, he allows his new ideal<sup>147</sup> to be glimpsed in a different way—appropriately enough in the chapter on religion”. (Lampert 2001: 255) He stresses that for Nietzsche religious cruelty has sacrificed God for “the stone, stupidity, gravity, fate, the nothing;” (Lampert 2001: 255 citing BGE: §55) and that, “all of us already know something of this” cruelty of honest nihilism. (*ibid.*) Lampert also makes the very important point that for Nietzsche, the sacrifice of God and the culminating nihilism can be lived through:

But the one who has thought it through to its depths “may just thereby, without really meaning to do so, have opened his eyes” (56) on the ideal opposite to the old ideal of renunciation and sacrifice, the new ideal of the saint of eternal return who does not merely resign himself to “whatever was and is” but shouts insatiably, “Once more,” to the whole marvellous spectacle of which he himself is a part. (Lampert 2001: 255)

He then notes that Nietzsche asserts a possible objection: “What? And would this not be *circulus vitiosus deus?*”, and in doing so, he introduces a playful ambiguity to his thought. He states that the above passage prompts the question: “—Is the circle of eternal return a refutation or a vindication of God?” for Nietzsche. The ambiguity here is also stressed more intensely, according to Lampert “in Nietzsche’s first report of his

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<sup>147</sup> This new ideal of glimpsing eternity as the most life-affirmative and earthly experience is argued by Lampert to be an interpretation of the world. Although Lampert looks at Nietzsche as a philosopher of Truth with a capital ‘T’ that is of Becoming in his ‘*Nietzsche’s Task*’, he argues that the new ideal in Nietzsche is an interpretation of the world. There are also commentators like Sadler who argue to the contrary that there is a distinction for Nietzsche between tragic insight and a conscious perspective that the latter belongs to Nietzsche’s epistemology, that is conscious knowledge of things, and is ultimately a falsification of reality (GS: §354)

thought of eternal return, for there the one who hears the thought is either crushed by its demonic gravity or moved to say to the one who brings the thought: “You are a god and never have I heard anything so divine” (GS 341)” (Lampert 2001: 255 citing GS: §341) In his essay ‘*Nietzsche’s Philosophy and True Religion*’ (2006), Lampert claims that this aphorism of *Beyond Good and Evil* (§56) echoes a previous one, aphorism (§37) in asking the question “What? And this wouldn’t be—*circulus vitiosus deus*?” Is the new deal just a vicious circle made god? This time *we* have to add “On the contrary! On the contrary!” where the contrary is the *virtuous* circle, the circle of *life*, made god.” (Lampert 2006: 143) He contends that for Nietzsche, new gods are necessary but ones that are strictly life-affirmative. The God of tradition, the supernatural God is to be seen as “an all powerful tyrant who set the world under a curse, assigning it to the Prince of the world, the so-called Devil.” (2006: 139) This idea of a supernatural God rendered nature the devil’s work, which Nietzsche wishes to overturn: “what was once seen as the Devil’s is vindicated as divine.” (2006: 140) He also asserts in making reference to “Before Sunrise” of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that Nietzsche’s idea of a new ideal that is life-affirmative includes the possibility of a new Good. (2006: 137, 142)

If eternal return is to be vindicated as a God then the release into God as “*circulus vitiosus deus*” is a feeling of eternity on earth; it is eternity in the immanent sense. It is the higher self that reaches the heights, an eternity within Becoming which is reminiscent of Plato’s vision of the Good, the *Agathon*.<sup>148</sup> Both thinkers affirm a

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<sup>148</sup>Although Nietzsche and Plato embrace a reality higher than the human, they differ on the human being’s most fundamental relation to that reality. For Nietzsche, it is rapture or vision; it involves the “Great Reason of the body” whereas, for Plato, it involves the mind. See also footnote no. 91 of chapter II where it is mentioned that Nietzsche wishes to overturn the ocular-centrism of the metaphysical tradition. It must also be mentioned that Nietzsche’s association of the pursuit of Truth with the mountain climb is not entirely similar to Plato’s. Although both Plato’s and Nietzsche’s philosophers

reality higher than the human, the realm of Being for Plato, and Becoming for Nietzsche. Nietzsche embraces a new ideal, a life-affirmative one, of *amor fati*, which is “this-worldly”, as it affirms an “Eternity” that is within Becoming. The only type of ideal Nietzsche embraces is one that is attainable such an attainable ideal Nietzsche recognizes in Plato in the first stage of ‘How the ‘True World’ finally became a fable’. This is a stage where Plato’s philosophy is not yet anything Platonic or Christian, in the sense of an ethic that is life-denying. Being, for Plato (not Platonism), and Becoming for Nietzsche, is not a “Beyond” in the sense that knowledge of it is an

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descend to man, the earth after experiencing knowledge of the highest things, it must however be noted that there is a distinction between Plato and Zarathustra’s cave. This distinction has been overlooked by McIntyre. See footnote no. 65 of chapter II where there is an outline of Alex Mc Intyre’s discussion of the “descent of creation” in Nietzsche or the philosopher’s return to man after his ascent to the vision of the Good. Plato’s philosopher’s descent to man involves a return to the cave, which represents earth, whereas Nietzsche’s philosopher’s descent is from the cave to man. Plato’s cave is a place of complete darkness, whereas Nietzsche’s cave is high in the mountains, full of light and clarity; it is a place of enlightenment, and self-reflection. The cave for Nietzsche is on top of a mountain, a metaphor for the climb or the struggle of overcoming, and is the site of solitude, and wisdom. However, for Plato the cave is a place where all men reside, it is not a place of solitude. This solitude involves intense self-examination, or self-reflection that in turn leads to self-redemption. The cave for Nietzsche, is ‘inward’, it is a “labyrinth of the heart.” (*Schopenhauer as Educator*: §3) Nietzsche unlike Plato emphasizes the role isolation plays in encountering the highest things. He proclaims that Zarathustra “...left his home and the lake of his home and went into the mountains. Here he enjoyed his spirit and his solitude, and for ten years did not tire of it.... “For ten years you have climbed to my cave...” (Z, Prologue: §1) Nietzsche refers to the mountain climber as “The wanderer” (Z, III: §1) as the person who descends into his own pain, the highest climb involves the deepest pain: “To you I must now go *down!* Before my highest mountain I stand and before my longest wondering; to that end I must first go down deeper than I ever descended—deeper into pain than ever I descended, down into its blackest flood. Thus my destiny wants it. Well, I am ready.” (*ibid.*) Then there comes the day that Zarathustra decides to descend to man, and in overflowing with wisdom he desires to give men a gift. ““For that I must descend to the depths...I must *go under*—go down, as is said by man, to whom I want to descend...Bless the cup that wants to overflow, that the water may flow from it golden and carry everywhere the reflections of your delight....“I love man.”...I bring men a gift.” (Z, Prologue: §1-2) Zarathustra wishes that man experience the joy that he feels and he professes his wisdom to a select few, those who will listen, whereas Plato’s Philosopher (Socrates) persuades all to leave the cave. Each time Zarathustra returns to his cave, the growth of his wisdom causes him pain, and he decides to descend again. “Then Zarathustra returned again to the mountains and to the solitude of his cave and withdrew from men...But his soul grew full of impatience and desire for those whom he loved, because he still had much to give them...Thus months and years passed for the solitary; but his wisdom grew and caused him pain with its fullness.” (Z, II: ‘The Child with Mirror’)

To encounter truth as an experience of the deepest joy does not occur on the mountain but rather when the self returns home to itself. (Z, III: ‘The Wanderer’) The mountain climb represents the struggle on the way to Truth; one must make the transition to the way of greatness in order to encounter Truth. Nietzsche’s cave is to be contrasted with the cave of Christ’s resurrection that is upheld by Christian dogma, where the soul is viewed in terms of atomism or substance, and resurrection is viewed in literal terms. The cave of Nietzsche’s philosopher is the site of resurrection as rebirth (GS, Preface: §3-4), a second innocence, to be born a new after illness. It enables the philosopher to experience *amor fati*; it enables the soul to enter into the Ultimate or God as Eternal Return of the Same.

unattainable ideal. This comparison between Nietzsche and Plato can only be properly understood when one takes into account the distinction between Plato and Platonism. Nietzsche is similar to Plato on the question of Being as reality, but radically different from Platonism (Kantian and Christian) conception of the “true world” which is divorced from us as human beings through the moral ascetic ideal. This distinction can be noted in relation to the first stage of ‘How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable: the history of an Error.’ (TI: §4) In the first stage, the “true world” is not yet anything “Platonic,” that is, not something unattainable (moral ascetic ideal). The true world here does not relate to the Christian or Kantian ethic of reward, of happiness as an unattainable ideal in a “beyond” (Platonism), which is life-denying. It seems that the fact that the “true world” is unattainable is what renders it a “beyond.” It can be argued that Plato’s Being is to be distinguished from Platonism that he saw that Plato embraces some sort of wisdom that is attainable that does not relate to a “beyond”. In relation to the first stage of ‘How the ‘True World’ finally became a fable’, Nietzsche adds the following commentary in parentheses:

The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, *he is it*. (The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, “I. Plato, *am* the truth.”).

