| dc.contributor.creator | Egan, Suzanne M. | |
| dc.contributor.creator | Byrne, Ruth M.J. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-11T11:30:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-12-11T11:30:04Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Suzanne M. Egan and Ruth M.J. Burke. “Counterfactual Promises and Threats.” Annual Cognitive Science Conference, Vancouver, B.C., Canada. July 2006. (Refereed). | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/proceedings/2006/docs/p1257.pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10395/2547 | |
| dc.description | Counterfactual promises and threats. | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | We examine counterfactual conditionals about promises, such as ‘if you had tidied your room then I would have given you
ice-cream’ and threats such as ‘if you had hit your sister then I would have grounded you’. Reasoners tend to understand
counterfactual conditionals of the form, ‘if A had been then B would have been’ by thinking about the conjectured
possibility, ‘A and B', and also the presupposed facts ‘not-A and not-B’. We report the results of an experiment that
indicates reasoners may understand counterfactual inducements somewhat differently by thinking about just the
presupposed facts: not-A and not-B. We discuss the implications of the results for accounts of the mental representations of promises and threats. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Cognitive Science Society | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/proceedings/2006/docs/p1257.pdf | en_US |
| dc.subject | Counterfactual | en_US |
| dc.subject | Promises | en_US |
| dc.subject | Threats | en_US |
| dc.title | Counterfactual promises and threats | en_US |
| dc.type | Conference report | en_US |
| dc.type.supercollection | all_mic_research | en_US |
| dc.type.supercollection | mic_published_reviewed | en_US |
| dc.description.version | Yes | en_US |