For both thinkers, knowledge of reality can be attained through insight, therefore it is attainable on earth. It is in this way that Nietzsche is an advocate of the immanence of eternity; it can be felt by man *in this life*. The extent to which the philosophical type ascends to reality is determined by the extent to which this type withdraws from “worldly” opinions, engaging in a reality of mere things. This withdrawal is therefore other-worldly only in this sense. Zarathustra’s pursuit of truth implies that he must

embrace solitude and turn his back on the “way of the world.” (Z, I: ‘On the Flies of the Marketplace’) This way is the way of actors, of mere opinions or shadows. (Zuckert 1985: 23)

Nietzsche’s Zarathustra experiences the deepest joy after ascending to or encountering the innocence of all Becoming, he reaches “the way to greatness” (Z, III: ‘The Wanderer’) and wishes to descend to the earth, to man in order to impart his knowledge of the highest things, as he wishes for man to experience the joy he feels. It is in this way that the overman or the “more than human” is the “meaning of the earth” (Z, P: §3); he embodies life-affirmation and glimpses eternity on earth. It is “this-worldly” joy and not after-worldly joy that Nietzsche affirms, a joy experienced in this life is to be affirmed. In a passage entitled ‘On the After-worldly’, Nietzsche rejects “the heavenly” in its relation to a joy that can never be attained, and asserts that an ascetic ideal (Kantian) that removes reality from us “it is a world concealed from humans.” (Z, I: §3) However, in a passage entitled “Before Sunrise”, Nietzsche speaks of “the heavenly” that can be accessed through dancing: “O heaven over me, pure and high! ...you are to me a dance floor for divine accidents...” (Z, III: §4) Nietzsche also speaks of the “heavenly need that constrains even accidents to dance star-dances...” (Z, III: ‘The Yes & Amen Song’) What was once thought of as heavenly in the after-worldly sense is to be reversed, as the “heavenly” joy is now to be experienced as earthly. This dancing-joy that Nietzsche refers to is earthly joy, which coincides with taking a Dionysian attitude that is life-affirmative. This attitude in turn implies that Nietzsche’s idea of the “higher type” is loyal to the earth, as Zarathustra proclaims in the prologue “remain faithful to the earth” (Z, P: §3). This loyalty to the earth also involves the earth becoming the sole source of value, and in turn enables the earth to

be raised to the highest level. For Nietzsche, it is in this way that dancing is the highest order of rank, and is also characteristic of what Nietzsche foresees as the New Dionysian Age to come. As Zarathustra proclaims that, it is the alpha and omega, “that is that all that is heavy and grave should become light; all that is body, dancer; all that is spirit, bird—” (Z, III: §16)

Nietzsche wishes to replace an old totality of ‘No-Saying’ that of the Christian or Platonic conception of Being, the after-worldly with a new totality of ‘Yes-Saying’, a Dionysian reality of Becoming. He also in turn wishes to replace Christian life-denying or ‘No-saying’ values with a mysticism that comprises of a Dionysian life-affirmative philosophy. As Lampert (2001: 256) states that “the songs of Zarathustra’s soul will bring the return of the earthly religion of Dionysos, which celebrates the divinity of earthly things.”, and that “Through the philosopher Zarathustra, the religion of Dionysos triumphs over the vengeful religion of the Father Sky who wills that Mother Earth be other than she is...” The teaching of eternal return is the focal point of the new “faith and love” which comprises of love of life and loyalty to the earth and takes “overcoming” as the new measure of all things. (Lampert 2001: 257 citing Z, I: ‘On the Thousand and One Goals’)

Nietzsche is an apocalyptic foreseer of the emergence of the few who address the “truly *great* problems and question marks” (GS: §373), who can encounter reality as it is, and experience the fullness of time as the ‘untimely’. For Nietzsche, to experience the fullness of time is to experience redemption; it is reconciliation with one’s past moments and a learning to affirm what was formerly negated. To experience the fullness of time is to experience a higher justice; it is an experience of the heart,

whereby all events flow into one another and form part of the “One”. (Z, II: ‘On Redemption’) It is the experience of encountering God as Eternal Return of the Same and experiencing the redemptive nature of the ‘untimely.’ Nietzsche as a visionary of the noon period communicates the apocalyptic message that the world is entering into the fullness of time, that the Noon or “Epoch” period is imminent, the world “culminates into God” (WP: §712), or what he refers to as god or the maximal state of the universe, an epoch in its evolution (WP: §639). This Noon period also refers to the radical idea of a new Dionysian existence or the Zarathustra kingdom of a thousand years. (Z, IV: §1) In *From High Mountains* Nietzsche employs the apocalyptic style and in doing so he refers to the noon in relation to the words “wedding” and “feast”. This is reminiscent of Christ’s parable of the Wedding Feast (Matthew 22), which is a symbol of the millennial kingdom of a thousand years:

*O noon of life! Our second youthful state!  
O Summer garden!  
Restlessly happy and expectant, standing,...*

*This song is over—longing’s dulcet cry  
Died in my mouth:  
A wizard did it, friend in time of drought,  
The friend of noon—no, do not ask me who—  
At noon it was that one turned into two—*

*Sure of our victory we celebrate  
The feast of feasts:  
Friend Zarathustra came, the guests of guests!  
The world now laughs, rent are the drapes of fright,  
The wedding is at hand of dark and light—*

(BGE: ‘*From High Mountains: After-song*’)

### III

#### *Metaphysical Homelessness & The Return Home to the True Self*

In this section there is an outline of Nietzsche's notion of the homecoming or the "return home" of the self to itself in "the widest circle", as Becoming (Z, III: 'On Old & New Tablets': §19). The section examines the homecoming experience of section III of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It also includes an exploration of the notion of tragic insight in this later work, and that the reality to be affirmed, for Nietzsche is an "eternity" within Becoming. The homecoming is experienced by "the wanderer", after his "great longing"; he is on his "way to greatness," whereby he enters into an oneness with the whole. It involves the "most comprehensive soul" (Z, III: 'On Old & New Tablets': §19) glimpsing eternity in "deep wells." (Z, III: "Before Sunrise") The main aim of this section is to maintain that, for Nietzsche there is a reality (non-spatial), and that the higher self belongs to it. This homecoming experience as a glimpse into eternity implies that eternity and the world are one. This redemptive experience is expressed by Nietzsche in such passages as "Before Sunrise" but climaxes in "Yes & Amen" in the form of "bird-wisdom". Eternity becomes one with the earth, and Nietzsche is a foreseer of the earth becoming divine. He refers to it as an apocalyptic event in 'On Great Events' (Z, II: §18). He speaks of the Hour as "the stillest hour" or "the Hour of Noon" in referring to the noon period of the coming of a redeemer, and the onset of a New Dionysian Age, which is comparable to the Biblical idea of "The Second Coming" as the figure marking the initiation of the Millennial Kingdom:

And in every ring of human existence, there is always an hour when the most powerful thought, the thought of the eternal return of all things, appears first to one, then to many, then to all—each time, it is the hour of *noon* for humanity.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>149</sup>Small, R., notes this in his article "*Zarathustra's Four Ways: Structures of Becoming in Nietzsche's Thought*" see footnote no.73 of the article where he cites this quote from KGW V/2, 396 Nietzsche,



In “The Wanderer” passage of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche mentions that the next stage on the path to redemption is the “Way of Greatness.”: ““Only now are you going your way to greatness! Peak and abyss—they are now joined together.” (Z, III: ‘The Wanderer’) It is this next stage beyond the mountaintop that is to be undertaken by “The Wanderer” or “The Convalescent,” the person longing “to return home.” For Nietzsche, what returns home is the self, and this occurs within the hour: “What returns, what finally comes home to me, is my own self and what of myself has long been in strange lands and scattered among all things and accidents.” (Z, III: ‘The Wanderer’) The self that belongs to the whole realizes the necessity of its existence in *amor fati*. It is the mountain climber that is the wanderer, he must overcome, which includes the coming of a “destiny and experience.” (*ibid*) In wandering the self is scattered; however, “in the end, one experiences only oneself.” (*ibid*) The return *home* to the self is to experience the necessity of one’s existence and as a result to overcome a state of homelessness.<sup>150</sup> It involves transcending a nihilistic existence of viewing the self as a mere accident, and in turn entering into union with Becoming. In *The Gay*

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*Kristische Gesamtausgabe: Werke*, G. Colli & M. Montinari (eds.), Berlin, De Gruyter, 1973. (Small, R., citing Nietzsche *Op. cit.*, p.101)

<sup>150</sup>Nietzsche’s idea of the scattered self returning to itself and in turn entering into union with reality is similar to Gabriel Marcel’s idea of recollection or secondary reflection. This experience involves for Nietzsche the ‘self’ becoming one with Becoming, whereas for Marcel, the self is restored to or becomes one with Being. . Marcel claims that secondary reflection is to be contrasted with primary reflection, thinking that that involves engaging in empirical or scientific data or problem solving. He notes that the self becomes ‘lost’ or scattered through primary reflection, and only it is only through secondary reflection that one can encounter a unity with Being. The self that encounters Being is not the self as object; for Marcel, one is not a disincarnate observer of one’s body, one is incarnation, as Nietzsche says in describing his experience of inspiration in *Ecce Homo*. (EH, ‘Z’: §3) See Cain, S., *Gabriel Marcel*, London, Bowes & Bowes, 1963, p.88 for a discussion of Marcel on religion “as an ontological “participation”, and entering in and opening-up to reality, involving “incarnation”” and as the relation of the human being in his wholeness to ultimate or transcendent reality. In recollection, Marcel argues that the scattered self can be restored to itself in a personal unity with Being; it involves a withdrawal from ordinary experience. The clearest example of secondary reflection is contemplation, and is similar to Nietzsche’s experience of *amor fati* where the self becomes one with reality. See Keen, S., *Gabriel Marcel*, Virginia, John Knox Press, 1967, p.23 for a discussion of Marcel on contemplation. See Jaspers, K., *Op.cit.*, p.283 and p.345 who notes Nietzsche’s relation to matters of contemplation.

*Science* (§377) Nietzsche describes nihilism as a state of homelessness (“We who are homeless”), a state that he refers to as “The Seventh Solitude.” (GS: §285 & §309) This state of homelessness results from the death of God, and the loss of the old ascetic ideal. The wanderer must now undertake “his loneliest walk” as the way of greatness in order to experience “The Hour.” This experience is for one only, and could be argued to be the experience of the redeemer. Nietzsche foresees the coming of a redeemer who is “victor” over the God of Christian morality and nihilism.

Is this even possible today?—But some day, in a stronger age than this decaying, self-doubting present, he must yet come to us, the *redeeming* man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness or any beyond, whose isolation is misunderstood by the people as if it were a flight *from* reality—while it is only his absorption, immersion, penetration *into* reality, so that, when he one day emerges again into the light, he may bring home the *redemption* of this reality: its redemption from the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal has laid upon it. This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; the Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness—*he must come one day.*— (GM, II: §24)

The redeemer is the person who encompasses a spiritual pathos which Nietzsche refers to as “loving contempt”,<sup>151</sup> contempt for the all-too-human, and love for the highest things or reality. The will to power of the redeemer or the philosophical type is comparable to the philosophical *eros* referred to by Plato; it is a mania that turns the

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<sup>151</sup> Nietzsche’s idea of “loving contempt” is best explored by Alex Mc Intyre in his work ‘*The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche’s Vision of Grand Politics*’ chapter 4 entitled ‘Hierarchy and the Overman.’ See chapter II of this thesis for an extrapolation of this chapter. For other references to “loving contempt” see in ‘On Virtue that Makes Small’ (Z, III) where Zarathustra mentions ‘loving contempt’ in opposition to the dictum ‘love thy neighbour.’ In the Prologue, Zarathustra also mentions “the hour of the great contempt” after his descent into the cave from man: ““Verily a polluted stream is man. One must be a sea to be able to receive a polluted stream without becoming unclean. Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this sea; in him your great contempt can go under.” ( Z, Prologue: §3) The overman as the ‘more-than-human’ is the meaning of the earth. He reaches the highest realm, and he imparts his insight into Becoming to man. He in this way becomes “the meaning of the earth” (*ibid.*)

soul towards the beautiful, the realm of polity or of Becoming, for Nietzsche. .<sup>152</sup>It is in this way that Nietzsche views himself as a foreseer of “*great politics*,” (EH, ‘Why I am a Destiny’: 1) of the subordination of politics to polity, of the mere empirical as law and opinion to the realm of the supra-human, of Becoming or of culture.<sup>153</sup>

In “The Return Home” passage Nietzsche refers to “home” as “solitude,” a state that in no way relates to loneliness, but is rather a state of rapture: “O solitude! O my *home*, solitude! Too long have I lived wildly in wild strange places not to return home to you in tears.” (Z, III: ‘The Return Home’) This state of solitude is not just one of rapturous insight into reality but is also one of silence. In a rapturous state of life-affirmation, the higher self is surrounded by silence, a silence that “draws deep breaths of clean air!” (Z, III: ‘The Return Home’) It is the self that in its silence is removed from “down there,” “the marketplace” from the uncleanness of the rabble. Nietzsche’s association of redemption with cleanliness and a withdrawal from the market-place is reminiscent of Plato’s idea that philosophy is purification of the soul. (*Phaedo*: 67c & *Phaedrus*:

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<sup>152</sup>See footnote no.45 of chapter II for a discussion of Alex Mc Intyre’s distinction between politics and polity in Plato and Nietzsche. Mc Intyre also notes that it is in the *Phaedrus* that Plato tries to make Becoming coeternal with Being; therefore it is the Plato of this work that is comparable to Nietzsche. Although Mc Intyre draws a comparison between Nietzsche and Plato on the ‘descent of creation’, that is the higher soul ascending to Being, he however goes on in chapter six of his work to emphasize Becoming as reality, for Nietzsche as opposed to Being.

<sup>153</sup>Jaspers outlines what Nietzsche means by “great politics” that it is embodied by the autonomous ones who have achieved self-mastery. They are not rulers over others but self-rulers. They experience both self-mastery and insight. “The “great politics” no longer expresses any will to rule, but its thinking purports to be that which does rule in the end.” (Jaspers, K., *Op.cit.*, p.283) He goes on to extrapolate what Nietzsche means by “grand politics” that it is linked to self-control and creativity: “To Nietzsche, the creative philosophers are the mightiest of all, not as a result of any power over their contemporaries, but because of the way they control themselves and, through the consequences of their thinking, eventually move the world: “The great moral natures arise as self-restrainers...during times of disintegration. They are governing natures (Heraclitus, Plato) in a transformed world where they only have to rule themselves.”” (*ibid.*) Nietzsche’s “great politics” is not “prompted by a feeling of humanity which accords to each man inalienable rights...he expressly rejects this notion and believes instead that the individual as such is the final source of all creation and, in its creativity, the sole manifestation of being that he can love and respect.” (*ibid.*) It is the individual who encounters reality that is to be respected.

243a)<sup>154</sup> Both Nietzsche and Plato affirm a realm that is higher than the human, the highest realm, Being for Plato and Becoming or more specifically an “eternity” within Becoming, for Nietzsche. This realm can only be experienced by the few, those who withdraw from “the *dirt* of what is human, all too human” (BGE: §271), that is the realm of anthropomorphic truths, laws and opinions. This withdrawal is also a form of asceticism; it is a cleanliness that leads the soul higher (*eros*) towards Becoming.<sup>155</sup> This asceticism, for Nietzsche, takes the form of self-overcoming, discipline, and isolation. In this way, there is a connection for Nietzsche between cleanliness and the most joyous experience of entering into the highest realm in this life. He uses the metaphor of “the well” to describe “the highest spheres.” (Z, II: ‘On the Rabble’) It is the pure person who drinks from the “well of life,” to which life gives back, which is to be distinguished from the rabble’s relation to the well.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>154</sup>See *Plato: Complete Works*, Edited with an introduction and Notes by John M. Cooper, & D.S. Hutchinson, (Associate ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1997, p.58 for a reference to Plato on Philosophy as purification.

<sup>155</sup>Although it can be argued that both Plato and Nietzsche affirm a realm higher than the human, Nietzsche is to be distinguished from Platonism, an emphasis on another world (after-world). See Zuckert, C., *Postmodern Platos*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p.25 where she mentions this distinction between Plato and Platonism or Plato’s followers. She states that Nietzsche considers that “Plato understood the tremendously self-affirmative character of philosophic activity. In explaining “How the true world finally became a fable” in the *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche summarized the first stage: “I, Plato *am* the truth.” Plato did not really teach the existence of another world; so much as he affirmed his own existence. “The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, *he is it*.” (Zuckert, *ibid.*, p.25 citing TI, ‘How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable’) Nietzsche’s asceticism is to be distinguished from the asceticism of Christianity, Platonism or the Kantian moral ethic, a human anthropomorphic value that is not actually based upon insight into reality; it is the unattainable ideal as a reward in the afterlife. Nietzsche affirms objective reality in the here and now, as he foresees the earth will encounter the eternal (eternity in the immanent sense).

<sup>156</sup>For Nietzsche, the pure person not only withdraws from the “human, all-too-human”, that of anthropomorphic laws and opinions, and removes himself from the herd; he also has a unique relation to the well of life or joy. Life is a fountain of pleasure and as a flowing it is inexhaustible. It is only the pure person, the person who wants nothing, that life as the well flows violently back at him with its purity. It is the person who asks for nothing that life gives back to, whereas the impure person (rabble) with his *thirst* for pleasure all that is reflected back to him is his own thirst. It is in this way that the well of life reflects back to you only yourself. What is received from the well of life depends upon who looks at it.

Life is a well of joy; but where the rabble drinks too, all wells are poisoned. I am fond of all that is clean, but I have no wish to see grinning snouts and the thirst of the unclean. They cast their eye into the well: now their revolting smile shines up out of the well. They have poisoned the holy water with their lustfulness; and when they called their dirty dreams “pleasure,” they poisoned the language too...

.... How did I fly to the height where no rabble sits by the well? Was it my nausea itself which created wings for me and water-divining powers? Verily, I had to fly to the highest spheres that I might find the fount of pleasure again.

Oh, I found it, my brothers! Here, in the highest spheres, the fount of pleasure wells up for me! And here is a life of which the rabble does not drink. (Z, II: ‘On the Rabble’)

The convalescent or the wanderer is the person longing to “become who he is” or to return to his self that belongs to the whole. In “On the Great Longing” after Zarathustra’s conversation with the animals and men, he is now returning home to himself. In the same chapter Zarathustra finds himself alone in intimate conversation with his soul:<sup>157</sup> “And verily. O my soul, who could see your smile and not be melted by your tears? The angels themselves are melted by tears because of the over-graciousness of your smile.” (Z, III: ‘On the Great Longing’)

In “On the Great Longing” Zarathustra’s soul continues to speak to itself and asks of itself: “O my soul, now there is not a soul anywhere that would be more loving and comprehending and comprehensive. Where would future and past dwell closer together than in you?” (*ibid.*) According to Small, the term “dwelling” expresses a

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<sup>157</sup>Higgins in her essay “Nietzsche’s View of Philosophical Style” mentions that private conversation, for Nietzsche appears as the “most perfect means of attaining an understanding of oneself” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. (Higgins, K., *Op. cit.*, p.76) She refers to it as “the unmediated encounter of oneself with oneself.” (*ibid.*) She claims that it is during periods of solitude that Zarathustra “comes to an understanding that is not pressured by the considerations of adapting his discourse to other individuals.” (*ibid.*) She discusses this in relation to the distinction between Zarathustra and the Magician of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The magician is “unavoidably confused as to what sort of person he really is...” (*ibid.*, p.75) He is the “paradigm example of the person whose self-understanding is so dominated by socially imposed categories that his conscious awareness is out of touch with the unconscious majority of his “self.” (*ibid.*, p.75-6) She also stresses the relationship between Nietzsche’s style as the communication of tragic pathos and the reader attaining self-knowledge. The ideal reader, for Nietzsche is one who is in touch with his unconscious, and the impact that reading has on this aspect of the self.

feature of the “way of greatness.” In “The Wanderer” Zarathustra speaks of the *hour*<sup>158</sup> which tells him that he is on the way to greatness. The way of greatness is to be distinguished from the two lanes<sup>159</sup> that meet at “The Gateway” (Z, III: ‘On the Vision & the Riddle’), which are “permanent thoroughfares, established for public use.” (Small 2001: 96) He argues that the mountain path is there for other climbers, and that the way of greatness is not to be shared even to this extent: “The lanes are for everyone, the mountain path for some, the way of greatness for one only.” (*ibid.*) Small explains that “instead of excluding past and future, the hour draws them into

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<sup>158</sup> Small in his article “*Zarathustra’s Four Ways: Structures of Becoming in Nietzsche’s Thought*” mentions the other references to the Hour in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. It features in the “Stillest Hour” or the “Blessed Hour.” (Small, R., p.101 citing Z, III: ‘The Stillest Hour’ & ‘On Involuntary Bliss’) He also notes that Noon and Midnight are important hours, often referred to in the work. Small mentions that the “‘hour of noon’ also suggests Zarathustra’s ‘great noon,’ which ‘has its own time and its own destiny.’” (Small, R., p.101 citing Z, III: ‘On Passing By’) He also argues that the hour is a “living present, not an instant.” (*ibid.*, p.101) He states that “Hours do not pass by in the twinkling of an eye they are time within which reflections, conversations, and other events can take place.” (*ibid.*) In referring to the hour as having intervals, he cites Franz Rosenweig who looks at the hour as the “circle returning upon itself.” (The Star of Redemption, W.H. Hallo (trans.), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971)

<sup>159</sup>Small outlines earlier in his article that in the chapter ‘On the Vision and the Riddle’ Zarathustra is climbing a steep and dangerous path weighed down by the ‘spirit of gravity,’ who draws him downward into the abyss. Zarathustra then finds himself at a gateway which stands between two lanes, the gateway is called ‘Moment’ (Small, R., *Op. cit.*, p.85) Small also notes that the two lanes contradict one another. (*ibid*) The lanes stand for infinite time, time as extension—extended into the past or the future whereas the gateway is the indivisible present. Small notes Aristotle’s argument in *Physics* (VI.2 233b-4a) that the indivisible present is that which makes possible the past and the future (divisible) in that they can be distinguished from the present. It is because of the indivisible present (cannot be broken down into segments of time) that past and future can be divided or segmented against the indivisible present. The lanes are a metaphor for time as extension. The kind of human activity that correlates with the lanes, is walking or running. Small also notes that Nietzsche engages the metaphor of the mountain for time as duration, and the type of human activity that correlates with this is climbing. Nietzsche uses various other metaphors for climbing such as the ladder and steps (Small, R., *Op. cit.*, p.93 citing SE: §1; Z’ On the thousand & One Goals’, ‘On Old & New Tablets’: §19) Stambaugh also notes this contradiction in “The Moment” (Z, III: ‘On the Vision & the Riddle’) as discussed earlier; she argues that the philosopher is forced to enter the moment because of the contradiction between the lanes. Both Stambaugh and Small note “the untimely” in Nietzsche, however, for Small it occurs within “The Hour” whereas for Stambaugh as well as Jaspers, it occurs within “The Moment.” The contradiction that occurs between the lanes creates the moment. This contradiction is resolved in the hour, according to Small, both the past and future “dwell together” in the self. This “dwelling” period prevents the experience of “the untimely” being reduced to the instantaneity of the moment. In the hour “past and future exert no power over the present.” (Small, R., *Op. cit.*, p.105) It could be maintained that the moment is correctly “a glimpse into reality” experience for the few whereas the hour is an experience of “the untimely” for one only. It could be argued that the mountain-climber or the wanderer not only experiences the moment but then goes on to experience the hour. Both the collision of past and future (the moment) and the dwelling of past and future (the hour) can both be argued to be “the untimely”.

itself, so that they no longer oppose each other as in the gateway “Moment,” but rather “dwell together.” He explains “dwelling together” as a “homecoming” experience: “The absorption of past and future within the present hour is a homecoming for the dispersed self.” (Small 2001: 104) In this thesis, it is argued that the homecoming of the scattered self is a return to the self that occurs within the hour. It is the higher self, “the Great of the Body” (Z, I; §7) that becomes one with objective reality as Becoming. It is also very important to note that Nietzsche rejects the concept of self as metaphysical “subject” or as “substance” that is a thing or soul monad. In taking into account Nietzsche’s dictum ‘to become who you are’ it is possible to argue that in spite of his rejection of the metaphysical self as subject, he however embraces some sort of higher self, which it is possible “to become” or “return home to”. The only kind of soul that Nietzsche embraces is “mortal soul,” “soul as subjective multiplicity”, “soul as social structure of the drives and affects” (BGE: §12) Nietzsche’s main criticism that he levels against the Christian conception of soul is its fixity, that it stays the same one’s whole life. However, for Nietzsche the ‘soul’ or what might be better referred to as “the Great reason of the Body” is a project or task which is continual throughout one’s life, or is in a process of becoming. Nietzsche is in this way an advocate of overcoming, the creation of a “self” is a process not a given. The question then arises is the “self” that is becoming or in perpetual strife a continual overcoming self or is there an aspect to the self that experiences a necessity to its existence? It is possible to argue that this homecoming experience involves the experience of this necessity; the self is no longer scattered among accidents, it becomes one with reality. For Nietzsche, the higher self is outside space; there is an aspect to the self that is extensionless.<sup>160</sup> Small argues similarly that there is no space inside my body: “For

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<sup>160</sup>This idea of the higher self in Nietzsche is similar to Wittgenstein’s notion of the transcendental ‘I’

other people, the space occupied by my body is like any other space. But in so far as every part of my own body is immediately present for me, there is, in a certain way *no* space inside my body.” (Small 2001: 105) The immediate self-presence of the ‘I,’ or the body, is not an “object” in space.<sup>161</sup> In this thesis, it is being argued that the necessary or higher self that occupies no space, is the self that experiences “the untimely”<sup>162</sup> or an “eternity” within Becoming. It is an experience that Nietzsche

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or the metaphysical self. See chapter one, section v, footnote no. 37 for a discussion of Stenius on Wittgenstein’s ‘Transcendental Linguism’ in *The Tractatus*. The metaphysical ego, which relates to what cannot be said or referred to, it is the realm of the unsaid (‘it is like the eye in relation to the field of sight; the eye cannot see itself’ (5.633-6.331); ‘it does not belong to the world but is a limit of the world’ (5.632) The metaphysical ego in being transcendental implies that the ego shrinks to an extension-less point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. (Stenius., *Op. cit.*, p. 222 citing *The Tractatus* (5.64)) In this way, it can be argued that for Nietzsche, the higher self as an “extensionless point” is to use Wittgenstein’s phrase “co-ordinated” with reality. Elsewhere in *The Tractatus*, he states that as for the immortality of the soul, “the solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies *outside* space and time” (6.4312) Wittgenstein, like Nietzsche claims that the real significance of life is in the realm of the noumenal (‘The sense of the world must lie outside of the world’ (Magee, B., *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.292 citing *The Tractatus* 6.41) See Magee also for an examination of Schopenhauer’s influence on Wittgenstein on the transcendental ‘I’ being a limit of the world. Magee also states that this ‘I’ being an extensionless point does not imply that Wittgenstein or Schopenhauer were solipsists. (*ibid.*) For references to Nietzsche’s critique of the oldest appearance that is absolute space being made into a metaphysics see Nachlass, XIV: 20 cited by Stambaugh, *Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return, Op., cit.*, p.70; KSA III: 19 [140] cited by Han, B., In *Nietzsche’s Metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy*, European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3): 2006, in her footnote no.45, p.24; and also in *The Birth of Tragedy* where he admires “the extraordinary wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer” who show that time, space and causality are human categories, and are critical of these categories being viewed as “unconditional laws of the most universal validity,” by earlier metaphysicians. Kant showed that this approach to metaphysics “really served only to elevate the mere phenomenon, the work of māyā to the position of the sole and highest reality” thus making impossible any knowledge of the innermost and true essence of things. (§18)

<sup>161</sup>Small refers to the body. This thesis does take into account Nietzsche’s emphasis on the body, but only in relation to what he refers to as “The Great Reason of the Body.” (Z, I: ‘On the Despisers of the Body’) In his essay ‘Zarathustra’s Four Ways’ Small mentions that in the homecoming experience, the self is reunited with Becoming, and in his work ‘*Time and Becoming in Nietzsche’s Thought*’ he emphasises this reality as the ‘innocence of Becoming’. (Small, R., London, Continuum International Publishing, 2010, p.168) Small seems to suggest that space is external reality and doesn’t extrapolate the distinction between space and Becoming or more specifically the “eternity” within Becoming. In his essay, he also claims that the overman is undergoing a series of stages or successive stages of development, which culminate in dancing and flying or the achievement of “bird-wisdom” (Z, III: ‘The Seven Seals’: §7). The type of human activity that the overman experiences in “the hour” or “the untimely” is dancing or flying: “And above all I learned to stand and walk and run and jump and climb and dance. This, however, is my doctrine: he would learn to fly one day must first learn to stand and walk and run and climb and dance: one cannot fly into flying.” (Z, III: ‘On the Spirit of Gravity’)

<sup>162</sup> The experience of “the untimely” is not the time that is a human category such as time as extension that is time ‘broken up’ into segments (past, present, and future) by the perspectival activity of the mind, as this is time as duration. This type of time is to be distinguished from the “untimely,” ‘The Moment, or the Eternal Return of the Same. See Stambaugh in her work “*Nietzsche’s Thought of Eternal Return*” (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.6-7) Objective reality is outside space and time; in this way the impersonal self (not conscious ego) must encompass space and time (time as extension). However,



refers to as *intoxication*, of the high feeling of spiritual joy as power where there is “the retardation of the feelings of time and space.” (WP: §799) It is in this way that the higher self is an impersonal ego<sup>163</sup>, it belongs to the universal or the whole; it is through the higher self (subjective) that one experiences reality (non-spatial). The higher self reaches “the way of greatness”, and in doing so withholds what Nietzsche refers to as “Bird-Wisdom”: “Behold, there is no above, no below!” (Z, III: ‘The Seven Seals’: §7) This Dionysian wisdom implies that the higher self is not determined by the directionality of space. It is this divine self that encompasses space and time: “For me—how should there be any outside-myself?” There is no outside. But all sounds make us forget this; how lovely it is we forget.” (Z, III: ‘The Convalescent’) Nietzsche uses a variety of metaphors to describe the self as the outermost boundary of all things, in speaking to his own soul, Zarathustra refers to it as “destiny,” the “circumference of circumferences” and “azure bell” (Z, III: ‘On the Great Longing’ & ‘Before Sunrise’)—a reference to “the heavens”, the dome of the sky. (Moles 1990: 304) The soul is the “umbilical cord of time” (Z, III: ‘On the Great Longing’); it is where past and future “dwell together” (*ibid.*) The self, for Nietzsche always returns to itself, it leads us back from “side roads and wrong roads”, it can be restored to the whole. (EH, ‘Why I am So Clever’: §9) It is “the most comprehensive

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objects in space and time are mind-independent, see T., Doyle’s ‘Nietzsche on Epistemology & Metaphysics’ for her argument that objects ‘intrinsic natures’ imply that they are metaphysically independent or irreducible to the human mind. These objects are known through consciousness, and this type of knowledge is a falsification of reality.

<sup>163</sup>It is the impersonal ego that belongs to reality. It is through the self that one encounters reality. It is in this way that Nietzsche’s notion of selfishness. His advocacy of selfishness as virtue is expressed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (‘On the Three Evils’). He proclaims that selfishness is “blessed” that “wells from a powerful soul...around which everything becomes a mirror—the supple, persuasive body, the dancer whose parable and epitome is the self-enjoying soul.” He also states that whoever proclaims “the ego wholesome and holy, and selfishness blessed” he will also speak of the nearness of “the great noon.” (*ibid.*) This touches upon Stambaugh’s proclamation that the Eternal Return of the Same is Nietzsche’s experience of the Self in *Nietzsche’s Thought of the Eternal Return*; it is this Self that belongs to the universal (Objective reality), as the Self enters the abyss of Eternity. (Stambaugh, J., *Op. cit.*, p.102/106)

soul” or “the most necessary soul” that “catches up with itself in the widest circle”; the self becomes one with eternity, or the Circle. (Z, III: ‘On Old & New Tablets’: §19) Nietzsche also depicts this soul as “the genius of the heart” in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§295).

What is the highest species of all being and what is the lowest? The parasite is the lowest species; but whoever is of the highest species will nourish the most parasites. For the soul that has the longest ladder and reaches down deepest—how should the most parasites not sit on that? The most comprehensive soul, which can run and stray and roam farthest within itself; the most necessary soul, which out of sheer joy plunges itself into chance; the soul which having being, dives into becoming; the soul which *has*, but *wants* to want and will; the soul which flees itself and catches up with itself in the widest circle; the wisest soul, which folly exhorts most sweetly; the soul which loves itself most, in which all things have their sweep and countersweep and ebb and flood— (Z, III: ‘On Old & New Tablets’: §19)

For Nietzsche, the experience of the non-spatial is best expressed by the metaphor of “the well;” it involves the experience of the “untimely.” (Z, IV: ‘At Noon’) This metaphor features in such chapters as “At Noon,” “The Drunken Song,” and “Before Sunrise” of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and is referred to as the “well of eternity.” The return home to the self involves the experience of the ‘more-than-human’ or higher reality, and is best portrayed in the chapter entitled “Before Sunrise.” (Z, III: §4) The self that feels eternity or “the heavenly” is referred to as the “azure bell.” This self experiences the blessedness of going beyond good and evil, as the blessedness and affirmation of all things in Yes and Amen. In this chapter Zarathustra speaks to the heavens, to the “pure and light, you abyss of light.” (Z, III: §4) He had to learn to reach out beyond himself or mount above himself in order to reach himself, through wandering and mountain-climbing.

Are you not the light for my fire? Have you not the sister soul to my insight? Together we have learned everything; together we have learned to ascend over ourselves to ourselves and to smile cloudlessly—to smile down cloudlessly from bright eyes and from a vast distance when constraint and contrivance and guilt steam beneath us like rain. (*ibid.*)

In overcoming “contrivance and guilt” his soul wants only to fly into the heavens. The unbounded saying of Yes and Amen to all things is common both to the heavens and to Zarathustra; it is a bright heaven that just escapes being stained by “drifting clouds” (*ibid.*) The passing clouds or shadows are metaphors for all the anthropocentric values including “good and evil,” and “guilt.” (*ibid.*) Zarathustra’s experience of “the heavenly” or the “well of eternity” involves the transcendence of such anthropocentric value-systems. The heavens represent, for Nietzsche, the ‘more-than-human’ and the blessedness of all things in Yes and Amen. In this way Zarathustra goes on to affirm and to bless by learning to stand above all things as their own heaven. In going beyond good and evil, the passing clouds can no longer rob Zarathustra of the heaven’s Yes and Amen or rob the heavens of Zarathustra’s Yes and Amen. Both Zarathustra’s and the heaven’s yes-saying are freed for each other. The “well of eternity” stands for the blessedness of all things and for Zarathustra to experience this blessedness is to “stand over every single thing as its own heaven” (*ibid.*); it is to experience belonging to the whole or enter into the innocence of Becoming.

But I am one who can bless and say Yes, if only you are about me, pure and light, you abyss of light; then I carry the blessings of my Yes into all abysses. I have become one who blesses and says Yes; and I fought for that and was a fighter that I might one day get my hands free to bless. But this is my blessing: to stand over every single thing as its own heaven, as its round roof, its azure bell, and eternal security; and blessed is he who blesses thus.

For all things have been baptized in the well of eternity and are beyond good and evil; and good and evil themselves are but intervening shadows and damp depressions and drifting clouds.

Verily, it is a blessing and not a blasphemy when I teach. “Over all things stand the heaven Accident, the heaven Innocence, the heaven Chance, the heaven Prankishness.” (*ibid.*)

In his essay “*Nature and the human ‘redivinised’*” Graham Parkes also explores the chapter entitled “Before Sunrise” of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. He notes that there is a distinction between the pre-dawn heavens and the sun; the heavens before dawn are “an expanse of pure openness that illuminates everything evenly, without bias or slant” whereas “the sun’s illumination which always comes from a particular direction, casting shade and shadows.” (Parkes 2000: 192) It is in this way that this passage is of utmost importance as “it seems to go beyond Nietzsche’s customary perspectivism and allow for an experience of the world that is not merely “from our little corner” but from a horizon that transcends anthropocentric values.” (*ibid.*)

In blessing all things in the “well of eternity” and Yes and Amen, Zarathustra has what is like an enlightenment experience, which is best exemplified by the dance. Zarathustra finds himself dancing “on the feet of Chance.” (Z, III: ‘Before Sunrise’) This type of enlightenment is inextricably linked with “reading and writing in blood,” a higher education (self-knowledge) that involves entering into the Oneness of things. It is an ecstatic experience: “Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath myself, now a god dances through me.” (Z, I: ‘On Reading & Writing’) In the chapter entitled “On Reading and Writing” of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche reveals his affinity with a god who can dance: “I would believe only in a god who could dance.” (*ibid.*)

Nietzsche also wishes to overturn the association of purity with Christian morality; he rather advocates a purity that comes with experiencing the blessedness of all things in Yes and Amen. Nietzsche equates purity with a Yes-saying spirit to all of life’s

experiences of going beyond good and evil. Zarathustra's purity is in turn a reflection of the purity of the heavens:

O heaven over me, pure and high! That is what your purity is to me now, that there is no eternal spider or spider web of reason; that you are to me a dance floor for divine accidents, that you are to me a divine table for divine dice and dice-players... (Z, III: 'Before Sunrise')

Nietzsche's reference to the heavens as a "dance-floor" reiterates the notion that the earth is to become heavenly. In using the term "the dance-floor," the heavenly is no longer transcendent set apart from the earth but rather embodies the earth; the earth in this sense becomes divine. Zarathustra's proclamation to "remain faithful to the earth," and do not believe those who speak of otherworldly hopes (Z, Prologue: §3), as Parkes maintains, does imply a "renunciation of transcendent perspectives in favour of a focus on the human." (Parkes 2000: 184) Nietzsche rather claims that in overcoming anthropocentric perspectives that the earth now becomes divine. (*ibid.*) The transcendence of human perspectives in the sense of anthropocentric representations of reality coincides with the recognition that there is an objective reality. Nietzsche reevaluates the relationship between the earth and eternity such that eternity is not set apart from the earth (as a static transcendent realm) but becomes one with the earth; it is in this way that Nietzsche is an advocate of eternity in the immanent sense. However, for Nietzsche there is a distinction between the earth and objective reality or eternity. For Nietzsche, earth and eternity will become one, in this way the earth will become a place of the most intense energy and joy. In overcoming the "spirit of gravity," the earth will be rebaptized as "the light one." (Z, III: 'On the Spirit of Gravity') The 'Before Sunrise' passage shows firstly that the earth is no longer as Lampert (1986: 174) suggests in his "*Nietzsche's Teaching*" "under the sway of the heavens"; and secondly, that a blessing has been conferred on earthly

things “that will be like a heavenly dome in providing security and well-being...” Zarathustra is the figure, who according to Lampert, in “having journeyed to the underworld and found the earth to have a heart of gold (Z, II: ‘On Great Events’)” that he here “ascends to the sky and finds in its openness a blessing for the earth.” (*ibid.*) The earth is no longer to be robbed of yes and amen in “Before Sunrise”, and this comes to a climax in the “The Yes and Amen Song” of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Zarathustra’s “bird-wisdom” in the song of yes and amen proves that he is fit enough to marry life<sup>164</sup>. This marriage coincides with his highest victory that of the creation of a new earth. The images of rapture, dancing and flying are to be associated with a victory and form the culmination of the marriage song. As Lampert (1986: 243) suggests that the image of the “bird”, for Nietzsche stands for complete victory over the spirit of gravity; it involves the transformation of heavy and grave into light and easy, of the body into dancer. The singing and flying of “bird-wisdom” represents the epitome of Zarathustra’s redemption. It includes the experience of singing; “Sing! Speak no more! Are not all words made for the grave and heavy?” (Z, III: 16) His singing and dancing redemption is of a silent nature, and involves entering into the silent logos of Becoming.

It is in this way that Nietzsche speaks of “this- worldly comfort” in his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” of *The Birth of Tragedy*; his embrace of “this-worldly comfort” is

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<sup>164</sup> Lampert in his ‘*Nietzsche’s Teaching; An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra*’ examines the chapter entitled ‘The Other Dancing Song’ that which is previous to the ‘The Yes and Amen Song’. This chapter shows that Zarathustra in being in a dance with life shows that he has achieved a certain intimacy with life, and renders him suitable enough to marry her. This other dancing song acts as preparation for the ensuing marriage in the next chapter of yes and amen. As Lampert states, “It is followed by a song that completes the dance by transforming it into a procession preparatory to the consummating marriage” (Yale University Press, London, 1986, p.235) This Other Dancing Song is comparable to The Yes and Amen Song in that it is a song of overcoming the spirit of gravity. According to Lampert, Life can only offer herself up to Zarathustra if “Zarathustra does not abandon her in favour of a vengeful wisdom that condemns life.” (*ibid.*, p.237) He goes on to claim that life then goes on to reciprocate his love from the heart, and the complementary pair that of Zarathustra and life prepare to marry, and in marrying life he marries eternity. (*ibid.*, p.238)

intimately tied up with a rejection of after-worldly joy. For Nietzsche, joy is attainable in the here and now by those “dragon-slayers” who “live resolutely’ in wholeness” and embody an artist’s metaphysics. (BT, ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’: §7) They are the ones who pronounce laughter and dancing as “holy,” and play a role in initiating the “heavenly” on earth, as the New Dionysian Age. (*ibid.*) His embrace of “this-worldly comfort” does not imply that he abandons what is real. The concept of eternity is ever-present in his later works; however, eternity and world become one. It is in this way that joy can be felt in the here and now.

Roberts, in his essay ‘*Ecstatic Philosophy*,’ notes that in Nietzsche’s ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ of *The Birth of Tragedy* in 1886 that Nietzsche seems to level criticism at his first book, and explicitly rejects its call for “metaphysical comfort.” (Roberts 2000: 203 citing BT: ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’: §7) He argues that in spite of this rejection that there is a positive role for mysticism in his work.<sup>165</sup> It would seem that

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<sup>165</sup>Roberts wishes to argue that in spite of Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysical comfort in his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” that Nietzsche remains a metaphysician of the real in his later works. He also maintains that Nietzsche’s advocacy of a “this-worldly comfort” does not imply a mere empiricism. This thesis coincides with Roberts on this point. Roberts refers to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, a later work, to compound his argument. However, although Roberts states that *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* resembles *The Birth of Tragedy* in its mysticism, he claims that this early work illustrates a metaphysical dualism or a Schopenhauerian pessimism, which he argues Nietzsche later abandons. In other words, Nietzsche abandons this pessimism in his later works, and this is why Nietzsche is so critical of his early work in his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism.” For an alternative argument that *The Birth* does not withhold a Schopenhauerian pessimism, see the translator’s introduction to *The Birth of Tragedy*, Kaufmann claims that Nietzsche did not come under the influence of a Schopenhauerian pessimism, as argued by Richard Oehler: (See Kaufmann’s introduction to *The Birth* p.11)

The *Birth* embodies a metaphysics of the Thing-in-itself but only as reality where the Primal Unity (BT: §4) is not viewed as a causal ground (or as substance), and the phenomenal realm is an appearance of this primordial reality. This primal realm can be accessed through tragic pathos (insight), in becoming one with it in the experience of intoxication whereby the spell of individuation is broken. The artist is in this way the “most accurate representation” of reality. The process of the *principium individuationis* is that it is a necessary prerequisite stage to entering into a unity with the Primal Being. This process involves a removal from the empirical or herd-self; it is a process of individuation or solitude. It is through “the cry of Dionysus” that the spell of individuation can be broken: “... and the way lies open to the Mothers of Being, to the innermost heart of things.” (BT: §16) It is in this respect that the early work embodies an artist’s metaphysics.

by Nietzsche rejecting the idea of metaphysical comfort that there is no room for mysticism in his thought. He contends that Nietzsche's embrace of "this-worldly comfort" is intended as an argument against metaphysical after-worldliness but not a rejection of metaphysical reality. Roberts draws upon Joan Stambaugh's *The Other Nietzsche* to argue that there is a mysticism at the heart of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: "Zarathustra undergoes an ecstatic experience born of the painful experience of the abyss, in which the boundaries of his self dissolve in a song of love and participation in the cosmos." (Roberts 2000: 204) It is in this way that Zarathustra finds himself in love with life and eternity, which is evident in the final two songs of Book III of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "The Other Dancing Song" and "The Seven Seals." Roberts states that "Despite what the late Nietzsche says about his first book, Zarathustra's ecstasy refigures the Dionysian as delineated in *The Birth of Tragedy*: "In song and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has forgotten how to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into the air, dancing." (Roberts 2000: 204 citing BT: §1) In the penultimate section of Book Four of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, after his "Last Supper" with the higher men, Zarathustra undergoes a visionary experience that reprises the ecstasy of Book Three. In the "Drunken Song" Zarathustra's spirit flies ahead and comes to rest on a high ridge, the same ridge that is mentioned in 'The Seven Seals', which is "between two seas, wandering like a heavy cloud between past and future." (Z, IV: 'The Yes & Amen song') In Zarathustra re-mentioning the high ridge, of standing between past and future, he reiterates an

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The question however arises, which is also noted by Roberts why is Nietzsche critical of his early work in the later period. This question has already been addressed in the third section of the first chapter. However another possible answer to this important question may be that Nietzsche didn't want the primal unity of *The Birth* to be in any way viewed in terms of the After-worldly. In writing in the shadows of Kant and Schopenhauer, he may feel that he came across this way in the early work. In the 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' Nietzsche has become his true self, he speaks as a foreseer of the oncoming "dragon-slayers" who will overturn the old ascetic ideal, and wear the "crown of the laughter," of holy laughter. The most erroneous interpretation that one can infer from Nietzsche's emphasis on "this-worldly comfort" in the 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism' is that there is no room for mysticism in his thought



apocalyptic image of making the transition from an old era to a new one. He speaks of sinking into “deep-wells,” of experiencing “the untimely”, as the “hour approaches” the world becomes perfect. (*ibid.*) The midnight bell tolls and Zarathustra tells the higher men not in his own words but in the words of the bell that “tell of the complex intertwining of pain and joy in which joy desires the return of all pain.” (Roberts 2000: 204) In the world becoming perfect, silence or stillness reigns, and such opposites as pain-joy, day-night, time-eternity collapse: “Just now my world became perfect: midnight too is noon; pain is a joy; curses too are a blessing; night too is a sun—go away or you will learn; a sage too is a fool” (Roberts 2000: 204 citing Z, IV: ‘The Drunken Song’) According to Roberts, the presence of ecstatic moments of perfection and joyful eternity invoke certain themes from *The Birth of Tragedy* and complicate the sense of Nietzsche’s “this-worldly comfort.” (2000: 205) Roberts argues that for Zarathustra “joy’s love for eternity includes the desire for suffering”, which is to be distinguished from after-worldly answers to the problem of suffering which promise some sort of escape from it. (*ibid.*) He contends that Nietzsche’s embrace of “this-worldly comfort” does not imply that there is no love of the real or the eternal in Nietzsche; he states that eternity is integrally bound up with the becoming of the world. (*ibid.*)

Roberts argues that Nietzsche upholds an artist’s metaphysics in the later works. This artist’s metaphysics shows that Nietzsche retains the idea of reality, which in his later period is an eternity that is within Becoming. The artist’s affirmation of eternity is “not a simple affirmation of this worldly reality understood as empirical appearance.” (Roberts 2000: 216) The artist as an expression of reality is an appearance of reality or “signifies reality once more.” (Roberts 2000: 216 citing TI: ‘Reason’ §6) He claims

that it is in this way that Nietzsche overturns the opposition between true and apparent worlds. He replaces this opposition with one of relative difference: “Nietzsche’s Dionysian artist works with a *relative difference* between ‘reality’ and appearance. Appearance, in this case, is not opposed to reality, but is, as Nietzsche puts it, ‘reality once more.’”<sup>166</sup>(Roberts 2000: 216) The artist as “the most accurate representation of reality” is no longer in opposition to reality. This reality which the artist affirms is Becoming. Roberts claims that for Nietzsche there is only “becoming,” “a never-ending movement of concealing and revealing, that is never known ‘in-itself.’”, and “Like lightning, a mark of the Dionysian, we can only glimpse becoming in the reiteration of the ‘once more.’” (*ibid.*) It must be stressed that when it comes to glimpsing reality in the reiteration of the “once more,” that this thesis contends that this reality of the later period is not the ‘mere’ flux of Becoming but rather an “eternity” within Becoming.

Nietzsche describes his inspiration as a feeling of *Gottlichkeit* or of divinity. (EH, ‘Z’: §3) This feeling of divinity is an expression of Dionysian appearance; it is “reality

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<sup>166</sup> In Robert’s work entitled ‘*Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion*’ he also discusses Nietzsche’s artist metaphysics. He claims that in spite of Nietzsche’s rejection of the apparent world/true world opposition, the appearance he attributes to the Dionysian artist must be something other than simple untruth or illusion. It is in this work that Roberts first highlights Nietzsche’s relative difference (not one of opposition) between artistic appearance and reality, where artistic appearance is “reality once more.” Roberts also notes a passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* (§34) which shows that Nietzsche looks at the truth/falsity distinction in terms of varying degrees of appearance, that there are “lighter and darker shadows of appearance.” Roberts refers to this passage to reveal an artist’s metaphysics in Nietzsche’s later works.

Roberts looks at the artist as an expression of becoming, that reality for Nietzsche, is strictly becoming. He argues that Being is denied by Nietzsche as causal ground. Nonetheless, Roberts does make an important point in a similar line to this thesis that the reality that is affirmed by the artist is not the reality that is to be grasped by the senses. This would imply a “paltry empiricism,” becoming is something more than “mere appearance,” more than that particular empirical reality that one ordinarily encounters as “this world.” (Roberts, T., *Op. cit.*, p.145) Roberts then refers to Stanley Rosen to support his point that Nietzsche does not adhere to a “paltry empiricism” in footnote no. 8 where he notes Rosen’s distinction between the two types of metaphysics. He distinguishes between metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense as the study of Being qua being (which, for Nietzsche, is already committed to dualism) and metaphysics as claims about the whole beyond the empirical. Roberts claims that it is in the last sense that Nietzsche remains a metaphysician. (Roberts, *ibid.*, p.145 citing Rosen, 1993, p.141)

once more.” It is through Nietzsche’s tragic pathos or the “great reason of the body” self, that Becoming reveals itself; it is the realm of the unsaid. It is through Nietzsche’s writing as a therapy, where philosophy is the activity of writing the self that he himself becomes the artist or the most accurate representation of reality. He writes his own experience of ecstasy where Becoming or “things themselves” reveals themselves through him as a writer. (Roberts 2000: 213) It is in this way the divinity of Nietzsche’s artistic metaphysics is comparable to the evangelical practices of Christ. In *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche claims that Jesus “knows that it is only in the *practice* of life that one feels “divine,” “blessed,” “evangelical,” at all times a “child of God...”” (AC: §33) The most divine, for Nietzsche is in human creativity, in dancing and noble laughter, in reaching the ideal of “the Great health.” (GS: §382) Nietzsche refers to his artist’s metaphysics as the “transfiguring power of intoxication” rooted in the higher type’s overabundant “gratitude and love.” (GS: §328) It is a feeling of divinity that marks the artist becoming one with eternity. In the same way “Existence” as the world is eternally “deifying and undeifying.” (WP: §712) It is through the deification of the world that the world becomes ‘godlike,’ that it reaches its perfection. (Z, IV: ‘At Noon’) For Nietzsche, this is existence taking on the character of eternity. In homecoming, the ‘self’ that is at one with eternity returns home to itself. This experience occurs in silence or stillness, within the realm of the unsaid.

What happened to me? Listen! Did time perhaps fly away? Do I not fall? Did I not fall—listen!—into the well of eternity? What is happening to me? Still! I have been stung, alas—in the heart? In the heart! Oh break, break, heart, after such happiness, after such a sting. How? Did not the world become perfect just now? Round and ripe? Oh, the golden round ring—where may it fly? Shall I run after it? Quick! Still! (Z, IV: ‘At Noon’)

## Conclusion

The main focus of this thesis has been with establishing Nietzsche as a metaphysician of Becoming, as a foreseer of the immanence of eternity and also in turn with establishing that there is a deep relation between his writing style, his unconscious, his higher self and his account of reality, of Becoming. Nietzsche chooses a certain style that of the Dionysian Dithyramb, of dancing-musical rhythms as the best means of expressing his own experience of the Dionysian, of relating to reality in the most primordial way. He chooses this style as he recognizes the limits of propositional and conceptual language for expressing reality.. Nietzsche brings his own experience of the Dionysian, of tragic pathos, or primordial truth to his works; he therefore writes from his unconscious, or a horizon that is open-ended to the future and is therefore untimely. . It is this higher self that is of the realm of truth, of Becoming, of the unsaid, of silence; it is the realm of truth revealing itself. Nietzsche's experience of truth is a divine revelatory experience of reality itself, of an "eternity" that is within Becoming, which cannot be expressed in everyday language. His writings emerge from Becoming, the divine *logos*, where "things themselves" speak through Nietzsche, the writer. This type of experience, as has been outlined earlier is one of "inspiration", "rapture", or "revelation", where he views himself as "a medium of overpowering forces" as "a mouthpiece" (EH, 'Z': §3). His works emerge from an "inspirational" experience where he stands as a prophet in the face of a new totality.

In the first part of this thesis, Nietzsche has been looked at as a metaphysician of Becoming, that he upholds the possibility of "metaphysical knowledge" that is existentialist in nature, a tragic insight into a new Dionysian totality. This thesis looked at the possibility of truth in Nietzsche in spite of his rejection of the term in particular in its dogmatic and moralistic forms. He declares absolute or dogmatic truth

to be actually perspectival or interpretive in nature. However, one of the main questions posed was could Nietzsche the ultimate critic of truth be an advocate of it? Could Nietzsche uphold the possibility of new truth? Or does perspectival truth reduce Nietzsche's philosophy to a relativism such that his own philosophical claims are deemed self-refuting? This thesis came to the conclusion that Nietzsche does embrace a new truth in the form of tragic insight such that reality can be glimpsed in *amor fati*. This tragic wisdom is itself an interpretation of the world. Although this tragic insight is an interpretation, its ontological status of glimpsing reality implies that it acts as a "new standard" in truth evaluation. His works also emerge from such insight and in this way his philosophy is not self-refuting. It became apparent that Nietzsche views conscious, linguistic and rational thought as a falsification of reality and that in spite of the limits of human reason that Nietzsche himself wishes to assert a new metaphysics that proclaims that Becoming or reality is accessible, and can be meaningful *for us*. It is possible to now contend that truth, for Nietzsche is revealing and concealing, that when it comes to rational, conscious and abstract thought or the herd use of language that reality conceals itself, and that through the unconscious, tragic pathos and silence that reality reveals itself. For Nietzsche, "metaphysical knowledge" or what might be more appropriately referred to as tragic wisdom takes the form of "rapture" or "intoxication". It is through the unconscious, "intuition" (BT: §1) in the early period (a term Nietzsche drops) or the "Great Reason" of the body (Z, I: §7) in the later period that one enters into the most truthful standpoint with reality. Nietzsche wishes to replace the Kantian ascetic ideal with a counter-ideal, an ideal that is made available by the advent of Zarathustra: "Above-all, a *counterideal* was lacking—until Zarathustra." (EH, 'Why I Write Such Good Books': 'GM') Nietzsche advocates a genuine asceticism that makes possible insight into Becoming in a

moment of *amor fati*. It is a life-affirming ascetic ideal that involves the sublimation of the senses. This asceticism provides the ideal conditions for participating in the truth or belonging to the whole such as suffering, discipline, solitude, “reading and writing in blood”, and self-overcoming. It is the higher type that fulfils these conditions in his ascent to Becoming. Nietzsche advocates “metaphysical knowledge” in the form of tragic pathos or tragic wisdom, which is to be distinguished from mere conscious or rational knowledge.

As I have already noted that this tragic wisdom involves entering into the silent *logos* of Becoming; it is through silence that one experiences the “revelation” or the “showing” of truth. It is an unconscious experience in the form of entering into a dancing oneness with reality whereby the individual type is a direct expression of this reality and becomes its most beautiful appearance. The Dionysian artist becomes the “most accurate representation of reality” and is no longer in opposition to reality but is as Nietzsche puts it “reality once more” (BGE: §34) It has been maintained that Nietzsche himself embodies this type of truth, and that his writings emerge from his tragic insight into Becoming, and that this occurs through his “higher” (SE: §6) self, the unconscious or what he refers to as that “granite of spiritual *fatum*” (BGE: §231). This idea of a higher self is comparable to Wittgenstein’s idea of the metaphysical self in *The Tractatus*, the ‘I’ that cannot be referred to by language. The philosophical type in his experience of “rapture” is the most adequate expression of reality. It is an experience that is one of silence, as it is through the non-linguistic rapture or tragic pathos that one belongs to reality *as it is*. In this way, Nietzsche views the conceptual and scientific modes of discourse as an inadequate means of expressing the *logos*.

This thesis was also asking the question what for Nietzsche is the most fundamental relation to an author or a text? It focused particularly on the reference from *The Antichrist* (§52): “What is here meant by philology is, in a very broad sense, the art of reading well—of reading facts without falsifying them by interpretation...” The art of philology for Nietzsche intersects with the question of truth. This art form must include the recognition of the metaphysical independence of an author or the text from interpretation. The author must be recognized while asking such questions like what is his most fundamental relation to his works?, and in turn to reality? The “art of reading well” has been identified as a way of relating to Becoming through pathos and the unconscious. It became apparent that Nietzsche prioritizes pathos, unique experience, blood and the unconscious over conscious and linguistic thinking when it comes to relating to an author primordially. This art of reading involves reading with ears, entering into the musical totality that Nietzsche’s works are attuned to, and in turn making the transition to entering into the silent *logos* of his works. Reading Nietzsche primordially involves the cultivation of one’s higher self or one’s “life-task” (EH, ‘Clever’: §9) through its impact on the unconscious and in turn encountering reality *as it is* in the moment of *amor fati*. This cultivation involves an untimely relation to Nietzsche as educator. This shows that “reading in blood” plays a role in encountering truth or reality *as it is*. The meaning of Nietzsche’s works is in his unconscious, his tragic pathos (silence), and in turn in their relation to Becoming. This is the author revealing himself. The author can also be concealed through the reader’s ability to digest the text, whereby it has an impact on his unconscious. The reader who enters into the silent *logos* of an author is the ideal reader who brings his most fundamental self to the text, his higher self, and shares the same tragic pathos as Nietzsche. He



enters into and participates in the “total union of all Being” (HH, I: §208) that Nietzsche’s works belong to.

Finally, the thesis continued to look at the relationship between objective reality and human subjectivity while asking the question what is the most truthful relationship to reality for Nietzsche? It asked the question what was reality for Nietzsche in the later period? It argued that reality for Nietzsche is a new “yes-saying” totality or the Innocence of Becoming as the eternal return of the same, and that it is through tragic pathos or the unconscious that one enters into the most fundamental relation to it. Nietzsche raises the ontological status of Becoming in the later period through the eternal return of the same, something is attained at every moment within the process—and always the same (WP: §55). The ontological status of Becoming is raised, as there is an “eternity” that is within Becoming, and in this way, it is not to be confused with the mere flux of becoming or time as duration. The latter is “man-time” or is a perspectival construction of the human mind. For Nietzsche, the eternal return of the same is not to be wrongfully conflated with the flux of becoming, as “duration “in vain,” without end or aim” (WP: §55) It is rather the ring as the highest form of affirmation where “something is attained in every moment”. (*ibid.*) It became evident that this relates to Nietzsche’s pantheistic conception of God that God is “in every moment” and that the world is “the attained release of God in every moment” (BT, ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’: §5). There was a question that emerged in the thesis on what is the relationship between eternity and the temporal? Nietzsche’s notion of eternity relates to the temporal in that “in every moment something is attained and is always of the same”; it relates to the immanence of eternity, the fullness of time or the moment. If this idea of the temporal is not time as duration (succession), that is time

that is constructed by the human mind or the flux of becoming then it must be irreducible to the human. This implies that there is an aspect to Becoming or a reality to time that is irreducible to the human, whereby there is “an eternity” that is within it or in the form of something that is attained and is always of the same. This is Becoming of the later period and is not to be conflated with the flux; it is the Innocence of Becoming or an “eternity” within Becoming. This notion of time is not “man-time”, linear time but is rather a notion of the temporal, of “eternity” that is vertical in nature.

This chapter also includes a brief look at Nietzsche’s “*The History of a Error*” passage of *Twilight of the Idols*. In the first stage of “How the “true world” finally became a Fable” Nietzsche is comparable to Plato but strictly insofar as for Plato, knowledge of reality can be attained through insight and that it is attainable on earth or in the here and now. Nietzsche however is to be distinguished from Platonism where knowledge of Being as a “Beyond” is viewed as an unattainable ideal. It becomes apparent that Nietzsche in the successive stages of “*The History of an Error*” is not rejecting reality or denying its accessibility but rather the idea of unattainable ideals where knowledge of reality has been rendered unattainable. These ideals are under the guise of after-worldly ethics and are deemed life-denying by Nietzsche. The ascetic ideal in its Kantian or Platonist form renders knowledge of Being an unattainable ideal. Nietzsche is rejecting a rational approach to accessing reality in favour of a sensuous one. In the final stage of “How the “true world” finally became a Fable”, Nietzsche refers to the final stage as the beginning of the Zarathustra reign “(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA”). The end of longest error can be argued to be

“the unattainable ideal”, which is dogmatic knowledge that is actually perspectival knowledge. In being a foreseer of the immanence of eternity in the world, Nietzsche contends that insight into reality is attainable. In this way, he introduces the idea of a new ideal that is in the form of tragic insight and is life-affirmative. This new ideal as the “most accurate” representation of reality is in turn the most truthful interpretation of reality. The “Zarathustra reign” is of the earth becoming eternal or of eternity manifesting itself in the world. In this way Nietzsche is an advocate of the immanence of eternity; it can be felt by man in *this* life, which is comparable to Christian praxis or the original teachings of Christ. (AC: §34)

Nietzsche’s conception of eternity does not present itself as something that stands in opposition to time, but rather as a dimension of time itself (the eternal return of the same moment): the ground for opposition is removed, and eternity brightens at noon. (Z, IV: ‘At Noon’) The noon period is the world becoming perfect, the world entering into the fullness of time, that the Noon or “Epoch” is imminent, where the world “culminates into God”. This noon period also refers to the radical idea of a new Dionysian age, of the “Zarathustra Kingdom of a thousand years” (Z, IV: §1) It is in this way that Nietzsche is a foreseer of the world being raised to the highest level.

This thesis also explored tragic wisdom of the later period in particular Nietzsche’s idea of “The Homecoming” (Z, III: ‘The Return Home’) and the climax of Zarathustra’s redemption that of “bird-wisdom” in “The Yes & Amen Song” in order to argue that it is through pathos and the unconscious that one enters into the most truthful relation to reality. The highest type in his experience of a dancing “rapture” is the most adequate expression of an “eternity” that is within Becoming. It is an

experience of *amor fati*; it is to encounter the most life-affirming moment. For Nietzsche, it is the self that experiences eternity, which is neither spatial nor the flux as duration. The meeting of past and future in the moment is not spatial. This therefore implies that eternity is not spatial. Eternity as the “inner necessity” of Becoming is non-spatiotemporal. In the experience of *amor fati*, the self negates time as duration; it involves the experience of timelessness. It is the experience of “the untimely”. It became evident that Nietzsche’s metaphor for “the heavenly” is the “well of eternity”. The experience of being released into the well of eternity is an unworldly experience; it is an experience of eternity on earth or in *this* life. Objective reality is not to be wrongfully conflated with spatiotemporal external reality, reality ‘out there’; therefore the experience of the objective must occur through the subjective or within you. It is also in this way that the self encompasses space and time. It is through self that one glimpses or encounters eternity (objective reality). This raises significantly the relevance of the self. It is a self that is impersonal in that it belongs to the whole; it is an unconscious or becoming self. This is what Nietzsche refers to as “The Homecoming” experience” (Z, III: ‘The Return Home’), which is reminiscent of Hölderlin’s elegy “Homecoming”.

I looked at this passage of “The Homecoming” to show that Nietzsche is a thinker who wishes to overturn the sense of homelessness that comes with the loss of the old absolute. This homecoming experience is where reality reveals itself to the unconscious, the “great reason” of the body.. It involves “true knowledge” in the form of tragic insight whereby the higher self, as the most necessary self, the divine self glimpses eternity in “deep wells” (Z, III: ‘Before Sunrise’) which we have seen is Nietzsche’s metaphor for the heavens or “the highest spheres” (Z, II: ‘On the

Rabble'). This experience climaxes in "The Yes and Amen song" as "bird-wisdom" where Zarathustra is no longer determined by the logic of space or of directionality. Zarathustra's redemption in the form of tragic wisdom is an interpretation of the world, and as has been aforementioned is the new standard of truth. The main question that emerged from this thesis was does the perspective deny "access" to reality, for Nietzsche? It is only possible to argue that the latter is the case if perspective is defined strictly in terms of conscious knowledge of things such that perspective as a mode of consciousness is a falsification of reality. However, one must consider Nietzsche's "physiological perspectivism" and the idea that tragic insight could be an unconscious interpretation of the world and in this way could be a more fundamental way of relating to reality. There is also the possibility that for Nietzsche tragic insight is not a perspective, and in this way can glimpse reality as it is. This could only be the case, if tragic insight is to be distinguished from a conscious perspective such that consciousness is a falsification of reality. This also could only be possible if there is an aspect to the self that is irreducible to the perspective, which would render the experience of encountering the whole as 'non-perspectival'. The question that then arose could there be a reality or an aspect to a text, an author, or self that is metaphysically irreducible to a perspective? It seems that there is an aspect to the self that is irreducible to a perspective; he refers to it as "granite of spiritual *fatum*" (BGE: §231). It is this aspect to the self that is impersonal or belongs to the whole, which makes it possible that the experience of belonging to reality is 'non-perspectival'. However, in glimpsing "eternity" one is encountering an eternity that is immanent in the world. In this way, tragic insight must be mediated through the world, which brings us back to the idea that for Nietzsche tragic insight is an interpretation of the world.

It has become clear that for Nietzsche, there is truth such that reality that is non-spatial can be accessed or glimpsed, and that in *amor fati*, the higher self belongs to it. The self that experiences eternity is the self that experiences the blessedness of all things, that “all is one”. It is an enlightenment experience whereby one enters into a dancing unity with the unsayable God. This type of enlightenment is inextricably linked with “reading and writing in blood” (Z, I: §7) where the higher self is cultivated towards Becoming. It is through tragic pathos or the “higher self” that one experiences the oneness of all things. Nietzsche in “writing in blood” or in writing the self is disciplined to the whole or a new totality as the Innocence of Becoming. In his experience of Dionysian “rapture”, Nietzsche himself is the most adequate expression of reality. This state of rapturous insight into truth is one of silence. He therefore chooses a writing style that best expresses his experience of the Dionysian. Therefore his writing style is an expression of tragic pathos, “the unsaid” and unconscious-musical rhythms. In this way, the content of Nietzsche’s works includes the idea that pathos and the dance are better modes of expressing reality than that of the conceptual or propositional uses of language.

Speaking is a beautiful folly: with that man dances over all things. How lovely is all talking, and all deception of sounds! With sounds our love dances on many-hued rainbows. (Z, III: ‘The Convalescent’: §2)

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